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AN ESSAY ON THE EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.



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AN ESSAY

ON THE

EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

BY

EDWARD STEERE, LL.D.

Nihil indignandum, vèl dolendum, si quicunque de divinis quærat sentiat, proferat; cum non disputantis auctoritas, sed disputationis ipsius veritas requiratur: atque etiam, quo imperitior sermo, hoc illustrior est: quoniam non fucatur pompâ facundiæ et gratiæ, sed, ut est, recti regula sustinetur.—*Octavius.*



LONDON:

BELL AND DALDY, 186, FLEET STREET.

1856.



PREFACE.

ON a subject which has been treated of so often, so fully and so well as that of this Essay, it would indeed be difficult to put forward anything that should be at once new and convincing; I can therefore lay claim to very little originality in its treatment, but have endeavoured to state the old arguments in as clear and satisfactory a manner as possible. It will be seen by the notes, which might have been much increased in number, and which I have appended, some for their elegance of expression, some for the authority of their authors, but mostly as containing additional or collateral reflections and deductions, as I think, not unworthy of notice,—how little there now remains to be said, and how much has been well said already; and here I ought to acknowledge my general obligations, as well to the writers quoted as to those others whose works I have from time to time consulted, though I have not cited them, and may perhaps have forgotten whence I gathered the ideas their writings have suggested.

It may seem to some, that I had better have set myself to refute the specific systems of error now prevalent, but I do not think that the evil which demands any real anxiety is to be met by such a course, for I believe that every erroneous system is, in substance, only an

attempt to solve the difficulties which lie in the way of embracing the truth; if this be so, to refute one system can only be to show the need of some new one, and to compel the addition of another link to the chain of false and soon forgotten theories. I have no inclination, if I had the ability, to fight the battles of scepticism against all the past and present forms of misbelief, and to dig up long buried fallacies to show their rottenness; I had much rather endeavour to annihilate religious scepticism altogether, by showing those who are almost persuaded to it, that they may, nay, must receive the truth. My object therefore has been, to remove, one by one, all the stumbling-blocks over which those who are impelled to err may stumble, being well assured, that if it were possible to do this completely, not only would erroneous theories fall by their own weight,—that they must soon do now,—but no one would then be tempted to prepare future ruins from their crumbling remnants.

The first difficulty which is likely to present itself to a careful enquirer is,—how can there be so much error among persons of good information and natural acuteness, as on any theory there must be, in regard to so very important a matter as this? I endeavour, therefore, in my first chapter to show, that their error may be accounted for without supposing any defect of evidence, by other reasons beside the common one of a desire to escape from the moral responsibility acknowledged by the acceptance of the truth. In considering this subject, one is led to enquire concerning the pre-

vious belief with which we all approach such investigations,—ought we to reject this in order to think impartially, or would not such a course be something like endeavouring to forget the arithmetic we learnt at school, when we apply ourselves in after life to the study of mathematics, because we did not at first reason out its rules for ourselves; I conclude that we ought not so to reject our previous belief. This conclusion renders the common consent of mankind of even more importance than otherwise it would be, and so I proceed in the next two chapters to enquire concerning that general belief in a Deity and the general abhorrence of Atheism as sinful and unnatural, independently of the rest of the moral character of the Atheist; and I think I have shown, that in both these matters we ought to attribute much weight, and in the absence of any insuperable objection to lend our belief to this general if not universal consent. This first part may be called introductory.

In the second part, the object of which is to remove antecedent objections to the doctrine of the existence, goodness, and wisdom of the Deity, without reference to any specific revelation, I begin by considering what is meant by the word "evil," and show some important consequences bearing upon our subject, which may be deduced from that examination; and then proceed to enquire first concerning moral evil, how it can have been consistent with the divine power, wisdom, and goodness, to allow the existence of moral evil itself, or of any being capable of producing it; and I show that

such allowance may be reconciled with them, at least in the way suggested, though I by no means intend to assert that such is, or can be the only way, that being quite unnecessary to the argument. I then pass to physical evil, and having shown that man might be created as philosophers, not Christians, generally hold him to have been, the doctrine of congenital corruption being reserved for the next division of the Essay, I set out several theories upon which the infliction of pain upon men such as they now are, may be reconciled with, or even deduced from the divine perfections; and lest I should seem to have dealt too hardly with human destiny, I turn in Chapter IV. to a consideration of the goodness of some of the principal ordinances of nature, showing that however individuals may suffer, as according to my previous deductions they ought; the general laws which govern human prosperity and happiness are so arranged, as to connect goodness with happiness, showing too, how the pleasure required by the previous argument is so ordered as to advance rather than retard that moral progress, the discipline of pain is intended to accelerate. In Chapter VI. I meet the latent objection that I have shown the need of some moral evil, which cannot be in God, and is not in man; by showing the possibility of some morally evil being, who may be used as God's instrument for our benefit. I then return to the consideration of the goodness of the laws of nature, and show this goodness in several instances, selected as those which in our day are likely to have most influence really, if not avowedly

in inclining men to deny God's good providence. In Chapter IX. I deal with so much of the great problem of hereditary sin and punishment as properly belongs to this division, and conclude this part in the next chapter by speaking of the evils suffered by the lower animals. The matter of my work thus far has been merely the suggestion of possible hypotheses, for my object being to obviate objections, I had no need to prove anything, but only to disprove the impossibility of any consistent theory of the goodness and power of God.

The third part has for its object the direct proof of the existence of the Deity, by arguments drawn from natural reason only, and beginning at the beginning, I have thrown into a note the most successful attempts to show that our proposition is self-evident, as to the cogency of which I confess I have never yet been able to come to any clear conclusion. In the text, I show that much of the idea of God is actually admitted by all who are called Atheists, and propose a form of moral proof, which I do not recollect to have seen elsewhere. Chapter II. returns to the matter suggested in the first note of the previous chapter, and gives a very concise and not easily refutable proof; the logical soundness of which ought perhaps to be rendered highly probable by the authority in the most logical of ages of the Doctor Profundus; from whom I have borrowed it, making only a few slight additions. Then follows a proof, which I am sure is sound, though I am not sure concerning my mode of stating it, fearing, lest in the endeavour to

clear up some of its difficulties, I may have suppressed or distorted some of its more essential members. Chapter V. endeavours to arrive at the truth by negativing error, and showing that those who refuse to believe in a God contradict themselves, or deny the obvious truths of nature; after this I have stated in a compendious form the great inductive proofs from the beauty, goodness, and exquisite adaptions of nature, and from the conscience and moral cravings of men. The part concludes with an argument from the usefulness and beneficial influence of a sound belief, as well on the community as the individual. These are but a selection of what might have been written under this head; I trust, however, that there is enough to convince a candid and sincere enquirer, whatever may be his natural mental disposition, whether it love subtlety, or seek moral beauty, or be content with plain and straightforward simplicity.

If our conclusions were only to result in an intellectual assent, they might be curious and pleasant exercises of ingenuity, but would be unworthy of anything like the serious and devout attention they do in fact demand; our first division embraces, therefore, a fourth part, which consists of such deductions from the previous conclusions as are most useful to and most necessary for man. This part commences with a review of the position which man must occupy in relation to God, to the complete understanding of which it is of course necessary to determine whether this life is the final, or only a preparatory and intro-

ductory state of human existence, and this question is investigated in the two following chapters from two distinct points of view, the one moral and general, the other partial, and rather metaphysical and philosophical. Then, having shown the probability, or perhaps the certainty, of an eternal future state, I proceed to examine their opinion who would make that future state a state of change, and conclude that, at some time after death (I do not say immediately, that is a point on which nature gives us little light, which belongs rather therefore to express revelation to declare), but that, sooner or later, man must arrive at a state in which he will find no occasion or opportunity for change, whether from good to evil, or from evil to good. Having completed this necessary digression, I return, in Chapter V., to the consideration of those less obvious moral duties (for moral duties of course they all are), which go by the name of "religious," such as prayer and thanksgiving, and so forth; these I show to be deducible from the existence of God and our relation to Him, without the necessity of any express revelation. Chapter VI. would be the natural end of this part were its conclusion any other than it is; it enquires concerning the prevalence of evil in man, and conducts us to the conclusion that this prevalence is universal; coupling with this the conclusions already arrived at concerning the eternal state of the wicked, another enquiry presents itself, and we cannot conclude without ascertaining that there is some possibility of pardon. The heathen, in the per-

sons of their greatest philosophers, got thus far in their enquiries, and perhaps a few would have assented to nearly all the previous arguments, but here they were wholly foiled, and very few penetrated so far as the moral sense of the unlearned had led them, I mean to the true idea of sacrifice,[1] yet philosophy was certainly right in refusing to rest in the absolute sufficiency of burnt offerings. Chapter VII. is, therefore, devoted to an enquiry, first, as to the possibility of remission without atonement, and failing that, to the conditions and possibility of an actual atonement, which leads to the conclusion: 1. That there must be a Saviour. 2. That there may be a voluntary atonement acceptable to God. 3. That God by emptying Himself of His glory might make such a one. 4. That the Saviour should be able to overcome death and hell. 5. That the Saviour must be man, and should be God's judge towards us and our King. These five conclusions are manifestly satisfied by Christianity, and I here propose it, as a question worthy of solution to any sceptic concerning that faith,—How could any man or set of men, in an age which was unconscious, as we shall both be ready to admit that the Augustan age was, of the moral reasoning which lays down these conditions, come to propound and maintain a system capable of receiving in after-times, so direct and close, and natural an application to our requirements? I venture to think that a true Revelation is the mode of accounting for it, which will be found in the end to savour least of the miracu-

[1] For a singular theory on this subject see *Sallustius de Diis et Mundo ad finem.*



lous. This part and the first book concludes with a short chapter in praise of natural religion. I have endeavoured throughout to conduct my argument without any assumption, which all would not be ready to make, however averse to religion generally they might be inclined to be. I suspect that some will think that I have attempted somewhat too dogmatic a solution of several matters, that it would have been better to have relied more on our ignorance of the divine nature, and the natural humility of a pure and intelligent spirit; to such I would say:—You are right, we ought to be too humble to be shaken in our faith by any of the current arguments of scepticism; but you must not read my book as addressed to you, there are others who *will* speculate, who *will* dogmatize, still more, who are unsettled by their speculations, it is for the refutation of those and the re-establishing of these that I have written,—to show that those who dogmatize about the goodness of God to overthrow religion must fail of their object, and that their objections may on their own principles be turned into confirmations. If I am right, your faith is confirmed; if I am wrong, their speculations and my answers must fall together.

In the second Book I have to deal with the Christian Revelation, towards which I am placed in a singular and somewhat difficult position. I have not to prove the truth of Christianity, for I am only speaking of the being and attributes of God; yet, before I can quote its teaching, I must remove all objections which go to make its truth inconsistent with those attributes,

and so traverse many of the topics necessarily discussed in a similar manner in proving that Revelation. I might indeed have separated Christianity from the Scriptures, and quoted only the common creeds of all Christendom, to show that they all allege and defend the proposition I am treating of; thus, without undertaking any measurement of its authority, I might have shown that all that authority, which is of course to all Christians the highest possible, had ruled strongly in my favour. But I am unwilling to seem to evade any difficulty which any one can be supposed really to think of weight; I have, therefore, divided this book also into three parts, allotted respectively, to antecedent objections, direct proofs, and important practical deductions; yet I must request the reader to remember throughout, that I am arguing from, not to Christianity, and endeavouring to show that it does not oppose, and that its evidences, which I assume to be of admitted weight, do confirm the truth that God is, and is all-wise and powerful, and good; at the same time I will not dissemble my hope that I may, in so doing, be strengthening some of the proper defences of Christianity itself.

Chapter I. of Part I. contains a sketch of Christian teaching, chiefly to show its solution of the problems left unanswered by mere natural religion. The fall of man and original sin, doctrines which many in our days, and very many in older times, have taken upon themselves to declare inconsistent with the Divine attributes, are then discussed; first as mere facts, to show

that they are probably true from mere antecedent reasoning, then as facts to be reconciled with God's goodness, as to which I am content only to suggest a conclusion, being quite sure that the reasons stated at the beginning of Chapter III. reduce the enquiry to a matter of interesting speculation, which may confirm and illustrate, but cannot have any weight to overthrow our previous conclusions; the rest of that chapter is, therefore, rather suggestive than formal. In Chapter IV. I have made some gleanings after the full harvest of argument which has been gathered in by so many able writers on the sufficiency of the Evidences of Christianity; then follow two chapters on the alleged insignificance of man and the influence of Christianity, which last, singularly enough, is both alleged by its defenders as too great for a mere human invention, and cited by its opponents as too small for a really divine institution. Chapter VII. is devoted to the objections drawn from the history of God's dealings, as recorded in the Bible; and Chapter VIII. deals with a cognate difficulty concerning the creation of the world, showing the abstract possibility of a recent creation. The part concludes in the next chapter, with a refutation of some objections alleged against the doctrine of a Trinity in the Divine nature, such as is taught by the Christian revelation.

Strictly speaking, perhaps, there can hardly be such a thing as a direct argument drawn from a revelation to prove the existence of God, that existence being necessarily assumed before we can conceive of a proper

revelation; however, the two doctrines are to some extent mutually confirmatory, and a revelation may give us a much more clear and satisfactory idea of God, besides that the proper and extraordinary evidences of revelation are also proper and extraordinary evidences of the being and power, and goodness of God. I have, therefore, in Part II., devoted a chapter to each of these topics, and so concludes the review of the evidence upon which we may believe in the existence of the Deity. It is an aggregate of many proofs, of which those I have given are I think singly conclusive; there are others, I believe many others, each entitled to some weight, but which must all with those that I have adduced, be regarded as one many-stranded cord of reasoning, if we would form any just estimate of the authority on which our belief really depends; for if we were asked why we believe in the existence of any person we are intimately acquainted with, we could only answer by giving a chain of reasoning from probabilities closely akin to the natural evidence we have of the being of God, as for instance, that we see a portion of matter moving in a way which seems to us to denote intelligence; this is the real basis of all our belief in the existence of mind without ourselves, and it is the same from which we conclude the existence of an all-pervading mind, that is of God, and even the speech of our friends may be very closely paralleled by the various signs and sounds, by which we are made conscious of what it is right, and prudent, and good for us to do.[1]

[1] See *Bp. Berkeley's Alciphron. Dial. II.*

The three chapters of the concluding part compare our conduct with the rule laid down by God Himself in the Decalogue,—briefly recount the virtues which are the subjects of the Evangelical Beatitudes, and propound a general argument to induce to a religious life; all considered principally as they flow from the proved existence of an all-perfect Deity.

I have now only, in conclusion, to commend the following pages to the reader's clemency; and if he be not in the end satisfied with my solutions, let him remember that many an author has argued weakly in defence of a good cause; so that to refute the arguments of the defender of a doctrine, is but a little step towards showing the worthlessness of that which he defends; and we may all recollect with advantage, that the business of a Theologian is to enquire, not what might be, but what is, and therefore, though our speculations should seem to lead to the conclusion that the world might have been better governed, yet, if indubitable facts within and about us do prove some government, and that intelligent and tending to good, we have a sufficient practical proof of God's being and our duty; and all the difficulties which can be raised, as they are purely speculative, and would not have any practical bearing on our conduct, no more amount to a proof that virtue is a name, and the being of God a doubtful matter, than the famous sophism of Achilles and the tortoise is a demonstration to those who cannot solve it, that a rapid runner could never quite come up with the slowest of all walkers.

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CORRIGENDA.

Page	16,	note 1,	line 5,	*for* σηφος,	*read* σοφος,
	31,	3,	1,	πονρηια,	πονηρια,
		4,	4,	εμψυχαην	εμψυχα ην
	40,	1,	5,	Sebstbestimmung	Selbstbestimmung
	85,	1,	4,	Καλλι κλεις,	Καλλικλεις,
	97,	1,	2,	oun	o un
	123,	1,	6,	beschränhtes,	beschränktes,
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	233,	3,	3,	Magister Deus	Magister. Deus &c.
	238,	2,	1,	Ὁτιμεν—ταθειν	Ὁτι μεν—παθειν
			2,	λυσω,	λυσιν,
		3,	1,	seine	seines
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			5,	kaun	kann
			6,	Enis	Eins
	239,	4,	5,	sensibiles,	sensibles,
	270,	2,	4,	Personlicpkeit	Personlichkeit
	276,	3,	8,	filii Mono-	Filii. Mono-
	277,	3,	10,	Dieieinigkeit	Dreieinigkeit

P. 6, l. 7. Add as a Note: "Being familiarized with the cursory thought of things as really hinders the weight of them from being seen, as from having its due influence upon Practice." *Butler's Analogy*, pt. II. ch. VII.

ON THE EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

BOOK I.

Πωλος. *Χαλεπον γε σε ελεγξαι, ω Σωκρατες, αλλ'ουχι καν παις σε ελεγξειεν, ὁτι ουκ αληθη λεγεις;*

Σωκρατης. *Πολλην αρα εγω τῳ παιδι χαριν ἑξω, ισην δε και σοι, εαν με ελεγξῃς, και απαλλαξῃς φλυαριας.*—*Gorgias*, 471.

BOOK I.

PART I.—Introduction.

CHAPTER I.

How the Truth may be disbelieved or doubted of.

THE facility with which any proposition may be proved is generally in inverse proportion to its approach to being essentially self-evident, and thus our proposition, "That there "is a Being all powerful, wise, and good, by whom all things exist," having been maintained by some to be in its nature self-evident, may well seem difficult of demonstration.[1]

[1] The question how far the existence of the Deity is really self-evident, is treated of in part i. ch. iii. and part iii. ch. i.; but even if the doctrine be so, an attempt to prove it may be useful, for certainly many men have succeeded in all but shutting their eyes to it.—"It is necessary, therefore, supposing men to have an innate idea of God, that this idea should be sometimes awakened in them, and that they should be made to feel the impression and evidence of it in a more powerful manner; as we cause ignorant and heedless persons to take notice of the beauties of a building, or a statue, which they would otherwise pass by without making the least observation upon them. And what method can be more useful to awaken this idea of God in the minds of men, and to excite afresh the perception of it, than by propounding to them such collateral proofs of His existence, which show, that though no idea of Him had been originally imprinted, yet He has not left Himself without a witness in the common and obvious deductions of reason." (*Rich. Fiddes, Body of Div.* b. i. p. i. ch. i.) A similar answer may be given to those who are inclined to think all attempts to prove the existence of the Deity of little or no value, because they hold it to be a matter of faith, rather than of reason; though they must confess that faith would be unreasonable, and therefore fallacious, unless it could be shown that reason was at least as strong in the affirmative as in the negative.

If it be self-evident, we can have no proof of it, properly so called, but only a series of illustrations and analogies. Yet is it possible to doubt a self-evident proposition? I think it is if any man desire to do so. We can all of us throw ourselves into an artificial position of doubt; it has been done even about our own existence, and still more frequently about our moral freedom of will, which nevertheless is the object of direct consciousness, and we are involved in innumerable absurdities if we attempt to deny it. The enquiry is of importance, whether our proposition be actually self-evident or not, because, however that may be, most men, whether by intuition or education, believe it when they begin their enquiries without any consciousness of having reasoned it out, very much as they have learnt to believe all obviously undeniable truths; a fact which renders it very difficult to form a proper estimate of the value of any arguments put forward in its defence; for if we cannot ourselves doubt without an effort of the will, we are in fact trying the force of arguments by their effect against a wilful doubt, though we know that no logic can persuade a resolute will. In such a state of voluntary doubt alone can believers examine the arguments heretofore adduced in proof of the existence and attributes of the Deity; what wonder then if some, beginning in a laudable desire to examine and satisfy themselves whether their opinions were well founded—having discovered that reasons given as sufficient to convince one in doubt, and which perhaps really were so, were yet insufficient to compel their assent—from feeling that the doctrine had not been so fully proved as they could have wished, and as perhaps it might have been,[1] have naturally and almost unconsciously arrived

[1] "However, if every separate part of the proof of religion were to be uniformly complete and decisive, there is no cause to think that many various and connected attestations of it would have been given; the very appearance of which, a case not to be denied, leads us rather to expect that the parts of them

at the opinion, that it has not been proved at all—that it cannot be, and therefore that it is false, or at least that they need not believe it?

In truth, notwithstanding all that has been done, and well done, on this or any other subject, almost every earnest and sincere thinker is driven to construct a new system and method for himself from the materials others have prepared for him: very rarely can he be perfectly satisfied with what any one person has said before him; and thus if he be willing to doubt, and unwilling to construct, or perhaps, from other motives, inclined to undervalue the truth, even if he found it proved, the more he reads the more reason he finds for objection, and the further he is from being convinced; whereas, if he had been content to dwell upon what might have been, rather than what was said, to consider rather how he could have put the same ideas, if he had been the author, and the author his sceptically disposed reader; if he had made the best of the arguments, instead of resting satisfied that as they stood they were not conclusive, then he might have strengthened his own belief, and helped to bring others to the knowledge of the truth, by treating upon the subject yet more fully and more convincingly.

Some men may even be led to oppose the truth by the weakness of the arguments with which it is attacked, when they feel that they could themselves find others much more weighty, though even these would not be irrefragable. If, pleased with the ingenuity that could make so much of a bad cause, they once allow themselves to dwell with pleasure on the idea that they alone can refute themselves, they are very likely, through mere pride of intellect, to love to seem to maintain, and by maintaining to bring themselves to believe, that very proposition which they once knew to be false and

would not be severally a perfect and final evidence."—*Davison on Prophecy*, Disc. xii. p. 511.

saw to be feebly defended, for no other reason than because they wondered men should have said so little in defence of a very specious fallacy.

Possibly the mere love of subtle reasoning, even in defence of the truth, may have the same effect. I cannot but think that a man may deaden his intellectual as well as his moral sense of right by incautious handling. The frequent consideration of moral propositions as if they were doubtful, tends to dull the instinctive sense of right and wrong, as we may see by the strange propositions some professed moralists have maintained. So the frequent discussion of intellectual propositions may dull the equally intuitive intellectual perception of truth and falsehood so far as doubt has been habitually considered possible, that is in the higher branches of argument, not in common affairs and every-day life. Thus, some in one way and some in another—many more, I suspect, than we generally imagine—have brought themselves into such a condition of mind in relation to some particular subjects which have engaged their special attention, that they are really and almost consciously unable to form any proper estimate of the value of conflicting arguments. In such cases, unless they become mere confirmed doubters, which is so unreasonable that it seldom happens, they generally fall a prey to the first compact theory which presents itself, and defend it with that strange obstinate cleverness we so often see and wonder at.

Though something of these causes has been frequently observed upon, I do not think it has always been duly considered how far they may account for the calling in question of plain truths by acute men and subtle reasoners, who have made those truths their study. We are not, therefore, to think that, because some remarkable for learning and intellectual power have doubted (if indeed they have), therefore we ought also to doubt; but may remember, what is certainly true in other matters, that men of ordinary understanding may see the

truth clearly and hold it reasonably, where learning and acuteness serve others only to obscure and hide it.

But beside the above there are other sources of error, more direct and more perceptible, which yet have led and may lead many into error. No one can compare the conduct of those who are most vehement in their reprobation of verbal Atheism with that high standard, which logically follows from the belief they so noisily maintain, without coming to the conclusion, that very many of them are fighting for what is to them a shadow, for something which they believe with their heads, or perhaps in their prejudice only, but for the influence of which upon their hearts and lives we shall for the most part look in vain. Now a man of strong moral impulses, who is conscious that he could find even in Atheism motives to good conduct strong enough to make him better than these men are, with all their Theism, is very apt, if he be not a good reasoner and careful observer, to conclude, that therefore they would do so also; that because he cannot perceive the influence of their creed, therefore it has none, and its profession is sheer and conscious hypocrisy, and so to travel onwards to the further conclusion that its renunciation by himself would be a mark and example of true sincerity, and tend to promote the general improvement of mankind. In truth, the number of oppressors of the poor, of cruel, heartless, loose and faithless, still more of coldly sensual men, who call themselves Theists, some of them even aiming at advancement in the Church of Christ, some altogether despising it, who go to make up the world which decries Atheism, is large enough to make it necessary for a candid thinker to be a sincere believer in some universal corruption of our race, or else possessed of a remarkably strong, clear intellect, before he can stand forward with confidence to defend the doctrine such men countenance. Yet, whoever will make a careful observation of this Theistic world, will find that it is in fact influenced and restrained by

its profession, a profession so little congenial to its other dispositions, that we cannot but assign the general belief in a Deity to some general cause, which will operate strongly to show that it is well founded. An Atheist, made in the manner last mentioned, will, as a man of strong moral feeling, be as much distressed as his less sincere opponents will rejoice to find, that he gains followers chiefly amongst those whose vices even hypocrisy could not protect against the self-reproach inseparable from their profession of any creed, and who, seeing no harm and much pleasure in immorality, are exceedingly willing to believe that a bugbear which chiefly restrains men from it. It is a strange and wonderful thing, this influence of the will and desires upon the intellectual belief; but it is real and of much real power, however it may seem logically absurd: "I will not" is a much stronger expression than "I do not" believe, and he is very ignorant of human nature who expects by any arguments to win a hearty assent from him who is to be convinced against his will; such a one will attack the very primary postulates on which all argument is based, and, if he cannot otherwise escape, will at last seem to himself to find an impregnable fortress in the absurd assertion that we none of us really know anything, and therefore it is in vain for you to talk.

In the last place, some, good men in the main, though rather inclined to weakness, may let themselves down into error by means of an excessive desire to treat their opponents fairly, to make due allowance for their own prejudices, not to allow feeling to influence their judgment, and so forth. With such intentions, they most fallaciously make as much allowance for their own prejudices as they see to be necessary in the case of some others, which is sure to mislead; in truth, there can be no better evidence that a man is dealing fairly, and ought to make no such allowances, than the fact, that he has become conscious of the improper influence of prejudice upon the rea-

ers who have taken his side of the question; it is for him id himself of undue prejudice as far as possible, but not to ke allowances in the dark, lest he should turn out in the l to have been, in fact, unfairly prejudiced on the other side. wever, I think there may be such a thing as a reasonable judice, and shall have occasion, in the next chapter, inci- tally to treat of it.

CHAPTER II.

The method of Enquiry.

THERE is but one science in which we have strictly demonstrative proofs, and the reason of this is, that that science, Mathematics, is alone conversant with nothing but relations. Its reasonings are valid and its conclusions indisputable, because they prove nothing actual; that is, they have to do with real things, only upon the assumption that such things as they suppose have real existence; but whether such things do exist, and therefore whether all the wonderful deductions of that science are anything more than a mental exercise, depends upon experience and experiment, and is not properly any subject of mathematical reasoning at all. Mathematicians can furnish us with formulæ most useful when we have real things to use them upon; but what those real things are, or whether they have any existence, we can never learn from this the only certain of the sciences.

As Mathematics is conversant with relations only, so Theology, properly so called, has no concern with anything but absolute existence; it is therefore likely to be the furthest of all removed from that absolute certainty which distinguishes our knowledge of relations. Indeed it follows from the very nature of reason and thought, that we ought not to expect anything like an absolute proof without the least assumption, or reliance on any merely probable reasoning; for applied thought is but the endeavour to fix the mind upon a subject with a view to catch and examine the suggestions which arise within us from the contemplation, and reason is but the mode of educing, from known or assumed facts, those

other facts which are true if the first are; it can never tell us that its premises are true, though we may sometimes perceive that they are false, because the supposition of their truth implies some contradiction. Ultimately, therefore, we must rest on something like faith, faith in our own mental or sensuous perceptions, or in the evidence of those experienced by others, and we cannot rightly expect anything to arise from a state of voluntary doubt, but doubt still, or perhaps error. We may not, therefore, reasonably or safely begin this enquiry by rejecting our ancestral faith altogether, as if we could thereby free ourselves from all probability of error. I say we cannot do so safely, because if the conclusion of our reasoning arise from or be influenced by any voluntary act of our own, such as this of doubting is, we can never, in following those conclusions, be quite certain that we act upon the dictates of our reason and conscience in a manner so free from all choice on our parts, as to make that, which would have been wrong had we thoroughly understood it, innocent in us because we did not; and so, if our conclusion be false, it being the result of our own act, we are morally responsible for its consequences. Again, such a rejection would assume that we are capable of finding out absolute truth each for himself; and if so, we are bound to discover, and discovering, we must be bound to act out absolute moral right also. But seeing that we are naturally fitted to dwell in society, to the constitution of which a certain degree of faith in others, and in their conclusions, is absolutely necessary; and that we have not the time, if we had the power, to investigate the entire truth even on any one subject, much less on all, we must be morally and shall most likely then only be intellectually right, when we treat that which is generally received as presumably true, and employ our reason (as mere reason is alone capable of being employed) to test and not to discover.

It appears to me, therefore, that this is one of those cases,

in which the most convincing and really satisfactory mode of dealing with a proposition is to assume for the moment its truth, and examine how far the actual state of things agrees with that supposition, and if we find nothing inconsistent with it, then to proceed with the enquiry what proof we have that this, which we have shown possible, is actually true. All proofs ought, in strictness, to extend to both branches; but as of course that which is, is possible, the possible truth of our present proposition is generally, in attempts to prove it, silently assumed; yet the greatest difficulties in the doctrine of the being and perfections of the Deity are not really deducible from any defect in the direct proof, but are based chiefly, if not exclusively, on the supposed discovery of certain inconsistencies with this doctrine, supposed to be discoverable in the actual course of nature: against such objections all demonstration must be useless, for if I seem to see with my own eyes something inconsistent with an alleged fact, a perfect demonstration would only prove to me the fallacy of its premises, and no argument, whencesoever derived, can convince my judgment, until I am satisfied that the inconsistency is only apparent; and this is one reason why antecedent probability has always even more force than direct evidence in working actual conviction. Possibly the neglect of these considerations is one reason why so many good proofs have had so little lasting effect.

I propose, therefore, after laying down a groundwork of probable evidence, in considering what ought to be the belief of those who have not examined, and are perhaps incapable of estimating aright the value of those stricter proofs, and more conclusive lines of evidence we have on this subject, to endeavour to obviate the difficulties most generally felt and put forward, and after that, to proceed with the more formal proof and some consideration of the consequences of what we shall then have established.

CHAPTER III.

Some Reasons for the common Belief in a Deity.

THE common consent of mankind from the earliest times and throughout the whole world has agreed in proclaiming the existence and power of a Deity. From the greatest philosophers to the least cultivated savages some superior power, some Deity has always been acknowledged and still is so. I know that travellers have every now and then found out a yet more degraded tribe than had been known before, and have proclaimed them destitute of any sense of the divine existence, yet in every instance, a more mature enquiry has discovered some Deity among them, and so confirmed the fact of its universality. Why then do men thus believe, who are not only unable to state, but have never heard of most of the reasons on which philosophers have made the doctrine to depend? The first answer naturally is, that the idea is connatural or self-evident; and if this be doubted, then some express and universal revelation, or some human system of teaching of almost incredible antiquity and extent of influence must be supposed; yet if these be supposed, there will remain the difficulty—How did it happen that in the lapse of ages this system was nowhere forgotten, and why should this be the one sole doctrine believed on such a foundation?[1] When

[1] Abbadie thus argues against the possibility of this belief having arisen from any of the ordinary sources of human error, and especially from mere education: "Si nous regardons les causes extérieures de nos erreurs, nous trouverons qu'elles dépendent des circonstances de tems et de lieux, et qu'ainsi elles varient perpetuellement. Qu'on cherche dans l'histoire l'état passé du monde, et qu'on jette les yeux sur l'état où le monde est aujourd'hui; et qu'on examine tous les erreurs qui régnent, et toutes celles qui ont régné parmi les hommes, l'on trou-

a proposition has been very long and very generally received as true, it is not sufficient, in order to displace it, to refute the arguments by which its truth has been actually defended; we must also account for its reception, by showing some probability inherent in it, or some cause or causes sufficiently powerful and extensive to have led mankind generally to accept it with little or no examination. To take a common instance of the inverse proposition, none of us now believe that the earth remains at rest while the sun moves round it in a circle, and we are not shaken in our new belief by the fact that for many ages all men thought it was so, and even our own eyes seem to tell us it is so still; and this in a great measure because the visible appearances in the heavens are sufficient to account for the prevalence of the old belief, and what we see every day elsewhere,—how that when we know that we are really moving we seem to be at rest, and objects really at rest seem to be flying past us—this is quite sufficient to account for those

vera que l'exemple, l'éducation, les sophismes du discours, ou les fausses couleurs de l'éloquence ont produit des erreurs particuliers, mais non pas des erreurs générales; ont pû tromper quelques hommes, ou les tromper tous dans certains lieux et en certain tems, mais non pas tous les hommes dans tous les lieux et dans tous les siècles. Voilà précisément en quoi la nature et l'éducation sont différentes. La nature est semblable dans tous les hommes qui sont et qui ont été. Ils sent le plaisir, ils désirent l'estime, etc. Mais il n'en est pas de même des principes de l'éducation qui varient sans cesse. La succession des tems, la révolution des affaires, les divers intérêts des peuples, le mélange des nations, les différentes inclinations des hommes changent l'éducation, elles donnent cours à d'autres maximes, et établissent d'autres règles d'honneur et de bien-séance. Si donc nous trouvons que ce sentiment qu'il y a un Dieu, s'est conservé parmi tous ces changemens de la société, qu'en pouvons nous conclure, si non que ce sentiment ne vient pas de la simple éducation?"—*Ver. de la Rel. Chrét.* p. i. s. i. ch. i. "There are very few probable truths," says another author, "but some time or other have met with contradiction, and when an imposture comes to be notorious, it is for ever baffled; and if the belief of a Deity had been such, how can we think, that a design formed to terrify and rack the world, should not have been found out and spoiled many ages ago; especially when inquisitive philosophers travelled up and down into so many parts to discover what was true, and what was false, and to communicate their thoughts wherever they went? Still they returned home confirmed in their belief of a God, as the rational sense of all men, &c. &c."—EDWARD PELLING, D. D. *Discourse concerning Existence of God.*

appearances on which the old belief might have rested.[1] But if it were otherwise, if we knew that objects at rest never appeared to move, and moving objects never seemed at rest; or if the sun were visibly immoveable and we felt the earth was whirling round and circling about it, then the old belief would be very startling, and its general reception, being unaccountable, would excite a strong suspicion of the probable falsity of the new theory. If therefore the belief in the being of God were full of obvious difficulties, its very antecedent improbability would raise a strong presumption of its truth, because then it must have rested on external evidence of the strongest kind. This presumption can only be set aside by showing, that the idea is so natural and so accordant with the everyday experience of mankind, that to question it must be more startling to ordinary men than to affirm it. But if it be indeed so accordant with the accustomed phænomena of actual existence, no small argument will arise in its favour from this circumstance; so that, take it as you will, the very extensive belief which has ever prevailed and does now exist among mankind must furnish exceedingly strong presumptive evidence of its truth; evidence so strong indeed, that (when we recollect that scarcely so many, if so many, have avowed themselves to have no perception of the existence of a Deity as we know to have existed without the sense of sight for instance) I confess I do not see how to avoid the admission,

[1] Accordingly, Abbadie says:—"Que le sens et l'imagination ayent produit par accident les erreurs universelles; et que le cœur soit, comme l'a reconnu de tout tems, une source féconde d'illusions et d'égaremens dans le commerce de la vie civile, cette considération nous est favourable, puisque nous sommes les partisans de bons sens, qui nous dit qu'il y a un Dieu, contre les raisons négatives des sens qui ne voient point cette Divinité, contre les difficultés de l'imagination qui ne saurait se représenter un objet qui est si élevé au dessus de sa portée, et contre les résistances des passions du cœur que cet objet afflige et contraint. N'est ce pas une chose surprenante, que depuis tant de siècles, les sens, l'imagination et les passions du cœur ayent continuellement fourni à l'esprit des hommes des préjugés contraires à cette verité, sans qu'ils ayent pû en étouffer la lumière?—*Ver. de la Rel. Chrét.* p. i. sec. i. ch. 3.

that experience shows that it is as impossible for a man in the full use of his faculties to pass through life without ever coming to a sense of the existence of a Deity (except so far as he may be able to deceive himself into disbelief), as it is impossible to exclude the power of seeing from an account of the natural constitution of mankind.

But though the belief in the existence of some supernatural power, a Deity in name or in character, has been universal,[1] yet since all have not held that Deity to be one only and perfect according to our ideas of perfection; can their consent be evidence to prove the existence of such a Deity as ours? It may, for this reason, that in proportion as men have been wiser and better and more intelligent, just in that same proportion has their conception of their Deity approached to ours of God,[2] till the wisest of old Greece and Rome clearly saw their Deity to be clothed with those attributes and perfections, not excluding that of unity, which we now conceive of as belonging to

[1] Maximus Tyrius after noticing the variations to be found among mankind says, Εν τοσουτῳ γε πολεμῳ και διαφωνιᾳ, ἑνα ἰδοις αν εκ πασῃ γῃ ὁμοφωνον νομον και λογον, ὁτι Θεος εἰς παντων βασιλευς και πατηρ, και θεοι πολλοι, θεου παιδες, συναρχοντες θεῳ. Ταυτα δε ὁ Ἑλλην λεγει, και ὁ βαρβαρος λεγει, και ὁ ηπειρωτης, και ὁ θαλαττιος, και ὁ σηφος, και ὁ ασοφος.—*Dissert. de Deo Platon.* This statement we know was not wholly true of the Jews, and is not as to the Christians; yet, as Dr. Wm. Bates remarks on this subject, what we now know, while it destroys the supposed necessity of believing in minor deities, conclusively affirms the statement as to one.

[2] "Whereas you make it no less than a wonder, why all men in general should not understand the same attributes in God that I doe; since if the idea of his divinity be impressed universally and equally upon the minds of men, every one has as great a privilege by the charter of his essence to speculate the same as myself: in sober truth, you may with equal reason wonder that since all men know the idea of a triangle, why all men doe not yet perceive as many proprieties and perfections in that figure as learned geometricians doe; and why some reason truly, others falsely upon that idea. When once we have conceived of the idea of the true God, however more and more perfections may be revealed unto us, which were not formerly known to be in Him, yet neverthelesse is not the idea of Him therefore augmented; but only made more distinct and express; in regard of all those accomplishments ought to be comprised in the same idea first conceived, insomuch as it is supposed to have been true from the very first conception. Thus the idea of a Triangle, receives no enlargement when several properties are discovered to be therein, which were at first unknown. Nor is

the Almighty.[3] Men cannot speak of their Deity having perfection in those things they have never thought upon, and whatever each nation has peculiarly admired, that they have attributed to their Deity, in what seemed to them its perfection;[4] this is all our argument requires, for when it is admitted that man to be perfect must be morally pure and intellectually enlightened, and that the highest conception of majesty implies unity in the ruling power, and that wherever these qualities have been little thought of, as attributes of the Deity, it arose not from any intentional degrading of the idea, but from the ignorance of those who so thought, so that they, upon being convinced of the necessity of these things to absolute perfection, would and do join with us in attributing them to the Deity,—it follows that all men have implicitly, if not explicitly maintained, believed in and worshiped a Deity such as ours, their variations from us and among themselves arising from no difference in the abstract conception, but only from their inferiority in, and their various degrees of mental and moral culture. Besides this, much apparent difference may be accounted for by the fact of their calling one deity by

our idea of the Divine Nature formed by us in parcels, or by sensible additions out of the various perfections and endowments of the creatures amassed together, and multiplied up to the rate of supernaturall; but springs up to us in a moment, perfect and entire, from this one root; that we understand Him to be an infinite Ens, so perfect as to be above all amplification, or access of more perfection." —*Walter Charleton, M. D. Darkness of Atheisme dispelled.* C. i. Sec. 4, Art. 5.

[3] Εν ταις αληθειαισιν, εις εστιν Θεος
'Ος ουρανον τ' ευρυξε και γαιαν μακραν
Ποντου τε χαραπον οιδμα κανεμων βιας.
Sophocles, quoted by Abp. Leighton in his Prælect. Theologicæ, which see.

[4] "Whatever unworthy conceits men have had of God, or whatever degrading representations they have made of Him, yet they all concur in this, that there is a supreme power to be adored. Though one people worshiped the sun, other the fire, and the Egyptians their rivers, gardens, and fields, yet the notion of a Deity existent who created and governed the world, and conferred daily benefits upon them, was maintained by all, though applied to the stars, and in part to those sordid creatures. All the Dagons in the world establish this truth, and fall down before it. Had not the nations owned the existence of God, they had never offered incense to an idol. No man would be imposed upon to take a Bristol stone instead of a diamond, if he did not know that there were such things

many names,[1] and speaking of many as gods whom yet they held subject to, and but the ministers of the one real and supreme Deity.

From this universal consent of mankind, it should seem, that there is something in man's nature and position in the world which lead him almost unconsciously thus to believe; and many of those, who are but little of philosophers, know experimentally, that the doctrine is necessary to them as spiritual beings, and alone is consistent with the course of things around them, nay, is even necessary to make those things consistent with themselves: this, which no doubt influences many more than are conscious of having thought much about it, coupled with the consent of those around them and those to whom they look up with respect, is, as I suppose, the reason why most men believe in the existence of the Deity, and I have no doubt that in so doing they believe reasonably. For to return to our illustration from astronomy, the learned believe in the Copernican theory because it enables them to give a consistent account of the visible phænomena of the heavens, and the unlearned believe it because the learned do. There is no strictly conclusive evidence as to what it is that causes the appearances we account for by lists of planets and fixed stars, we only know that certain bright objects

as diamonds in the world; nor any man spread forth his hands to an idol, if he were altogether without the sense of a Deity."—*Stephen Charnock. The Existence of God*, Part I. "Quippe omnis, qui Deum esse dicit, sive unum sive plures, non intelligit nisi aliquam substantiam, quam censet supra omnem naturam, quæ Deus non est, ab hominibus et venerandam propter ejus eminentem dignitatem; et exorandam sibi propter quamlibet imminentem necessitatem."—*Anselm Mon.* c. 79. Κοιναι δε εισιν εννοιαι, οσας παντες ανθρωποι ερωτηθεντες ομολογησουσιν· οιον πας Θεος αγαθος, οτι απαθης, οτι αμεταβλητος.—*Sallustius Phil. De Diis et Mundo*, c. 2.

[1] Ὡν μια ἡ φυσις, πολλα δε τα ονοματα, ὑπο γαρ αμαθιας αυτων, τας ωφελειας τας ἑαυτων εκαστοις επονομαζομεν· αλλοις αλλη κλησις Θεον· καθαπερ και τα μερη της Θαλαττης, Αιγαιον τουτο, Ιωνικον εκεινο, Μυρσωον αλλο, Κρηταιον αλλο, ἡ δ'εστι μια ὁμογενης και ὁμοπαθης και συγκεκραμενη. Maximus Tyrius. Ὁτι ουκ εστιν αγαθου αγαθον μειζον. For an elaborate list of epithets applied to Ζευς, see *Pseud. Aristotle, De Mundo*, cap. ult. Εις δε ων, πολυωνυμος εστι, &c.

above us seem to move, some in one way and some in another, that the telescope enlarges some of these, and brings to light other similar objects, while some seem when seen through it, even smaller than they do to the naked eye, but that these are suns and worlds, and how large they are, and how they move, and how far distant they are from us and from one another, are only the conclusions of probable reasoning, based upon the assumption, that it must be possible to give a rational account of them, and carried on by analogies with what we see on the earth; much stronger than these, and much more within the power of every man to investigate, are the similar arguments for the existence of the Deity. Again, the assent of the unlearned is compelled by the consent of the learned: if, therefore, as is certainly the fact, the bulk of the learned in such matters have believed and do believe what we now maintain, and have always been able to find, as they thought, full and conclusive answers to all objections, then are the common people fully justified in their belief; so much so, that their desertion of it would be in no way justified by the fact that objections may be started which they cannot answer. For if any astronomer should now venture to maintain the central rest of the earth against the bulk of his fellows, would not every one not deeply versed in the science say, if he were told he ought to answer his arguments, or be convinced, "Though I cannot answer you, that seems to me of little consequence, for I have no reason to suppose that I could if your arguments were all anciently exploded fallacies. Go and argue with the professed students of this science; if you can convince or convict them, I shall believe you, not because you can outargue me, but because when those who have made any subject their peculiar study profess a universal, or all but universal agreement, neither I nor any other sensible man would hesitate to believe that they were right." Whilst all other knowledge has been the subject of numberless changes,

and most of our present theories can be traced back to their origin, the great doctrine of Theology has never changed; we know not who first invented it, or where it was first proclaimed; it has never been the exclusive theory of a few enlightened minds, and all our advances in intelligence and learning have but served to purify and define that same conscious conception which has found a home among the people of every country; the first settlers have professed it, and their latest descendants have maintained it; ingenuity has never shaken it, and science serves but to confirm it. Truth and happiness are its fruits in those who hold it sincerely, and justice and benevolence the outward evidences of its reception.

CHAPTER IV.

The Impiety of Atheism.

IT has contributed much to the maintenance of Theism among all classes, that there has always been a kind of moral stigma attaching to the profession of Atheism, implying that no one could profess himself such without being a person of depraved moral feeling. Certainly, if there be sufficient evidence to satisfy any careful and candid enquirer that there is a God, it will follow that no man can be an Atheist who is careful and candid (and the want of these qualities is a vice), unless there be some peculiar external reason which prevents his discovering the truth. That there are many good proofs of this doctrine, I hope, before I shall have finished this Essay, to have completely established; if so, disbelief must arise either from never having heard of the truth, which is in this instance impossible, or from ignorance of any of the modes in which it may be established; but if the moral consciousness of every good man must lead him to the belief in a Deity, then no man can be an Atheist without a depraved moral consciousness, or a deliberate and voluntary effort to oppose its dictates; and the judgment of society will be right, though perhaps formed only upon moral repugnance and instinctive reason, not on conscious argument.

No one of sound moral feeling can help hoping, or wishing, that there may be a just and holy omnipotence presiding over and directing the course of the universe, however hidden by the mists of our ignorance, and perhaps beyond our power to contemplate by the mere brightness of its perfections. There is manifestly reason to expect, that there should be some

obscurity, and many difficulties, to hinder our arriving at a perfect knowledge of this power, so much and so many, as the imperfection of all our knowledge, compared with that which is perfect, may necessitate, therefore no doubt actually much and many. But is Atheism more clear of difficulties? Not at all. "Why should evil exist in the world, if it is the work of a beneficent Creator?" is a question not more difficult to answer, than why, on any other supposition, virtue should tend to happiness and vice to misery. Thus Atheists, and for this purpose Sceptics also, being no more able to explain all things than Theists, and having no omniscient and omnipotent goodness on which trustfully to depend for the ultimate triumph of right; a good man, if he be not a Theist, must be full of inextricable perplexity and never-ending regrets. In such a state no man can long remain; he is sure, therefore, before long, either to abandon his scepticism, or to harden his sense of right into a sense of what is for his own advantage, and so get rid of the conception of moral right altogether; a proceeding which society, on utilitarian principles, is very right in condemning.[1] I am far from thinking that the difficulties are equal on both sides; but if they were, there would then be nothing to determine the judgment, except the presumption arising from moral feeling, a presumption which is quite

[1] "If actions themselves have no other goodness besides their connection with public happiness, I believe it will be impossible to assign any reason why opinions should be thought incapable of moral worth; for, surely, it is of great and general importance that men should judge rightly in matters of religion. If it be said that a free choice is essential to morality, I answer, that circumstance is quite foreign to the purpose, and the reason is, because the freedom of an action no way affects its influence on the public. If to be virtuous and to be useful are the very same thing, equal degrees of utility must unavoidably deserve equal approbation. On the same account, it is perfectly insignificant whether our actions be intended or unintended, and even whether they be actions or not actions. If they have no absolute worth to recommend them, they can only be valued for the good they produce. Whatever, therefore, produces the same quantity of good must appear equally valuable and praiseworthy."—*An Enquiry concerning Faith.* London, 1744 (sometimes attributed to Bp. Butler).

as strong as those which rightly determine our judgment in every-day affairs, and it would be a mockery seriously to deny that these are generally regarded as of quite as much real importance. This being so, no man can be a Sceptic unless his moral sympathy with right be almost nothing, nor can he be an Atheist unless his moral sympathies preponderate in the other scale, and so every man's avowed judgment is an index to his unavowed moral feelings, and a really good man cannot but be a Theist, because he cannot fail to follow his moral conviction, that the universe ought to be directed by a perfect Deity.

Though such enquiries as the present are necessary when disputes have arisen, I think it far from necessary that every one should pursue them; and I am sure that, though it is the fashion, even with those who have no intention of countenancing profanity, to ridicule or pity that feeling of reverential awe, which forbids or shuns all enquiries into the moral character of the Author of the universe, yet such a feeling is only the evidence of moral purity, for, whatever that character may be, it is not for us to question its goodness.[2] How can we presume to enquire into the nature of that to which we owe our existence, and venture to conclude that it is unworthy of our respect and love? On the contrary, we must assume it to be so, as the condition of all our enquiries, because, as regards us it must be so, which the following considerations will serve to some extent to elucidate.

There is such a virtue as filial piety, and it consists in great part of a disposition to esteem those from whom we derive our being as always worthy of love and reverence. This virtue is not without its benefit to ourselves, for by it alone are we

[2] "It was the wisdom of antiquity to bury all such difficulties in the abyss of infinite wisdom and power, and there leave them till God should think proper to bring them to light; and had we something of the same spirit, it would be the better for us."—*Sherlock on Prophecy.* Dissert. II.

enabled trustfully and beneficially to accept that correction and education which, though they seem to us at the time strange and useless, we find in after life to have proceeded from goodness towards us, and to have conferred real benefit upon us; and experience tells us, that it is necessary, for the ultimate advantage of every man, that he, in his younger days, receive in faith and do his best to profit by many things which seem to him at the time unaccountable, or even unreasonable. Now what we owe individually to our parents, we must owe as a race to the Giver of existence to that race; and, since we are incapable of any benefit without existence, we must assume that He who, or that which gave us this capacity, by giving us existence, bore then and bears still a good will towards us; if so, analogy will lead us at once to conclude, that we shall in all probability find ourselves treated in a very different manner to that which we should of ourselves desire, and that we shall have to wait until we see what is our ultimate destination, before we understand why we were so placed and so treated as we have been; and the same analogy accounts for the use of the word impiety, and the idea of it as a vice, even in an Atheist.

When we find that children understand how it can show a parent's disinterested love, and real desire for their happiness, to set them to what seem at first hard and tedious tasks, then only, and indeed not till long after that time, can we expect to comprehend altogether how God can be all good and yet permit evil on the earth; I say, not till long after this, for children are destined one day to equal if not to excel their parents in intelligence; but we—if God be what our religious sentiment depicts Him as being—we, though we grew in knowledge and intelligence through all eternity, could never fathom the entire depths of His wisdom, power, and goodness. But it may be said, surely to cause or permit evil is the direct opposite of goodness. Certainly it is in form, and so is the

punishment the direct opposite of beneficence; to school to those who most need it (in spite of ɔved and improving methods of education), gene- rect reverse of conferring happiness; yet the should be equally kind to the idle and the dili- ho should never wish any of his children to do the moment distasteful to them, would be very ıg a good parent, and very far from so treating his o promote their happiness.[1] Who can deny that, ɔur relations to our Almighty Father, the same hold, and the same seeming contradictions may to the preservation of the truth? If this be only argument is complete, for it follows immediately st assume that it is actually so, or be guilty of ıpiety against our first great Parent, and thus, ıo way ashamed to confess that we cannot now hings, we may wait in hopeful faith for a time ıll better understand them; and that such a time he daily increase of knowledge in ourselves, and fellows even on this earth, shows to be both pos- ɔbable. We used to believe our parents loved us, knew they did many acts of kindness towards us; believe the same of that power by which we are ı life and health, and not left wholly destitute of happiness. We knew that we must trust in our ıuse we could not do without them; can we do which could in a moment destroy us, and all that are, or simply leave us to perish, by withdrawing ned benefits? Our parents said they loved us,

ɔr any place, or person, is exactly the measure of my desire to doctrine which seems to me as natural now as it seemed strange ıild, when I could not make out how, if my mother loved me more ildren, she should find fault with me and not with them. But I s ought to be a difficulty to any one who is more than six years ɔld. *Life*, p. 406. *Πατρος επιτιμησις ηδυ φαρμακον πλειον γαρ του δακνοντος.—Demophilus. Similitud.*

and acted for our good; has not God given us reason to tell us that it is so with Him, and have we never heard of any special revelation of Himself which has been made to assure us of His love?

Finally, we ought, no doubt, to aim at attaining the true object of our being, and if there be an intelligent Creator of the universe, we must have been made to promote His glory and fulfil His pleasure; if so, we cannot but carry out best the object of our being by supposing Him perfect, and by acting upon that supposition; how His glory may be promoted by the presence of evil perhaps we cannot tell, but, as He has allowed it, we have every reason to believe that, somehow or other, it has that effect: certainly, from our knowledge of ourselves, we must expect to find many things in the universe seemingly inexplicable, and therefore the presence of some such ought to tend rather to confirm than shake our faith. In this faith alone can we hope to attain the object of our being, whether it be the glory of God or our own happiness; for how can mankind expect to be rationally or permanently happy if they believe themselves subject to a power careless of their well-being, or in the least disposed to cause their misery?

PART II.

OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED AND REFUTED.

CHAPTER I.

Of Evil in general.

I KNOW of no objection to the existence of the Deity that any one would now think of arguing, which is not directly or indirectly deduced from the supposed impossibility of the existence of evil in a universe created and governed by a Being all-powerful, all-wise, and all-good. The old objection has ever remained the same. If God does not desire the existence of evil, but cannot prevent it, He is not all-powerful; if He can prevent it, but will not, He is not all good. My answer is, that God does not desire the existence of evil, but will not prevent it, and yet is all-good, and this I support by showing that evil is not done by Him, nor is it any consequence of His work, and that He has so ordered evil to effect good, that the allowance of it is consistent with, if not required by, perfect goodness.

Besides the real difficulty, there is a tendency in most persons to accept the fact as irreconcileable with God's goodness, arising, often unconsciously, from their own circumstances and feelings. Every one who is discontented with his position in the world, is very apt to ascribe it to anything rather than to a cause which shall have its roots in his own faults, or in some affection or mode of thinking, some overweening love, perhaps, of something transitory, which needs

correction;[1] and whenever any one ascribes his ill fortune in any degree to the power of forces external to and unconnected with his own moral character, he does in effect impeach the goodness or power of the Deity, and so, though most probably far from conscious Atheism, is in fact but a wavering Theist in understanding, and one still less decidedly in feeling and practice. Let every one, therefore, who begins to enquire into this matter, see well to it, that it is not a secret impression he would be extremely unwilling to avow, that he himself is not so well off as he ought to be, which is at the bottom of his anxiety. The truth is, that except as to a desire for our own moral amendment, we must either be perfectly at rest in our minds and rely with confidence on the Ruler of events, or else we contradict in practice our own speculative opinions, and are Theists only in profession.

If evil were a substantial thing, like a tree or an animal, or if it were an inseparable quality belonging to any real thing, as weight does to all material objects, its existence would be a much greater difficulty than it is; but when we come to enquire what evil is, we find it almost impossible to describe it as having any substantive existence. No material or substantial thing, taken simply, is in any respect evil.[2] Take a

[1] Ω ποποι οἱτε δε νυ θεοις βροτοι αιτιοωνται,
Εξ ἡμεων γαρ φασιν κακ' εμμεναι οἱ τε και αυτοι
Σφῃσιν ατασθαλιῃσι· ὑπερ μορον αλγε' εχουσιν.—*Odyss.* i. 22. *Zeus loq.*

[2] Commemoremus—bona quanta potuerimus, quæ dignum est ut Deo auctori tribuamus, et his sublatis videmus utrum aliqua natura remanebit. Omnis vita et magna et parva, omnis potentia et magna et parva, omnis salus et magna et parva, omnis memoria et magna et parva, omnis virtus et magna et parva, omnis intellectus et magnus et parvus, omnis tranquillitas et magna et parva, omnis copia et magna et parva, omnis sensus et magnus et parvus, omne lumen et magnum et parvum, omnis suavitas et magna et parva, omnis pulchritudo et magna et parva, omnis pax et magna et parva, et si qua similia occurrere poterunt, maximeque illa quæ per omnia reperiuntur, sive spiritalia, sive corporalia, omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo, et magnus et parvus a Domino Deo sunt. Quibus bonis omnibus qui male uti voluerit, divino judicio pœnas luet: ubi autem nullum horum omnino fuerit, nulla natura remanebit.—*Augustine. De Natura Boni.*

venomous serpent, for instance; it is beautiful; it is endowed with wonderful powers; there is much that is good in its adaptation to the purposes of its being, and benevolence towards it has been clearly shown by its Maker in all these gifts: where is the evil, then? It arises from the power of inflicting pain and causing death possessed by it; but these evils do not exist in the nature of the animal viewed in relation to itself, but only from some relation in which it may stand to something else: it is possessed of faculties which may cause pain and death, and these last we call evils; but what are they? They are sensations. Are these real things? No, they are only affections of things. The same rule will apply to all which we may call physical evils; they do not consist in substances, but in the affections of substances: and if we proceed further to enquire what affections, we shall see that they are such affections as are contrary to the natural objects of the formation of the substances affected; thus pain and dissolution are affections of the human body contrary to the apparent objects of its formation, for these are, beyond all doubt, the healthy preservation of life, which is in itself pleasurable. Physical evils, therefore, are no part of creation, but are created anew from time to time by disturbances of the due order of nature.

There is another kind of evil,—moral evil,—which we can only conceive of as existing in intelligent beings. This consists in the volition to do wrong things; it is the direct opposite of goodness, the direct opposite, therefore, of what must be the will of God. Yet it is not more real in itself than the other species of evil, for it is the direction of a will, not the will itself,[3] and since this kind of evil can alone exist where

[3] Una voluntas quæ per natura bona est, per aversionem vel conversionem potest esse causa boni et mali: et sic ab eo quod est bonum, est malum.—Natura enim—quamvis possit esse mali causa, non propter hoc tamen mala est. Quia probat Aristoteles metaphysice, quod propter potentiam mali nihil malum est: quia potentia mali nihil ponit de actu sive forma mali. Et natura bona se

nature does not compel to evil, and where there is a free will,[1] the intelligent being is himself the cause of the evil in himself, and not the Maker of that being in any sense. An action is morally evil which is contrary to reason and conscience, contrary, that is, to the nature of a moral and intelligent being. There can be no doubt that man's will is naturally the instrument by which he is enabled to carry out the conclusions of his reason and the dictates of his conscience, and we cannot conceive even the worst men, when pursuing the worst ends by the worst means, to have proposed to themselves anything evil as their final object; they are seeking their own security, or their own pleasure (both in themselves good things), even in their greatest crimes and vilest excesses.[2] Moral evil, therefore, as it exists in man, is nothing substantive or essential, but only an affection of his will, contrary to the objects for which he was endowed therewith.

If then, physical and moral evil be neither of them real things, but only contingent affections, contrary to the natural objects of the formation of real things, what are all real things, and what are their natural objects? Certainly, these being the

habet ad voluntatem bonam et ad voluntatem malam, sicut bona terra se habet ad arborem bonam et ad arborem malam: radicantur enim bonæ et malæ voluntates in una natura bona, sicut arbores bonæ et malæ in una bona terra. —*Albertus Magnus. Sum. Theol. Tract.* vi. *Quæst.* xxvi. *Membr.* ii. *Articulus* iii. Bonum dicitur trifariam: est bonum physice, est bonum metaphysicum, est bonum ethicum. Actio voluntatis quatenus est ens, bona est bonitate physica vel metaphysica, sed est mala ethice, quia actioni adnascitur αταξια. Voluntatis itaque entitas bona est physice, sed voluntas non est bona bonitate ethica. —*John Cameron. Disp. ad Thes.* v. *Opp.* p. 356. Εν γαρ τω θελειν και νομιζειν τι κακον, το κακον ονομαζεται, ουκ ον απ'αρχης, αλλ'επιγινομενον.—*Hippolytus. Philosophumena*, lib. x. 33.

[1] Si culpa est, voluntas est: si voluntas est in peccando, natura non est quæ cogat.—*Aug. de Act. c. Felice Manich.* lib. ii.

[2] Σωκ. Ποτερον ουν σοι δοκουσιν οι ανθρωποι τουτο βουλεσθαι ο αν πραττουσιν ἑκαστοτε, η εκεινο ου ἑνεκα πραττουσι τουθ' ο πραττουσιν; οιον οι τα φαρμακα πινοντες παρα των ιατρων, ποτερον σοι δοκουσι τουτο βουλεσθαι ὁπερ ποιουσι, πινειν το φαρμακον και αλγειν, η εκεινο το ὑγιαινειν, ου ἑνεκα πινουσιν; Πωλος. Δηλον ὁτι το ὑγιαινειν, ου ἑνεκα πινουσιν.—Σωκ. Τα δε μητε αγαθα μητε κακα, αρα τοιαδε λεγεις, ἁ ενιοτε δε ουδετερου, οιον καθησθαι, και βαδιζειν, και τρεχειν,

contradictories of evil, must be good:[3] their Maker, therefore, must be good; and since there is nothing evil in them, He is (so far as they inform us) perfectly good. Again evil, as we have seen, cannot have actual and persistent existence, but grows out of, and presupposes those things, of which it is an abnormal relation, to be in themselves good. Of what nature then can the absolute existence be from which all things derive their reality; clearly it is impossible but that the absolute existence, that is God, should be good, and, as He is a pure existence, without possibility of decay, so He must be purely good without possibility of evil.[4] But if God be good, since there is undoubtedly some such thing as evil in the world, whence can it proceed? The cause must be either independent or a creature of the absolute First Cause, which we have shown to be good. But if it be independent, it must also possess absolute existence, and therefore, by our previous reasoning, be perfectly good; which however, by definition, it

επιπλειν, και οιον αν λιθους και ξυλα και ταλλα τοιαυτα; ου ταυτα λεγεις, η αλλ'αττα καλεις τα μητε αγαθα, μητε κακα; Πωλ. Ουκ, αλλα ταυτα. Σωκ. Ποτερον ουν τα μεταξυ ταυτα ενεκεν των αγαθων πραττουσιν; οταν πραττωσιν, η τα αγαθα των μεταξυ; Πωλ. Τα μεταξυ δη που των αγαθων.—Σωκ. Ουκουν και αποκτινυμεν, ει τινα αποκτινυμεν, και εκβαλομεν και αφαιρουμεθα χρηματα, ωμενοι αμεινον ειναι ημιν ταυτα ποιειν η μη; Πωλ. Πανυγε. Σωκ. Ενεκ'αρα του αγαθου απαντα ταυτα ποιουσιν οι ποιουντες. Πωλ. Φημι. Gorgias, pp. 467-8.

[3] *Ου γαρ εστιν υφεστως ωσπερ τι ζωον η πονρια, ουτε ουσιαν αυτης ενυποστατον παραστησαι εχομεν, στερησις γαρ αγαθου εστι το κακον. Οφθαλμος εκτισθη, τυφλοτης δε, τη απωλεια των οφθαλμων επιγενετο, ωστε ει μη φθαρτης φυσεως ο οφθαλμος, ουκ αν εσχεν η τυφλοτης παρεισδυσιν· ουτω και το κακον ουκ εν ιδια υπαρξει εστιν, αλλα τοις της ψυχης πηρωμασιν επιγινεται.—Basil. Homilia quod Deus non est auctor malorum.*

[4] *Την πρωτην αιτιαν μιαν τε ειναι προσηκει, παντος γαρ πληθους ηγειται μονας, δυναμει τε και αγαθοτητι παντα νικα· και δια τουτο παντα μετεχειν εκεινης αναγκη· ουδεν γαρ αυτην αλλο κωλυσει δια την δυναμιν, ουδε εαυτην αφειει δι'αγαθοτητα. Αλλ'ει μεν ην ψυχη, παντα αν εμψυχαην ει δε και νους παντα νοερα, ει δε ουσια παντα ουσιας μετειχε· τουτο δε εν πασιν ιδοντες τινες, εκεινο ουσιαν ενομισαν. Ει μεν ουν ην μονον τα οντα, αγαθα δε ουκ ην, αληθης ην ο λογος, ει δε δι' αγαθοτητα εστι τε τα οντα, μετειληχεν αγαθου, υπερουσιον μεν αγαθον δε ειναι το πρωτον· αναγκη. Σημειον δε μεγιστον· του γαρ ειναι δια το αγαθον αι σπουδαιαι καταφρονουσι ψυχαι οταν ωσπερ πατριδος, η φιλων, η αρετης κινδυνευειν εθελωσι.—Sallustius Phil. De Diis et Mundo*, c. v.

is not. Thus the opinion that the origin and maintenan
all things can be ascribed to two equal powers, one good
one evil, is negatived by the very nature of good and
themselves when rightly understood;[1] and there is this
ther reason against it, that two powers, one good and one
would, if equal, destroy one another; or, if that were im
sible, would each prevent the other doing anything, or ma
anything which should display its Maker's moral charac
and if one were of greater power than the other, that
would entirely destroy, or turn to his own purposes, the w
of the other, unless indeed good and evil agreed to tole
one another in the abstract, which is palpably absurd. W
ever author, or authors of evil there are, therefore, in

[1] Ει δε εις εστιν ὁ Θεος, και ουτος ουρανου και γης Κυριος, πως αλλος
θεος παρα Τουτον; Που δε και εσται ὁ κατ'αυτου θεος; τα παντα του μον
αληθινος πληρουντος κατα του ουρανου και γης περιληψιν;—ει μη αρα
ισοστασιῳ, και του αγαθου Θεου τον φαυλον δυνασθαι γενεσθαι κυριον ει
Αλλ' εαν τουτο λεγωσιν, ὁρα, εις ὁσην ασεβειαν εκπιπτουσιν· εν γαρ τοις
δυναμενοις, το ὑπερεχον και κρειττον ουκ αν ἑυρεθειη. Και γαρ ει μη θελ
του ἑτερου, το ἑτερον εστιν, ισῃ αμφοτερων ἡ δυναμις και ἡ ασθενεια εστιν.
μεν δυναμις, ὁτι νικωσιν αλληλων την βουλησιν εν τῳ ειναι, ασθενεια δε
τερων εστιν, ὁτι μη βουλομενοις αυτοις παρα γνωμην αποβαινει τα πραγ
εστι γαρ και ὁ αγαθος παρα γνωμην τον φαυλου, και ὁ φαυλος παρα βου
του αγαθον. Αλλος τε και τουτο γαρ αν τις αυτοις ειποι· ει τα φαινομενα
του φαυλου εστι, τι το εργον του αγαθου; φαινεται γαρ ουδεν, πλην μονη
του δημιουργου κτισεως, τι δε και του ειναι το αγαθον γνωρισμα, ουκ οντων
εργων, δι' ὡν αν γνωσθειῃ, εκ γαρ των εργων ὁ δημιουργος γινωσκεται. Π
ὁλος και δυο αν ιεη εναντια αλληλων, ἡ τι το διαιρουν εστι ταυτα, ἱνα χωρι
ληλων γενωνται; ειναι γαρ αυτα ἁμα αδυνατον, δια το αναιρετικα αλλ
ειναι, αλλ' ουδε ἑτερον εν ἑτερῳ δυνηθειη αν ειναι, δια το αμικτον και ανο
αυτων της φυσεως. Ουκουν εκ τριτου το διαιρουν φαινησεται, και αυτο
Αλλα ποιας αν ιεη και το τριτον φυσεως, ποτερον της του καλου, ἡ του φα
Αδηλον φαινεται της γαρ αμφοτερων ειναι αυτο αδυνατον. Σαθρας δῃ τ
της τοιαυτης αυτων διανοιας φαινομενης, αναγκη την αληθειαν διαλαμπει
Εκκλησιαστικης γνωσεως· ὁτι το κακον ου παρα Θεου ουδε εν Θεῳ, ουτε εξ α
γεγονεν, ουτε ουσια τις εστιν αυτου, αλλα ανθρωποι κατα στερησιν της του
φαντασιας, ἑαυτοις επινοειν ηρξαντο και αναπλαττειν τα ουκ οντα, και
βουλονται.—*Athanasius. Oratio contra Gentes.* Adde quod Deum aliquem
malum, communi omnium hominum sensui repugnat, qui Dei nomine opti
et præstantissimum aliquod ens intelligunt. Unde dicitur homo homini
esse cum ipse benefacit.—*Curcellæus. Institutiones Religionis Christianæ*, li
c. 18.

world, they must be, though depraved, the creatures and subjects of a Being of perfect goodness, and at least relatively to them all-powerful. Thus the mere consideration of the nature and mode of existence of that evil, which has been alleged as an evidence of the nonexistence of a Deity, has brought us to the conclusion, not only that such a one possibly exists, but that He is all good, and that evil exists only by His permission. This being so, it is manifest that what seem evils cannot really be inconsistent with perfect goodness towards us, though we may not be able to perceive all the reasons upon which they proceed, and cannot sufficiently appreciate our ownselves to know how they have severally become just and expedient.

If I fail, therefore, in my attempt to show how such evils as we see around us may be reconciled with the goodness of the Deity, I have yet two strong positions to fall back upon; the one arising from our conscious ignorance, which forbids us to conclude that all we do not understand to be good is in itself evil; the other, derived from our knowledge of the true nature of that which is alleged as an objection, assures us, that there is some way in which all must ultimately be reconciled as the exclusive work of some purely beneficent Deity.

If the existence of moral evil can be accounted for, then by common consent the existence of physical evil is capable of easy solution,[2] whether we regard it as a just punishment, or a means of warning and amending; as the withdrawal of temptations, and the best method of hindering from acts which would have been morally evil, or, perhaps, would have led to greater suffering, or as the natural and proper process whereby

[2] *Κακον τοινυν το μεν, ὡς προς την ἡμετεραν αισθησιν· το δε, ὡς προς την ἑαυτου φυσιν. Το μεν ουν φυσει κακον, εξ ἡμων ηρτηται, αδικια, ασελγεια, αφροσυνη, δειλια, φθονοι, φονοι, φαρμακειαι, ραδιουργιαι, και ὁσα τουτοις συγγενη παθηματα την κατ' εικονα του κτισαντος γεγενημενην. ψυχην καταρρυπαινοντα, επισκοτειν αυτης τῳ καλλει πεφυκε. Παλιν κακον λεγομεν, το ἡμιν επιπονον και οδυνηρον προς την αισθησιν, νοσον σωματος, και πληγας σωματος, και των αναγκαιων την ενδειαν, και αδοξιας και χρηματων ζημιας, και οικειων αποβολας·*

the order which is outraged by sin is again restored,[1] and the majesty of eternal right vindicated in the sight of all creation. I shall, therefore, proceed first, to enquire concerning the existence of moral evil in man, and any other intelligent being which may be capable of sinning; and afterwards pass on to the consideration of physical evils, and the various modes by which their existence may be reconciled with the goodness of the Deity.

Of death itself I do not think I shall have any occasion to speak very particularly, for by it man passes to a state, which either depends upon his moral character, and if so is to the good, one far preferable to their condition here, and one, therefore, to which it is no evil to summon them; or else man returns to the peace of nothingness, or escapes the bondage of

ὧν ἑκαστον ἡμιν υπο του φρονιμου και αγαθου δεσποτου προς το συμφερον επαγεται, &c.—*Basil Hom. q. D. n. e. Auct. Mali.*—Pour ce qui est du mal, Dieu ne veut point de tout le mal moral, et il ne veut point d'une manière absolue le mal physique ou les souffrances;—on peut dire du mal physique que Dieu le veut souvent comme une peine due à la coulpe, et souvent aussi comme un moyen propre à une fin, c'est-à-dire, pour empêcher de plus grands maux ou pour obtenir de plus grands biens. La peine sert aussi pour l'amendement et pour l'exemple, et le mal sert souvent pour mieux goûter le bien, et quelquefois aussi il contribue à un plus grand perfection de celui qui souffre, comme le grain qu'on sème est sujet à une espèce de corruption pour germer.—*Leibnitz. Theodicée, Essais sur la Bonté de Dieu*, pt. i. sec. 23. And so also Origen upon a text of much seeming difficulty. Τουτον δε τον τροπον και το, ὁ ποιων ειρηνην, και κτιζων κακα, (*Is.* xlv. 7.) διηγουμεθα· κτιζει γαρ τα σωματικα, η τα εκτος κακα, καθαιρων και παιδευων τους μη βουληθεντας παιδευθηναι λογῳ και διδασκαλιᾳ ὑγιει.—*Orig. c. Celsum.* lib. vi. p. 314. Ed. Cantab.

[1] Meo judicio omnes istæ falsæ sunt simpliciter, bonum est mala fieri, bonum est mala esse, justum est malum fieri, justum est malum esse. Secundum quid tamen aliquid veritatis habent. Est enim aliquid bonum simpliciter et absolute, et aliquid bonum alicui et ad aliquid. Mala fieri et mala esse absolute malum est: sed alicui et ad aliquid habet rationem boni quod est utile. Ut, verbi gratia, malum Decii utile fuit Laurentio, ut eminentius probaretur virtus ejus. Similiter ei qui tepidus fuit in cultu Dei, utilis fuit casus in hoc, quod sibi indignaretur et fortius resurgeret. Ad aliud quod quærit, in quo sit bonitas illa quæ significatur, cum dicitur, bonum est mala fieri? Dicendum, quod nec in subjecto mali, nec in respectu malitiæ, sicut bene probatur objiciendo: sed est in ordine mali ad bonum, et est ordinis bonum: et hoc, ut dictum est, est bonum alicui et ad aliquid et secundum quid.—*Albertus Magnus. S. Th.* P. i. *Tr.* xx. *Qu.* xxx. *Memb.* ii. *Art.* iii. Part ii.

matter.[2] None of these things are evil in themselves, and must be of right peculiarly in the power of Him who gave us being, and who can be under no obligation to continue that existence to us longer than He shall be pleased to determine.[3]

[2] Ὁν γαρ καλουσιν οἱ πολλοι θανατον, αυτο τουτο ην αθανασιας αρχη, και γενισις μελλοντος βιου.—*Maximus Tyrius. Dissert* Ποθεν τα κακα; Καλον το ὑναι απο κοσμου προς Θεον, ἱνα εις αυτον ανατειλω.—*Ignatius, Ep. ad Rom.* c. iii.—Ειδε ἡ ζωη ἡμιν ῳ μεμικται κακον αγαθον, πως ουκ ὁ θανατος κακον; η τινι; τῳ γαρ κακον συμβεβηκεναι δει τῳ τινι, ὁ δε ουκ εστιν αιτιον ον, η ει εστιν ιστιρημενον ζωης, ου δ' ὁυτω κακον τῳ λιθῳ, ει δε εστι ζωη και ψυχη μετα θανατον, ηδη αν ειη αγαθὸν, ὁσῳ μαλλον ενεργει τα αυτης ανευ σωματος· ει δε της ὑλης γινεται, τι αν εκει ουση ειη κακον; και ὁλως ὡσπερ τοις θειοις αγαθον μεν ισπ, κακον δε ουδεν ὁυτως ουδε τῃ ψυχῃ τῃ σωζουσῃ το καθαρον αυτης· ει δε μῃ σωζοι, ουχ ὁ θανατος αν ειη κακον αυτῃ, αλλ' ἡ ζωη, οτι μη ζωη. Ει δε και εν ᾳδου δικαι, παλιν αυτῃ ἡ ζωη κακει κακον, οτι μη ζωη μονον. Αλλ'ει συνοδος μεν ψυχης και σωματος ζωη, θανατος δε διαλυσις τουτων, ἡ ψυχη εσται αμφοτερων δεκτικη. Αλλ'ει αγαθον ἡ ζωη πως ὁ θανατος ου κακον; η αγαθη μεν ἡ ζωη οἱον εστι αγαθον, ου καθὸσον συνοδος, αλλ'ὁτι δι'αρετης αμυνεται το κακον· ὁ δε θανατος μαλλον αγαθον η λεκτεον, αυτην μεν την εν σωματι ζωην, κακον παρ'αυτης· τῃ δε αρετῃ εν αγαθῳ γινεσθαι την ψυχην ου σωζουσαν το συνθετον, αλλ'ηδη χωριζουσαν ἑαυτην.—*Plotinus, end of seventh book of Ennead. I.* Εκ Θεου μεν γαρ οἱ θανατοι. Ου μην πονηρον παντως ὁ θανατος· πλην ει μη τις λεγοι τον του ἁμαρτωλου, διοτι των εν ᾳδου κολασεων αρχη τυγχανει ἡ απαλλαγη των εντευθεν. Παλιν δε τα εν ᾳδου κακα, ου Θεον εχει τον αιτιον, αλλ'ἡμας αυτους· αρχη γαρ και ριζα της αμαρτιας το εφ'ἡμιν και το αυτεξουσιον. Ὁις γαρ εξην απεχομενοις του κακου μηδεν δεινον εχειν, οὐτοι δι'ἡδονης εις την ἁμαρτιαν δελεασθεντες τινα αν ειποιμεν ευπρεπη λογον, το μη ουχι αυτοι ἑαυτοις αιτιοι των αλγεινων γεγενησθαι.—*Basil Hom. q. Deus, n. e. a. m.* Hoc autem modo quo corruptio et dissolutio est pœna, est contraria naturæ bonæ, et in natura bona est, et sic causam efficientem non habet sed deficientem potius, ut dicit Augustinus, causatur enim a perversitate malæ voluntatis, et non est a Deo, nisi sicut dicitur tenebræ esse a sole quando lumen non influit. Et sic pœna inferni ordinando et infligendo est a Deo et a bonitate Dei, instrumentaliter autem ab igne: sed sicut in subjecto est in bona natura et dissolutio ipsius. Et subtiliter loquendo non habet esse vel essentiam veram, sed est dissolutio et corruptio modi, commensurationis et harmoniæ, quæ conservant bonam naturam in vero esse. Hoc tamen fit ordine justitiæ divinæ, quæ ordinat culpæ malum per pœnam, et redigit ad bonum ordinis quod in seipso bonum esse noluit.—*Albertus Magnus Sum. Theol. Tract.* vi. *Quæst.* xxvi. *Membr.* ii. *Art.* ii.

[3] God can do no wrong, since He is absolute sovereign. Man may do wrong, princes may oppress and rifle, but it is a crime in them to do so, because their power is a power of government, and not of property in the goods or lives of their subjects; but God cannot do any wrong, whatever the clamours of creatures are, because He can do nothing but what He has a sovereign right to do. If He takes away your goods He takes not anything that is yours more than His own, since though he entrusted you with them He divested not Himself of the property.

When He takes away our lives, He takes what He gave us by a temporary tion, to be surrendered at His call. We can claim no right in anything l His will. He is no debtor to us; and since He owes us nothing, He can wr in nothing that He takes away. His own sovereignty excuseth Him those acts which are most distasteful to the creature. If we crop a medica for our use, or a flower for our pleasure, or kill a lamb for our food, neither of them any wrong; because the original of them was for our us they had their life, and nourishment, and pleasing qualities for our delig support; and are not we much more made for the pleasure and use of Go any of those can be for us? He is not our Lord by election; He was s before we were in being; He had no terms put upon Him. Who capitulate Him and set Him on His throne by covenant? What oath did He take subject at His first investiture in His authority? His right is as natu eternal as Himself; as natural as His existence, and as eternal as His Hath He any law but His own will? What wrong can He do that bre law, that fulfils His law in everything He does by fulfilling His own will, as it is absolutely sovereign, so it is infinitely righteous? In whatsoever He from us then He cannot injure us; it is no crime in any man to seize up own goods, to vindicate his own honour; and shall it be thought a wrong i to do such things? Besides, the occasion He has from every man, and that day provoking Him to do it, He seems rather to wrong Himself by forb such a seizure, than wrong us by executing it.—*S. Charnock, on the Domi God.*

CHAPTER II.

Why was Man created capable of being evil?

MORAL evil is the choice of a free will turning away from that which is good and right. What is moral goodness? Goodness is the persistent voluntary choice of that which is right for the sole reason that it is so, uninfluenced by any other consideration.[1]

There cannot, therefore, be any moral goodness in a being incapable of any voluntary self-originated choice. But a being capable of voluntarily choosing the right must be also capable of refusing so to choose, as otherwise its acts would not be voluntary, and therefore not morally good. There is none of this highest kind of goodness in clockwork, in the machinery of an automaton, nor yet in the lower animals, unless so far as it is possible they may have conscious self-determination. All these may be in a certain sense good, but the goodness is not theirs, but his, who so made them as to work out such good ends. If God, therefore, desired to create a being morally and voluntarily good, He would create one capable (as regards liberty of will) of being morally and voluntarily evil. It is absurd to say, that if God is omnipotent He could have created a being capable of good only and not of evil, for omnipotence does not extend to the reconciling of contradictories;[2] and if

[1] *Ουδε ὁμοιον εστι επι τε των τεχνων, και των αρετων· τα μεν γαρ ὑπο των τεχνων γινομενα, το ευ εχει εν ἑαυτοις· αρκει ουν ταυτα πως εχοντα γενεσθαι· τα δι κατα τας αρετας γινομενα, ουκ εαν αυτα πως εχῃ, δικαιως η σωφρονως πραττεται, αλλα και εαν ὁ πραττων πως εχων πραττῃ· πρωτον μεν εαν ειδως· επειτ' εαν προαιρουμενος, και προαιρουμενος δι'αυτα· το δε τριτον, και εαν βεβαιως και αμετακινητως εχων πραττῃ.—Aristotle. Nich. Eth.* lib. iii. c. iv.

[2] *Αλλα δια τι ουκ εν τῃ κατασκευῃ το αναμαρτητον εχομεν, φησιν, ὡστε μηδε*

it did, the will to work opposites at the same time could only arise from ignorance or fickleness, which must be both alike impossible in perfect Deity. That God should determine to create a race of beings capable of understanding and being really good, is certainly not inconsistent with, but rather an evidence of His goodness. If so, in creating such a race (since it is as absurd to suppose a race of beings capable of good and incapable of evil, as to imagine a circle whose circumference should not be greater than its diameter) He would create a race of beings capable of choosing and being evil, and would do so solely because He is perfectly good. Moral evil is, therefore, possible in the universe, because God wills that moral goodness should be there.

But God foresaw from the beginning, that some men would choose moral evil, and so give occasion to the introduction of physical evil also, by way of just punishment. Does this materially alter the case? Surely not. The permission of existence to a being capable of moral goodness, and which should find its greatest happiness in being good, though, with the foreknowledge that it will abuse its powers and bring evil

βουλομενοις ἡμιν ὑπαρχειν το ἁμαρτανειν; *Οτι και συ τους οικετας, ουχ ὁταν δεσμιους εχῃς ευνους ὑπολαμβανεις· αλλ' ὁταν ἑκουσιως ιδῃς αποπληρουντας σοι τα καθηκοντα. Και Θεῳ τοινυν ου το ηναγκασμενον φιλον, αλλα το ἐξ αρετης καθορθουμενον. Αρετη δε εκ προαιρεσεως και ουκ ἐξ αναγκης γενεται. Προαιρεσις δε, των ἐφ' ἡμιν ηρτηται· το δε ἐφ' ἡμιν εστι, το αυτεξουσιον. Ὁ τοινον μεμφομενος τον ποιητην ὡς μη κατασκευασαντα ἡμας αναμαρτητους, ουδεν ἑτερον η την αλογον φυσιν της λογικης προτιμᾷ· και την ακινητον, και ανορμητον, της προαιρετικης και εμπρακτου.*—*Basil Hom. q. D. n. e. a. m.* Peccatum consideratum ut actus voluntatis internus a Deo omnipotentia sua non impeditur, imo nisi destructa voluntatis libertate impediri nequit. Dices; Tum homo fortior esset Dei, si ille aliquid contra Dei voluntatem possit velle. Resp. Fortitudo aut potentia non consistit in volendo aut nolendo, sed in potentia exequendi quicquid vis aut non vis, seseque ab alterius potentia, qui te propterea punire vult, tuendi. Neutrum horum homo potest. Voluntas esse potest in homine maxime debili et infirmo, rebellandi principi aut magistratui, imo et in malifico, qui ad supplicium vinctus ducitur: nemo tamen eum propterea principe suo fortiorem dicet. Deinde potest et Deus ipsam voluntatem destruere, hominisque brutalem quandam naturam indere ut Nebuchadnezari. Verum salva manente libertate, actus voluntatis internus seu elicitus, per omnipotentiam divinam impediri nequit.—*Limborch. Theologia Christiana*, lib. ii. c. xxviii.

upon itself, is in no respect the cause of either form of evil; for to foreknow is not to cause,[1] and where a will is free to determine itself, in which state alone it can be capable of being morally evil, there can never be any external cause whatever of its determination. That which we are by nature is alone God's act, that which we are by choice it is not His will that has made us. He gave us power to do, or to forbear, and gave us a sense of right to guide us; if we, therefore, fall away, He is blameless and we are justly condemned.[2] It may be suggested, that possibly God might have allowed those only to come into existence who would choose rightly; but this would have been to have undone His own act; certainly, if there were any reason why some of a race should never be allowed to exist, that race would have been so constituted at first as not to have included any such members.

God is Himself capable of goodness, and yet incapable of evil; how can this be reconciled with what we have just said of the connection between the two? God cannot do evil, only because He will not. The eternal and immutable direction of the will of the Almighty to good is secured by many causes which cannot have existence in finite creatures; take for one instance that very immutability, which must have place in all absolute and necessarily eternal existence, but goodness in a created being must be a derived and imitative, not an original

[1] Sed præsciebat quod eorum futura esset voluntas mala. Præsciebat sane et quia falli non potest ejus præscientia, ideo non ipsius sed eorum est voluntas mala.—*Aug. De Gen. ad Lit.* lib. xi. s. 12.

[2] *Το ἡμιν και το εφ'ἡμιν αλληλων διαφερει· ἡμεις μεν αρρενες και θελειαι εσμεν· εφ' ἡμιν δε, το ειναι σωφρονας, η πορνους. Στεφανουμεθα ουν η κολαζομεθα δια το εφ'ἡμιν· εφ'ὰ γαρ ἡ προαιρεσις ἡμων αγει ἡμας, δια ταυτα η στεφανουμεθα η κολαζομεθα. Και γαρ προς το πραττειν δεδωκεν ἡμιν ὁ Θεος δυναμεις· αλλα ταυτας ὑπεταξε τῃ εξουσιᾳ της προαιρεσεως, και προς την προαιρεσιν εχει ὁ Θεος την δικην κυβερνιτικην των εν ἡμιν προαιρετικων δυναμεων, και ου προς την φυσιν. Ελαβομεν δε παρα του Θεου του πραττειν και το μη πραττειν την δυναμιν· πραττειν μεν τα δικαια, ου πραττειν δε τα αδικα. Ὁταν ουν ὁυτως πραττωμεν και μη πραττωμεν, δικαιως στεφανουμεθα· μετατιθεντες δε το πραττειν και το μη πραττειν εις το αντικειμενον, δικαιως κολαζομεθα.—Quæst. et Resp. ad Orthodoxos. Resp.* ix.

and essential quality or habit.[1] But why is not the constitution of all God's works so ordered as to lead to goodness? If the universe and all it contains are, as they certainly seem to be, so ordered as that the ultimate effect of all possible motives to action must be to advance goodness, yet a comprehension of the constitution of the entire universe must be necessary to the realization of the true unity of these motives; in the absence of such entire comprehension, it is evident that man may mistake and go astray, and no finite being can thoroughly comprehend even itself, much less the universe, which contains itself and so much beside. I suppose it is to obviate the effects of this ignorance that man is endowed with conscience and a moral perception of right and wrong, the accordance of which with what perfect knowledge would make other motives of action, is well attested by the theories of those, who think to teach morality by school instruction in social philosophy and that class of sciences. Yet why was not this moral sense made so strong as to be irresistible, and so man effectually preserved from all offences? Because God did not will it. Why did He not will it? We do not know.[2]

[1] " Er kann das Gute nicht auf schlecthin ursprüngliche und selbstbestandige Weise in sich setzen, und hat es darum nicht als sein eignen Wesen; sondern er kann nur gut sein durch sein Verhalten zu einem von ihm verschiednen, ihm in seiner Existenzbedingenden Wesen, zu Gott. Weil aber der Mensch das Gute nicht als sein eignes Wesen hat, so geht bei ihm vermöge seiner Sebstbestimmung neben der Möglichkeit und dem Sollen des Guten die Möglichkeit des Bösen, des Abfalls von Gott her."— *Julius Müller. Christlicher Lehre von der Sünde*, vol. ii. p. 191. The same author, though he says, as I think, mistakenly, " An und für sich liegt ja keinesweges im Begriffe der Freiheit wesentlich die Möglichkeit des Bösens," yet, having alleged the goodness of the Deity in proof of that position, concludes thus: " So ist *durch die ewige Wirklichkeit seines Willens* diese Möglichkeit schlechthin aufgehoben." I cannot but think that some have confused abstract freedom of will to will, with freedom of will from powerful seductive persuasions to will in a certain manner. See *Anselm, de Libero Arbitrio*, and the elaborate chapter on Pelagius and Augustine in *Neander's Church History*.

[2] Præterea quæri solet: cur Deus hominem temptari permiserit quem decipiendum fore præsciebat? Sed non esset laudabile homini si ideo bene vivere posset, quia nemo male vivere suaderet, cum in natura posse, et in potestate

But is it not inconsistent with perfect goodness that God, being able to make man sinless, should have made him as he is? This objection is of substantially the same nature as if it should be said, that it is not enough to set good and sufficient food before a famishing man without compelling him to eat it. I suppose, in such a case, it would be clear that, whether the hungry man chose to starve or no, it could in no way be chargeable upon his entertainer. God has provided man with a moral perception and moral instruction sufficient to tell him that he ought always to be careful to do well, but has not given him so strong a bias to good, but what some exercise of his own volition, some co-operation on his part, is still necessary; but, if man is to be rewarded for doing well, this volition cannot be unjustly required as a condition of obtaining that reward. Man himself can never object to this gift of free will as an evil, for its first and only immediate effect is to raise him in the scale of creation, to give him a greater likeness to God, and a capacity for a much higher goodness and happiness than any creature wanting such

habere velle, non consentire suadenti (Deo juvante), et gloriosius non consentire quam temptari non posse. Moventur etiam quidam dicentes: cur creavit Deus quos futuros malos præsciebat? Quia providit quid boni de malis eorum esset facturus. Sic enim eos fecit ut relinqueret eis utrum aliquid facerent, et si culpabiliter aliquid facerent, illum de se laudabiliter operantem invenirent; a se habent voluntatem malam, ab Illo naturam bonam et justam pœnam. Frustra ergo dicitur non deberet Deus creare quos præsciebat malos futuros, sciebat enim bonis profuturos et juste pro mala voluntate puniendos. Addunt etiam talem hominem debere facere qui nollet omnino peccare. Concedimus quidem meliorem naturam esse quæ omnino peccare nollet; concedant et ipsi non esse malam quæ talis facta est ut posset non peccare si vellet: et juste punitam quæ voluntate non necessitate peccavit. Cum ergo hæc bona sit, illa melior, cur non utramque ut uberius laudaretur de utraque. Illa enim de sanctis angelis, hic de hominibus est. Item inquiunt: Si Deus vellet et illi boni essent. Et hoc quidem concedimus, sed melius voluit ut quod vellent essent, et boni quidem non infructuose, mali vero non impune essent. Item, inquiunt: Posset Deus voluntatem eorum vertere in bonum, quia omnipotens est. Posset revera. Cur non fecit? Quia noluit. Cur noluit? Ipse novit, non debemus plus sapere quam oportet.—*Peter Lombard. Liber Sententiarum*, ii. dis. 23 a. The substance of this is taken from Augustine, *De Gen. ad Lit.* lib. xi.

powers of self-determination could ever attain to.[1] There is not, there cannot be anything evil in so noble a power viewed in itself; he that consciously abuses it can alone complain, but his mouth is stopped by that very fact of his having consciously abused it, so that there can remain nothing due to the Creator but the praise of having made so noble a creature.

But the objection is probably intended to amount to this, that if a perfectly good being is able to confer many benefits, he must, by reason of his being perfectly good, confer the greatest, and the greatest only. It would then follow that there could be but one order of beings in the universe, and that in all probability the Divine. Our objector is perhaps scarcely prepared for this, and will suggest that it would not be inconsistent with the Divine goodness to create any perfectly happy, or indeed any senseless being, however finite, because such beings would enjoy the utmost felicity they were capable of, and would have received nothing but good at the hand of their Maker. But we have shown already that man has received nothing but good by his creation, and as to the rest, who can say that man has not and will not in the whole of his existence taken as one period, have enjoyed as much felicity as he is capable of, especially seeing that for this purpose you must take him strictly as he is, without any idealization of, or supposed improvement in, his nature and character; and it is impossible to be sure that a morally evil being is by nature capable of any higher happiness than a temporary enjoyment followed by continuing pain. Since, however, we are not speaking of things as already made, but

[1] Haben wir nun die Macht der freien Selbstbestimmung schon früher als das höchste Selbstsein, dessen das Geschöpf fähig ist erkannt, so ist doch dieses Selbstsein des Geschöpfes keinesweges schon für sich als ein Keim oder Anfang des Bösen, des Selbstsuchts, zu betrachten. Vielmehr ist es die nothwendige Bedingung des wahrhaft Guten im Geschöpfe, der Liebe zu Gott und alles dessen, was sich aus dieser im Verhältniss zu Gott und Menschen Heiliges und Vollkommenes entfaltet.—*Julius Müller. Christliche Lehre von der Sünde*, vol. ii. p. 193.

of what must have determined God's will before, and in the act of making them, it is clear that if He had the power of giving being to perfect conscious happiness, and if His goodness would only allow Him to confer the greatest possible benefit, then it would have been impossible for Him ever to have given existence to a stone, because it would undoubtedly have been a greater benefit to the stone, regarded as a mere something in being, to have been endued with sense and conscious happiness. Again, as to the finite being supposed to be perfectly happy, it would have been a greater benefit to it to have been gifted with perfect wisdom as well as perfect happiness; and besides, though we may talk of perfect happiness in finite beings, meaning that they enjoy all they are capable of, yet since the higher we go in other qualities the higher is the degree of happiness the members of each class are capable of, it is evident that perfect happiness in the mind of the Deity must include all those other perfections which are capable of enhancing and increasing the possible happiness of their possessor; as to any finite spirit, therefore, it would have been inconsistent with the Divine goodness to have made such a one at all.

It is so obviously absurd a consequence, that because God is perfectly good it must therefore be impossible for Him to create a diamond, or a happy spirit, that we may well pause to consider the truth of that description of perfect goodness which we have been arguing upon, and enquire a little into what we ought to mean by the expression. All goodness, so far as it is good, is perfectly good; all that is signified by the epithet perfect is, that the goodness we speak of is entirely free from any taint of ill-will.[2] Is there, then, necessarily the least evil

[2] Perhaps Divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a bare single disposition to produce happiness, but a disposition to make the good, the faithful, the honest man happy.—*Butler's Analogy*, p. i. ch. ii. s. i.

intention in conferring even the smallest conceivable benefit? Certainly not; nay, though much greater benefits might have been conferred, it yet shows no evil intention in the Giver that He confers only the smaller, because all things good in themselves must be purely good in the giving with regard to every one who receives them, without having had previously any just claim to them; and because the conferring in such a case of any benefit conclusively negatives the existence of any ill-will, and so proves the perfect goodness, in relation to the giver of that particular action. When, under such circumstances, better things are given to one than to another, we can only say (observe I speak of those cases where the receiver has no antecedent right whatever) that the goodness of the common benefactor, purely good as He is to all, flows more largely in one channel than in another, and there can be no reason why it should not rightly do so, except in the specially excluded case of previous title in any of the recipients. It is clear then, since that which could never exist at all, but for the spontaneous determination of its Creator, can have no antecedent title to any benefit whatever at the hands of that Creator; that if mankind, and created things generally, have not received all that possibly God might have conferred, but only smaller benefits, we cannot therefore conclude that God is not perfectly good, but rather, as all His gifts are in themselves real benefits, we must conclude that He is so.

It should seem that we limit too much the operation of perfect goodness, when we think to confine it to the conferring of the greatest possible benefits only. Would it not be more perfect to confer every possible benefit, from the greatest to the least?[1] Certainly, if to the greatest conceivable amount

[1] Talem, inquiunt, faceret hominem, qui nollet omnino peccare. Ecce nos concedimus meliorem esse naturam, quæ omnino peccare nolit: concedant et ipsi non esse malam naturam, quæ sic facta est, ut posset non peccare si nollet, et justam esse sententiam qua punita est, quæ voluntate non necessitate peccavit. Sicut ergo ratio vera docet meliorem esse naturam, quam prorsus nihil delectat

of happiness you add the very least, the total is really increased. It appears to me, that if we are to argue at all from the supposed effect of perfect benevolence on the will of the Deity, then we must conclude, that every possible gift will be given to His creatures, and fitting creatures made to receive each particular gift; the result of this would be, that there must be a perfect series of beings, corresponding to the communicable blessings in the power of the Almighty to give, reaching possibly from a communication of the Divine Nature itself down to the lowest form of mere existence. There would then be no inconsistency between the perfect goodness of the Creator and the gift to man, that is to one of the series, of a nature far from being the most perfect conceivable. The perfection in this case of each being would be, perfection in its adaptation to receive that particular gift which should mark its place in the series.[2] Again, if there is some limit in the nature of things, to the highest possible order of existence, we might expect others of other classes, or suppose, that in place of one individual of the higher order two were created of the next degree, the same amount of benefit would be conferred, and therefore the same goodness shown, or probably rather more; and if the series be so small in its graduated increase as to make the differences almost imperceptible,

illicitum: ita ratio vera nihilominus docet etiam illam bonam esse, quæ habet in potestate illicitam delectionem, si extiterit, ita cohibere, ut non solum de cæteris licitis recteque factis, verum etiam de ipsius pravæ delectationis cohibitione lætetur. Cum ergo hæc natura bona sit, illa melior, cur illam solam, et non utramque potius faceret Deus? Ac per hoc qui parati erant de illa sola laudare Deum, uberius eum debent laudare de utraque. Ille quippe est in sanctis Angelis, hæc in sanctis hominibus. Qui autem sibi partes iniquitatis elegerunt, laudabilemque naturam culpabili voluntate depravarunt, non quia præsciti sunt, ideo creari minime debuerunt. Habent enim et ipsi locum suum, quem in rebus impleant pro utilitate sanctorum. Nam Deus nec justitia cujusquam recti hominis eget, quanto minus iniquitate perversi?—*Augustine. De Genesi ad lit.* lib. xi. ch. ix.

[2] We must never forget that the question is not whether perfect goodness would not give equal gifts to a number of pre-existing beings, but whether it would create a series of equal beings to begin with.

then a very small increase in the number of objects would fully compensate for the lower degree of perfection attained by each; so that the aggregate of the several steps in the series might be equal each to each, and as a whole equal to an equal number of individuals of the highest order; if so, it certainly seems that the series would be a much better exhibition of wisdom and power than the mere repetition of similar individuals. It would be curious to examine whether we have not some evidence of the existence of such a series in actual nature. Very probably some links in the chain would be—intelligence without a sense of morality, intelligence coupled with and directed by a moral sense, but this last requiring volition to give effect to it[1]—intelligence with the moral sense so strong as to require volition to overcome it, and then intelligence coupled with a moral sense so strong as to direct the volition itself. Each of these, except the last, which might be absolutely free, would require a different mode of government, and each would probably possess a different degree of intellectual and actual power, corresponding to the force of its moral tendency to right.

Existence is and must ever be a blessing until it becomes as a whole rather more painful than pleasant; this no man will say that human life is, even as we see it: witness the general shrinking from death, and how universally even those who fear to live for the future would gladly be young again, and begin their life anew. But since we do not see the whole of the life of our species, and cannot tell how happy the future may be, it is impossible to conclude that our life is not a blessing; one of the smallest blessings perhaps (though in my

[1] Ora un Gerarchia tale, che debba anche a se stessa la sua felicità, che abbia dritto ad esser felice, che abbia il piacer di saperlo, e di esser ammirata, e applaudita, ella è certo preferibile al non esistere, o al non essere prodotta. Dunque aver dee luogo nello immenso Universo, che abbracci tutte le compossibili Gerarchie, preferibili dico della divina Bontà al non produrle.—*Gualberti di Soria. Della Esistenza di Dio*, &c.

judgment far otherwise) which it was in God's power to give, yet still a real blessing; and one in which, as we are wholly indebted for it to Him, we must acknowledge Him to have been only and simply good towards us. For this we can make Him no return, for we are and have nothing that is not His already; therefore must we ever thank Him even for the least of all His mercies as for something which, since we had not the slightest claim to it before He made us to receive it, can only proceed from perfect and pure beneficence.

Now, as regards sin, and the suffering consequent upon it, these do not come from God;[2] they spring, as we have seen, from man himself, and can only exist so far as man has a really originative power within himself, and, as regards God, they are an abuse of powers given by Him for good ends, an abuse of His beneficence, contrary to His will and to the true constitution of man's own nature, and even the possibility of their existence is a strong testimony to the noble and glorious powers granted to man by the mere goodness of his Creator. Why should God interfere to prevent them? To do so would be to withdraw a benefit from the creature, to deprive it of its liberty, and take away a part of its highest privileges, nay

[2] The goodness of God is not impaired by suffering sin to enter into the world, and man to fall thereby; it is rather a testimony of God's goodness that He gave man an ability to be happy, than any charge against His goodness, that He settled man in a capacity to be evil. God was first a benefactor to man before man could be a rebel against God. To what purpose should God make a law to govern his rational creature, and yet resolve that creature should not have his choice whether he would obey it or no? Had he been really constrained to observe it, his observation of it could no more have been called obedience than the acts of brutes, that have a kind of natural constraint upon them by the instinct of their nature, can be called obedience. In vain had God endowed a creature with so great and noble a principle as liberty. Had it been goodness in God, after He had made a reasonable creature, to govern him in the same manner as He did brutes, by a necessary instinct? It was the goodness of God to the nature of men and angels, to leave them in such a condition to be able to give Him a voluntary obedience, a nobler offering than the whole creation could present Him with. And shall this goodness be undervalued and accounted mean because man made an ill use of it and turned it into wantonness?—*S. Charnock. Of the Goodness of God.*

[illegible] good. God Himself these [illegible] and independent in [illegible] determined by the voluntary and [illegible] creatures, and His love of [illegible] rewarding the good and in [illegible] complain, for the whole [illegible] and the rest of [illegible] injured, but, [illegible] between sin and [illegible] and love of goodness in [illegible] Thus the misery of [illegible] as regards the sufferer, is [illegible] and as regards all the [illegible] and works to a good end.

[illegible] can only be [illegible] appeared to the [illegible] had com- [illegible] —Was it an act of goodness or [illegible] part therein, to make [illegible] yet unmade. [illegible] will become evil, [illegible] will become good. Now [illegible] the good and evil possible in any creatures are both alike indifferent; neither [illegible] away from His happi-

quis [illegible] appeared quid impune committeret? quis custodiret, quod sine [illegible] admisset? Lege nil vam licere et malo frequentiorem: nonne [illegible] interdixerat, nihil in illa interesse? Horremus terribiles minas [illegible] creatoris, et vim a malo avellimus: quid si nihil minaretur? Hanc justitiam, malum dicas, quæ malo nec favet? Hanc bonum negabis, quæ bono prospicit? non qualem oportet Deum velis: qualem malles expediret, sub quo delicta gauderent, cui diabolus libaret? Illum bonum judicares Deum qui hominem *posset magis malum facere*, securitate delicti? Quis boni auctor nisi qui et exactor? Proinde, quis mali extraneus, nisi qui et inimicus? Quis inimicus, nisi qui et expugnator? Quis expugnator, nisi qui et punitor. Sic totus Deus *bonus est*, dum *pro bono* omnia est. Sic denique omnipotens, quia et juvandi et *ludendi potens*.—*Tertullian adv. Marc.* v. ii.

ness, as He is perfect in all things: even compassion in Him cannot be what it is in us, a fellow feeling of misery, but can only be a disposition of will towards the sufferer, similar to that which would be produced in man by the force of sympathy.[2] Man is not necessarily to his Creator, in this respect, more than the work of a handicraftsman is to him, the character of whose work does not directly bring him sorrow or joy; the real cause of his joy or sorrow in contemplating it is the discovery of his own inability to produce a fine piece of workmanship, or the self congratulation incident to the knowledge that he has, and has exhibited consummate skill. With God there can be no such feelings; the qualities of His creatures cannot produce in Him any new feeling of joy or pain, they can only determine His will as to what offices and states those several creatures shall be placed in. The goodness of the Deity we may expect to operate only to cause Him to will and do all those things, which are directly and in themselves good, and to make impossible the doing, or willing anything that is in the least degree otherwise; thus, viewed in relation to God and in its own nature, the act of giving existence to a being having a free will of its own, and capable of and having a natural impulse to a certain perfection, must be equally good in every case, however the will of that being may choose afterwards to exercise its power of self-determination, God's act being precisely the same in both cases. As regards the creature so made, God's will towards it when made must be, that its position and state shall be such as best becomes its voluntary

[2] Sed et misericors simul et impassibilis quomodo es? Nam si es impassibilis, non est tibi miserum cor ex compassione miseri; quod est esse misericordem. At si non es misericors, unde miseris est tanta consolatio? Quomodo ergo es et non es misericors, Domine; nisi quia es misericors secundum nos, et non es secundum Te? Es quippe secundum sensum nostrum, et non es secundum Tuum. Etenim cum Tu respicis nos miseros, nos sentimus misericordis effectum; Tu non sentis affectum. Et misericors es igitur, quia miseros salvas, et peccatoribus Tuis parcis; et misericors non es, quia nulla miseriæ compassione afficeris.—*Anselm. Proslogium.* cap. viii.

character, and has the strongest tendency to bring it to its proper perfection. We cannot say that if it chooses to become evil, His goodness still wills its happiness, and His justice demands its misery, because in perfection no two qualities can clash, and in regard to a moral being, if it use its powers well, justice and goodness both direct that it should be made happy; if it use them amiss, justice requires that it should not be made happy; and to make an evil-doer happy in his evil-doing is not goodness, but either weakness or criminal encouragement of wrong. Why not make it happy by making it good? Because, to make it happy by any interference with its liberty, or in any way but by its own willing choice of goodness, is equally to make it happy in its wickedness.[1] If, as to the rest of creation, the existence of an evil being were *necessarily* evil in relation to them, then no doubt that would be a reason for forbidding and preventing it; but as we know, on the contrary, that God being omnipotent can,[2] and as we see does in fact continually make the evil intention of one work directly to the benefit of another, there can be, as regards the will of God, nothing in this respect to determine it against the creation of such a being. To sum up the whole, we have seen, that God may, without impeachment of His perfect goodness, create beings not possessing all conceivable perfections, and may therefore create a being possessed of a free will, and therefore capable of both good and evil, whose happiness shall depend upon its willingness to exercise that will aright; and, by a consideration of the relations the creation of such a being

[1] It does not belong to the argument here to speak of Christianity, which has opened a way to happiness, by putting supernatural aids to the attainment of goodness within the reach of man's free will, by making him (if he will, and then only) a good and happy creature.

[2] Qua propter nec naturæ Dei nocere omnino potest, nec alicui naturæ sub Deo noceri injuste potest: quia et cum peccando injuste aliqui nocent, voluntas injusta eis imputatur; potestas autem qua nocere permittuntur, non est nisi a Deo, qui et ipsis nescientibus novit quid illi pati debeant, quibus eos nocere permittit. —*Augustine, De Natura Boni.*

would have to the goodness of the Deity, we have been led to think, that there is no reason why such a being should not be created, either in regard to its Maker, itself, or the rest of creation; while there is, on the other hand, this reason in favour of its creation, that that would be an act of pure beneficence in the Creator. If, therefore, we are asked—How is it possible that God should have created a being capable of falling into sin, and of becoming evil?—we may answer, that there may be a sufficient cause in the very fact that He is all good.

CHAPTER III.

Of Justice, and of a State of Probation.

THE intention to cause suffering is generally an evidence of moral evil, but not always. There are cases in which it is even wrong not to do that which will cause pain; there are, therefore, cases in which an all-perfect Deity, who will not destroy the free will of his creatures, or any of its immediate effects, may permit, if indeed He will not cause, physical evil in the universe. Moral evil is alone that essentially evil thing which no goodness can ever wish for.[1] But if, for instance, by knocking down an assassin I can prevent a murder, though the act under other circumstances would be wrong in itself, in these it would be not only justifiable, but a duty; so much so, that he who should refuse to do it would be guilty of very nearly the whole preventible crime. So again of a surgeon; he may in the course of his duty inflict considerable pain and cause much suffering and many disfigurements, which without good cause would have been highly criminal, yet, when rightly used, the operations that produce them may properly win for him the highest esteem, respect, and gratitude.[2] He there-

[1] *Το μεν ουν κυριως κακον ἡ ἁμαρτια· ὁπερ μαλιστα εστι της του κακου προσηγοριας αξιον, εκ της ἡμετερας προαιρεσεως ηρτηται, εφ'ἡμιν οντος η απεχεσθαι της πονηριας, η μοχθηρους ειναι. Των δε λοιπων, τα μεν ὡς αγωνισματα, εις επιδειξιν ανδρειας προβαλλεται· ὡς τῳ Ιωβ ἡ των παιδων στερησις &c.—τα δε, ὡς θεραπεια των ἡμαρτημενων· ὡς τῳ Δαβιδ ἡ περι τον οικον αισχυνη &c.—Και παλιν κατανοησαμεν αλλο τι ειδος των φοβερων παρα της δικαιας του θεου κρισεως επαγομενον, επι τῳ σωφρονεστερους ποιησαι τους προς ἁμαρτιαν ενολισθητους, ὡς ὁ Δαθαν και Αβειρων ὑπο της γης κατεποθησαν. &c.—Basil Hom. q. D. n. e. auctor mal.*

[2] *Ὡς ουν ευεργετης ὁ ιατρος, καν πονους, καν αλγηδονας εμποιῃ τῳ σωματι (τῃ νοσῳ γαρ μαχεται, ουχι τῳ καμνοντι,) ὁυτως αγαθος ὁ Θεος ὁ την σωτηριαν τῳ παντι δια των μερικων κολασεων διοικουμενος, συ δε τῳ ιατρῳ μεν ουδεν εγκαλεις· τα μεν*

fore, upon whose care the welfare of all depends, the fosterer of right throughout the universe, may, nay possibly must, cause much seeming evil, because He is good. Again, the lawgivers and judges of every well-ordered community cause much suffering and are praiseworthy; how much more He whose laws control the lawgivers, and who is the Judge of all judges.

It is probable that, in each of the cases I have mentioned, the rule of justice, that he who causes evil ought to suffer for it, is at bottom the reason why it is right to cause physical evil, for in all cases the special object of attack is that which threatens or is actually causing evil. This law of justice has sometimes been spoken and thought of as if it were scarcely reconcileable with our idea of goodness, yet the feeling is of the same nature with that which tells us what is good, and must therefore be accepted with it, and allowed, if necessary, to qualify and restrict it whenever we attempt to speak of right and wrong.[3] Justice, however, is that which all men require as the measure of the conduct of others to-

τιμωντι, ταδε καιοντι, ταδε παντελως εξαιρουντι του σωματος· αλλα και χρηματα του ὑποτελεις, και σωτηρα προσαγορευεις, ὁτι εν ολιγῳ μερει την νοσον ἱστησι, πριν εις ὁλον το σωμα το παθος διαχυθηναι. Ὁταν δε ιδης πολιν επικατασεισθεισαν τοις ενοικουσιν, η πλοιον αυτανδρον κατα θαλασσης διαλυθεν, κατα του αληθινου ιατρου και σωτηρος γλωσσαν κινειν βλασφημον ουκ οκνεις και τοι γε ηχρην συνιεναι, ὁτι μετρια μεν καμνοντων και ιασιμα των ανθρωπων, ἀι εξ επιμελιας ωφελειαι παραλαμβανοντι· ὁταν δε κρειττον αποδειχθῃ της θεραπειας το παθος, αναγκαια γινεται του αχρειωθεντος ἡ αλλοτριωσις, ὡς μη δια συνεχειας την νοσον βαδιζουσαν, επι τα καιρια προσελθειν. Ὡσπερ ουν της τομης, η του ιατρος, ουχ ὁ ιατρος αιτιος αλλ' ἡ νοσος· οὑτω και οἱ των πολεων αφανισμοι, ικ της αμετριας των ἁμαρτανομενων την αρχην εχοντες, τον Θεον απασης μεμψεως απολυουσιν.—Basil. Hom. q. D. n. est auctor mali.

[3] The distribution of happiness and pain in the world, as we see it around us, is no difficulty and no argument at all against the existence of a moral Governor, unless there be such a propriety of pain to moral evil; and the fact that such a present connection does not appear [if it does not] shows that the sense or feeling of this relation or propriety is not drawn from experience and observation of the world as it is, and therefore must be drawn from out of our own natures, that is, a confession true and unbiassed, and made as it were in the face of contradicting facts, by our own conscience, as to what ought to be, not a statement of what is.—From a MS. Essay by *Edward Fry, Esq.*

wards themselves; it is perfect virtue in relation to society;[1] a just man is a man free from all blame, and there is no sense of injury without the idea of justice. A feeling that he who does evil suffers no wrong when corresponding evil is inflicted by way of punishment, is a universal feeling, as universal as the very perception of good and evil itself. All laws attest it; the right of self-defence rests upon it; the involuntary glow of passion is its evidence; and all virtuous indignation is but the expression of the great law of justice,—the law which declares that he who does evil ought to suffer for it. Whatever, therefore, is justly due to his offences, every man may, nay must, receive at the hands of God, who by reason of His almightiness must be the Judge, and of His goodness the just Judge of all mankind; so far, therefore, as men have done evil, the evil which they suffer may be a part of its just reward.[2]

All men suffer more or less; either, therefore, all men have done evil, or evil must be shown to exist with good cause without the previous evil-doing of each sufferer. We will

[1] *Αυτη μεν ουν ἡ δικαιοσυνη, αρετη μεν εστι τελεια, αλλ'ουκ ἁπλως, αλλα προς ἑτερον. Και δια τουτο πολλακις κρατιστη των αρετων ειναι δοκει ἡ δικαιοσυνη· και ουθ'ἑσπερος, ουθ'ἑωος ὁυτω θαυμαστος. Και παροιμιαζομενοι φαμεν,—Εν δε δικαιοσυνῃ συλληβδην πασ'αρετη'στι.—Και τελεια μαλιστα αρετη, ὁτι της τελειας αρετης χρησις εστι.—Arist. Nic. Eth.* v. 1.

[2] Incipe nunc etiam judicis statum ut ad finem mali arguere, qui idcirco alium Deum somniasti solummodo bonum, quia non potes judicem: quanquam et illum ut judicem ostendimus. Aut si non judicem, certe perversum ac vanum, disciplinæ non vindicandæ, id est non judicandæ constitutorem. Non reprobas autem Deum judicem, qui non judicem Deum probas? Ipsam sine dubio justitiam accusare debebis, quæ judicem præstat, aut et eam in species malitiæ deputare, id est, injustitiam in titulos bonitatis adscribere. Nunc enim justitia malum, si injustitia bonum. Porro cum cogeris injustitiam de pessimis pronunciare, eodem jugo urgeris justitiam de optimis censere. Nihil enim æmulum mali non bonum, sicut et boni æmulum nihil non malum. Igitur quanto malum injustitia, tanto bonum justitia. Nec species solummodo, sed tutela reputanda bonitatis; quia bonitas nisi justitia regatur ut justa sit, non erit bonitas, si injusta sit. Nihil enim bonum, quod injustum, bonum autem omne quod justum. Ita si societas et conspiratio bonitatis atque justitiæ separationem earum non potest capere, quo ore constitues diversitatem duorum deorum in separationem, &c.—*Tertullian, Adv. Marc.* lib. ii. c. 11 and 12.

assume that all men have not done evil. Now there is no dispute among Theists but that man's existence does not terminate on earth, but after death he shall enter into a new state, whose pains or pleasures will be regulated according to his good or evil conduct here, while he had the power of both; in other words, man is in a state of probation, and having a power of choice, shall hereafter receive according to his exercise of it; evil to him who delighted in evil, and good to him whose pleasure was in goodness. Now no man can demonstrate that this is not so; no man is entitled, therefore, to say that what on such a supposition would be right is not actually so. But how can a man consciously shun pain which he has never felt, or desire pleasure which he has never tasted? To be fairly swayed by such motives, he must know both; evil, therefore, may perhaps be in the world, that he may know what to avoid, as pleasure may be there, that he may be induced to seek that which will procure it.[3] It is manifest that very few virtues could be exhibited by man, if indeed any, and very few of his high endowments used to any purpose, were not the

[3] No man can make an election of the better, and know what's really Good, unless at the same time he know also what's really Evil, and how to reject and avoid the worse. Those two objects, though absolute contraries, are yet perfect Relatives; though irreconcileable Enemies, are yet consubsistent Twins, and live so connexed hand in hand, that the ablation of the one necessitates the ablation of the other. Good and Evil being thus blended together, and in this miscellany proposed to man; then begins that Criterion, Wisdome, to exercise its Faculties, display their discretive energy, and immediately exploring the difference, affects the Good for Utility, but rejects the Evil for Safety. As therefore there are innumerable Goods offered to the judgment of man, which he may with happiness enjoy; so also are there as many Evills, which he may with caution abhor. For if there were nothing Evill, nothing dangerous, in short nothing hurtfull to man; pray, what stead could his reason stand him in? And hence is it manifest, that whoever strikes at the necessity of Evill, at the same time cuts off the necessity of Wisdom, and downright adnulls the use of the Intellect: since if God had created nothing that might prove noxious to man, to what purpose would His Cogitation, Intellect, Science, and Reason have served? For then to what object soever He had extended His hand, though at adventure; yet would that have been by nature fit and commodious for him.—*Walter Charleton, M.D. The Darkness of Atheisme dispelled by the Light of Nature*, chap. v. sect. 3. art. 3.

world in which he is placed a chequered scene of good and evil, which calls forth every moment some exercise of his discretion, some manifestation of his moral disposition. To some extent even moral evil seems necessary to call out some of the most lovely virtues, such as patience, humility, disinterested love, and a kind, forbearing, and forgiving temper.[1] In a state of probation there must be some temptation to evil, for if there is every inducement for me to do well, and none whatever to do evil, I cannot be said to do well and to exhibit moral goodness in obeying those inducements. To take an instance. A man is accused of a murder which he has not committed; he tells the truth, and declares that he is innocent. Can he be said to exhibit any moral excellence in thus telling the truth? Can we conclude that he is therefore a hater of lies? Certainly not; it may be that he is wholly swayed by self-interest, and would in reality have scrupled neither the murder nor the lie. Thus moral excellence cannot be manifested where the inducements are not almost or altogether equal on both sides; nay, we think very little of virtue where it is not shown by choosing the right against a prospect of greater present pleasure in choosing otherwise.[2] There must, there-

[1] Nunc designare id brevissime satis est: Virtutem aut cerni non posse, nisi habeat vitia contraria; aut non esse perfectam, nisi exerceatur adversis. Hanc enim Deus bonorum, ac malorum voluit esse distantiam; ut qualitatem boni ex malo sciamus, item mali ex bono; nec alterius ratio intelligi, sublato altero potest. Deus ergo non exclusit malum; ut ratio virtutis constare posset. Quomodo enim patientia vim suam, nomenque retineret, si nihil esset, quod pati cogeremur? Quomodo laudem mereretur devota Deo suo fides; nisi esset aliquis, qui a Deo vellet avertere. Si enim virtus est, malis ac vitiis fortiter repugnare; apparet, sine malo ac vitio, nullam esse virtutem, quam Deus ut absolutam perfectamque redderet retinuit id, quod erat ei contrarium; cum quo depugnare posset. Agitata enim malis quatientibus, stabilitatem capit; et quanto frequentius impellitur, tanto firmius roboratur.—*Lactantius. De Justitia Div. Inst.* lib. v. ch. vii. *Ει δε μηδε τουτων, μηδε των αλλων αμαρτηματων ευθυς αι δικαι αμαρτησασιν επονται, θαυμαζειν ου δει. Οτι ου Δαιμονες εισι μονον οι κολαζοντες τας ψυχας, αλλα και αυτη εαυτην υπαγει τη δικη. Και οτι μενουσι τον απαντον χρονον, ουκ εχρην εν ολιγῳ παντων τυχειν· και δια το δειν ανθρωπινην αρετην ειναι. ει γαρ τοις αμαρτησασιν ευθυς ηκολουθουν αι δικαι, φοβῳ δικαιοπραγοντες ανθρωποι αρετην ουκ αν ειχον.—Sallustius Phil. De Diis et Mundo*, c. 19.

[2] Connected with this subject is the question often discussed among Christians:

fore, be some temptation to evil in the world, and therefore, possibly some evil being to act as tempter, or at least some seeming evil to be incurred in doing good, whether of positive loss or of missing some apparent and present benefit to act as an incentive to moral evil, and thereby give occasion for the exercise of goodness. Evil, therefore, may be in the world in order to give men an opportunity of being good and of manifesting their goodness; and again it may be in the world to punish those who choose amiss, and to deter others from following their example; and if after death men are to pass into a state of happiness or woe, according to their actions here, it may be that those who, though in the main good men are yet not faultless, may here on earth suffer some things as

why was Adam allowed to be tempted in Paradise? St. Basil says: Αλλα δια τι ην το ξυλον, φησιν, εν τῳ παραδεισῳ, δι' ὁν τῳ Διαβολῳ εμελλε προχωρησιν ἡ καθ' ἡμων επιχειρησις; ει γαρ μη ειχε της απατης το δελεαρ, πως αν ἡμας δια της παρακοης εις τον θανατον ὑπηγαγετο; ὁτι εδει ειναι εντολην την δοκιμαζουσαν ἡμων το ὑπηκοον, δια τουτο την φυτον ὡραιων καρπων ευφορον, ἱνα εν τῃ στοχῃ του ἡδεος, το της εγκρατειας καλον επιδειξαμενοι, των της ὑπομονης στεφανων δικαιως αξιωθωμεν.—*Hom. q. D. n. e. a. m.* Cyril of Alexandria gives this reason. Κατακοσμησας δε ουν το τεχνημα Θεος, την εν παραδεισῳ διαιταν εχαριζετο· επειδε γαρ εδει τοι ὁυτως κατηγλαισμενον, και τῃ των ανωθεν ἐγαθων αφθονιᾳ κατεστεμμενον, μη ευκολως αναφερεσθαι προς αλαζονειαν ἐαν, ἐγνοουντα την δουλειαν, και ὡς εστι μετρον των οικετικων· (το γαρ τοι λιαν ευρυ προς το ευκλες, και το αμετρως ελευθερον, αποφερει προς το ὑπερο φρυ και ἐπαρατον παθος·) προφασις αυτῳ του μη αγνοειν τον δεσποτην, ἐγκρατειας εδοθη νομος· ἱνα δι' αυτον καλοιτο προς αναμνησιν αει του μετ' ἐξουσιας προστεταχοτος, και ειδειη σαφως, ὡς εστιν ὑπεζευγμενος τοις του κρατουντος θεσμοις.—*De Ador. in Spir. et Ver.* lib. i. Augustine remarks on the same subject: In esca factum est. Non quidem mala nec noxia, nisi quia prohibita. Neque enim quicquam mali Deus in illo tantæ felicitatis paradiso crearet, atque plantaret. Sed obedientia commendata est in præcepto, quæ virtus in creatura rationali mater quodammodo est omnium custosque virtutum: quandoquidem sic facta est, ut ei subditam esse sit utile, perniciosam autem suam, non ejus a quo creata est, facere voluntatem. Hoc itaque de uno cibi genere non edendo, ubi aliorum tanta copia subjacebat, tam leve præceptum ad observandum, tam breve ad memoria retinendum, ubi præsertim nondum voluntati cupiditas resistebat, quod de pœna transgressionis postea subsecutum est, tanto majore injustitia violatum est, quanto faciliore posset observantia custodiri.—*Augustine. De Civitate Dei*, lib. xiv. c. xii. "We may observe that no moral precept could have been at all proper on this occasion, as there was then scarce a possibility of his transgressing any such; it must have been, therefore, some indifferent action, neither good nor evil in itself, but as far only as it was commanded or forbidden."—*Kennicott, Dissert. on the Tree of Life.*

if by way of acknowledgment of the atonement due from them before they can enter into their state of perfect happiness, while, on the other hand, those who do but little well may be wholly rewarded for that little on this side the grave, and thus much present inequality in the distribution of prosperity may perhaps be accounted for.[1]

I cannot leave this subject without remarking, that none of the more perfect creatures of an all-good Deity can exercise their moral faculties unless they are to a large extent ignorant of the constitution of the world in which they live, since that world, proceeding from such an author, must be so constituted as to make right and pleasure ultimately and substantially one; and if so, to any creature possessed of perfect knowledge and perfect powers of self-control, there could be no conflict of motives, and there would be no necessity for anything, and therefore probably nothing, but an enlightened sense of self-interest, which is not goodness. Similarly from the nature of the creature itself, since it could not be the work of perfect Deity if it were possible for it to desire, or follow anything evil for its own sake; the only way in which sin is likely to be possible is by the mistaking a lesser good for the greater, to which ignorance is also necessary, and which we find in fact to be a very common source of all kinds of sin. Thus our being in a state of probation may account for and require the seeming evils which attend our ignorance.

[1] Ευπραγουσι δε και ευθυνουσι και ευτεκνουσιν ανδρες πονηροι, ισως τινα μικρα αγαθα ποιησαντες, και ενταυθα τον μισθον αυτων απολαμβανοντες· ως ὁ πλουσιος εκεινος ὁ ακουσας· μνηθητι ὁτι απελαβες τα αγαθα του εν τῃ ζωῃ σου· τουτεστιν, επληρωθης τον μισθον των αγαθων ἐργων, ὡν επραξας· δυσπραγουσι δε ευλαβεις και ὁσιοι ενταυθα, ὁπως δια της θλιψεως καταρθεντες, ως ὁ Λαζαρος των ιδιων ἁμαρτιων, εκει λοιπον τελειως συν αυτῳ παρακληθωσιν.—*Quæstiones ad Antiochum inter opp. Athanasii. Resp.* 68. Εισι δε ὁι μεν, speculates Socrates in the Gorgias: ωφελουμενοι τε και δικην διδοντες ὑπο θεων τε και ανθρωπων, ὁυτοι οἱ αν ιασιμα ἁμαρτηματα ἁμαρτωσιν· ὁμως δε δι'αλγηδονων και οδυνων γιγνεται αυτοις ἡ ωφελεια και ενθαδε και εν ᾅδου· ου γαρ οἱον τε αλλως αδικιας απαλλατεσθαι.—*Gorgias*, 525.

CHAPTER IV.

Of Accidents and Irregularities in the Government of the World.

THE obvious freedom of man's moral choice may furnish a ready solution of the difficulty suggested by those seeming uncertainties in the government of the world which have been urged by some as evidence that the universe is directed by chance and accident. Although, no doubt, if God is perfect His will must be unchangeable; yet, if man have a free choice in his actions as well as in his intentions, the happening of things external must be governed according to man's will, in order that he may not disarrange the order of the whole; for if he alone had a free choice, and all else acted, as most things seem to do, in obedience to fixed and immutable laws, every action of man must affect in some degree the action of every other existing thing, and so he might unconsciously entirely change the course of nature. As in man-made machinery there must be compensating appliances to meet the uncertainty of action arising from natural causes, so there must probably be, and man's history seems to show that there has been a compensatory counteraction to meet the ever-varying choice of man in thought and deed. In the analogy suggested, since the uncertainty arises from human ignorance, not from natural freedom, full compensation may be provided by mere naturally inanimate appliances. The law which regulates the action of one thing being ascertained, that which acts upon a law its contradictory will of course effectually neutralize its operation, but of innate free will, nothing but the consequent dictates

of some other intelligent free will can be the constant contradictory.[1] To the continued maintenance and government of the universe, therefore, free will is necessary, and the manifestation of this free will is likely to consist in the happening of events governed by a law which defies all anterior calculation, and turns the actions of men to work perhaps the very opposite effects to those intended, precisely as the events we see in the world actually seem to happen, and as the experience of man has declared itself in the proverb, "Man proposes, but God disposes." The happening of irregularities and accidents may be accounted for in this manner, in perfect consistence with the acknowledgment of the obvious fact, that there is a course of nature and a regularity of action throughout the universe, which is so insuperable a difficulty in the way of those who would account for such things by attributing all to chance.

Uncertainty is most commonly alleged against the existence of a Perfect Ruler, as we find it in relation to the consequences of moral actions. Why, it is asked, are not good men always prosperous, and bad men always unfortunate? This question involves generally a confusion of very distinct things; physical actions have physical consequences, and moral actions should have moral consequences; to expect a man of good morality and worldly carelessness to have worldly prosperity, involves as true a contradiction as to expect a man of worldly

[1] This may be put as an argument for the existence of the Deity against the fatalists:—Istud autem ita deducitur quod ex humanarum actionum libertate necessario sequatur, non esse æternam et immutabilem in rerum natura omnium causarum concatenationem. Absque qua si non existit mundi Omnipotens Gubernator, naturalis omnium rerum ordo vacillabit, et tota natura per se corruptioni obnoxia redditur. Quod cum ab atheis maxime absurdum habeatur, et revere etiam sit, apparet nullum aliud hanc absurditatem declinandi superesse effugium, nisi statuamus existere mundi Creatorem et Dominum, qui omnipotentia et sapientia sua omnia dirigit, et naturæ ruinam quamdiu ipsi est libitum, præcludit.—*Cuper Arcana Atheismi rev. et ref.* b. ii. c. xi. If it should ever be proved that there is really no such thing as an accident in nature, this argument would remain untouched; the only difference would be, that then the governing free will must, from the very beginning, have foreseen and provided against human free actions.—*See Dr. Chalmer's Nat. Theol.*

prudence and application, but wholly destitute of moral virtues, to be peculiarly rewarded with peace of mind, and such like moral benefits. If this distinction be clearly seen, the objection almost vanishes; for it is an acknowledged truth, that good men are generally internally happy, and that careful, diligent men are generally successful in their worldly projects; in short, that excellence in each capacity has generally its appropriate reward.[2] I think we may say further, that of two men of equal diligence, equal ability, and equal advantages, the one of good, the other of bad moral character, the moral goodness of the one will turn the scale even of worldly prosperity decidedly in his favour; but the fact is, that few men, very few, are excellent in both respects, as there are few men of universal genius, so are there very few who are admirable for their moral character and at the same time excellent men of business. Where a good man in most respects is unfortunate in business, it may in nearly every instance be traced to his faults in business; and where he is also unhappy in himself, this unhappiness may be safely ascribed to moral causes, to his having neglected his worldly pursuits in circumstances in which carefulness and diligence in them had become moral duties, or else to his having set his heart, not on moral excellence, but on worldly greatness; in each case the defect has its own appropriate consequences. The man in general estimation most to be admired is he who, to all the other perfections of pure morality, adds this excellence (of pure morality also), a due and becoming attention to the concerns of his worldly business, and where shall we find such a man upon the whole unprosperous?

[2] "Good men surely are not treated in this world as they deserve, yet it is seldom, very seldom their goodness which makes them disliked, even in cases where it may seem to be so; but it is some behaviour or other which, however excusable, perhaps infinitely overbalanced by their virtues, yet is offensive, possibly wrong; however, such it may be as would pass off very well in a man of the world."—*Bp. Butler, MS. apud Mus. Brit.*

If we consider the state of mind of a good man in calamity, and compare it with that of one of an evil disposition, we shall see that to the first it is incomparably less a calamity than to the other. One who, suffering from sickness, bears his disease with patience, and allows it its proper work of drawing him away from useless and idle longings after transitory things, may be sometimes even happier than he was while in health, and must be always far happier than one full of an evil temper, who is not just at the moment of pleasurable excitement. Peace is the purest happiness, the good have it always, the evil never. Wealth, power, and reputation are not essential to happiness, and they are the appropriate rewards of worldly not of moral excellence.

Again, when we see a good man whose way has been full of troubles, we can never tell how far it is to that very circumstance that his virtues owe their strength; nor can we ever be certain of ourselves how much suffering some transitory misfortune may have saved us from; few men would not choose rather to suffer a little sickness, if the alternative were certain death; we should be very ready to acknowledge this in the case of a person who, by some painful accident, is hindered from sailing in a ship which founders at sea, with the loss of all on board; at first, no doubt, such a one would be sorry, but it would be the sorrow of ignorance, to be turned by knowledge into thankful joy. Such things must happen every day, where the benefit is not so obvious to those who receive it. In truth, when we think we see a good man unhappy, our estimate may err in both branches; we cannot see the heart of another, we may therefore mistake an outward show for real virtue, nor yet can we ever certainly know how far accidents and circumstances, which seem to us adverse to another's happiness, may not really bring him rather pleasure, nay even for our ownselves, we cannot point out, with infallible certainty, what are the essential conditions of our own

enjoyment. A wise man, therefore, will hesitate long before he arraigns the Divine goodness in such matters.

Besides all the above considerations, there is a degree of influence and practical authority over the wills of others, and therefore over their every action, possessed and exercised by a perfect man, such as no mere political potentate ever had or can have, and this is one of the surest proofs that we do not over-rate the importance of moral right. The effects of this power may be seen in the struggle carried on during the middle ages between the kings of Europe and the bishops of Rome; the goodness and holiness of Europe sided with the bishops, and they prevailed. It was because Anselm and Becket were deemed holy men, and reverenced as saints by the people of England, that the Church there gained the battle of investitures against political, physical, worldly power. It was because a man excluded from the sacraments was thought of as a wicked man, that an interdict was so much dreaded, and therefore it was, that whenever that conviction was lost, whenever the national mind was convinced that the interdict itself was unjust, it wholly lost its power, and often came to be merely despised. In our own day it is notorious, that a pure, honest, just, and upright man, by the force of his mere integrity has a powerful influence over the actions of all by whom he is surrounded, and those of looser character, in their own despite, respect and do honour to consistent goodness in another. It is well worth the attention of all who desire power, even for its own sake, that unvarying integrity and strict adherence to moral right are often the easiest way to its attainment, and are always indispensable requisites to its secure and permanent enjoyment. Even a usurper has hardly ever been dethroned if only he governed justly.

CHAPTER V.

The beneficial Effect of Pain and seeming Evils.

BUT, after all, it may be said that there are some really good persons who seem to be peculiarly and particularly tormented by outward adversity, as if God did sometimes at least specially chasten those He loves, if He love good men, and such cases ought to be accounted for in some more minute and special manner.

It is sufficiently obvious that our mortal life does not present a sufficient object or end for which we can suppose ourselves to have been brought into existence; and it is clear that our capacity for happiness in any future state must be increased by our present advances in moral improvement,[1] because such improvement brings our wills and affections more into harmony with that adaptation of created things to their proper objects, the deviation from which is the root of all evil. Now the moral nature of every one of us needs great improvement, a truth evident enough with relation to the great body of mankind, and which those whose goodness seems almost to constitute them exceptions have all but universally

[1] The action, the affection, the habit, the character which tends to misery, is vice, from which it necessarily follows, that the being who is wicked must also be miserable. If the wicked rise, they must in the nature of things rise to suffering. It cannot be otherwise. If men descend into their graves hardened in impiety, in malignity, in impurity, in selfishness, in intemperance, when restored to life, they must rise with the same habits and in the same character, or they would no longer be the same persons. But if vicious, they must necessarily be miserable. The contrary supposition involves a contradiction in terms. *Belsham's Discourses*, [*Unitarian*] vol. ii. pp. 128-9. "We see that vice has terrible consequences, which naturally attend and follow it, in the present scene of things. And there is no reason to think that it will be otherwise when this scene of things is over."—*Matthew Horberry on the Scripture Doctrine of Future Punishment*, ch. iii. p. 141.

confessed of themselves; whence it is probable that one principal object of our present life is to prepare for another, and to do this to a large extent by being educated into a moral state as nearly approaching perfection as may be possible. If this be so, will our condition be one of pleasure or of pain?

Pleasure is the one thing all men seek for itself; it is that which produces satisfaction, that which tends to exclude all desire of change or of other objects.[2] Pleasures are greater and greater exactly in proportion as they leave less and less to be desired beside themselves. If our state were one of perfect pleasure, we could not be educated at all; our life must then be one of rest and passive enjoyment, or of steady continuance in one course of action. If nothing we did produced pain, moral, mental, or physical, it is obvious, that so far as external influences are concerned, we should be in no state of education, but in one of perfect liberty, without even a choice of less or greater pleasures. Does pleasure in any case directly tend to our moral improvement?

The first pleasure to present itself is naturally the moral pleasure resulting from well-doing; does this directly influence us for good? Moral pleasure operates for good by connecting happiness with goodness, and so turning those faculties and longings which lead to the pursuit of pleasure to seek after goodness as the means of obtaining it; but the direct reason why we seek this is, that we experience a feeling of pain in being without it. If a man be conscious that he is not so good as he ought to be, and concludes from his moral feeling that he should be happier if he were, what operates

[2] Gregory of Nyssa even says: Τελος του κατ'αρετην βιου μακαριοτης εστιν. την γαρ το κατα σπουδην κατορθουμενον προς τι την αναφοραν παντως εχει. και ὡσπερ ἡ μεν ιατρικη προς την ὑγειαν ὁρᾳ, της δε γεοργιας ὁ σκοπος προς το ζην ὁτι παρασκευη· ὁυτως και ἡ της αρετης κτησις προς το μακαριον γενεσθαι τον κατ'αυτην ζωντα βλεπει, τουτο γαρ παντος του κατα το αγαθον νοουμενου κεφαλαιον και περας εστιν. το μεν ουν αληθως τε και κυριως εν τῳ ὑψηλῳ τουτῳ θεωρουμενον τε και νοουμενον, ἡ θεια φυσις λεγοιτο αν εικοτως.—*Tract.* i. *in Psal.* c. i.

directly to make him better is not the pleasure he has felt, but the absence of the pleasure he hopes to feel, in fact, the pain of absent pleasure; and so again a man perseveres in goodness, so far as the influence of moral pleasure is concerned, from the fear of losing that pleasure, the fear that is of pain, in other words, the pain of fear. But moral pleasure has a direct effect; if we put out of the question the fear of losing it, what is it? It is to make a man satisfied with his moral state, which I suppose no one will say tends to its improvement.

In like manner the pleasure of friendship operates by making it a pain to lose such friendship, and so urges us to all those little self-denials, that struggle against our passionate and covetous impulses, and that self-control in our words and thoughts, and actions, all of them for the moment painful, yet all of them very beneficial to our moral nature, which tend to maintain and strengthen the affection of our friends.

But wherever there is a fear of pain in the loss, or actual pain in the wanting, there is also a pleasurable anticipation of pleasure in the possessing, may we not thus arrive at a pleasure tending directly to moral improvement? Anticipation consists of two parts, the pleasure of knowing that in certain events we shall have, and the pain of knowing that in certain events we shall not have some definite pleasure. The painful part tends very clearly to make us do whatever may be necessary to obtain the pleasure, but the pleasurable part, so far as it is present pleasure, tends to make us rest satisfied with the contemplation, and supplies no new spur to exertion; on the contrary, let a man be quite sure that he can at any time gain his object by a little exertion, and you will almost certainly find him rest content with the consciousness of the power without troubling himself to exert it. In practice we can never altogether forget that, sooner or later, the power

we rely upon will be lost; but so far as we can succeed in shutting our eyes to that fact, just so far do we find the disposition to exertion grow gradually less and less, till not unfrequently, when we really desire to use our power, we find it gone from us for ever, as for the same reasons, perseverance and death in sin have been noticed by all divines as the most probable effects of a feeling of certainty that true repentance will never be impossible to us.

As to pleasures of a lower nature, let any one, standing in the midst of a scene of the greatest natural beauty, endeavour to realize his first involuntary feelings if settled there, surrounded by all that taste could require and wealth could furnish, blessed with soundness of mind and body, and with perfect external prosperity,—let him realize the sweetness of all these, and ask himself what would be its moral tendency? What but to make him say, Here will I live my life out in enjoyment, I have all I need, how can I be happier, what have I to care for more? Far, very far would be any thought of striving upward to moral perfection, till satiety, or some reverse of fortune, or failing health, or some encounter with the natural bounds of human power produced some pain to bring back the consciousness of his real, true, and natural state. All these pleasures are very proper to a being which has already attained its full perfection, because in perfection rest only can be desirable; but we know, practically, that men have not attained to this condition, and can only attain their true perfection by a constant and vigorous exercise of their moral faculties. It may be doubtful whether it is not essentially impossible for any created being to become perfect, except by the force of something like habit, since such can be good only by the voluntary conformity of their wills to the will of their Creator, that is of the perfect Being, who alone is free, and at the same time essentially, and in that sense neces-

sarily, good;[1] but certainly perfect goodness might give existence to such self-determining beings, provided they were at the same time surrounded by the proper incentives to their natural perfection, that is, as we have now seen, by the threatened and actual presence of painful and distasteful sensations.

Is pleasure, therefore, useless? By no means; it is necessary to maintain the animal power of the mind, very much as recreation is to some extent necessary to all men, and does in fact advance them in their intellectual pursuits, by reviving the animal power of application and attention; so pleasure, by relaxing the strain upon the moral nature of man, enables it to return with vigour to its direct course of improvement. Again, pleasure is useful, that we may fear pain the more, and more varied pleasures to give entrance to the fear of more varied pains; he who has never tasted intellectual pleasures, for instance, feels no pain in the lack of opportunities of enjoying them; so it is with all pleasures, they increase the faculty of suffering pain, and make that which in itself is neither pleasurable nor painful very far from agreeable, by raising higher and higher the standard of that perfect pleasure which is naturally the ultimate object of our wishes. In so doing it helps to guide our conceptions upward to some more perfect state, in which all that is now wanting may be supplied to us, and thus gives more point to that most important effect of pain and disappointment—the gradual withdrawing of our affections from anything in this life as their ultimate object. There is only one thing which can draw man away from the pursuit of virtue, and that is the pursuit of worldly and immediate enjoyment; when therefore by sickness, or unforeseen misfortune, he loses that which seemed within his

[1] *Προαιρετικη γαρ εδει, και ουχ ὡσπερ εξ αναγκης ὁρασθαι την αρετην, αλλ'ουδε φυσεως νομοις αδιαπτωτως ερηρεισμενην, ιδιον γαρ αν ειη τουτι της ανωτατω πασων ουσιας και ὑπεροχης.—Cyril. Alex. De Adorat. in Spir. et Ver.* lib. i.

grasp, and which would have made him contented in its possession, and so have shut out from his view every other aim and object, then he is driven of necessity to reflect upon the uncertainty of all happiness in this world, and to turn his mind to the consideration of the question, whether he has not mistaken his object—whether pleasure, pure and unfading, may not be to be sought by some other road,[2] and whether there may not perhaps be something higher and more worthy of his efforts, than mere pleasure in any shape.[3]

If we enquire, upon the preceding views, how we ought to expect to find pleasure and pain distributed in the economy of the human race, it will appear that, as it is undoubtedly the best exercise and display of virtue to adhere to it when all things seem adverse, and in continually overcoming great temptations to strengthen the mind by habit to disregard them all—that therefore the force of the temptations to ill, that is of the pain to be encountered in doing well, would be exactly proportioned to the strength of the individual mind,

[2] Nihil enim est magnum in re, quod parvum tempore; nec longis dilatatur gaudiis, quicquid arcto fine concluditur. Brevem utilitatem sæculi istius, brevia habent commoda.—Nunc vero æterna vita beatissima est.—Atque haud scio ad hanc beatissimam vitam, quod compellere nos ocius, aut efficacius debeat; an ipsa futuræ vitæ commoda, quæ promittuntur; an præsentis vitæ incommoda quæ videantur. Inde nos illa blandissime provocant, hinc ista vehementer exturbant. Proinde, cum in meliorem partem etiam pessima suffragentur; si bonis non illicimur, malis extrudamur. Ad incitamentum meliorum optima deterioribus concinnunt et in eandem utilitatem diversa concurrunt. Nam, dum alia nos invitant, alia fugant, in melius utraque nos solicitant.—*Eucherius ad Valer. (De contemptu mundi.)* See *Delaney's Rev. examined with candour. Vol.* i. p. 77.

[3] Surely there is a love which exults in the power of self-abandonment, and can glory in the privilege of suffering for what is good. "Que mon nom soit flétri, pourvu que la France soit libre," said Danton; and those wild patriots, who had trampled into scorn the faith in an immortal life, in which they would be rewarded for what they were suffering, went to their graves as beds, for the dream of a people's liberty. Shall we, who would be thought reasonable men, love the living God with less heart than these poor men loved their phantom? Justice is done: the balance is not deranged. It only seems deranged, as long as we have not learnt to serve without looking to be paid for it.—*Westminster Review, N. S.*, No. 8, p. 441.—*Froude on Job.*

so that the more power of resisting temptation and of doing well under adverse circumstances any one may possess, with the more reason should we expect to find him exercised by such temptations and such adverse circumstances, for the better display and confirmation of his habits of virtue. Thus, as a rule, the best men would suffer most external adversity, and those of the weakest virtue in adversity, rejoice in the smoothest external prosperity. When we know that this is possible, what can we see in the triumphs of the worse and sufferings of better men but a confirmation of that very doctrine of the good providence of God, which they are alleged to refute?

CHAPTER VI.

The Existence of Evil Spirits.

HAVING now shown, in detail, several modes in which the permission of evil upon the earth may be reconciled with the Divine Goodness, it will be interesting to enquire whether there is anything really improbable in the generally received opinion, that there are a race of beings of an essentially higher nature than man, but entirely given over to work evil, to whom a large portion if not the whole of the sufferings and allurements to evil experienced by us are properly attributable. From some of our previous arguments it should almost seem to follow, that moral goodness in an intelligent being necessarily presupposes the existence of evil, and if so, it seems as though God must have created something naturally evil, from which our moral consciousness revolts; but this is not absolutely necessary, seeing that there are sins which may be supposed to proceed from within in any created being, and thus the source of evil would not be God's work.[1] Even the very highest conceivable created being may be capable of pride, or envy, without any previously existing or external cause of evil; he may see God all-powerful, far beyond his own utmost strength, and may envy that power, and fret himself at his own perfect subjection to it, or he may look on those below him, and forgetting that himself too is God's creature, may say, How great and glorious am I; how mean are these! fall down before me,

[1] *Ποθεν ὁ διαβολος, ει μη παρα Θεου τα κακα; ποθεν πονηρος ὁ ανθρωπος; εκ της οικειας αυτου προαιρεσεως. Ποθεν κακος ὁ διαβολος; εκ της αυτης αιτιας, ανθαιρετον εχων και αυτος την ζωην, και επ'αυτῳ κειμενην την εξουσιαν, η παραμενειν τῳ θεῳ, η αλλοτριωθηναι του αγαθου.*—*Basil. Hom. q. D. n. e. a. m.* And all Christian Theology agrees with this.

ye simple ones! and reverence my power and majesty;[1] and such an one, thus alienated from God and his own true standard of goodness, may readily become an agent of evil to the rest of creation. Certainly the evil in the world must proceed either from man himself or from some external power, and if we examine the nature of this evil we shall find that it is far from having an exclusively internal source; we find pains and afflictions from without, and allurements to and probably suggestions of evil, such as almost of necessity lead the mind to the idea of some external, invisible, and malicious tempter. This idea is supported by the distinction we all draw between the command to inflict and the actual infliction of punishment, which impels us to the conviction that God Himself, delighting in goodness, and loving to confer happiness only upon His creatures, would not directly interfere to afflict any, but would rather allow that, wherever necessary, such punishments should be the mutual works of evil beings,[2] seeking

[1] Some Christian writers have connected the fall of the now evil spirits with envy at the creation of man: thus Cyprian, De Zelo et Livore—Hinc Diabolus inter initia statim mundi et perit primus et perdidit. Ille dudum angelica majestate subnixus, ille Deo acceptus et carus, postquam Hominem ad imaginem Dei factum conspexit, in zelum malevolo livore prorupit, non prius alterum dejiciens instinctu zeli, quam ipse zelo ante dejectus; captivus antequam capiens; perditus antequam perdens, dum stimulante livore homini gratiam datæ immortalitatis eripit, ipse quoque id, quod prius fuerat amisit. Quale malum est, fratres dilectissimi, quo Angelus cecidit, quo circumveniri et subverti alta illa et præclara sublimitas potuit: quo deceptus est ipse qui decipit? Lactantius expresses a similar idea, though coupled with a doctrine afterwards condemned as heretical; and Milton, who was not more orthodox than Lactantius, attributes the fall of Satan, in his "Paradise Lost," to envy; the more common opinion, however, makes his sin to have consisted in pride. I quote these and other Christian writers and doctrines in this part of my essay, not as authorities, but to show in what manner acute and intelligent men have solved the innate difficulties of Theology, and for this purpose I am entitled to use the opinions of any school of philosophy and of any creed, as facts, without at all depending upon the answer to the question, whether such creeds and opinions are proved to be altogether right and well founded: thus in this instance I have the assent of these thinkers to the proposition in my text, that a naturally pure spirit may become evil in the manner suggested.

[2] Thus Philo Judæus after a somewhat similar suggestion adds: Τουτο μοι

their pleasure through the sufferings of others. Certainly, when we consider the hardening effect almost inseparable from the employment of inflicting punishment, and how rarely the judge and executioner are both alike good and honourable men, there does arise a seemingly strong reason why God should continue to intelligent beings limited powers of action, after they have become morally perverted; I mean, that they may serve, under the control of His providence, as the instruments of effecting that amount of temptation and trouble which, as we have seen, has a beneficial operation upon good men, as well as for their own mutual punishment. This argument is much confirmed as regards evil men, by the reflection, that they can seldom make themselves at once so evil, but that they may in time very much improve themselves, and to give them time and power for this, they must continue to live and ought to be exposed to such influences as may give them to know how hateful their offences must be to God, by showing them the extreme hatefulness of a thoroughly depraved character, in regard to its effects upon themselves and generally among mankind. Oh! that those who look upon the hangman's office as degrading would so live as to avoid the torturer's part among their fellows, and those who despise the careful soberness of religion would see to it, that they never gulp down pleasures that are but a bait concealing the angler's hook, which shall draw them to the bank, there to gasp and die for his amusement.[3] Ye that would not be a sport for

δοκουσι και των βασιλεων οι μιμουμενοι την θειαν φυσιν πραττειν, τας μεν χαριτας ἐ'αυτων προτεινοντες, τας δε τιμωριας δι'ἑτερων βεβαιουντες.—Περι Αβρααμ.

[3] Quicunque ergo mali sunt, sic ordinati sunt; quia et unusquisque sibi et omnes invicem sibi nocent. Hoc enim appetunt, quod perniciose diligitur, et quod eis facile auferri potest; et hoc sibi auferunt invicem, quando se persequuntur. Et ideo cruciantur quibus auferuntur temporalia, quia diligunt ea: illi autem qui auferunt gaudent. Sed talis lætitia cæcitas est, et summa miseria; ipsa enim magis implicat animam, et ad majora tormenta perducit. Nam gaudet piscis quando hamum non videns, escam devorat: sed cum piscator eum adducere cœperit, viscera ejus torquentur primo; deinde ab omni lætitia

fiends, nor God's unwilling sword of punishment to others, there is but one way certainly to escape these things, it is to hate and avoid all evil.

If, as we are apt to do when we see men tempted and fall, we think of all temptation, and therefore of the existence of a tempter, as an evil in itself, we must remember that temptation does not make a man evil, it only makes manifest the goodness of the good, and brings to light the hidden failings of the bad.[1] It would be strangely unjust if God regarded differently those who fall through temptation and those who only stand because they are not tempted; the true lesson to be learnt from the contemplation is, therefore, that we have a time given us to become stronger against, and even by temptation, and that, instead of deeming ourselves better than our erring fellow, we should fear lest we too, being tempted, should likewise fall.[2]

sua per ipsam escam, de qua lætatus est, ad consumptionem trahitur. Sic sunt omnes, qui de bonis temporalibus beatos se putant, hamum enim acceperunt, et cum illo sibi vagantur; veniet tempus ut sentiant quanta tormenta cum aviditate devoraverint. Et ideo bonis nihil nocent quia hoc eis auferunt quod non diligunt: nam quod diligunt, et unde beati sunt auferre illis nemo potest. Cruciatus vero corporis malas animas miserabiliter affligit, bonas autem fortiter purgat. Sic fit ut et malus homo et malus angelus divinæ providentiæ militent; sed nesciunt quid boni de illis operatur Deus. Non itaque pro meritis officii, sed pro meritis malitiæ stipendiuntur.—*Augustin. De Agone Christiano*, s. 8.

[1] Quæ latet, inque bonis cessat non cognita rebus,
Apparet virtus, arguiturque malis.—*Ovid. Tristia*, lib. 3, el. 3.

[2] "Omnes cum secundæ res sunt maxime, tum maxime,
Meditare secum oportet, quo pacto adversam ærumnam ferant."
Terence. Phormio.

CHAPTER VII.

Of some Social Evils in detail.

NO one will have felt the full force of the arguments offered in the preceding chapters, who has been in the habit of considering mankind, in relation to these matters, in the abstract form of a typical man, and of examining into the government of the universe, upon the supposition that it ought to be a general scheme for the benefit of such typical men. The truth is, as indeed on the least reflection must be obvious, that if there is a God, He must govern the world, and all that more immediately concerns ourselves, with a view to our benefit, take us as we actually are, reasonable beings certainly, but full of whims and caprices; the proper method, therefore, of conducting our enquiries must be to accept the position we involuntarily take up as the centre of the universe, and examine all that we know of the laws of nature, by seeking to discover what is their natural effect or tendency in regard to ourselves; if we do this many a difficulty will be solved by the discovery that what seemed unaccountable was in fact rendered necessary by some fault or defect in ourselves, or others, which we had never thought of looking for, and were therefore quite ignorant of. It is, no doubt, in the abstract, exceedingly strange, and in a typical world probably impossible, that what any one does from vicious motives should work a benefit to the community; yet, regarding the world as it is, it is manifest that the Divine goodness would find its proper office in bringing about such a result. The fallacy consists in regarding man as being and not being at the same time; as being so as to have antecedent

rights, and require certain laws; as not being, for the purpose of excluding all that he is voluntarily, and all the consequences which flow from his own acts. This fallacy is very extensively adopted, without any distinct consciousness; men grumble at misfortunes, and doubt the goodness of God who allows them, principally because they assume that they had a right, before they were created, to be created perfect; and that when actually made, they were and are morally pure and intellectually wise, and therefore not rightly subjected to any educational training; sometimes, indeed, they seem to think they have a right to present enjoyment in their own way, and the rewards of obedience to God as well, and that if they suffer anything in their attempts to obtain both these, it is God's providence that is to blame, not their wilfulness; yet more commonly do we expect to be made happy, without taking any care about ourselves, or using our reason to enable us to avoid or profit by our misfortunes. Thus there are many things which seem to many evils, but are really good and useful. I will devote this chapter to the consideration of an instance or two drawn from social philosophy and the common accidents of actual life.

When, for instance, provisions become dear and wages fall, those who suffer most very soon begin to complain of the hardness of the times, then of the harshness and avarice of masters and dealers, and the supineness and indifference of the state, till they persuade themselves that they are very unjustly handled, and their faith in a wise and beneficent Ruler of the whole world, never very strong, breaking down at last altogether, they become discontented as citizens and Atheists in religion. Yet both these calamities are all the while beneficial to those who suffer from them, both are part of a very beneficent system of government, both derive their good effect from their very unpleasantness, and neither of them can be remedied or much alleviated by the state.

The immediate natural cause of the dearness of food is its scarcity, and the first effect of the rise in its price is to limit or lessen the consumption of that which cannot in prudence be so freely consumed as in times of greater plenty; thus it makes every one prudent, without or against his will, by imposing just that check upon him, from without, that a provident person would impose upon himself from within; this check too is so directed as to fall most heavily on those who need it most, for the careless always suffer more than the prudent in times of adversity. But prices often rise when there is no immediate scarcity, when no one really believes that there is too little food to keep the people alive, and when this is the case the multitude demand laws against the hoarding of provisions, or any rise in the price of them, and incautious legislators accede to their demands. This is to interfere with the operation of natural causes, to mend God's work, and what is its result? An instance occurred not many years ago in the Island of Madeira. There was a prospect of scarcity seen at first by those only well acquainted with the extent of the supply; prices began to rise and the people to murmur, the authorities gave them their own way, and everything went on smoothly enough till it became manifest to all that they were in danger of starvation, for the stock in the island kept diminishing, and nothing came to supply the place. Why was this? Simply because the price having been artificially kept down, the dealers could import only at a loss, which they reasonably enough refused to do. So the matter ended in a real famine, a thing of the horrors of which this country has happily but little experience, which those, however, who complain of scarcity and high prices may realize as the substance of which these are but the shadow.[1] If the rise

[1] The following is the account of an eye witness, from a letter dated the 12th of March, 1847:—"But the worst of all is the famine, really and truly a famine—no bread to be had in the island for money. It is useless as far as that

of prices be allowed to take its natural course, it effectually prevents a real famine, by making it worth the while of the dealers to ransack every corner of the globe for food, and there was never yet a universal scarcity. But it may be said, what the people complain of is not the keeping provisions in store against an anticipated famine, but the doing it wantonly and selfishly. Now "he that withholdeth corn the people shall curse him;" and if he do it wantonly, or perhaps from merely selfish motives, their curse will no doubt take effect, but this withholding will nevertheless operate either to the ultimate good of the community or to his pecuniary loss. Few persons would be foolish enough to withhold that which, being perishable in its own nature, they do not expect to be soon able to get a higher price for, but if an owner is ever to realize a higher price for his goods, it can only be because the scarcity will have become greater, or the prospect of it more imminent; well, he holds, and the scarcity does become greater, what is then the result? It is that he saved corn when it was comparatively plentiful, to issue it when it had become scarcer; what can that be but a benefit to the community? What is it but the very precaution a prudent ruler would desire to make use of to save his people from famine? The effects of his withholding were, first, to make people more careful in the

is concerned, people in the streets do not care to receive it, because no food can be bought. They are daily expecting food which has been sent for, but till that comes the state of the poor is and must be dreadful. I have to-day been in a house where two hundred and fifty houseless persons are collected from the streets, and furnished with straw and one meal a day [of vegetable broth], by order of the governor; but it is at the worst, we hope, for money has been sent for the corn, so it must arrive. One reason of the great distress just now is the following: when the scarcity began it was said that many people were hoarding corn to get a large price by and by, and the people threatened a disturbance, upon which the governor declared, that if people did not sell their corn at cost price, and riots were in consequence, he would not call out the soldiers to put them down; and this, though done with the best intention, is the real cause of this great distress, for the people having to sell their corn at cost price, would not, indeed could not import more to sell in the same way, so that, though there was plenty for a little time, yet that soon passed, and now there is none, no food to be had for money."—*Memoirs of Rev. R. A. Suckling, by I. Williams, B.D.*, p. 36.

consumption of that which it was possible they might come actually to want; then, to the extent of the consequent rise in price, to put a premium upon the finding out and importing provisions from other countries; and lastly, to furnish the people with food exactly when they were most in need of it.

Surely the Providence, which brings all these results out of man's mere selfishness, cannot but be wise and good. If a speculator hold over a time of scarcity, so as actually to withhold his corn when most wanted, and to sell it when it has become more plentiful than it was when he procured it, Providence does not bless him with a profit; on the contrary, like the man who hoards from mere churlishness, he is taught by a loss that he ought not so to deal.[1] Those who think the government of the world faulty in these matters would often wish that the state should seek for and import food, but how is this to be done? where is the money to come from? whence can it come (except in the case of very limited failures) but out of the pockets of those very persons who have to pay it now, with the purely useless addition of the expenses of collecting, and of all the manifold risks, nay almost certainty, of mismanagement necessarily incident to state trading.

But some one will say, "Why should there ever be scarcities at all? Surely it would have been better to have provided that the fruits of the earth should be produced in uniform sufficiency." Yet I think it will be clear, upon re-

[1] This same love of gain has also an important influence in producing mental exertion and its consequent benefit, intellectual improvement. "The truth is, that man, who obviously requires an urgent stimulus to animal exertion, has equal need of a strong and sensible incitement to the exertion of the mind. It is not necessary to maintain the degrading opinion, that the improvement of the intellect can only be stimulated by the actual and immediate influence of the love of gain. It is sufficient to show that the vast and complicated machine of human society, the movements of which are as intricate as the motion is constant, is kept in continual activity by each individual's desire of bettering his own condition. The impulse, indeed, once caused, the active habits once introduced, reach far beyond the immediate influence of the principle; but it does not follow that they would continue if the principle itself were removed."—*Abp. Sumner. Records of Creation*, vol. ii. ch. iii. p. 64.

flection, that this would not be so, inasmuch as the necessary effect of this uncertainty is to make men prudent and thoughtful, and to impel them to produce, as a rule, more than a sufficiency, which excess is the source of all wealth, a thing few objectors think would be a real evil if only they could get a due proportion of it; besides which, if a mere sufficiency were alone produced, or only a small excess, it would be in the power of any miscreant to destroy enough to work a real scarcity; in point of fact, where are famines most frequent, but where the earth produces most unfailingly, and where are they rarest, but where, as in our own land, the natural productions of the soil are least adequate to supply the wants of the population?

Very similar observations will apply to the case of a fall of wages. Wages are never low where there is much work and few workmen; they always fall where there are many workmen and little work; that being so, it follows that the fall is a warning to all to look out for some other employment. Suppose the weavers, for instance, agreed that they would do nothing but weave, and the state thereupon made a law that they should all be paid high wages, however little work there might be to do, what would be the result of this? It is clear that the state must pay the wages, for the masters would soon be ruined, and then, no doubt, other trades and professions, seeing the happy estate of the weavers, would follow the same plan, and claim their high wages too; everybody who had anything of his own would forthwith escape from the consequent heavy taxation with all he could manage to carry away, and the weavers and all the rest would, in the end, lose their wages, and be obliged to turn agricultural labourers, or starve. Where is then the hardship of that fall of wages which tells us, while there is yet time, that we are in danger of losing our employment altogether, if we continue in what we now follow, and without any sudden and absolute priva-

tion of the means of subsistence, warns us before we actually come upon it, of the inevitable alternative that lies before us. Surely a man would not object to be roused pretty roughly if he were asleep in a burning house; and we may notice that, as at present ordered, the last persons to be affected are always the most skilful workmen, those that is who are least likely to be able to change with advantage.

If indeed God had made men capable of but one trade, or occupation, His goodness would be concerned to open for each of them opportunities of employment in that particular line of business; but as man is born, neither a tailor, nor a mason, nor a weaver, nor yet a farm labourer, but may be each and all of these, or may follow any of a thousand other occupations, it is only requisite that some means of obtaining subsistence should be open to all, and then the vast uncultivated tracts of fertile land throughout the world leave one at no loss for the answer, that God has amply provided such means for all, and provided them too in a very beneficial manner; for, by scattering the race all over the world, it puts within the reach of every individual the peculiar productions of every climate and country, as it has enabled us in Britain (who, had mankind begun to exist here and never necessarily spread to other regions, should in all probability never have heard of such things) to use at once, here in our own land, the tea of China, the coffee of Arabia, the spices of the Eastern Isles, the cotton and the rice of America, the silk of India, the fruits of southern lands, and the furs of the coldest north. Let a man seriously think over those very subjects in the natural government of the world, which seem at first to strike him as harsh, and unworthy of an allwise and beneficent Ruler, and, as in those two instances which I have mentioned, he will find in everything he can well understand, that what careless observers are apt to think of as evils are in truth great benefits, which often, by the very fact of their seeming repug-

nance to the moral qualities they really exhibit, serve to show the depth and wonderful extent of that wisdom and beneficent foresight which has ordered and directs them.

God having made provision for the subsistence of every man, it is no objection to His goodness that there are poor people among us, but rather a testimony to His benevolence that there are any rich, for who are the poor? No man who has the means of subsistence within his reach is really poor, though it is true that we call many others poor who yet are only less wealthy than their neighbours; and if there are none so destitute but what, if they are prudent and temperate, they can find a livelihood somewhere, the difficulty falls to the ground. If we deem ourselves poor, we may accept it as a useful chastisement, for I doubt not we can find faults deserving correction and virtues needing exercise within ourselves, which may amply account for and justify our affliction; but if we consider the matter carefully, we shall very probably find that our poverty is only comparative, and that our complaint is in fact rather envy of another's prosperity than any just expression of our own misfortunes. You, who being yourselves above actual want, yet think hardly of the Divine mercy; when next you are receiving that for which you have not laboured—when next you are about to lay out your money or use your property in any way not strictly necessary to yourselves—then pause, and call to mind your complaint of God. Look reverently on that money you had all but wasted, for that is God's provision for the poor, it is not yours; it is His, for He is and must be the Lord of it and of you; it is given you by Him for their use. What you have is not this wealth *which* you can only enjoy by parting with it; but you have the occasion and the opportunity, by well applying it, of gaining for yourselves true wealth, wealth that wastes not in the using, and rusts not in the hoarding, a true possession, from which you may have happiness for ever.

CHAPTER VIII.

On the Abuse of Authority.

THERE are persons, who without objecting to the existence of the poor as a class, are yet inclined to think it hard that any person of good character should be placed in that class, and that while a very extensive power and influence is enjoyed by some, and not infrequently abused by them, others who seem in every way better adapted to promote the welfare of mankind, find themselves condemned to humble and secluded stations, apparently cut off from every opportunity of benefiting anybody. The first answer to this is that which we have given to the existence of evil generally; by this means men are exercised and led into goodness, which if the rulers of this world were always careful duly and fully to practise and reward (alas, that the idea should seem so chimerical!) might be merged into self-interest; but there are other considerations more peculiarly appropriate to this subject.

For no man, however lowly and however separate from society he may seem to be, is entirely deprived of all opportunities of usefulness and of all influence over his fellow men. Even a prisoner may turn the heart of his gaoler by his fortitude and quiet patience, and by that happy calm which entire submission to the will of God is certain to spread over the soul and exhibit in the bearing of them that live in it. Example does teach more forcibly than precept, and that man must be indeed deaf to every argument, and beyond the reach of any persuasion, who can see one, though suffering long and intensely, blessed with a sweeter and more continuous flow of peaceful happiness than he himself ever enjoys,

and yet remain careless of its source, with no love kindled, no compassion, no self-reproach excited in his own breast. True, the objector may reply, but who is to be so perfect as this supposes? You, I answer, if you desire any solid happiness, you must endeavour to be so. We ought to remember that an extensive influence is seldom a deep one, and requires a certain formality, and I may say worldly policy, which frequently reduces its effects on those with whom they might be really deep and permanent, and mere surface influence is always deceptive. The rich and powerful are liable to have it supposed, or at least insinuated of them, that it is easy enough for people so well off to avoid glaring offences, and that they encourage morality for the better protection of their own property; so that the influence of a poor good man is generally more real and effective than even the hearty and earnest endeavours of one higher in the scale of society, and he too better understands and can more readily apply the remedy to the evils of immorality, as they appear combined with that poverty to which they tend to bring at the last all their followers.

Again, a position of great influence is one of many perils, among which the temptations to pride and self-sufficiency and a certain smooth hypocrisy are not the least, and no man knows how far he might fall into those same sins, for which he condemns others, if he were placed in their position. This is true of all social advancement: take, for instance, what many sigh for, a position of temporal independence. If they desire it, as some say, that their minds may be at peace, and so better able to serve God, they forget that if they do their best, wherever they are, it is impossible to serve Him more effectually; and who can tell how great, nay, how irresistible, might then be the temptations to idleness and self-indulgence, with their attendant shadows, languor and satiety? So that surely he argues most soundly, who, supposing himself not

to be much better in himself than other men, concludes the probability of his own fall from the fall of so large a proportion of those who possess what he longs for. But in a position of great power in the social community, who can tell how far he may be able to avoid being seduced by the mere facility of sinning with apparent impunity, and if he do fall, how much wider are the effects of his crimes, and therefore how much more unpardonable must they be.[1] While, then, we give especial praise to those who use their power well, we ought to take especial care how we condemn those hastily as essentially worse than other men, who seem to have abused theirs. You complain of the abuse of patronage, of the rashness and time-serving place-hunting of those above you; but if you were in their place, how would you see into the hearts of those who came or were recommended to you for advancement? How could you withstand the influence of some and your own involuntary antipathy to others? How could you distinguish between the man who assumed virtue to obtain preferment, and him to whom virtue was habitual? How would you decide between two seemingly lawful courses of action, and foresee all the consequences of both before the event had happened to enlighten you? How could you estimate, how can you estimate now, the effect upon your own mind exercised, without your being even conscious of it, by the flattery and artful deference you would meet with?[2] Are you sure that you would avoid the desire to keep your place, or to gain a better, when it suggested itself under the form

[1] Thus Plato doubted whether a mere private citizen could sin inexpiably.—*Θερσιτης δε και ει τις αλλος πονηρος ην ιδιωτης, ουδεις πεποιηκε μεγαλαις τιμωριαις συνεχομενον ως ανιατον· ου γαρ, οιμαι εξην αυτῳ· διο και ευδαιμονεστερος ην η ὁς εξην. Αλλα γαρ, ω Καλλι κλεις, εκ των δυναμενων εισι και οι σφοδρα πονηροι γιγνομενοι ανθρωποι· ουδεν μην κωλυει και εν τουτοις αγαθους ανδρας εγγιγνεσθαι· και σφοδρα γε αξιον αγασθαι τι ον γιγνομενων· χαλεπον γαρ, ω Καλλικλεις, και πολλου επαινου αξιον, εν μεγαλῃ εξουσιᾳ του αδικειν γενομενον δικαιως διαβιωναι· ολιγοι δε γιγνονται οι τοιουτοι—Gorgias*, p. 525.

[2] Bishop Butler, in answer to a letter of congratulation on his election to the

of a desire to be in a position to do more good and to be able to advance worthy men, and to keep the power from falling into notoriously worse hands? If you were wholly free from such influences now, you would not complain of seclusion and obscurity as evils.[1] But it is only where you can give satisfactory answers to all these questions, and raise a moral certainty that he, who seems to do well in obscurity, would not be perverted by them, and he who does evil in authority may not be half excused by their influence; which when we recollect how many such have seemed well qualified for command till they obtained it, will appear to be almost impossible, —then, and then only, shall we be in a condition to question the Providence that setteth up one and putteth down another.

The abuse of power and the overruling of such abuse to good ends, of which it is easy to call to mind many instances, is useful to us as an evidence of some higher power and wisdom controlling the course of the world; and when we consider this and our own ignorance together, it is clear that we must expect to be often placed in seemingly strange positions, as many of the manœuvres in every great war must seem to the private soldiers actually engaged, useless and disagreeable, and sometimes even disgraceful. I suppose the men kept in reserve always think they might be better employed, though the fact of their being in reserve may decide the war; and so it is no wonder that we, whom it may be as important in the great war with evil to keep in reserve and inaction, should feel as though we could be better employed

see of Durham, writes thus: "This right use of fortune and power is more difficult than the generality of even good people think, and requires both a guard upon one's self, and a strength of mind to withstand solicitations, greater, I wish I may not find it, than I am master of."

[1] How know I, if Thou should'st me raise,
That I should then raise Thee?
Perhaps great places and Thy praise
Do not so well agree.

George Herbert. Poems, p. 70.

elsewhere. Our obedience and resignation when we seem to be forgotten or neglected, will not be without its effect upon ourselves, but as soldiers who can stand firmly in unbroken order beneath the fire of an enemy, without returning it, are almost certainly invincible, while those who rush on hastily to the assault may be as quickly repulsed; so we, though if suddenly exposed to the temptations of authority, which seems to us the readiest way to honour, we should be cut off, may become perfectly invincible by the discipline of obedience and resignation, and so when the war is over may lie down to rest unharmed, and sleep the sleep of the victorious.

The lamentable abuse of power we see so often around us ought to act as a warning to us not to abuse that power which we possess, not to make ourselves partakers of other men's sins. This power is greater than we generally imagine; it is exercised continually and involuntarily, and its effects are felt by many who are not aware whence the influence they obey proceeds. Everything we do, or say, or seem to think, contributes its mite to the total of our offering at the shrines of vice and virtue; we cannot help doing something, or neglecting to do it, and the fact in either case is an example which will encourage those who wish to do the like, and discourage those who wish not to do it, and which those who like us will feel an impulse to follow, and those who dislike us to avoid, while even the sources of those very likings and dislikings are generally to be found in a certain something in the manner and address, and mode of thinking and speaking, rather than in any distinct and definable quality. Many of us have effectually prevented the doing of a good act by seeming careless about it when hinted at in our presence, many have given active countenance to evil by merely neglecting to observe whether it was evil or no. As we are in our physical structure so wonderfully made, that if we saw the process of

our own internal mechanism we should fear to move, so if we regard ourselves as units in society, and completely realize the awful influence we have over the will and intellect, and disposition of persons whom we never knew, and how fearfully and wonderfully everything in and about us operates for good or evil, we should dread our own movements, and hesitate to act, or speak at all, yet fear to forbear. It is well for us, therefore, that the greater portion of our influence is unconscious; but while we acknowledge this, the fact of that influence must be distinctly recognized, and we must not forget that we have it and cannot get rid of it, do what we may; that the welfare of the whole human race during its whole existence here and hereafter, as it depends upon the actions of its members, and these are influenced by a never-ending chain of motives, of which we furnish some, having an influence on all the rest, so upon us rests some, we know not how much, of the responsibility for all the evils in and around us. By keeping this fact steadily in view, we arrive at a conception of the life of the humblest among us, so replete with dignity, so full of motives to quiet watchfulness and earnest endeavours, so beset with difficulties worth overcoming, and tasks worth accomplishing, that the difference between the various degrees of human authority seem to shrink into nothingness, or else the thought of the higher among them grows to be simply awful and overpowering, and thus in either way they become anything but objects of repining longings. If a man lament his lack of power to rise in the social scale, or to acquire learning, or that he was born of poor or spendthrift parents, the best way for him to arrive at a true conclusion will be for him to consider whether he can for a moment suppose, that the object of any man's existence can be, that his death may deprive a nation of its king, or learning of its brightest ornament, or that he may leave behind him more wealth than many generations of his heirs can dissipate. Clearly these

things are gross and perishable, and worthless to him, for they go not with him to his last long home; they can yield him no hope when he is ready to depart, to be at peace, as he longs to believe, for ever. One thing a wise man would desire then to know, so far as it may be possible to any, it is that he had kept his way in purity all his life long, that he had himself gone on steadily to perfect goodness, and could look back on his past words and actions with the hope that they had all tended to confirm and encourage the good, and to defeat and reform the bad, so that his account with his own conscience might be that he had deserved well of all men, and could bear to think of an all-holy God as perhaps his approving Judge. Viewed in the strong light of this fearful responsibility, there is an awful grandeur in our duties and destinies that will not allow us to think of any action or thought of ours as immaterial, or as unworthy of our most careful attention, and beside which all earthly pomp and greatness fade into empty nothingness.[1]

[1] Viewed as a state of probation, our present condition loses all its inherent meanness; it derives a moral grandeur even from the shortness of its duration, when viewed as a contest for an immortal crown, in which the candidates are exhibited on a theatre, a spectacle of beings of the highest order, who, conscious of the tremendous importance of the issue, of the magnitude of the interests at stake, survey the combatants from on high with benevolent and trembling solicitude.—*Robert Hall's Sermon on the Death of the Princess Charlotte.*

CHAPTER IX.

Of Hereditary Punishment, Habit, and Education.

THE three subjects of which I propose to treat in this chapter are closely connected in their bearing upon the moral character of mankind: the first and last making together the chief apparent bond of union between the various generations of men, while the force of habit is necessarily implied in the influence of Education. It is manifest, that the first is the source of physical evil, the two latter can only be objected to on the ground of their having a possible influence in causing moral evil.

That the sins of wicked men, and the foolishness of foolish men, should operate to the prejudice of their offspring, is certainly at first sight startling; yet it has a beneficial operation as regards both the parents and their children. For many are deterred from sin by the knowledge that their children would suffer for it, and so their act would be a crime in some sense against the innocent, and attach a stigma to their name and disgrace to their memory long after they had ceased to breathe, who would never have hesitated if all the consequences of their vice or folly had ended in themselves, had been buried in their graves, and left no trace of poverty and shame, and suffering connected with the continuance of their name and family.[1] A similar reason may be given for

[1] Numquid etiam de his quæ in suis post mortem cujusque contingunt, ullus mortuos tangit dolor? aut hæc saltem scire putandi sunt, quorum sensus alibi est pro meritis, seu bene, seu male? Cui respondeo magnam quidem esse quæstionem, nec in præsentia disserendam, quod sit operis prolixioris, utrum, vel quatenus, vel quomodo ea quæ circa nos aguntur noverint spiritus mortuorum. Verum tamen quod breviter dici potest, si nulla illis esset cura de nobis, non diceret Dominus dixisse illum divitem, qui tormenta apud inferos patiebatur,

the fact, that some men are punished for their first offence, and that some diseases, and other evil consequences, though originally contracted only by great excess, are communicable without it: the fear of these keeps men from evil companions, and so from the worst forms of temptation much more effectually than if they had followed certainly upon great excess, or any particular acts; for these almost every man, when he first begins to sin, expects that he may be able to avoid, however others may see that he will almost certainly fall into them. Again, as to the children and descendants themselves, born of such parents, and educated under such influences, that natural docility of temperament necessary to all rational beings, necessary to all those beings that are made to act upon their own judgment, and not follow blindly natural instincts, that natural docility which preserves some from contamination, even from the very beginning of life, when they are born of good and pious parents, would lead these children into vice and evil doing; there ought, therefore, to be some natural monitor to remind all such, that vice is not mere pleasure, to show them how much of their education is good and ought to be followed, and how much is bad and ought to be unlearnt; this corrective is furnished by transmitted punishments, for how can he who inherits disgrace from his parents' crimes, or poverty from their wastefulness, or disease from their excesses, or who has passed his youth in the misery arising from the subjection to

habeo ibi quinque fratres, ne et ipsi veniant in locum hunc tormentorum. Sed quomodolibet intelligant, qui hoc aliter intelligere conantur; et quia fatendum est non esse consequens, ut si sciunt mortui suos vivere, quia nec in loco pœnarum eos vident, ubi dives ille erat, necin requie beatorum, ubi Lazarum et Abraham quamvis longe agnoscebat, ideo eos etiam quæ circa eorum caros aguntur, vel læta, vel tristia scire necesse sit: hoc dico, paucos esse ejus animi homines, qui post mortem suam quid suis boni malive contingat, saltem dum vivunt, negligant atque omnino contemnant; multos autem, quod indicat etiam tanta cura commendandæ ultimæ voluntatis et qualiumcunque testamentorum, satis agere ut cum defuncti fuerint, suis bene sit.—*Augustin. In Ps.* cviii. (cix.), a. 17.

such parents; how can he fail to perceive and know, that in these things they transgressed the bounds of natural lawfulness, they erred in the search after happiness, and if there be a God they merited condemnation and punishment at His hands. Evil must be seen by him in its true light, as the source of pain and misery, he cannot sin in ignorance of the natural effects of transgression: the moment he begins to think at all he must begin to loathe vice, at least in others, and then, except for self-deceit, and unless perhaps habit have fixed his character, he is fairly on the road to forsake it.

Now it should seem that some natural tendency, similar to that which we know as the force of habit, must have been implanted in man by his Creator, if He desired him ever to attain perfection; because, as man is essentially finite, weak, and ignorant, he must be changeable, and incapable of long continued and intense attention. Unless this infirmity and tendency to languor can be somehow counteracted, it will always be uncertain how a man will act, as we find now, that the sins of the best men arise generally from inattention at the moment to what they were about to say, or do, or think; this power of attention itself is made far stronger by habit, and the habit of acting rightly supplies its place even when it fails; for the suggestion of evil is startling to one habituated to do well, and while he needs no exertion to pursue his ordinary course of virtue, the suggestion of vice arouses instantly that attention his good habits had preserved at rest, and therefore in full vigour for this new contest. The direct operation of the force of habit in the formation of character is to give fixity and steadiness, and greater capacity for action, which in themselves are good points. If any man, therefore, seem to be compelled to do evil by the force of habit, the real cause of this evil is not the force of habit, but that long chain of separate evil acts which must have concurred to the formation of the habit, and although it may require a very serious and continued effort to

deviate from the beaten track of long usage, yet it is not impossible. That which a man is entirely set upon abandoning habit cannot hold him to, though it does try the strength of his resolution pretty severely, and he who has sinned most habitually ought to be required to repent most sincerely; in truth, there is a relation between the power of will and the power of habit, those who are least capable of strong effort being generally those whose habits are most easily disturbed by a change of external circumstances, or of the predominant direction of the desires. And when a man has repented, what shall keep him good? What, but that very same force of habit which taught him that reformation is no light matter to be done for amusement, or to be left for odd scraps of leisure. Since, therefore, a habit of well doing is essentially more pleasurable in its progress and continuance than one of habitual vice, it follows that the power of habit, which gives effect to both, is not evil in itself, and tending rather to promote good than evil—is therefore good.

As to the influence of education, we may say nearly the same of it, that it is good in its direct effects and as powerful, or rather more so when directed to good ends than when perverted to any others. The same answer, however, will not altogether suffice, because we are here to a large extent subject to the power of others; indeed, education may perhaps be defined to be, the share in the development of the intellect and character of man properly attributable to external causes. All men are to a certain extent subject to the influence of others, especially in their early years, and this influence all are bound to use for the benefit of those subject to it. This all good men of course endeavour to do, and not they alone, for there are very few bad men who would desire that their children and dependants should imitate their own faults; and though perhaps they had rather not subject themselves to the self-reproach of seeing a servant, or associate, do what they are

conscious they ought not themselves to neglect, yet there is a pride, of which the worst men are capable, in a child that does honour to his parents, or in retaining the services, or friendship of one whom no one can help liking or admiring, which operates very strongly to prevent the wilful and direct abuse of the educational power of their influence; so that take mankind as a whole, there can be no doubt that education is more generally directed to good ends than otherwise, and that the universal docility of temperament is beneficial to its possessors. As I have before observed, some such quality is necessary even to our physical sustenance; we have it all to learn, and as to intellectual advancement, the most learned men are but great scholars.[1] As habit, which makes reformation difficult, soon begins to make relapse still more so, in like manner the teachability which subjects men to the seductions of evil company, is that in which alone, of earthly influences, we rest our hopes of their return. That same power which leads from vice to vice, him that shuns the society of the good and loves to sit in places redolent of evil; conducts from virtue to virtue him that, shunning all appearance of evil, loves to converse with the good, and to spend his time where virtuous influences reign: thus the worst man may amend his life by seeking the society of those of better disposition and more confirmed virtue. This, thanks to the influence of philanthropy and Christianity, is impossible to hardly any, and thus a man may if he will, as many have done, when he perceives the faults produced in himself by education, effectually amend them by

[1] The vast extent of their ignorance compared with their knowledge is well illustrated by such stories as that told by Diogenes Laertius of Thales.—*Λεγεται δε αγομμενος ὑπο γραος εκ της οικιας, ἱνα τα αστρα κατανοησῃ, εις βοθρον εμπεσειν, και αυτῳ ανοιμωξαντι φαναι την γραυν, Συ γαρ, ω Θαλη, τα εν ποσιν ου δυναμενος ιδειν, τα επι του ουρανου οιει γνωσεσθαι*; and when we laugh, as who can help it, at the story Peter Heylin tells of the extreme surprise of the Oxfordshire rustic, that he who had written an account of the whole world should not know his way out of Wychwood Forest; what was ludicrous in the man was his ignorance of the truth that the very wisest of us is very ignorant.

the very same process, and by the power of those very same faculties, by the misuse of which he had been led astray into sin; if he continue in it, therefore, the continuation must be more or less his own act, and be attributable to himself rather than to his instructors. In any case the ordinance of nature which makes him teachable cannot be in itself evil, because it gives effect to the antidote and not to the bane only; beside which, its whole effect on every man is good, especially with regard to his physical nature.

Returning now to the condition of those born of evil parents, and allowing for the corrective effect of hereditary punishments, and the knowledge necessarily acquired of the hatefulness of sin by familiarity with sinners, we shall see that their relative position to the children of the good, will depend very much upon the question, Whether it is better to know, by experience, the sinfulness and some of the consequences of sin, and by report the goodness and consequences of virtue, or to know by experience the goodness and some of the consequences of virtue, by report only the sinfulness and consequences of a vicious life? I think it would be difficult to decide this question; and, as to the remaining inequality, we must never forget, that he who starts under a disadvantage has the more merit if he win the prize; that God knows exactly how far the sinfulness of each flows from his own acts, so that perhaps one repentant tear from an habitual sinner may outweigh in virtue, and be more plentifully rewarded in the end, than a long course of easy well-doing, in one more favoured by a good education, and by his circumstances leading him involuntarily to good. God would not be just were He not to punish a rich man's carelessness and omissions as severely as a poor man's crimes and commissions, for the poor can never have the opportunities of beneficence always possessed by the rich, and the rich are never tried by the temptations and provocations, which continually beset the poor.

I confess, that what seems to my own mind no small argument for the existence of a perfect and most perfectly beneficent Being is suggested by the fact, that wherever I turn my attention to vice and misery in their worst forms, I find there men and women who, having arrived at the legitimate conclusion of all these arguments concerning the existence of evil, and recognizing in its presence an opportunity for the exercise and increase of their own virtuous goodness, actuated by no desire of gain, rewarded by no ostentatious reputation, devote their whole energies to nothing else but the well-being of the worst and generally most thankless and repulsive part of all creation: surely it is impossible to see such exquisite virtue in men, and yet believe that they are sprung from some origin wholly destitute of conscious goodness, that they will never be more completely rewarded, and that they are not now supported and encouraged by the continual presence of a Power at once almighty and all-merciful.

CHAPTER X.

On the Existence of Evil among the lower Animals.

I HAVE now, I think, completed a survey of the evils which properly exist in and among men; there remain to be considered those which exist elsewhere in the universe, among animate and inanimate things. As to these latter, it does not seem that we can, in strictness, affirm the existence of anything evil to them; for, as they are supposed to be incapable of feeling, and much more of thinking, there cannot be any relation for good or evil with them, and thus they can only be regarded in relation to this subject as they affect other and at least sentient beings. So far as man is affected by the operation of these natural calamities, and by the existence of noxious and venomous animals, they may be considered as very apt and proper means for the infliction of those educational pains and misfortunes which, as we have seen, may be useful to all men;[1] of course such pain being useful, the existence of fit instruments for its infliction is also useful and indeed necessary, and we see such supplied by these means without the apparent existence of external moral evil, and therefore most usefully and well. Beside this, it is certain that the existence of noxious animals, for instance, has a powerful effect in com-

[1] Porque assi como el hombre, que comparado con Dios, es menos que una pulguilla oun mosquito, se levantó contra Dios y le desobedaciò; assi quiso el que el mosquito y la pulga y otros semejantes animalillos se levantassen contra él, y lo molestassen y humiliassen; visto que tan viles criaturas eran poderosas para inquietar una criatura tan generosa como es el hombre, sin ser el parte para defenderse de ellas, &c. Mas en todo es Dios bueno, en todo misericordioso. Porque esta pena de tal manera es pena, que tambien es medicina, &c.—*Luis de Granada de Symbolo de la Fé*, ch. 21, s. Unico.—*Lanfranc Elucidarium*, tit. 12.

pelling men to associate for their mutual defence, and so to form something like society, in which state alone the faculties of man find their most appropriate exercise; and from the most noxious things, animal, vegetable, and mineral, come the most effectual remedies, while the existence of such powers call forth in the mind of man the consciousness of his own real weakness and ignorance, and impress him with the idea of a superior Power, as men, who have hardly ever thought of God before, begin to pray when a storm terrifies them with the prospect of immediate destruction.[1]

A much greater difficulty remains in the fact, that not man alone but the lower animals themselves suffer pain continually: an inundation sweeps them away, carnivorous animals devour them, they kill or injure one another, and man's cruelty is daily exercised upon them; sometimes even cruelty to them is his recognised and honourable amusement. How can these things be, and God be good, and wise, and powerful?

If we suppose the lower animals to be incapable of any but

[1] "On pourrait encore ajouter qu'il est bon en général que la foudre tombe tantôt dans un désert, et tantôt dans une ville, pour marquer que tantôt Dieu s'approche, et que tantôt il s'éloigne du pêcheur: qu'il faut qu'il-y-ait de monstres, des serpens, et des bêtes vénéneuses, pour menacer les hommes, pour leurs faire mieux connaître la justice de Dieu: qu'on tire des serpens les plus vénéneuses d'excellens remèdes: que les abeilles nous fournissent le miel: que les mouches et les arraignées purifient l'air: que les insectes ramassent la corruption de la terre, la vermine celle du sang, et qu'il n'y a peut-être rien de plus propre à nous représenter la misère des hommes, que ces vers, qui par les sages loix de la nature se forment de leurs cadavres dans le tombeau. Mais il est beaucoup plus raisonnable de répondre en troisième lieu, que quand nous ne pourrions pas découvrir la fin de certaines choses dans la nature, il serait ridicule et extravagant de s'imaginer qu'elles en manquent pour cela; parceque ce serait supposer que nous connaissons toutes choses."—*Abbadie de la Ver. de la R. Chr.* p. 1, s. 1, c. 4.—Similarly Augustine, "Venena ipsa quæ per inconvenientiam pernicioss sunt, convenienter adhibita in salubria medicamenta vertantur: quamque a contrario etiam hæc quibus delectantur, sicut cibus et potus et ista lux, immoderato et importuno usu, noxia sentiantur. Unde nos admonet divina providentia non res insipienter vituperare; sed utilitatem rerum diligenter inquirere, et ubi nostrum ingenium, vel infirmitas deficit, ita credere occulta sicut erant quædam quæ vix potuimus invenire; et ipsa utilitatis occultatio, aut humilitatis exercitatio est, aut elationis attritio."—*De Civitate Dei.* c.

purely physical pains, of any but purely animal joys, I am not sure but that, with all its drawbacks, their state is one upon the whole rather of pleasure than of pain, rather a blessing, therefore, than a curse, and this is all we need prove. It is the higher mental endowments of man, which make him capable of the acuter of his sufferings, as well as of the more solid and refined of his enjoyments. Even with man the memory of mere physical pain is almost incredibly fleeting; we cannot recall the sensation of suffering, and if we make no especial effort to preserve the memory, if we have no anticipation of its probable return, often even if we have, we find ourselves, as soon as the attack is over, or perhaps when it is only a little abated, full of plans and hopes, and feelings of pleasure, without the least shadow or after-taste of that passed pain, which seemed for the time so unendurable. If we realize our state, had we nothing, and felt we nothing, of memory or anticipation, were we wholly incapable of remorse, or the sense of injustice, or the pang of rankling envy, or wounded pride, or of the sorrow of unrequited affection, how clear of pain would our horizon seem, how much should we enjoy every little present pleasure, how soon forget every vanished pain! We see how near man may come to this state of animal indifference, and with what effect, in the case of the least cultivated, the most degraded and so most contented of slaves; they have but few of the cares and sorrows of free men; they feel but little of the horrors which we, who are free and have tasted higher pleasures, know to be inseparable from slavery; indeed, if there were not this compensating tendency to impassibility, we could scarcely imagine how existence could be supportable. What these slaves approach to, what those who would delude us with the exhibition of their thoughtless merriment would have us believe they are, but which they are not, and so long as they possess the full faculties of man they cannot be, that the animals are. What a

different standard of happiness must we apply to the lamb, that nibbles playfully at its own sacrificial garland, and to the martyr, who is led from torture to a lingering death, yet both are perhaps happy, both secretly rejoice at their then condition, the pains of the one exceed those of the other in due proportion to the vast disparity between their conceptions and capabilities of perfect pleasure. If we sever our momentary feeling of pain from the dread which prolongs it and forebodes still worse to follow, and from the memory of past enjoyment shedding over our present sensations a light of sickly intensity, we shall find that the meaning we now attach to the word will not be applicable to them. How afflictive, for instance, is such a sensation of pain as seems to render it impossible to think, and drives out all desire, save that of rest, that the whole activity of the mind may be concentrated into one huge act of passive endurance; yet the chief pain of this is purely intellectual, it consists in the nervous and ever-recurring enquiry, When is this to end? It will be impossible to bear this much longer; I shall not endure it and live. What can it end in? how awful to die thus! varied by the recollection of pleasures we might at the moment have been enjoying, of good and useful acts we might have been doing, of the flight of time while we are merely suffering, changing into its opposite, the dull weariness of having suffered so long while the day has worn away so slowly; add to these the anxious irritable watching, and watching for every motion, every sound, and the throng of thoughts that seem to rush wildly past, and then mockingly dare us to catch and hold them. Again, the effect of fright, apart from the foreboding of future pains, is to produce either stupefaction, or nervous over-excitement; these its physical effects are both rather the absence of any power of feeling than directly painful in themselves, and, as a soldier in the heat of battle has not time to feel his wounds, and may fall dead with exhaustion before he is con-

scious of his weakness; so the hunted stag, if it had high powers of intellect, might run to death in similar unconscious excitement, but if it have no such powers, if it have no conscious anxiety about the end of all its persecution, no anxious comparison of its powers and dangers, as they from time to time seem to have increased or failed, then it is manifest that it cannot have suffered half that agony which they deserve to feel who can in such things find their pleasure. Without some power of combination and comparison, some purely intellectual power of voluntary memory and anticipation, an animal can be but a machine, acting indeed by its own will, and actuated by sensations and instinctive impulses, instead of acting directly from purely reflex and unperceived causes and laws of operation, but almost equally incapable of pleasure and pain as we think of them. The pain would be felt certainly, and would produce an impulse to strive to escape it; but if without any dread of worse consequences to follow, without the recollection and regret of pleasures that might have come in its place, without any of that sense of having lived in vain, of being hopeless, helpless and forsaken, which are the bitterest ingredients in the cup of human suffering, even of that which is purely physical, the pain would be forgotten as soon as it was over, would derive no new intensity from its mere continuance, and every moment of life must be to the consciousness a new birth, with all the spring and vigour of fresh and buoyant youth, such as they have who know no memory of pain, no mental regret, no fear of evil, no anxiety for the future. Such a being may suffer, but cannot be unhappy; how great a contrast to ourselves! Now when to all this we add, that mere existence must be pleasure to a being, which cannot comprehend the ideas of duty and of an ultimate and worthy object of life, and compare the moments of actual pain with the life of actual pleasure which is allotted to every animal, I think we cannot call its existence an evil to

itself, or a gift which it would be impossible for a benevolent Deity to confer.

Of what is the real condition of animals we are all but totally ignorant; there are many effects which seem to show the existence, in the higher orders at least, of a certain degree of intellectual power, in memory for instance, and the power of association, not without a shadow of reasoning, and to some extent a feeling of gratitude and some moral qualities, as if some at least of their actions and perhaps thoughts were voluntary, and not purely instinctive and necessary, or in any manner analogous to the chemical affinities of matter or the purely reflex action of the sensitive plant, even beyond the degree to which such powers are implied in the very definition of an animal. It is impossible, however, to establish the existence of intellectual powers without proving or admitting the existence of moral faculties also, and the moment the ideas of voluntary wisdom and goodness are allowed to enter, we must make each class of the lower animals the centre of a new moral system, analogous to that which we have connected with the race of men. Thus the further we remove any class of animals from the merely passive and passionless following of instinct, which our previous argument assumed them to be, the more reason we raise for the probability that pain may not be to them an unmixed evil, not therefore to be thought of as essentially opposed to any presumption arising from the goodness of the Deity; this much, however, it is necessary to recollect for our own admonition, that if any higher order of beings directly and knowingly inflict pain on us, whatever good God's providence may draw out of that evil, they can only be fiends, so those who voluntarily inflict pain on animals, however the permission of such pain may be reconciled with the Divine goodness, assimilate themselves to fiends in their work, and invoke on their own heads the punishments due to such guilty spirits. It does

not appear, however, that the life of any animal is so evidently far short of the proper end of its faculties as we know that human life is, and it is also certain that the power of reasoning and moral consciousness is very much less in any animal than it is in man, a fact which is at once proved and applied to our subject by the evident enjoyment many of them show that they experience, where a man could not but be filled with fear and anxiety, and be wholly engrossed by painful recollections, or anticipations yet more painful.

In the case of the lower animals, as elsewhere throughout creation, evil exists only in a fleeting and contingent form; no animal, for instance, is certain to experience any particular pain; and though from experience we conclude that all will suffer some, there is nothing naturally impossible in the idea of an animal that should pass through its life without experiencing any pain whatever; and even as to death, if all the reproducing energies of the animal frame proceeded with uniform and uninterrupted regularity, there seems nothing which should interfere with perpetual continuance; the same observation may be made of man; pain, sorrow, decay, and death, are matters of which we learn to think as certain by experience and comparison, but of this certainty the natural constitution of no living thing, taken singly, would furnish any obvious proof, a thought which brings us back to our first proof, grounded on the negative nature and the want of any real substantive existence of evil in any natural person or thing.

PART III.

Proofs of the Existence of God.

CHAPTER I.

How far is the Existence of the Deity implied in universally admitted Truths.

WE have before considered at some length the question how far the existence of the Deity is necessarily and involuntarily admitted by all men, and we have seen that the belief in the existence of a Deity has ever prevailed, and does so now throughout the whole world, which is at least one of the characteristics of an innate idea or self-evident proposition.[1]

[1] It is difficult to pass over altogether the facts on which such an appeal as that of Arnobius is based.—Quisquamne est hominum, qui non cum istius Principis notione diem primæ nativitatis intraverit? Cui non sit ingenitum, non affixum, imo ipsi pene in genetalibus matris non impressum, non insitum esse Regem ac Dominum; cunctorum quæcunque sunt moderatorem?—*Adv. Gentes*, l. i. § 49. *Ὁμολογουντα δε τουτοις και αυτον οψομεθα τον της εναγους ἡμων θρησκειας κατηγορον Ιουλιανον· διϊσχυριζεται μεν γαρ ὡς αδιδακτον τι χρημα, και αυτομαθες ανθρωποις, το ειδεναι Θεον. Φησι δε ὁυτως· "Οτι δε ου διδακτον, αλλα φυσει τουτο τοις ανθρωποις ὑπαρχει, τεκμηριον ἡμιν εστι πρωτον, ἡ κοινη παντων ανθρωπων ιδιᾳ και δημοσιᾳ, και κατ'ανδρα και εθνη περι το θειον προθυμια· ἁπαντες μεν γαρ αδιδακτως θειον τι πεπιστευκαμεν· ὑπερ ὁυ, το μεν ακριβες, ουτε πασι ραδιον, ουτε τοις εγνωκοσιν, ειπειν εις παντα δυνατον."—Cyril. Alex. c. Julianum*, lib. ii. There is a distinction between what is strictly self-evident and the necessary consequences of our idea of anything: to this latter class belong the argument at page 54 and the famous Cartesian proof of the existence of the Deity, expressed thus by Des Cartes himself in replying to the most obvious objection—Je voyais bien que, supposant un triangle, il fallait que ses trois angles fussent égaux à deux droits, mais je ne voyais rien pour cela qui m'assurât qu'il-y-eut au monde aucune triangle: au lieu que, revenant à examiner l'idée que j'avais d'un être parfait, je trouvais que l'existence y était comprise en même façon qu'il est compris en celle d'un triangle que ses trois

If this were one of those ideas which the mind of man is incapable of thinking at all without adopting and receiving as certainly true, an Atheist would of course be all but impossible. Yet there have perhaps been persons even osten-

angles sont égaux à deux droits, ou en celle d'une sphère que toutes ses parties sont également distantes de son centre, ou même encore plus evidemment; et que par consequent il est pour le moins aussi certain que Dieu, qui est cet être si parfait, est ou existe, qu'aucune démonstration de géométrie le saurait être. Discours de la Methode. 4me Partie. Anselm had long before, thus stated the same argument.—An ergo non est talis natura, quia "dixit insipiens in corde suo, non est Deus?" Sed certe idem ipse insipiens, cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico, "aliquid quo majus nihil cogitari potest;" intelligit quod audit, et quod intelligit in intellectu ejus est, etiam si non intelligit illud esse.—Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse vel in intellectu aliquid, quo nihil majus cogitari potest: quia hoc cum audit intelligit: et quicquid intelligitur, in intellectu est. Et certe id quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. Si ergo id, quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu; id ipsum, quo majus cogitari non potest, est quo majus cogitari potest: sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu, et in re. Proslogium, c. ii. Upon this argument arose the question among the schoolmen whether the existence of the Deity might not be self-evident "per se" and not so "quoad nos," the usual answer being in the affirmative; a conclusion adopted and enforced by Bishop Pearson in his Latin theological lectures. Thomas Aquinas speaks thus in his *Summa Theologiæ*, Quæst. ii. Art. i.—Dico ergo, quod hæc propositio, Deus est, quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia prædicatum est idem cum subjecto. Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. (Quæst. iii. Art. iv.) Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per ea, quæ sunt magis nota quoad nos et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus. Durandus a S. Portiano thus rather over acutely criticises Anselm's argument when alleged as proving the proposition self-evident.—Quod autem subditur de Anselmo, qui dicit quod nullus potest cogitare quod Deus non est: licet hæc verba dicet in corde, aut sine ulla, aut cum aliqua extranea significatione: dicendum, quod Anselmus non dicit hoc absolute, ut ibidem patet, sed supposito quod hæc sit ratio hujus nominis, Deus: Deus est quo majus cogitari non potest. Et supposita illa, deductione quod illud cogitetur esse majus, quod non potest non esse. His enim duobus concessis: et facta deductione: sequitur quod Deus non potest cogitari non esse: non autem absolute, quia non concedens alteram præmissarum, aut non deducens conclusionem ex præmissis potest secundum se cogitari et mente concipere Deum non esse. Propter quod oppositum ejus scilicet, Deum esse, non est per se notum nobis sed fit notum deductione facta ex notioribus quoad nos. Ad illud quod tertio subditur, dicendum, quod non est per se notum quod hæc sit ratio nominis quod est Deus; "Deus est quo nihil majus cogitari potest:" nec Anselmus accipit hoc ut per se notum, sed tantum ut creditum: dicens: "credimus Te esse aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari potest," nec de omni cogi-

tatiously denying the existence of a Deity, or admitting that it was a point full of doubt, and by no means so clear as to compel their assent after the manner of a necessary idea. Hence most theistic writers have given up the hope of establishing their proposition on so aboriginal a basis. I am not myself altogether satisfied on this head, because I can conceive of men wanting the common faculty of mental perception in this matter, as easily as of those who have a different perception of colours from other men, and I do not think even the secularism of our day goes beyond scepticism, or that any one ever wrote a book to defend, or any one capable of doing so ever maintained the positive doctrine, that there is no God, in its native clearness; and thus I may observe incidentally, how great a testimony it is to the truth of our doctrine, apart from all other considerations, that it has never been directly denied by any one capable of estimating the consequences of his denial, and very few have even thought it doubtful, while it has been adopted by nearly all philosophers, and worked into the institutions of every country and every time. However, taking the matter most strongly against the doctrine, there has never been, and I think never can be, any Atheist who will deny that there is a government more powerful than that of man exercised over the course of natural events.[1] Thus much all must adopt as

tatione veritatem habet, quia licet Deus sit quo nihil majus cogitari potest, et quo nihil majus vere cogitari possit: potest tamen (quamvis falso) cogitari aliquid majus Deo. Ex quo sequitur quod licet Deum esse sit verum: non tamen est per se notum, quia oppositum per se noti quoad nos non potest nec vere nec false opinare. In Lib. Sent. L. i. Dist. iii. Quæst. iii. ad finem. It is difficult to be quite sure of one's footing in such arguments; however, even Dr. Clarke (*Demonstr.* iii. 3.) could not wholly reject them as fallacious, and I have in a subsequent chapter exhibited one which seemed to me the most striking.

[1] De quelque manière que l'univers soit fait, et quelque philosophe qu'on suive, on conviendra sans doute avec moi, qu'afin que cet univers subsiste tel qu'il est, il faut une matière, un mouvement limité à une certaine mesure, et un mouvement determiné d'une certaine manière; puisque si vous ôtez toutes ces causes, vous faites du monde un néant ou un chaos.—*Abbadie*, p. 1, s. i. c. v.

the common basis of their philosophy; the only question is, has this government, have these laws of nature, any and what cause? have they any intelligent origin? All-powerful they certainly are, in the sense of being able to do everything that is or naturally can be done. As to the wisdom of these laws, it is evident that whencesoever they may spring, they act as though they had been regulated by most extensive knowledge and very considerable wisdom, as is manifest from the mere continuance of the order of things during so many ages, and from the fact that man, though he comprehends them not as a whole, yet derives his preservation from them. The truth is, that most men look no further than the beginning of our definition, "there is a being," and knowing that we mean an intelligent being, they deny that, and think the whole matter ended; but whatever may be thought on this head, no one can deny that there is an all-powerful something, though that something, some would have to be mere innate quality. The greatest dispute has always turned on the attributes of intelligence and goodness, yet no one can deny, but that so far as primary adaptation of structure and general preservation goes, there is a certain air of goodness in the laws of nature. Reduced to the form of our definition, what all must admit, if not from original consciousness, at least from experience, stands thus: "There is in the universe something or some things which work together in harmony, all-powerful, and if intelligent, very wise and not essentially evil, by which all things exist." Whether this something be called fate, or chance, or necessity, or nature, or be divided into many, as the innate qualities of many different things, all those who know by experience that there is an ordinary course of nature, as there certainly is, must admit its existence however they may in form deny, that the laws of nature are the will of the Deity, or any plastic nature created by him. The proposition may be thus put:—There is an ordinary course of events in

the universe, directed by some power external to and greater than the will of man, which acts as though not entirely destitute of wisdom and goodness. I cannot conceive a man seriously to deny this proposition, nor do I think it would be difficult to arrive by a mere generalization of it and the analogies of the action of human intelligence, at the conclusion that therefore there is most probably a being all-powerful, wise, and good. I propose to draw out from this basis two proofs of the Divine existence, one moral, the other more strictly intellectual, and first the moral proof, which has much analogy with one offered in a previous chapter, though not exactly identical with it.

When I consider myself and my position in the world, I become conscious that I do not depend upon myself alone, or mainly, for my preservation and happiness; to some extent these depend upon causes wholly external to myself: as for instance, the place where, the time when, the parents of whom, and the circumstances in which I was born, and to some extent upon causes practically external to myself, as upon actions of mine of the ultimate consequences of which I was actually and as to many of them necessarily ignorant. All that I can do is to use well what opportunities I have, the result of which I find to be, that I can procure much internal happiness, but can only very slightly operate with any certainty upon its external causes. Now of this, my limited power, I have been always conscious; yet, till I came to years of discretion, I thought very little about it, because I used always to have some person older than myself to help me, to listen to my complaints, and to supply and satisfy my desires; some one whom I practically thought of as omnipotent and yet accessible; but now, though I find many of my fellow-men excel me very much in wisdom, and have very much more power than I, still I see that they are nearly as helpless as myself, and I can never find any one of them that shall

answer the ideas of my schoolboy days. I have need of help, I am by myself all but powerless, and yet the earth does not present me with a visible helper; can I say that there is none such? I find that I am helpless in the hand of circumstances; but what are these circumstances? They are the results and operations of the laws of nature, viewed as one great whole, working to the maintenance of that whole; and when I perceive that though they work in the main on a settled plan, yet the things themselves are, as far as I can perceive, blind and dull, and senseless, or when intelligent, as with men and animals, yet wholly unconcerned about me, and unconscious of the manner in which their actions will affect me, I conclude, that in the directing power of nature as a whole, I must look for the power which I must rely upon for support and help.

Of what this power may be I have no direct knowledge; but since I find that I need an object of trust, and in my early years have been supplied with one, I look with as much confidence for some such object still, as I expect, when I discover a hitherto unobserved animal, to find some food proper for its sustenance. I can have no other object proper for my trust and faith to repose in save only the Power which directs all things. I place my faith, therefore, in that, which I am right in doing, because it must be right and reasonable to do that willingly which one cannot help doing, and whether I will or no, upon that Power even for my existence one moment beyond this time I must depend. But my reason does not leave me here, it tells me that I am so formed, that it is impossible for me to trust in anything that I do not believe to be sufficiently good to bear me no ill-will, and sufficiently wise and powerful not to be overreached or overcome by other forces; that I must, therefore, believe this Power to be a perfect being, powerful, intelligent, wise, and good. I believe, therefore, that God is, and is the governor of all things. In other words, I trust voluntarily in that upon which I involuntarily

depend; and since I know that this trust is reasonable and necessary as regards myself, I conclude that it is also reasonable and perhaps necessary as regards that Power viewed in its own essence; this it can only be, if that power is the will of a perfect being, of the perfect being, for however multiform it may seem to be, since they, if many, do work in harmony and govern the universe jointly, they are but one to me. Speculative doubts and difficulties can in no way affect this proof, they are to be expected so long as I am as I am, finite and ignorant, they cannot make me less dependant upon the Power which so ordered all things as to produce and still to preserve me; they cannot therefore shake the faith that is based on that dependance, but, on the contrary, the faith they cannot shake annihilates them, by imparting an unwavering confidence that they will at the last be found, as many strange accidents have already shown themselves to be, both reasonable in themselves and useful to the sufferer.

Here is my first argument to prove the existence of the Deity; it rests upon the presumption, that when so much provision has been made for my sustenance as an animal, there is a corresponding provision somewhere for my necessities as an intelligent being, fortified by a willingness to find right and goodness triumphant in all things without me, as I know they ought to be within me. I cannot help thinking that this argument can only be evaded, or refuted upon one of three suppositions: first, that man needs no external object of trust, and has full power to help himself to the utmost extent to which it is necessary that he should be assisted, which is either transparent folly or outrageous presumption; or, secondly, that man's intellectual nature is a sort of phœnix in the universe, the one thing of its kind, a faculty without an object, an instinct without a use, a longing which cannot be satisfied; or lastly, that good is not essentially the highest of objects and motives, and that it is not desirable to our peace of mind that

we should believe in any ultimate subjection of evil, in any ultimate triumph of goodness. No one could openly embrace or defend any of these theories without being instantly repudiated and condemned by the common intelligence and conscience of mankind, as holding a doctrine contradictory to all experience, and tending to the encouragement of most pernicious theories of life and action.

So much for the moral proof, deducible from the existence of fixed laws of nature; in a subsequent chapter I shall endeavour to show that the existence of a personal and intelligent Deity is the only possible solution of the intellectual difficulties which surround the subject; but now that we have arrived at the idea of a Deity, two more direct proofs offer themselves, which we will first examine.

CHAPTER II.

A Scholastic Proof of the Existence of the Deity.[1]

LET us suppose a Being possessing every perfection which we can conceive of as possessed by any existence. Such a one may in the abstract without doubt possibly exist. Among the perfections of which being is capable, that of unoriginated self-existence must find a place, we can readily enough conceive of

[1] This proof is taken from Abp. Bradwardine's work De Causa Dei, where it is thus stated in scholastic Latin:—Dicatur siquidem, causa compendii, A. aliquid tam perfectum et bonum, quod nihil perfectius vel melius esse potest: Sumatur quoque possibile ad communem modum loquendi; vel, si oporteat, maxime absolute, pro ille viz. quod per se, et formaliter simpliciter, contradictionem, seu repugnātiam non includit: Ex quo scilicet posito et admisso pro possibili absolute secundum speciem obligationum quæ positio nominatur, nusquam, in consequentia bona et formali simpliciter, sequitur, impossibile absolute, quod scilicet per se et formaliter simpliciter contradictionem includit.—Possibile est igitur A esse, seu A potest esse, aut posset esse, quis non statim assentiat? Quisve hoc posito et admisso pro possibili absolute, se non a contradictione defendat? Si autem possibile sit A esse; aut si A potest, aut posset esse; A est, imo et necesse est A esse, et A est necesse esse, et hoc per se.—Si igitur A potest esse, potest esse A quare et potest esse necesse esse, cum hoc sit perfectius et melius quam possibile esse, potestque esse necesse esse per se. Esse namque bonum per se, est sufficientius, dignius, perfectius et melius, quam esse bonum per aliud, alio indigere, ab alio dependere, sicut cujuslibet animus judicat, et memorati Philosophi [Avicenna, &c.] contestantur—Omne—non ens quod dicitur possibile sive potens, sic dicitur per potentiam alicujus activi. Si ergo A non est et potest esse, per aliquam potentiam potest esse, et non per potentiam propriam, cum nullam habeat; cum etiam nihil omnino possit se facere et producere de non esse ad esse? Nam omne faciens aliquo modo præcedit, saltem naturaliter, suum factum; sed nihil seipsum præcedit: cum insuper secundum præmissa, omne non ens dictum possibile, sic dicatur per potentiam alicujus activi, nec potest A potest esse per potentiam alienam. Hoc enim secundum prius ostensa esset per potentiam alicujus activi, quod posset facere A: sed nullum est tale, cum ab omne aliud ab A. sit incomparabiliter minus A. et impotens ipsum causare. Si etiam A causetur ab alio, non est A; perfectius enim est esse per se sufficienter, omnino incausabiliter et independenter ab alio, et summam et primam causam aliorum; quam ab alio dependere et

this, though we may not be able altogether to comprehend it, and not only may we, but we must conceive of it as a quality possessed by something, because, look at the universe how we will, there must be something in it self-existing, though it were only the cycles in which things finite might be supposed to revolve.[2] Now then, this perfect Being being possible, does such a one exist? That which is not and cannot be, is impossible, but that which is not and can be must be something which it is possible for something now in being, directly or indirectly, to give existence to, or which can come into existence of itself; it is evident that no being possessed of unoriginated self-existence can ever be brought into being by any power external to itself, nor can it or anything else come into existence of itself, for that is utterly impossible, the idea of it involving this plain contradiction, that the same thing must at the same time be, as the producer, and not be, as the thing to be produced. The perfect being, therefore, if it did not exist already, would be impossible, but it is possible, therefore it exists. To put the same argument in another form, suppose the Deity, or perfect being not to exist, we have already shown that it would then be impossible for it to exist at any future time, and it would also be impossible that it should ever have existed at any past time, because a being perfectly

alteri subjici ut effectus. Non potest ergo esse A ab alio quovismodo, quod et posset ostendi per multas alias rationes. Per nullam ergo potentiam potest A esse, cujus oppositum dicebatur. Quare contradictionem includit, A non esse et posse esse; et verum est, et necessarium Deum esse, esse quoque tam perfectum et bonum quod nihil perfectius vel melius esse posset.—*De Causa Dei*, lib. 1, ch. i. Both forms of this proof are given in Cudworth's Intellectual System, &c., ch. iv. p. 725, fol. ed.

[2] Yet further—"An eternal succession of finite beings involves in it a contradiction, and is therefore plainly impossible. As the supposition is made to get quit of the idea of any one having existed from eternity, each of the beings in the succession must have begun in time: but the succession itself is eternal. We have then the succession of beings infinitely earlier than any being in that succession; or, in other words, a series of beings running on *ad infinitum*, before it reached any particular being [whatever], which is absurd."—*Robert Hall's Sermon on Modern Infidelity.*

[illegible] : A [illegible] be never be destroyed, nor can a [illegible] have some beginning or end: well [illegible] existence of a perfect being is impossible, and has [illegible] : I mean, I must have been always impossible [illegible] some external power, or of something internal in their nature: but no external force or circumstances can make a self-existent being impossible. therefore there is something impossible in its own nature. the conception of which, nevertheless, involves no contradiction, and indeed is [illegible] essential to the existence of anything: in its own nature, therefore, it is at the same time possible and impossible. which is absurd. therefore the Deity actually exists.

This proof is not open to the objection that it proves a mere logical existence, a mere abstract conception, for in fact it implies over the gulf between intellectual and actual things, and destroys existence from conception, where the two naturally meet and mingle, that is in the first origin of all things.[1]

[1] Omne ens unity of the Deity is in a large extent included in the above proof. Demonstratione pure a formaliy sua. De Causa Dei, lib. 1. c. 1. corol. p. 14. Deus possibile est simpliciter absolute unicum Deum esse. Quis non statim assentiat? Et si sit possibile unicum Deum esse, illum, viz. quem secundum premissa necesse est esse, qui et sit A: necesse est ergo Unicum illum esse et unicum alium Deum non esse. Sit enim B alius quidam Deus, et secundum primi possibile est B non esse Deum, quare et secundum sextam partem non esse B. ergo vel est impossibile esse, vel possibile esse possibilitate contradictionis. quare et necesse est B Deum non esse: sicut, &c.—vel brevius unicum Deum necesse est esse Deum, sicut prima suppositio et sexta pars demonstrat; B non necesse est esse Deum, secundum premissa; B ergo non est Deus. *Multitudo quæque Deorum æqualium si ponatur, nonne est aliquo modo perfectior uno Deo.* Quare et nullus eorum est omne perfectus.—Quamobrem unus Deus.

CHAPTER III.

Of Necessary Existence.[1]

THE universe of existence, including therein all existences of whatsoever kind and degree, cannot be made up of a series of contingent beings —cannot consist of a series of beings, the existence of no one of which is necessary to the existence of the rest, and to no one of which no external cause of existence is necessary; for if that were so, we should have a series of beings with no cause from without, because there is nothing without, and with no cause from within, because no one is necessary to the existence of the rest, and yet, by hypothesis, there would be no one of them all to which some cause would not be necessary; the supposition thus brings us out into an

[1] The reader will perceive that this proof is nearly identical with Dr. Clarke's celebrated Demonstration. I have, however, endeavoured to distinguish more accurately the different kinds of necessity. A similar proof, in a form not unworthy to rank with the "Demonstration," is given in a work by Gualberti di Soria (?) published anonymously at Lucca, in the year 1745, with the title "Della Esistenza e degli Attributi di Dio &c. Ragionamenti Metafisici. They are substantially the same with the third of those given by Thomas Aquinas. —Summ. *Theol.* qu. 2, art. 3. Tertia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario; quæ talis est,—Invenimus enim in rebus quædam quæ sunt possibilia esse et non esse, cum quædam inveniuntur generari et corrumpi, et per consequens possibilia esse et non esse. Impossibile est autem omnia quæ sunt talia semper esse, quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse aliquando, nihil fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset, quia quod non est non incipit esse, nisi per aliquod quod est. Si igitur nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse; et sic modo nihil esset, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia sunt possibilia, sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium in rebus. Omne autem necessarium, vel habet causam suæ necessitatis aliunde, vel non habet. Non est autem possibile quod procedatur in infinitum in necessariis quæ habent causis efficientibus (ut probatum est in isto articulo). Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod est per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis: quod omnes dicunt Deum.

express contradiction, inasmuch as each being is supposed to have been caused, and yet no cause of any of them could ever have existed. We cannot, therefore, suppose anything to exist at all without supposing necessary self-existence somewhere, for to deny such necessary existence altogether would, according to our previous argument, imply that nothing exists now, not even the reasoner.

To prevent confusion we may, I think, distinguish four kinds of necessary existence: first, by consequential necessity, as the sound of a trumpet necessarily exists whenever the trumpet is rightly blown into, and a watch cannot but exist when its parts have been rightly made and skilfully put together; then, by either of two kinds of causal necessity, necessity as an original cause, and necessity as a sustaining cause, as the existence of the watchmaker is necessary to the first existence, but not to the continuance of a watch, while the continuing existence of a trumpeter is implied in the continuance of the trumpet's sound; and lastly, by an absolute necessity, of the nature of which we cannot hope to understand more than we do of any other absolute essence, of absolute human nature, for instance, we know that such things must exist, because we are involved in direct contradictions whenever we attempt to deny it. That which is consequentially necessary must post-exist as regards its cause; that which is necessary as a cause must pre-exist, or co-exist, as regards that to which it is necessary. Thus we find three relative necessities corresponding to the three relations of time, and one corresponding to time itself, resembling it, I may add, in the controversies to which our idea of it has given rise.

Many difficulties have been introduced into this subject by an attempt to argue about absolute self-contained necessity, as though we could discern the contradiction implied in supposing it away without any regard to any relative necessity whatever, which is as impossible to us as it is to perceive the

thoughts of another without some visible or material symbol. In fact, we cannot define anything without making it part of our definition that it is. A being that does not exist, is a contradiction in terms, and everything that is, exists by some sort of necessity, and is necessarily conceived of by us as existing.[1] We may indeed speak of a being to which nothing external is necessary, and which is necessary to nothing without itself, but we may safely disregard the possible existence of such a one because it can have no relations with anything else, for if it had it would become in some sense necessary to them as they now are: and its existence can never be proved. Besides, the analogy of nature is wholly against the existence of any such unnecessary necessity; if indeed it does not imply a real contradiction to suppose an absolutely necessary being, necessary to absolutely nothing.

If we can show that absolute self-existence may reside in one being only, and must reside in at least one such being as would alone be a sufficient first cause of all things, then we may conclude that there is and can be but one necessarily existent being. For if we suppose one such being as might be the cause of all others to exist thus necessarily, so that all other beings might derive their origin from him, then since each and every other being may be supposed, without any contradiction to its existence now, not to have existed from eternity, no one can have necessarily so existed; and so the present existence of the things we see and know will have been shown to involve the existence of one, and one only absolutely necessary being, that is to prove the existence and unity of the Deity.

I mean then, by a necessary being, one that is concluded to

[1] Quarto quæritur; utrum hoc ipsum, non posse cogitari non esse, sit Deo proprium, vel aliis etiam convenit? Et videtur quod conveniat etiam aliis. Sicut enim in antehabitis dictum est, quod est, non potest cogitari non esse, dum est: falsum enim non potest intelligi; ergo nec intelligendo cogitari. De multis ergo cogitatur, quod sunt, et non possunt non esse.—*Albertus Magnus*, 1 P. *Summ. Theol.* tr. 4, qu. 19, membr. 4.

be necessary in itself, because it and its necessity are necessary to the existence of our own selves, and of those external things which we perceive to exist. Now every necessary being must be eternal, because time can have no relation to absolute necessity, and because that which exists of necessity, without any external cause, must have existed at the very commencement of all things, and could not then, or ever, have come into existence for the first time, self production being an impossibility.[1] All necessarily existing beings are, therefore, eternal. Again, there must be in the universe some one necessarily existing being possessed of intelligence; for we know that there is intelligence in the world, both in the shape of human intelligence and under the form of the wonderful adaptation of animal instincts, and as the less cannot produce the greater, these animals and men must themselves be necessary and eternal, or there must be some other greater intelligent being capable of giving them existence, that is of creation.[2] It would be manifestly absurd for me to

[1] "As supposing his being and not being at the same time: He must be, as the cause producing, and not be, as the effect to be produced; and must necessarily be before he was, which is an evident and undeniable contradiction"—"if there were not some being without beginning, there was a time when there was no being; and if so, it must have been impossible for anything ever to have come into being, unless something be supposed to make itself, which is already shown to be impossible."—See *T. Burnet's Boyle Lectures*, pp. 8 and 9. This author tries to demonstrate the whole of natural and revealed religion; though not without many faults, his work well deserves some attention.

[2] 'Tis an axiome to which every sceptick will readily condescend, "tantumdem ad minimum esse debere in causa, quantum est in effectu;" there must be so much at least in the cause as is found in the effect; and therefore, since I am, res cogitans, a substance thinking, and having a certain idea of God in me, what cause soever be at length assigned for the principle and fountain of my being, that cause also must be Ens cogitans, and must possess the idea of all those perfections which I ascribe unto God. Now of that cause it may be again enquired, whether it were derived from itself or from some other cause; for if from itself, it may be naturally collected, that such a cause is God; for as it hath the power or act of self-existence, or self-conservation, so also undoubtedly hath it the ability of actually possessing all such perfections the idea whereof it comprehends in itself, i. e. all such accomplishments as I conceive to be concentred in God." V. p. 127, note 2, and p. 148, note 3.—*W. Charleton's Darkness of Atheisme*

allege, that I and all the individual intelligent beings which are, or have ever been, have been and will always be necessary, by an unchangeable, eternal, and self-contained necessity; but if not, then is there some necessary being in the universe capable of bringing every one of us into existence. There is, therefore, at least one necessary being of intelligence greater than the highest ever seen among us, possessing the power of creation, and this is and must be the one necessary being; for such power and such intelligence, existing and working from all eternity, is amply sufficient to account for the existence of everything that is, or is conceivable.

I have assumed that the soul of an intelligent being, such as man, has a certain originative or intellectually creative power, such a power must reside either in intelligence or creativeness, and either will suit my argument; however, if any one wholly denies a creative power to human intelligence, he will not need a long argument to convince him of the existence of the Deity, for as he is certainly capable of some idea of God, that idea must be either created or reflected; and if the mind merely acts like a mirror, the existence of the idea in the mind proves the existence of the object without it, by the most clear and direct proof possible. Perhaps it was for this reason that the Epicureans admitted the existence of Deity in spite of their essentially Atheistic philosophy.[3]

I can perceive two objections which may be put forward against the preceding argument: first, that creation is inconceivable and impossible; secondly, that intelligence may be merely the result of certain combinations of material atoms, to the production of which, from time to time, matter and motion are alone essentially necessary. I shall proceed to show the

Dispelled, ch. 1, sec. 2. Closely connected with these arguments is the common mode of proving the existence of the Deity from the necessity and necessary perfections of a first cause. See *Thomas Aquinas, Summ. Theol.* qu. 2, art. iii. "Utrum est Deus"? "Secunda via est ex ratione causæ efficientis, &c."

[3] See *Bentley's first Sermon on Atheism.*

falsity of these assertions, premising only, that were the latter of them true, it would yet imply the existence of a mover, and of a mover in a determinate manner, whence we might gather the existence of a Deity.[1]

We know that many things are possible, though we do not comprehend the mode of their existence, or how they are brought about; the question, therefore, as to the impossibility of creation depends, not upon our comprehension of its possibility, but upon our possible apprehension of it as a fact.[2]

[1] Albertus Magnus, after giving several forms of proof, goes on.—" His viis ego addo duas. Una quæ sumitur ex octavo physicorum, in cujus principio probatur, quod motor primus non potest esse motus ab aliquo. Deinde probatur, quod movens motum nec movere, nec moveri, habet nisi a motore primo. Similiter motum tantum moveri non habet nisi per influentiam a primo per omnia media, moventia et mota, usque ad ultimum quod est motum tantum. Propter quod si cessaret motus in primo, secundum quod est actus moventis, cessaret in omnibus mediis, in quibus est actus moventis et mobilis, et cessaret in ultimo, in quo est actus mobilis tantum. Destruatur ergo consequens; quia videmus quod non cessat in mediis, nec in ultimo. Ad sensum enim patet esse multa mota, et multa esse moventia et mota: ergo necesse est esse unum primum movens, in quo non cessat motus, secundum quod est actus moventis et non mobilis."—(See *Aquinas, Summ. Theol.* qu. 2, art. iii. " Prima autem et manifestior via est quæ sumitur ex parte motus, &c. v. etiam. *Pseud. Aristotle, De Mundo.* c. 6. *Aristotle, Metaph.* lib. 11 (12) ch. 6. *Physic. Auscult.* l. 8, c. 3.) " Secunda quam addo est hæc, quod dicit Boetius in libro de hebdomadibus, et per se notum est, quod omne, quod habet esse et quod hoc est, ab alio habet esse et quod hoc est. Omne quod est in mundo habet esse et quod hoc est. Ergo ab alio habet esse et quod hoc est. A causa determinata habet quod hoc est: ergo non ab eodem habet esse. Omnis causa secunda determinata est: ergo a nulla causarum secundarum habet esse quod hoc est. Est autem aliqua causa ejus, quod est esse in entibus factis. Cum autem non sit nisi causa prima vel secunda; oportet quod *esse* causatum sit a prima causa in omnibus quæ sunt. Et hæc ratio fundatur super quartam propositionem Libri Causarum, quæ dicit quod prima rerum creatarum est esse. Et ex eadem via probatur, quod esse est effectus primæ causæ in omnibus his quæ sunt. Et est Aristotelis in quadam epistola quam fecit de principio universi esse. Sola enim causa prima simplex, in fine simplicitatis, existens et nullo determinante ad secundum potest esse causa secundum quod est esse."—*Summ. Theol.* Tract. iii. quæst. 18, membr. 1.

[2] " We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we cannot conceive the manner of their production,—My right hand writes while my left hand is still. What causes rest in one and motion in the other? Nothing but my will, a thought of my mind; my thought only changing, the right hand rests and the left hand moves. This is matter of fact which cannot be denied. Ex-

Now as to the idea of creation, and its contradictory annihilation, there are few which in practice we more often and more readily realize; every individual man who is now dead has, with relation to his fellows, come into existence, existed, and ceased to exist, and we have a clear conception of him as one individual thing which was not, was, and is not; we know that this is so in relation to ourselves, and we can conceive of nothing in relation to ourselves without at the same time conceiving of it as absolute in itself; the creation, therefore, existence and annihilation of an uncompounded thing is not inconceivable as a fact. As a fact we must realize the same ideas in observing the increase of plants and living things in general; we nowhere see reproduction, but what we call by that name is always multiplication and destruction; we can never say that the life of the parent passes to the offspring, for in every case a new creature begins to exist before the old one dies, so that there are two, then three, then again two, or perhaps only one, and there cannot be two in the place of one without creation, nor one in the place of two but by annihilation,[3] unless indeed life and intellect were mere com-

plain this, and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to understand creation."—*Locke, on the Human Understanding*, bk. 4, chap. 10.

[3] Cum Deum esse per Scripturas nolis probare, ipseque nullo sensu corporeo sit comprehensibilis; multum audire me juvat, qua ratione philosophica comprobari valeat," says the Jew in the Dialogue of Peter Alphonso (*Tit.* i. *Ap. Bibl. Max. Patr.*) to which Peter replies: "Si mundum cum omnibus quæ in eo sunt creatum esse monstravero, tunc Deum qui interpretatur Creator necessario esse concludam:" he then proceeds to show that the world is compounded, and therefore not eternal, and moved, and therefore needs a mover, whilst our own souls by their internal contrarieties bear witness to a greater, whence they derive their better part. Theodore Abucara proves the existence of Deity from the necessity of creation more pertinently to the remarks in the text thus. "Απας ἀριθμὸς προσδεχόμενος προσθήκην, καὶ πέρας ἐπιδέχεται· ὁ ὂυν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀριθμὸς ἐπιδεχόμενος προσθήκην, πεπερασμένος ἐστὶν, εἰ καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀγνοοῦμεν τὴν ποσότητα, ἀλλ' ὑποθώμεθα, συντομίας καὶ σαφηνίας ἕνεκεν, εἶναι τοὺς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἑκατόν. ἀδύνατον δὲ τούτους ἅπαντας γενητοὺς ὑπάρχειν, ἐξ ἀλλήλων μὲν γὰρ γενεαλογοῦνται, ἀλλὰ ἀναποδίζων ὁ νοῦς τὴν γενεαλογίαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνω εἰς ἕνα καταντᾷ πάντως ἀγέννητον. οὐ γὰρ ἐνδίχεται ἐπὶ τὸν πρῶτον ἐλθόντας εἰπεῖν, ἀντὸν ἐξ ἄλλου γεγενῆσθαι· ἐπεὶ κἀκεῖνος ἐξ ἑτέρου γεγενη-

binations of matter, which I shall hereafter show that they are not. Again, as we can in fact form some idea, and one practically clear and intelligible, however obscure in theory, of what we intend to be understood by the word creation, so neither does it involve any insuperable intellectual difficulty; it does not amount to the producing of something from and by absolutely nothing, any more than composing a book and displaying

μίνος ἂν ἔιη. μέχρις ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν πρῶτον ἀγένητον τὸν νοῦν ἐπερείσωμεν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τοῦτον, ἢ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φῦναι, καθάπερ τὰ βλαστήματα. ἢ ἀΐδιον εἶναι, ἢ ὑπό τινός δημιουργοῦ πεποιῆσθαι. Ἀλλ'εἰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐπεβλαστήκει καὶ εἰς ἔτι ἂν ἀχρι τοῦ παρόντος ἑτέρους ἐβλάστανεν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ τῶν δένδρων, καὶ βοτανῶν ἔιδη. ἐπειδὴ δὲ, ουχ ὁρῶμεν τοῦτο γινόμενον, δῆλον. ὅτι ὀυδὲ τὸν πρῶτον ἐβλάστησεν. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἀΐδιος ἦν. Εἰ γὰρ ἄναρχος, καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπῆρχεν, οὐκ ἂν ἐτεθνήκει, ὀυδ'ἂν ἀπώλετο. τὸ γὰρ ἀναρχον, καὶ ἀπλεύτητον. λείπεται τοιγαροῦν ἀυτὸν πεποιῆσθαι, τὸ δὲ πεποιημένον ἔχει ποιητὴν. ἆρα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ κτίστης τε, καὶ ποιητής.—Dial. ὀτι εστι θεος. Gretzer's Works, vol. xv. This argument derives a curious confirmation from the use of it by one who had certainly never heard of the Bp. of Cara. "Es wunderte sich eimnahl in einer Gesellschaft von getauften Grönländern, wie sie doch ehedem so unverständig und ohne Nachdenken hätten dahin leben können. Hierauf versetzte einer. Es ist wahr wir sind unwissende Heiden gewesen, und haben nichts von Gott und von Heiland gewusst. Wer hätte es uns auch sagen sollen, ehe ihr gekommen seyd? Du musst aber nicht glauben, dass kein Grönländer darüber nachdenkt. Ich habe oft gedacht, ein Kajak mit dazu gehorigen Pfeilen ensteht nicht von selbst, sondern muss mit Mühe und Geshicklichkeit von Menschen-Händen gemacht werden; und wer es nicht versteht, der verderbt leicht etwas daran. Nun ist der geringste Vogel viel künstlicher als der beste Kajak, und niemand kan einen machen. Der Mensch ist noch weit künstlicher und geshickter als alle Thiere. Wer hat ihn gemacht? Er kommt von seinen Eltern, und diese kommen wieder von ihren Eltern her. Aber wo kommen dann die allerersten Menschen her? Sie sollen aus der Erde gewachsen sein? Aber warum wachsen dann nun nicht mehr Menschen aus der Erde? Und woher ist dann die Erde, das Meer, Sonne, Mond und Sterne enstanden? Nothwendig muss jemand sein, der das alles gemacht hat, der immer gewesen ist, und nicht aufhören kan. Derselbe muss unbegreiflich viel mächtiger, geschickter und weiser sein, als der klügste Mensch: er muss auch sehr gut sein, weil alles, was er gemacht hat, so gut und uns so nützlich und nöthig ist. Ja! wenn ich den kennte, den wollte ich recht liebhaben, und in Ehren halten. Aber wer hat ihn gesehen und gesprochen? Niemand von uns Menschen. Es kan aber doch Menschen geben, die etwas von ihm wissen; die möchte ich gern sprechen. So bald ich also von euch zum erstenmal, von dem grossen Wesen gehört habe, so hab'ich gleich und gern geglaubt, weil ich so lange darnach verlangt hatte." (*David Crantz, History of Greenland.*) Others confirmed this testimony in various ways, especially one whose argument I have quoted a little further on at p. 147, note 3.

ive genius is doing so; both are the putting something
nothing was before, but both are the doing so by a
tent and sufficient agent, in whom, if you will so have
thing created may be said to have had before its crea-
kind of rudimentary or potential existence.[1]

o the other objection, that matter may be the only ori-
hing from which the whole universe has sprung, I may
e, that the conception of matter in the abstract is not a
asier than that of a creating Deity; the moment one
ts to examine it, it falls away into an innumerable mul-
of inconceivably small particles, and no one was ever
r so long as all extension is divisible, is at all likely to
e to catch and examine a real atom, or to find anything
sed of pure matter; the invisible air is material, so is an

Begriff des Schaffens schliesst wesentlich das Hervorbringen eines
eins durch Wollen, durch bewusstes Selbstbestimmen in sich; darum
r einem persönlichen Wesen das Schaffen zugeschrieben werden.
enthält der Begriff des Schaffens, dass diese Hervorbringen in Unter-
on allem andern, ein absolutes Bedingen, dass es mithin nicht ein durch
twas ausser dem Hervorbringenden beschränhtes, sondern ein unbe-
schlechthin auf sich selbst ruhendes ist;—Die wiedersinnige Vorstel-
einem werdender Welt aus nichts, so dass das Nichts die Ursache von
sein der Welt enthielte, haben die Kirchenlehrer damit niemals ver-
—*Julius Müller Christ. L. v. d. Sünder* v. 2. p. 178. Nullo namque pacto
est aliquid rationabiliter ab aliquo, nisi in facientis ratione præcedat
rei faciendæ quasi exemplum, sive, ut aptius dicitur, forma, vel simili-
t regula. Patet itaque quoniam priusquam fierent universa erat in
ummæ naturæ, quid, aut qualia, aut quomodo futura essent: quare cum
facta sunt, clarum sit nihil fuisse antequam fierent, quantum ad hoc,
erant quod nunc sunt, nec erant ex quo fierent; non tamen nihil erant
ad rationem facientis, per quam et secundum quam fierent.—*Anselm.*
. c. 9. Tu autem Domine, qui et semper vivis et nihil moritur in Te;
ante primordia seculorum, et ante omne, quod vel ante dici potest. Tu
sus es, Dominusque omnium, quæ creasti: et apud Te rerum omnium
um stant causæ; et rerum omnium mutabilium immutabiles manent
; et omnium irrationabilium et temporalium sempiterna vivunt rationes.
tin. *Confess.* L. 1, c. 6. But creation cannot be necessary in the Deity.—
ò che è essenziale all' Ente necessario, è anche eterno, et indificiente.
roduzione della materia è momentanea cosa; subito che la materia è, la
me è finita. Dunque un tal produzione non è eternea, ma un atto pas-
per la natura sua. Dunque un tal atto non è essenziale all Ente neces-
Gualberti di Soria, Della Esistenza et degli attributi di Dio, &c. p. 14.

impalpable powder: and what is the electric fluid running as it seems to do through the very substance of its conductor, as matter never does, but which is always supposed to do; is that a form of simple matter? Thus matter eludes our senses, and escapes our apprehension, till at last if we believe in material atoms at all, we find we are in fact believing in a thing from effects which seem to require such a cause for their production, exactly as most men quite as naturally believe in the existence of spirit, because, though they see it not, they see that which they conceive to be the effect of its existence. Yet if we are to believe in matter as an imperishing thing we must believe in material atoms, because it is manifest that, unless material things are made up of inappreciable but separable elements, there is nothing which may not daily be created and is not every day destroyed, except a spirit.[1]

But surely one need scarcely say seriously to prove, that that which has existed while every particle of its material frame has been lost and replaced by others, perhaps many times, can be no part or consequence of that material framework, or that our souls are, so far as we have any means of judging, uncompounded and incapable of dissolution. Even the life of plants

[1] Αλλα τι ἐη ἐστι το ον; αρα ταυτι τα στοιχεια τα τεττερα, ἡ γη και το πυρ και ὰι αλλαι ὲυο μεταξυφυσεις; αρα ουκ ἐη τα οντα ταυτα ἐστιν ἡμιν ξυλλη,ὶ3ην ἡ καθ'ἑν γε τι αυτων; και πως; ἁ γε ἐστι και γεννητα και παλινγρετα, τι γε ἐστιν ὶοραν αυτα ἐξ αλληλων γινομενα και απαλλασσομενα, και μητε στοιχεια ὑπαρχοντα μητε ξυλλαβας. Σωμα μεν ταυτι ὁυτως ουκ αν ειη το ον. αλλ'αρα ταυτι μεν ου, ἡ ἑ'ὲλη ἐυναται ειναι ον; Αλλα και ταυτη παντος μαλλον αἱ'υνατον αρρωστια του μενειν· ποταμος γαρ ἡ ἐλη ροωδης και οξυρροπος, βαθος, και πλατος, και μηκος αοριστος και ανηυτος.—ἐμοι μεν ου ὶοκει αλλο τι ειναι ἡ μονων γε το ασωματον. αὐτη γαρ ἐη φυσεων πασων μονη ἑστηκε και ἐστιν αραμια και ουὲιν σωματικη. ουτε γουν γινεται ουτε αυξεται ουτε κινησιν κινειται αλλην ουὲιμιαν, και ὶια ταυτα καλως ὶικαιον ἑφανη πρεσβυσαι το ασωματον.—*Numenius* v. *Ritter, Hist. Phil.* p. 490. "Though our general or specific conception of matter makes us speak of it as one thing, yet really all matter is not one individual thing, neither is there any such thing existing as one material being or one single body, that we know or can conceive of."—*Locke's Essay on H. U.* b. iv. c. 9. There are some excellent remarks on Epicurean atoms in Abbadie's work, p. 1. s. i. ch. vi.

cannot be inherent in their matter, for we know that that is made up of many particles, some of which are every day being given off. When the leaves drop, for instance, does the life drop also? Clearly not, for though the leaves die it is only because they cease to be any part of the plant, the whole plant continues to live as before, and the shedding its leaves freely is even a sign of vigorous life. But if the whole life remains undiminished when part of the matter is gone, those material particles could not be any part of the cause of the continuance of life. Again, certain matter lives as this plant, in process of time the whole of that matter is changed, the plant lives on, new matter worked up into a larger and different general form is now maintained by that life, whilst all the old matter which once had life is now dead leaves and so forth. It is obvious, therefore, that the life has no essential connection with any particular matter, and it deserves notice that the nearest approaches to the phænomena of life which have ever been artificially produced have been the effects of that fluid, which of all inanimate things approaches most nearly to our idea of a spirit, and is least bound by the laws obeyed by all material substances.

In like manner as matter, if it be imperishable, is so as an infinitude of atoms, the existence of no one or number of which will account for the existence of any other, except by way of creation; so life, or soul must be a number of individuals, because if the whole were ever one mass, it is obvious that it has since perished as one mass, and become a number of distinct individuals; as a number of distinct individuals alone, therefore, can it be necessary and imperishable. Whence it follows that one all-pervading and alone necessary intelligence would not account, except by way of creation, for the existence of our individual souls, and therefore they must be eternal and severally necessary, or individually created; but as it is obvious that they have none of the characteristics of

necessary and eternally self-existent being, it follows that they are created.

Thus I have removed the objections to the previous argument and its conclusion remains, that the state of things around and within us compels us to believe in one and one only Being essentially necessary to their and our own existence, and therefore concluded to be essentially necessary in itself. All else which does exist we must conclude to be consequentially necessary as the effect of the will and choice of that Being (I say will and choice, because we have shown it to possess intelligence), and the will of the first Being may be necessary, not only as a first cause but also as a sustaining cause, especially as it is certain that what can create can destroy, and that the creature must always be subordinate to and less than the Creator, besides that our own consciousness tells us of our need of a sustainer.[1]

The Deity, as we may now call the necessary being, being thus shown to be one and eternal, and intelligent, He is also omnipresent, because what is absolutely necessary must be so everywhere, as the absolute necessity that the three angles of a triangle should equal two right angles exists everywhere, whether there be a triangle there to manifest it or not. What is necessary everywhere must be everywhere, and that at once:

[1] "From hence that I have formerly been 'tis no valid consequence that therefore I must now be, unless some other cause be admitted which doth freshly create me in each of those particles, or atoms of time, and particularly in this instant moment, i. e. doth constantly conserve me in being. If there were any such power conservatory radicated in my essence, doubtless I should be conscious of it; but I am convicted there is none such, and therefore from this one evidence, that I cannot maintain, or perpetuate my own being for the shortest moment imaginable, I judge that I am subordinate unto and dependent upon some other entity distinct from myself."—*W. Charleton, Darkness of Atheisme dispelled*, ch. 1, sec. 2. The necessity of the Deity as a sustaining and co-efficient cause has been often and elaborately maintained, and by none more so than by Archbishop Bradwardine in his great work De Causa Dei. I suppose it is in a very natural exaggeration of this doctrine that we shall find the true cause of the errors of Spinoza and the Theistic fatalists.

the Deity, therefore, is omnipresent and consequently omniscient. Again, He knows all things past and present, because they have been His work or its consequences, produced before Him, and He knows all things future, because He knows with what capacities all their possible causes were created, and what must be their mutual action. He is necessarily all-wise, because, having given existence to everything, and seeing everything, He must thoroughly understand them all; which is the sole condition of perfect wisdom, and of course He that can unmake and remake all things is absolutely omnipotent in this dependent universe. So much for power and intelligence; now of moral qualities, can the disposition of that intelligent Being, by whom all things were made and now exist, be changeable or bad? If goodness be good by an all-pervading natural necessity, then must the naturally necessary Being, the centre of all natural necessities, be essentially good; but if not, and that only is good which the arbitrary will of the Omnipotent declares to be so, then must that Omnipotent, who is the sole standard of goodness, be essentially and perfectly good. Again, it is a duty to conform to the will of our benefactors; but if His will, to whom we owe all things, were ever bad, or variable, it would be our duty always, or sometimes, to love evil, but this can never be our duty, goodness and duty being, for this purpose, convertible terms. God's will, therefore, is never evil; and though there is evil in the world, yet as we have seen that we can account for its existence quite as fully as we can reasonably expect, we have here proved, that there is a Being all-powerful, wise, and good—that there is a God by whom all things exist.[2]

[2] This last section might perhaps have been much shortened by the use of such arguments as the following:—Si un être qui existe nécessairement n'avait point toutes les perfections, il faudrait qu'il fût borné; et s'il était borné que quelque principe le bornât, et s'il avait un principe, qu'il ne fût point par lui-même: ce qui détruit la supposition. En effet s'il n'a point reçu ses perfections, mais s'il les tire de lui-même, il-y-a autant de raison qu'il les ait toutes, qu'il-y-en-a qu'il en

ait une; et qu'il les ait dans un degré infini, que non pas dans un degré limité. Car puisqu'il n'a point de principe de son existence, il n'a point de principe aussi, qui a pû limiter à dix degrés son excellence et ses perfections.—*Abbadie, Tr. de la Rel. Chret.* R. 1, s. 1. ch. 6. "The goodness of the Creator is deducible from similar inferences, for goodness, truth, and justice consisting in the observance of the mutual rights and relations of persons, can only be impeded, either by ignorance of the different bearings and dependencies of actions, or by some frailty and imperfection inducing the violation of those bearings and dependencies when known and perceived. But the relations of all existing beings, and of every possible action, are always and at once present to the view of infinite wisdom; and a Being possessed of omnipotence can be swayed by none of those weaknesses or frailties which assail imperfect natures to the violation of the eternal rules of truth and equity.—*Abp. Sumner's Records of Creation*, vol. ii. *Introduct.*

CHAPTER V.

Of Chance and Necessity.

RETURNING to the argument from the existence of permanent natural laws. We are conscious of many impressions, which we know are not produced by our own actions. Consciousness therein tells us that there is some being external to ourselves. We are conscious that our own designs do often fail, and our actions are often turned to opposite effects, so much so that we cannot properly say positively of any one thing, that we will do it, without understanding the addition; if possible, the power therefore which is external to us is relatively to us omnipotent. Is this power the will of God, or is it fate, or chance? The three great and probably only possible solutions of our consciousness of control.

Chance is the law according to which things happen when undirected by any controlling power. Of that which is governed by chance we can only prove a probability, grounded upon the assumption that like things will not immediately follow one another, but we are practically certain of the happening of future events, because we know that like things will almost certainly follow one another; the world, therefore, is not governed by chance.[1] In earlier times, some thought

[1] This is Aquinas' fifth and last proof of the existence of the Deity; his words are:—Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum. Videmus enim quod aliqua quæ cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem: quod apparet ex hoc, quod semper aut frequentius eodem modo operantur ut consequantur id quod est optimum. Unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt ad finem. Ea autem quæ non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente,

they could draw an argument from the freaks of nature,—from "lusus naturæ,"—to show that no intelligent Deity could be the ruler of the world, but only chance. The ancients who thus regarded Chance as the fountain whence flowed the form and order of the universe, had by no means so extended a knowledge of natural objects as we possess; many things which seemed to them unaccountable, we have discovered to be exactly adapted to some particular end. In proportion as our knowledge of nature has extended, so have we progressed in the appreciation of the causes and objects of formations in animals, of the configuration of the earth, and of strange phænomena throughout the universe, so that any philosopher who should now say of anything that there could be no reason for it but chance, would only meet with ridicule from all his hearers. Again, our extended acquaintance with geography has driven into the regions of phantasy many and many a strange form of animal and man. Where are the Cynocephali, and the Skiopedi, and the Arimaspi, and all the herd that find a grave description in works of ancient naturalists,[1] and where are the remains of those countless experiments in animal-making, which we have been told preceded the formation of anything that could maintain itself in life?[2] Certainly our geological researches have not yet succeeded in turning up any such, as they ought to have done, but have on the contrary accounted for and reduced to order many strange experiences, and especially that king of "lusus naturæ," the formation of stone shells, and the setting them on

sicut sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem et hoc dicimus Deum.—S. T. qu. ii. artic. iii.

[1] See Pliny, Nat. Hist. lib. vii. c. ii. where it is remarkable that he adds, "si credere licet" only to the account of the wonderful size of some Indian trees, probably the truest thing in the chapter. I cannot help thinking that Pliny's philosophy was one of the great reasons why he wrote this chapter and those near it, and that he found their moral in the subsequent observations upon the "magna ludentis naturæ varietas."

[2] V. Lucretius.

the tops of mountains.[3] Nay, we are come so far, that some philosophers will have it, that the changes of weather are governed by some fixed and unchangeable law,—some law as unalterable as that which directs the movements of the planets in their orbits. For my own part, I am not yet convinced of this, but if the universe be thus bound by rule and order, where shall we find a place for chance? If our weather change and change in fixed and orderly progression, if rain and frost and snow and hail, fair weather and tempest, silently and certainly pass on in obedience to some eternal law, where shall we then find chance? Clearly no natural thing will furnish us with even an illustration of the meaning we give that word. But if nothing now move by chance, when did it cease to act? Did it, could it, bring this world into its present fair state of order, give to each atom its appointed sphere of duty, settle the manner of existence best fitted to maintain this chance-constituted fabric against the power of its Creator's hand, and then expire, slain as it were by its own offspring, and pass into the fabulous darkness of a thing which once had active life, but whose very bones have been long since annihilated? Men have differed most widely in knowledge and understanding; one man or one age sees mysteries without number, where other men and another age see only the orderly working of a well-arranged plan; if this be so, surely it is no argument against the existence and perfections of the Deity that some things seem to the wisest of us mysterious. No objection can be drawn from these, unless it can be shown that there are things and phænomena strange and capricious by inherent nature, not made to seem so merely by man's ignorance,[4] a proposition which cannot be proved,

[3] That such considerations as these once had some influence, may be seen in the fact that it was a standing question with the schoolmen whether the Cynocephali were among the objects of salvation.

[4] "In a Clock or a Watch; he who should go about to condemn the Shape or Use of any particular wheel, the situation or design of which was not at all

and which is practically refuted by the fact that better enquiries and fuller study do every day make plain and easily intelligible things heretofore deemed mysterious, strange, and unreasonable. How could this be, did not nature really operate upon a settled plan, and with a regular purpose?

Suppose, if you can, a chance system, where not only a few, but millions of chances fell out in orderly progression, following one another as if according to certain rules and by chance regular, the whole thing would be absurd; a regular orderly chance is just no chance at all.[1] It is no answer to suggest that the universe may be like a drop of water, which,

understood by him; it would but discover his own ignorance, and not at all reflect upon the workman. We need not, therefore, be surprised, if in our survey of the Universe we be often at a loss how to account for many things that we observe there. Many parts of it are wholly out of our reach; as may justly be inferred from the multitude of fixed Stars perpetually discovered by Telescopes as they are improved in goodness. Other parts we know very little more of than their bare existence, as of the nearest of those stars. Other parts, as they approach nearer to us, we know something more of, and by observation and analogy, judge them to be of the same species with this earth which we Inhabit; such are the Planets. But amongst these is a very numerous system of Comets, the nature and use of which we are in a great measure ignorant of. And of those parts which are nearest to us, even our own Globe, how little is it that we know of it? We live upon the superficies, and cannot tell what is contained within the Bowels of it, for many thousand miles; nay, even upon this superficies, there are whole species of creatures, which it will be difficult for us to determine what purposes they serve. And we find by the improvement of microscopes, that nature knows no end in smallness as well as in greatness, from the multitude of minute animals which everywhere appear. To be able, therefore, to pronounce peremptorily concerning such a system as this, requires to be everywhere present in it, to be able to understand and connect every part of it, and to see the fitness and adjustment of the whole; which the wisest and most sagacious of men are so far from being able to do, that we can scarce conceive it of any created being of the highest rank or station."—*J. Clarke on the Origin of Evil*, vol. i. p. 63. Though we have since made immense advances in the knowledge of natural objects, how true this observation still is!

[1] Soc. *Ποτερον, ω Πρωταρχε, τα ξυμπαντα και τοδε το καλουμενον ὁλον επιτροπευειν φωμεν την του αλογου και εικη δυναμιν και το ὁπῃ ετυχεν, ἡ ταναντια, καθαπερ ὀι προσθεν ἡμων ελεγον, νουν και φρονησιν τινα θαυμαστην συνταττουσαν διακυβερναν*; Prot. *Ουδεν των αυτων, ω θαυμαστε Σωκρατες. ὁ μεν γαρ συ νυν ἐη λεγεις, ουδ' ὁσιον ειναι μοι φαινεται· το δε νουν παντα διακοσμειν αυτα φαναι και της οψεως του κοσμου και ἡλιου και σεληνης και αστερων και πασης της περιφορας αξιον, και ουκ αλλως εγωγ'αν ποτε περι αυτων ειποιμι ουδ'αν δοξαιμι.* —*Plato Philebus*, c. 16.

chancing to fall, may create myriads of worlds like this to beings proportionately small, for the millions of chances which we know are not uncertain, do not relate to man alone, but apply as well to all the countless particles of which this globe is constituted. It is not a rind of order with a core of chance, but all is orderly throughout, and the further we penetrate into the knowledge of distant worlds, the more surely we discover that not only does order rule among them, but that one order binds us up, together with countless worlds invisible, into one orderly and well-governed whole. Perhaps the analogy of a chance drop of water may not be inapplicable, and if our system be to the universe as that drop of water is to the world, we may conclude that as neither the fall, nor aught that goes on within that tiny globe, is exempt from the all-pervading influence of natural laws, in like manner we and all that concerns us are governed without escape by those same natural laws, and so chance can have no actual existence.[2]

But, though the material universe may in all things act according to law, is it so in regard to man in his intellectual and moral relations? Not altogether, because the will of man possesses at least a certain freedom and power of self-origination, and cannot therefore in this respect be included in any general law. However, ask any one who enters a profession,

[2] The material unity which we know to pervade the universe may be usefully connected with the logical unity of all things thus concluded by Anselm in his Monol. c. iii. Quicquid—est, non nisi per aliquid est. Quod cum ita sit; aut est unum, aut sunt plura, per quæ sunt omnia quæ sunt. Sed si sunt plura, aut ipsa referuntur ad unum aliquid, per quod sunt: aut eadem plura singula sunt per se: aut per se invicem sunt. At si plura ipsa sunt per unum, jam non sunt omnia per plura: sed potius per illud unum, per quod hæc plura sunt. Si vero ipsa plura singula sunt per se, utique est una aliqua vis, vel natura existendi per se, qua habent ut per se sint. Non est autem dubium, quod per idipsum unum sint, per quod habent, ut sint per se. Verius ergo per ipsum unum cuncta sunt, quam per plura, quæ sine eo uno esse non possunt; ut vero plura per se invicem sint, nulla patitur ratio: quoniam irrationalis cogitatio est, ut aliqua res sit per illud, cui dat esse, &c.

or applies himself to any business, and though, if he be a reflecting man, he may tell you that there is some doubt as to himself, as to his own power and his own success, he will certainly tell you also, that as to the general rule, the law of social economy, no one can doubt but that industry brings profit, and virtue honour; and except so far as any individual may be individually concerned, the effect will as certainly follow upon the cause, as in the material universe; and that if a man be honest and temperate, and diligent, he will be happy and healthy, and successful; nearer than this, unless we were to reduce man to a machine, and exclude all moral government by external influences, we cannot expect to go; for though unchanging rules of sequence might seem at first sight more favourable to virtue, we shall see, if we consider them closely, that if there were no doubt, there would be no room for exertion; if there were no seeming accidents man would be morally, where he is physically, in such countries as yield certain maintenance to very moderate labour—where fruits grow freely man never plants, where game abounds man never labours, where the harvest never fails man never strives for more than bare subsistence. Thus it is that the fairest parts of the earth generally have the most backward races of men for their inhabitants, and thus, too, those whose lives show the most prosperous returns for all their labours are, take them as a whole, the least elevated in mental and moral culture: conventional honesty and moderate diligence suffice for all their wants; beyond these and the ends they serve, beyond steadiness and outward decency, and skill in their own occupations, if they attain to these, they hardly ever think of knowledge and morality at all; and indeed it is a lamentable fact, that the greatest vice is not unfrequently joined with the greatest skill and popularity, and genius. If we go further, and attempt to apply the theory of chance government to the happiness and misery of men, viewed in relation to their moral qualities, we

are immediately involved in the absurd assertion, that by the laws of nature it is as likely that the consciousness of goodness will make a man miserable, as that it will tend in any way to his happiness, a doctrine too glaringly false to be ever seriously defended. The external control, therefore, to which we are subject is not to be attributed to chance, it is necessity.

Fatal necessity is the most favourite substitute for a personal Deity, perhaps, because in it we seem to have found a kind of stern hard law, which fully answers our sense of control, and yet leaves us practically much more free than the supposition of our freedom; what has been said of a doctrine its opponents allege to include this idea,[1] may be more truly said of the idea itself, that it is a sheep in wolf's clothing; for if all my feelings and actions are governed and directed by a power external to myself, and wholly inflexible, why need I have anything like anxiety, or mental trouble: surely to rejoice and make merry all the days of my life is my only duty, as it is my great privilege; but unfortunately this very conclusion brings us into direct collision, not only with our own premises, but with the first and most powerful of our natural feelings; such, for instance, as the wisdom of forethought, the care of self-preservation, the sense of duty and responsibility, and the very ideas of wisdom and folly themselves.[2] If the world were actually governed by an abstract unalterable necessity, all these would be simply and utterly unreasonable, yet they can never be shaken off altogether, and will haunt us in the shape of prudent resolves, an anxiety about our health, and a vague sense of dutiful submission being right and beau-

[1] By Coleridge of Calvinism, in his Aids to Reflection.

[2] We must hold and act with Pyrrho, though on different grounds. *Ουδεν γαρ εφασκεν ουτε καλον, ουτε αισχρον, ουτε δικαιον, ουτε αδικον. και ὁμοιως επι παντων, μηδεν ειναι τῃ αληθειᾳ,—ου γαρ μαλλον τοδε η τοδε ειναι εκαστον. Ακολουθος δ' ην και τῳ βιῳ, μηδεν εκτρεπομενος μηδε φυλαττομενος, ἁπαντα ὑφισταμενος, ἀμαξας, ει τυχοι, και κρημνους, και κυνας, και ὁσα τοιαυτα, μηδεν ταις αισθησεσιν επιτρεπων. (σωζεσθαι μεντοι—ὑπο των γνωριμων (!) ακολουθουντων.)*—*Diogenes Laertius in Vit. Pyrrhon.*

tiful, or at least of the folly of grieving under what is inevitable;[1] these thoughts we shall find necessary to us in our friends, if we profess to have overcome them for ourselves, and we shall certainly feel a disposition to enlighten, or console those friends on some of these topics even at the very moment when we have tried to convince the world and ourselves that this prudence, this care and dutiful submission, this practical wisdom and folly, and the conviction we aim at producing, cannot be of any the least use to us, and in fact are impossible and self-contradictory; for as to the idea of a man's having any power over his thoughts and feelings, or his wishes and convictions, that on the doctrine of necessity must be simply and utterly absurd; and so our own actions directly and necessarily contradict our teaching. In truth, if there be a threefold test of the correctness of any opinion, corresponding to the threefold nature of man, each of its branches will bring this opinion of natural necessity to its proper and appropriate contradiction; for if we rely upon necessity refusing to add to it any volition of our own, to supply our physical wants,[2] we shall soon physically perish. If we apply it to morals, it destroys our moral nature even more rapidly;[3] and if we

[1] *Ει μηδεμιας εστιν αρχη πραξεως ανθρωπος, περιττως εχει το βουλευεσθαι. Εις τι γαρ χρησεται τη βουλη μηδεμιας αν πραξεως κυριος; το δε καλλιστον και τιμιωτατον εν ανθρωπῳ περιττον αποφανειν, το ατοπωτατον αν ειη. Ει τοινον βουλευεται, πραξεως ἑνεκα βουλευεται· πασα γαρ βουλη πραξεως ἑνεκα και δια πραξιν.—Nemesius de natura hominis*, ch. 39.

[2] *Ματαιοτατοι δε παντως και οι περι τας τεχνας πονουμενοι· αλλ'ευθυνησει μεν ὁ γεωργος, μητε σπερμα καταβαλων, μητε δρεπανην θηξαμενος· ὑπερπλουτησει δε ὁ εμπορος κἀν βουληται, κἀν μη, της ειμαρμενης αυτῳ συναθροιζουσης τα χρηματα.—Serm. I. de morib. per Symeonem Magist. e S. Basilii operibus select.*

[3] *Ει γαρ των κατα κακιαν και αρετην ενεργηματων, ουκ εκ του εφ'ἡμιν εισιν αρχαι, αλλ'εκ της φυσεως αἱ αναγκαι, περιττοι μεν οἱ νομοθεται, τα πρακτεα ἡμιν και τα φευκτα διοριζοντες· περιττοι δε και οἱ δικασται, αρετην τιμωντες και πονηριαν κολαζοντες. ου γαρ του κλεπτου το αδικημα, ουδε του φονευς. ῳ γε ουδε βουλομενῳ ἑυνατον ην κρατειν της χειρος, δια το αναποδραστον της επι τας πραξεις κατεπειγουσης αναγκης.—Symeon Magister ubi supra.* Nam stoliditas inveniri quæ major potest, quam mala esse nulla contendere, et tanquam malos perdere et condemnere peccantes?—*Arnobius. adv. Gent.* lib. ii. § 78.

attempt to apply it to the intellect, our intellectual faculties must vanish into a merely passive receptivity.

It is no answer to this to say, that of course necessity operates by means of our conscious volitions, for if so, it is a necessity necessarily contrary to our consciousness, which certainly tells us that we are swayed indeed by motives, but never compelled by them. If, however, any one affirms that necessity may consist with our nature, and does not exclude us from any of the truths on which we are every day obliged to act, then neither does it affect the being, or wisdom, or goodness of the Deity,[4] or indeed anything at all, and perishes itself instead; for if, notwithstanding the dominion of blind necessity, a house must have a builder, then the world too must have a maker; if a ship that navigates with wonderful success a most difficult and intricate passage must have a skilful pilot, then the world must have a wise and skilful governor; and if it be not mere cruelty to punish a criminal, then a just God will certainly punish sinners: deny the first set of propositions, and you set yourself in opposition to the common sense of all mankind; admit the first and deny the second, and you are arbitrarily inconsistent, and contradict your own self. But if you will distinguish kinds of necessity, and admit that there may be such a thing as a necessarily free choice, and then suppose the original cause of all to be necessary in itself, the acts of man to be at least in part merely conditionally necessary, as the effects of his own free will within the extent of its power, and everything beyond that, and without him, as necessary, because it is as an Almighty power directs, or did once for all direct, in giving it the nature it now possesses, and that the whole universe is planned and ordered according to that moral necessity which is inherent in perfect wisdom and goodness; then indeed you will probably speak in a manner consistent with yourself, and with the facts around you,

[4] See the chapter on Necessity, in Butler's Analogy.

but your doctrine of necessity will have given place to that of a real Deity.

Perhaps the most ready argument to show that neither chance nor innate qualities can be the ultimate causes and governors of the universe, may be drawn from the fact, that men have been found to claim for each of them separately this honour. If chance governed, there could be no certainty; if innate qualities alone prevailed, there could be no uncertainty; yet we know that practically there are some things certain, and some which are, and seem to be essentially, uncertain.

If, then, neither of these solutions will avail, we must adopt the third, with which the grounds upon which both the others are based may easily be reconciled, for a personal will can alone control other personal wills such as our own, and may and does act generally by rule, but may and does for particular purposes deviate from that rule, and is thus in some respect always uncertain; of this, Fate in its general sense of an overruling determination, is some expression, though what blind fate can be is not so easily explained.

Now the world being governed by a Being, omnipotent and omnipresent, for the control is universal, and therefore the power must be present everywhere, can we conceive of this Being as other than morally perfect? Surely not, for the thought of a Being present everywhere and always capable of effecting its intention, whatever it may be,—the thought of such a Being as animated with the desire to afflict and torment unnecessarily, or with any desire incompatible with the most perfect justice and benevolence, so as to be supposed capable of doing any evil intentionally, or through the want of perfect wisdom, capable of doing it unwittingly,—such an idea is too shocking to have been ever seriously realized, and has, I think, never been so; those who have dreamed of an evil Deity, have always supposed a greater of perfect good-



ness, and those who, realizing the true idea of Deity, have doubted His wisdom and goodness, are those who have denied the existence of any Deity at all. The idea of eternal torments is very awful in any case, but if the Deity, the directing power which governs all things, were at all short of perfection in wisdom or goodness, the best of all mankind might be punished eternally, and the worst escape, which our moral nature declares to be wholly impossible. And lastly, as to the unity of the Deity, not only is it unphilosophical and contrary to the economy of power observable in all natural processes to suppose plurality unnecessarily, but the very idea of perfection includes that of unity, at least to an extent sufficient to convince us of it, in the absence of any argument to raise a contrary presumption.

CHAPTER VI.

Of the Design and Goodness manifested in the Structure of the Universe.

IF we turn from the indirect evidence, that no substitute can be suggested for the pure and perfect Deity, to the direct evidence offered to the nature of its original by the actual state of things around us, and contemplate the formation and order of the external world, we shall see that each thing in its place and order, and all in one grand harmonious whole, work together for the good of the universe, and that things in themselves blind, and deaf, and helpless, when in their natural and proper places, evolve results more beautiful and more lasting than anything the art of man can effect.[1] So certain and universal is this, that no naturalist when he finds a new and unexpected formation, thinks for a moment, that perhaps it was put there for nothing, but begins immediately to enquire what use it serves, observe what use, for it is as far from his imagination, that an animal, for instance, should be so framed as to cause suffering to itself, as that its formation should have no object whatever, and he would laugh at the suggestion, that he had perhaps found something at last useless, or positively injurious.[2] So

[1] Pigliate in mano una rosa, e dimandate a costoro se fanno dirvi chi le lavorò sì gentilmente quel manto, cui cede lo Scarlato ancora Reale, e chi segue già, da tanti anni, che il mondo dura, a lavorargliene ogni Primavera un novello? La Terra è cieca, e non s'intende di colori, di vistosità, di vaghezza, di proporzione, cieche sone le spine, onde pullula un sì bel fiore, cieche le radiche, ciechi i rami; cieche sono le rugiarde ch'ella ha per latte, e cieco il Sole, che le apre sul mattino la boccia su cui pompeggia, e che glie l'aduggia alla sera, per figurare, a quanti vogliano attendervi dei mortali, la vanità delle loro ambite belleze.—*Segneri. L'Incredulo senza scusa.* Part I. ch. ix. § 2.

[2] If this be so, as it certainly is, in natural science, do not those proceed in an

it is of the human frame itself, though there are in it still, some formations of which scientific men are obliged to confess that they do not understand the objects and uses; there is no one actually engaged in scientific research, who will seriously tell you, that he is doubtful whether they are of any use at all, or whether the purposes they serve are beneficial, or not. This being so, I need not stay to prove that the eye, or the ear, or the hand is a very wonderful and wonderfully well constructed machine;[3] or that the whole structure of any plant, or animal you may name, or especially of man himself, is most wonderful, and most beautifully and excellently fitted together; but I may at once conclude, as the result of all our experience and observation, that man himself and everything known to him is wonderfully formed and adapted, even in those parts which are invisible to the unassisted human eye, each to some particular object, and through that object to the good of itself and of the whole. Hence it follows necessarily, that somewhere or other, there must be intelligence to

unscientific manner in regard to theology, who allow, that because the existence of evil seems injurious and unnecessary, therefore it may be so; and who refuse to allow the slightest weight in this investigation, to that analogy, which they cannot but admit to be supreme and conclusive in all other enquiries?

[3] Stimo Anassagora, che l'Uomo, in grazia delle mani da lui godute fosse dotato della natura di senno. (*V. Arist. de part. Animal*, lib. iv. c. 20. *Galen de usu part.* lib. i. c. 1.) Nel che egli erro certamente, mentre non perchè v'era la cetera fu fatto il suonatore, ma perchè v'era il suonatore fu fabbricata la cetera. Non fu però data la mente all'Uomo, perche egli possedeva le mani: ma bensi furono date all' Uomo le mani, perchè egli possedeva la mente. Tuttavia questo errore include un gran Panegirico delle mani, mentre dinota, essere stupendo il loro lavorio, che non un Uomo del Volgo, ma delle Scuole, arrivo a potersi persuadere, benchè falsamente, che in riguardo delle mani noi fossimo ragionevoli. —*Segneri, Incredulo senza scusa*, part I. c. xv. § 2. If a man should affirm, that an ape, casually meeting with pen, ink and paper, and falling to scribble, did happen to write exactly the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes, would an atheist believe such a thing? and yet he can easily digest as incredible as that, that the innumerable members of the human body, which, in the style of the Scriptures are all written in the book of God, and may admit of almost infinite variations above the twenty-four letters of the alphabet, were at first fortuitously scribbled, and by mere accident compacted into this beautiful, and noble, and most wonderfully useful frame which we now see it carry.—*Bentley. Sermon II. On Atheism.*

plan and direct, and goodness to choose good ends, and beside these unity to make all work in harmony,[1] as much higher and greater and more true, than any that man possesses, as the works of nature excel in ingenious contrivance and beneficial effects and general harmony, the very highest masterpieces of human ingenuity and skill.[2] This intelligence, goodness, and unity do not exist in the things themselves,—in the material atoms and spiritual units which go to make up the universe, for if we at all disturb their proper order of working, they will decay instead of reproducing, destroy instead of preserving, suffer instead of enjoying, and counteract one another instead of working out any such results as in their natural place and order they are adapted to accomplish. This intelligence, goodness and unity, therefore, much higher than any we are acquainted with elsewhere, and as regards this universe severally perfect, must reside in some being external to that universe, and differing from it at least as much as our own souls differ from our bodies, that is, there is a God.[3] No such mere neces-

[1] Quod si in uno exercitu tot fuerint imperatores, quot legiones, quot cohortes, quot cunei, quot alæ; primum nec instrui poterit acies, unoquoque periculum recusante; nec regi facile nec temperari; quod suis propriis consiliis silantur omnes; quorum diversitate plus noceant, quam prosint. Sic in hoc rerum naturæ imperio, nisi unus fuerit, ad quem totius summæ cura referatur, universa solventur, et corruent. Dicere autem, multorum arbitrio regi mundum, tale est, quale si quis affirmet, in uno corpore multas esse mentes; quoniam multa et varia sunt ministeria membrorum; ut singulos corporis sensus, singulæ mentes regere credantur: item multi affectus, quibus commoveri solemus, vel ad iram, vel ad cupiditatem, vel ad lætitiam, vel ad metum, vel ad miserationem; ut in his omnibus totidem mentes putentur operari. Quod si quis profecto dicat; ne ipsam quidem, quæ una est, habere videatur. Quod si in uno corpore tantarum rerum gubernationem mens humana possidet, et universis simul intenta est: cur aliquis existimet, mundum non posse ab uno regi, a pluribus posse?—*Lactantius. De falsa Religione*, lib. i. § 3.

[2] Nature cannot act [as she does] without rationality, and therefore there must be a reason which directs nature. Embodied souls, though rational, cannot direct nature, as they are ignorant of its character; therefore there is an omniscient being, the director of nature, which is Iswara, or God.—*Vachespati; cited by H. H. Wilson in his Commentary appended to the Translation of the Sánkhya Kárikd*, c. 56.

[3] Neque enim divinorum librorum tantummodo auctoritas esse Deum præ-

sary agent as a pantheistic naturalism might suggest, would at all answer the exigences of the case, for an agent cannot be one, beneficent and intelligent, in the sense in which the course of things shows him to be, without being also free and personal, and no objection can be made to these latter attributes, which would not also go to disprove the former, and to show that what we know to be true ought to be impossible.

An illustration and confirmation of this natural evidence may be drawn from the order and progression, which certainly exist in nature, so that, by most minute steps we can trace an ascending series from the very rudest senseless rock to the very highest powers of human intellect;[4] in this series why should we stop before we come to its extremities, which are,

dicat, sed omnis quæ nos circumstat, ad quam nos etiam pertinemus, universa ipsa rerum natura proclamat, habere se præstantissimum Conditorem, qui nobis mentem rationemque naturalem dedit, quæ viventia non viventibus, sensu prædita non sentientibus, intelligentia non intelligentibus, immortalia mortalibus, impotentibus potentia, injustis justa, speciosa deformibus, bona malis, incorruptibilia corruptibilibus, immutabilia mutabilibus, invisibilia visibilibus, incorporalia corporalibus, beata miseris, præferenda videamus. Ac per hoc quoniam rebus creatis Creatorem sine dubitatione præponimus, oportet ut eum, et sumem vivere, et cuncta sentire atque intelligere, et mori, corrupi, mutarique non posse, nec corpus esse, sed spiritum, omnium potentissimum, justissimum, speciosissimum, optimum, beatissimum fateamur.—*Aug. de Trin.* lib. xv. 6.

[4] With respect to the perfection of those several sorts of beings that are visible to us. Some there are that are without any power, so much as of vegetation, or propagation of their kind. Others are endued with a power of vegetation, that are propagated from seeds according to their kind, that grow, and live, and die. A third sort are, animals that have a life of sense, if not (as 'tis probable) some degree of reason too, in their sphere. But there are a yet more noble sort of animals, we call men, that have not only sense and some low degree of reason, but such noble faculties as enable them to understand things that are above the reach of sense. I would not drive any argument further than it will easily go, but methinks, this plain climax in the creatures that are visible to us, can scarce choose but lead a considering man to believe, that there are a higher sort of rational beings that depend less on matter, and are not so clogged and pressed down with it, as these rational natures in mankind seem to be. And consequently, that we must at last come to some one most perfectly rational, intelligent, and wise being, that is the cause and original of all things.—*John Huncock. Boyle Lectures*, 1706. Compare *Thos. Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ. Quæstio* 2, *Articulus* 3, "Utrum est Deus. Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur," et seqq.—*Κλιμακος γαρ δικην, Θεον ἁρμοσας την κτισιν, δι'αυτης προς ἑαυτον τοις φιλοθειοις αναβασιν ετεχνησατο.—Basil. Seleuciæ, Orat.* i.

the one a perfect being, that is God, and the other, the nearest possible approach to nothing, or perhaps nothingness itself.

This series may be traced in nature in a thousand ways; in fact we cannot find anything that has not a place in some natural series. Of course we can only expect to see a portion of any of these series until and unless we become omniscient, and therefore our ignorance of a large part of each is no argument against its existence and continuance, but rather the continual discoveries we are making in such matters ought to incline our belief in the opposite direction. There is a very plain reason why we do not directly perceive any higher portion than our own selves; it is because no intellectual, as no physical capacity can ever comprehend and as it were contain anything greater than itself, though our researches and enquiries, at the same time that they make known to us new links elsewhere, conduct us inevitably to the conclusion, that higher powers and higher intelligence must have some existence. No series which has evident and necessary limits can be really infinite, such can be so only in relation to some power of perception or calculation, which, like our own, is less than perfect.

Beings exist for one another, as the earth for grass, grass for the ox, the ox for man, and man for what? Surely for God, or the series would, after gradually arising from nothing, fall back at once from its highest point, which would be absurd; it must go on to that which, being perfect, is a sufficient cause for itself. It is no answer to this to show that man's body, for instance, feeds worms, which are much lower in the scale of being than himself, for it cannot be pretended that man as a whole, body and soul together, serves any such purpose, and the truth is, that man, as matter, stands to living things of any kind in the relation of the less to the greater, though as a whole the relation may be exactly reversed; everything which has two parts may be regarded from three points of view, and may take a place in three distinct series,

and so it is with man. Thus the objection only serves to display a new token of all surveying intelligence, and to raise our conception of the designer and governor of all, by bringing home to us that marvellous interpenetration and complete economy of causes and relations which so eminently distinguish the works of nature from those of our lesser understandings.

CHAPTER VII.

Of the Evidence afforded by the Soul of Man.[1]

OUR consciousness shows us many things within ourselves which point to the existence of the Deity. Take the conscience of man, when it reproves and when it encourages, can we seriously believe that there is no external ratification of those reproofs and praises, or that they are merely the foretaste or presentiment of some natural and inevitable consequences of our actions, and that therefore it will make no difference to us whether we obey or stifle it? Are we not sure that it is a voice which addresses us as moral beings, as capable of other influences than those of mere physical desire and fear? It is obvious that conscience speaks of the moral government of a moral being by some other far more powerful, that is, it tells us of a Ruler, who is and must be omnipotent and perfect.[2] Closely connected with this is that sentiment, which looks

[1] There is a very good statement of the design and goodness manifested in the intellectual constitution of man in Abbadie's Work, part 1, sec. 1, ch. 11.

[2] It must be confessed by all that there is a law of nature written upon the hearts of men, which directs them to commendable actions, if they will attend to the writing in their own consciences. This law cannot be considered without the notice of a lawgiver. For it is but a natural and obvious conclusion, that some superior hand engrafted those principles in man, since he finds something in him accusing him upon the pursuit of uncomely actions, though his heart be strongly inclined to them: man knows he never planted this principle of reluctancy in his own soul; he can never be the cause of that which he cannot be friends with. If he were the cause of it, why doth he not rid himself of it? No man would endure a thing that doth frequently molest and disquiet him if he could cashier it. It is therefore sown in man by some hand more powerful than man, and which is so rooted that all the force that man can use cannot pull it up.—*Stephen Charnock, on the Existence of God*, part 1. *Κακα μειζω πασχει δια το συνειδος ὁ αδικων, βασανιζομενος τῃ ψυχῃ, ηπερ το σωμα ταις πληγαις μαστιγομενος.—Demophilus Sententiæ.*

very like the remains of an innate idea of the Deity, I mean that vague feeling of awe, which comes at times over every man, especially if he be alone, and in silence, so that he shall fully realize his own loneliness;[3] then, if he have time to think, he feels a dread of some unseen power, an expectation of some silent voice, which will bring his conscience into unusual activity, and will not suffer him to outrage eternal justice by any fresh offence; the presence of the Deity seems to overshadow him, and all that is turbulent and earthly and wicked seems to die in him, or to be turned into the listening consciousness of religious awe, similar in duly increased proportion to that feeling which is excited by the presence of a man of extraordinary power and goodness.

Even when they profess perfect intellectual doubt, men show the unnatural character of scepticism and their own innate disposition to awe and reverence, by the tendency they exhibit to seek to some higher power, those otherwise the most incredulous, seeking rest in the predictions of fortune tellers, or the presages of dreams, or the superstitious observance of days, or the fear of omens and presentiments, so much so, that it is all but proverbial how superstitious nearly every infidel has been in some things.

There can scarcely be a more suicidal objection than that which has been sometimes put forward, that possibly fear has been the true original of all human religion, for this admits to the full all that we have said above, as well as the conclusion I have desired to arrive at, for it declares that the consciousness of man is naturally impressed by a fear of some punish-

[3] Ein Mensch ist doch ganz anders als die Thiere gemacht. Diese dienen einander und endlich alle dem Menschen zur Speise, und haben keinen Verstand. Der Mensch aber hat eine verständige Seele, ist niemanden in der Welt unterworfen, und fürchtet sich doch von den Künftigen. Vor wem fürchtet er sich dann? Das muss ein grosser Geist sein, der uns zu gebieten hat. Wen man doch den kennte und zum Freunder hatte!—*Reasoning of a heathen native of Greenland*, v. ante, p. 122, note 3 (at the end).

ment following up his offences, and by a certain feeling that when most alone he is most helpless in the hands of some superior power, and that the conclusion naturally and universally, and I will add, therefore, properly,[1] drawn from this has always been, that there is a God.

Most men have, and all men are capable of certain abstract ideas, which cannot, or can hardly be accounted for without believing in the Deity; we have ideas of infinity and perfection,[2] nay we must have them before we can form any intelligible or correct idea of ourselves, or of any actual thing with which we are acquainted; we must have a conception of a perfect Being before we can know that we are ourselves imperfect, and some idea of space without bounds must precede the idea of form, that is of bounded space,[3] and thus the

[1] If man be rightly defined a rational animal, then human nature must be a rational nature: but if so, a foundation in reason, and an origin in human nature are not two different predicates, but one and the same, only in different expression.—*Warburton, on Hume's Natural History of Religion.*

[2] "By the name of God I understand a certain substance infinite (and so forth). Now so divine, excellent, and perfect are all these attributes, that when with reverential awe I contemplate them either conjunctively or distinctly I become fully informed that they are too great and noble to be derived from so mean, frail, and imperfect a being as myself: and upon this firm foundation I erect to myself this verity, that God doth exist. For though the idea of a substance be included in me for this cause, that I am a substance, yet it doth not necessarily follow that, therefore, I can have the idea of an infinite substance, since I am myself but finite, unless that idea first proceed from a substance really infinite."—*Charleton's D. of A.*, ch. 1, sec. 2.

[3] "I demand from the whole world by what means possible I should come to understand that I doubt, desire, &c. i.e. that something is wanting to my nature which I find requisite to make it perfect; if there were in me no idea of a more perfect Being, by comparing whose perfections with my own deficiencies I am brought to an assured knowledge of the imperfection, and so the subordination and dependence of my own being."—*W. Charleton, u. s.* L'Etendue intelligible infinie n'est point une modification de mon esprit; elle est immuable éternelle, nécessaire. Je ne puis douter de sa réalité et de son immensité. Or tout ce qui est immuable, éternel, nécessaire, et surtout infini, n'est point une créature, et ne peut appartenir à la créature. Donc elle appartient au Créateur et ne peut se trouver qu'en Dieu. Donc il y a un Dieu et une raison; un Dieu dans lequel se trouve l'archétype que je contemple du monde créé que j'habite un Dieu dans lequel se trouve la raison qui m'éclaire par les idées purement intelligibles qu'elle fournit abondamment à mon esprit et à celui de tous les

idea of God is implied in and presupposed by that of man, seeing that we know ourselves, and all around us, to be imperfect, which could not be unless we had some standard of infinite, that is (as the word infinite is used in these matters), pure goodness and knowledge and power with which to compare them. It is surely impossible to realize the necessary conception of existence, and believe that there is no absolute existence; of power, yet believe that there cannot be any Omnipotent; of knowledge, and be sure there is no Omniscient; or of goodness, and deny that there is any purely good Being, or maintain that that highest good all men seek so eagerly is, after all, a mere phantasy in its perfection, though so real when impure and mutilated.[4] Besides, we can have, and from

hommes. Car je suis sûr que tous les hommes sont unis à la même raison que moi; puisque je suis certain qu'ils voient, ou peuvent voir ce que je vois quand je rentre en moi-même, et j'y découvre les vérités ou les rapports nécessaires que renferme la substance intelligible de la raison universelle qui habite en moi, ou plutôt dans laquelle habitent tous les intelligences."—*Malebranche Entret. sur la Metaph.* 2me *Entretien.*

[4] "For why does not the needle more naturally turn towards its beloved north, nor the heliotrope more zealously affect the kisses of the rising sun, than the soul of man, especially when by often reflecting upon her own excellencies she has disdainfully shaken off those plummets which sink her down into matter, dilating and spreading herself boundlessly beyond the utmost sphere of finite beings, points with her full bent and verticity to the fruition of some infinite good, as the only centre whereon she can finally rest? We find by experience that these noble intelligent creatures are too large for the circle and embraces of nature; aspiring above the gratifications of sense and materiality to the everlasting possession of a spiritual and immortal blessedness. They can indeed refresh themselves with the excellencies of the creatures, and discover such variety of sweetness and beauty in their natures as will plentifully entertain them with delightsome speculations. But for pure rest and peace, for plenary acquiescence and termination of desires, 'tis nowhere, I say, to be found within the whole latitude of the creation. The Depth saith, It is not in me, and the Sea saith, It is not in me; so that though our perverse wills should pursue their beloved prey through all the vast wilderness of the world, and force our enslaved understandings to follow the chase with them, yet after all their toil and labour they must at last sit down weary and dissatisfy'd, find themselves poor and indigent in the midst of all their enjoyments, and weep with the insatiable Macedon, because they cannot find a world—some solid and substantial happiness, which may fill the utmost capacity of their craving appetites, and refresh them with an inexhaustible spring of uninterrupted delights. But whence is it, I ask

time immemorial have had, and acted, and argued upon our ideas of the relations which would follow from the existence of a Creator and Deity. If these relations and abstracts had no corresponding absolute and concrete, our ideas would be in fact ideas of absolutely nothing, yet some of them are necessary to enable us to think at all: either therefore our mental system is based, in some material parts, on shadowy illusions, or else there is some being possessing these noble attributes, that is, there is a God, which, after the proofs and illustrations we have already gone through, we must surely readily believe.

again, that our souls have these capacious, these dilated desires; unless there be some Being of such ample, copious and solid excellence, as may answer to the full extent of them? Some object within the latitude of its entity proportionable for them to fix and bottom upon? That is, in other terms, unless there be a God."—*Thos. Gregory*, Μεθ' ἡμων ὁ Θεος, p. 36.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of the Beneficial Effects of Theism.

THE effect of the belief in a Deity when really and earnestly embraced, upon the character of man, furnishes a strong ground of probability for the truth of that belief. How differently does adversity affect a believer and an unbeliever. If a man really believe it to come from an allwise goodness he improves himself under it and by it, but if he do not, how can he avoid becoming reckless and discontented, and given to drown his sorrows in excesses, thereby becoming perpetually worse and worse, and less and less able to recover himself.[1] It is a homely simile, but there is nothing so like adversity as the heap of manure which the idle and foolish man allows to lie sweltering and infectious before his very door, whilst the wise and diligent, by spreading it over his fields, not only escapes infection and disease, but may gain by it an almost indefinite increase in his crops. Neither can prosperity overturn the

[1] What rational considerations are there to which an unbeliever in the Divine government can resort for consolation under the sufferings and sorrows of life? The utmost which can reasonably be expected from that philosophy, if such it may be called, which excludes God from the universe, is a gloomy and sullen resolution in sustaining calamities which are inevitable, and of which it would be useless to complain? Such is the wide distinction between the man of rational and habitual piety, who firmly believes in the wise overruling government of God, and the man who has no faith in Divine Providence: the latter can have no hope—the former can never despair.—*Belsham's Discourses*, vol. ii. p. 75.—*Καθαπερ γαρ οἱ μεν δι'ολισθηρας ὁδου βαδιζοντες ὑποσκελιζονται και πιπτουσιν, οἱ δε δια ξηρας και λεωφορου, απταιστῳ χρωνται πορειᾳ· ὁυτως οἱ μεν δια των σωματικων και των εκτος την ψυχην αγοντες, ουδεν αλλ'η πιπτειν αυτην εθιζουσιν· ολισθηρα γαρ ταυτα γε και παντων αβεβαιοτατα. Οἱ δε δια των κατα τας αρετας θεωρηματων επι θεον σπευδοντες, ασφαλη και ακρανδαντον ὁδον ευθυνουσιν· ὡς αψευδεστατα φαναι ὁτι ὁ μεν εκεινοις πεπιστευκως απιστει Θεῳ, ὁ δ'απιστων εκεινοις πεπιστευκε Θεῳ.—Philo. περι Αβρααμ*, p. 387.

morality of a true Theist, for he will not ascribe his prosperity to anything but the will and favour of the Deity, which he knows he cannot hope to continue towards him as before, if he allow the pride of power to lead him away into cruelty and tyranny, or the pride of riches to make him haughty and self-indulgent, but he must still, as he hopes to remain where he is, labour diligently for the good of those over whom he has any influence, and strive to use to good purposes only that wealth which the Author of all good gave him to no other end. The pride and superciliousness, or the waywardness and folly so likely to be engendered by a conscious superiority in personal beauty, or mental power, are inconsistent with a real Theistic belief, because God, who is himself much greater, will do nothing but what is kind and beneficent, and loving, and gentle, and condescending. Even further, the mere conception of the Deity is so high and noble, that it must have an elevating and purifying effect upon the taste and judgment and disposition.[1] It is impossible to contemplate perfection and love deformity, it is impossible to realize the presence of perfect wisdom and goodness and yet to wander without pain among scenes of vice and folly. Since our moral sense rejects

[1] When we reflect on the manner in which the idea of the Deity is formed, we must be convinced that such an idea, intimately present to the mind, must have a most powerful effect in refining the moral taste. Composed of the richest elements, it embraces in the character of a beneficent Parent and Almighty Ruler whatever is venerable in wisdom, whatever is awful in authority, whatever is touching in goodness. The idea of the Supreme Being has this peculiar property: that, as it admits of no substitute, so from the first moment it is formed it is capable of continual growth and enlargement. God himself is immutable, but our conception of his character is continually receiving fresh accessions, is continually growing more extended and refulgent, by having transferred to it new elements of beauty and goodness; by attracting to itself, as a centre, whatever bears the impress of dignity, order, or happiness. It borrows splendour from all that is fair, subordinates to itself all that is great, and sits enthroned on the riches of the universe. As the object of worship will always be, in a degree, the object of imitation, hence arises a fixed standard of moral excellence; by the contemplation of which the tendencies to corruption are counteracted, the contagion of bad example is checked, and human nature rises above its natural level.—*Robert Hall, on Modern Infidelity.*

as necessarily false any belief that tends to corrupt mankind, surely we ought to allow the good effects of this to be some argument in favour of its truth.

Again, that entire self-control and indifference to the allurements of mere immediate pleasure, without which no man ever was or can be good, or great, is at first very painful and difficult, but the real belief in a God makes it comparatively easy, or perhaps even necessary, for no one can contemplate the moral perfections of the Deity without a certain longing to be like Him, and a certain reverend love, and more than these, without the assurance, that if we endeavour to be like Him He will love us, and aid us, and so we shall stand, not in our own strength alone, but in His also. Now what is particularly difficult is for any one to keep such a constant control over himself that he may do well, not in great things only, or in things he has had time to consider of, but in little things and in situations into which he comes unexpectedly; but this is the very characteristic of love, that it pervades the whole life of him that hath it, and shows itself most where there is least time for reflection, and least room for other motives,[2] so

[2] Nothing is too little to be done for one deeply loved. In great acts we may please ourselves, have self-satisfaction, be self-complaisant; nothing but deep fixed love will do unweariedly all little things, not for its own will, but to please whom it loves. Love has the object of love ever in its eye, its thoughts; it acts spontaneously, because it loves, not to show its love, but because it loves and cannot but so act, &c.—*E. B. Pusey, D.D., Sermon.* "Do all for the Lord Jesus." Love being placed on things that differ in three degrees, it comes to be divided into three sorts. Either it is to things below us, and then it is called a bare affection; or to things equal with us, and then it is called friendship; or to things above us, and then it arrives at the name of devotion. Now the nature of love in every one of these being such, that it joins our hearts to the thing beloved, and we and it make but one whole: in this only they differ, that though we may consent to part and break with that which we esteem less than ourselves, yet we can never agree to be separated from that which we esteem greater. The less part will always be abandoned to the conversation of the greatest, we must always sacrifice that which is worst, to keep entire the best; and therefore, though in bare affection a man will always prefer himself before that he loves, when one must suffer a displeasure, yet it is quite otherwise in the highest love (and sometimes in the second sort), which we call devotion, for there a man

that to love God really and heartily will rather make it cult for a man to avoid doing well in those very unexp and seemingly unimportant matters in which it would o wise be so difficult for him to control himself, and of c whatever the love of an all-holy God prompts us to do be good in itself and useful to society. Thus, too, against mental cowardice, which made the old philosophers regar mass of men as hopelessly depraved, which has in all stayed the activity of philanthropists, and stagnated their wishes into a treatise, or a series of letters, or even pe into misanthropy and despair of the capacity of man for g ness; against this and all cowardice in action there cann a better preservative than the conviction that God is wit that He loves us, and will not fail to help us; this is ev in history, where we see that an army of fanatics has al always prevailed as long as its faith remained, and that l in a prediction has always had the strongest tendency to l about its fulfilment; and indeed there lies at the root heroism a firm faith in some unseen power, whether it be or destiny, or fortune viewed as God; so that a sound T will, with equal advantages, have more power, as well as will to do well, than any other man who is destitute c faith and love.[1] Can that belief which thus raises and d fies the character of man be properly or reasonably reject

prefers the thing he loves so much before himself, that he fears not to vent very life for the conversation of it; because, as there is no compare, he t between all the world and this, so he is tied with an incomparably stronge to it than to all the world.—*Bishop Patrick's Parable of the Pilgrim*, ch. xi

[1] The uses of the doctrine of God's holiness are thus summed up by Curc Usus doctrinæ de Sanctitate et Justitia Dei sunt multi. 1. Sicut is sanc justus est, ita oportet nos, si filii ejus esse velimus, sanctitate et justitiæ c dare, et ab omni impuritate et injustitia, sive in factis, sive in dictis, nobis c 2. Servit ad timorem ejus in cordibus nostris excitandum. Nam qui just is abhorret a peccato et iniquitate, eamque impunitam non relinquet. 3. ad consolationem nostram, ut persuasi simus [Ipsum promissa fidelibus facta impleturum, nec] eos in augustiis aut persecutionibus deserturum. 4. nos judiciis Dei acquiescere, absque murmure, quia nihil iniquum facere u potest.—*Religionis Christianæ Institutiones*, lib. ii. c. 14.

false, to make way for a creed which, in teaching him to regard the present as alone certain, and pleasure as the only possible object of his desires, tends strongly to degrade him so much lower than the brutes, as his passions and will are less restrained by natural instinct.[2]

It is not merely on the man as an individual that a firm and trusting belief in a Deity works out beneficial results, for the very fountain of all social beneficence and benevolence that passes the realm of mere sensibility, must be sought in the willing sacrifice of self for the benefit of others, and of present enjoyment under a sense of duty and religion, or in the hope of a recompense in the future happiness of others as well as self, from which it is manifest that a Theist would be far more likely to be at once able and willing to confer benefits on society at large than any sceptic or atheist.[3] The Theistic belief, therefore, deserves encouragement from us as members of society, and if so we ought certainly individually to hope it true, and to act as though it were. But beside these, the belief itself is, and has always been recognized as being, to a great extent essential to the healthy action of society, for no state can be maintained by laws without morals, and what are the great sanctions of morality? Some would mention first,

[1] The exclusion of a Supreme Being, and of a superintending Providence, tends directly to the destruction of moral taste. It robs the universe of all finished and consummate excellence, even in idea. The admiration of perfect wisdom and goodness, for which we are formed, and which kindles such unspeakable raptures in the soul, finding in the regions of scepticism nothing to which it corresponds, droops and languishes. In a world which presents a fair spectacle of order and beauty, of a vast family nourished and supported by an Almighty Parent; in a world which leads the devout mind, step by step, to the contemplation of the first fair and the first good, the sceptic is encompassed with nothing but obscurity, meanness, and disorder.—*Robert Hall's Sermon on Modern Infidelity.*

[2] For the good influence of Religion upon communities and governments, "habemus confitentes reos;" 'tis so apparent and unquestionable, that 'tis one of the objections of the Atheists, that it was first contrived and introduced by politicians, to bring the wild and straggling herds of mankind under subjection and laws.—*Bentley, Sermon* 1. *on Atheism.*

the utility of virtue to the individual, and it is certainly a fact tending to prove the existence of the Deity, that the more we know the more clearly do we see the natural connection between virtue and happiness; but it is absurd to talk of selfishness as the great incentive to virtue among the ignorant, seeing that every crime is committed for the sake of procuring some pleasure, or avoiding some pain, and the wisest and acutest of us all cannot unerringly calculate the ultimate profit and loss attached to any action. Clearly the two great sanctions of morality are the common judgment of mankind, including the individual conscience as part of it, and the belief that a Judge, impartial and incorruptible, is watching every movement and noting every thought. Of these, the first by its mere existence tends strongly to prove that the true nature of man, the ideal of his character is most pure and upright, and so to point to a perfect God; but as the opinion of mankind is represented to every man by the opinion of his own particular class, or of his own immediate associates, into conformity with which he is always striving to bring his own conscience, and though a man very seldom outrages the opinion of his class and associates, it not unfrequently happens that, even in following that opinion, he does violence to that universal judgment of impartial men, which alone accords with the standard of perfect right. Besides this, a man may be, and men often have been successfully hypocrites as to the opinion of their fellowmen, but to God no one can be a hypocrite. No one can hope (except so far as he deceives himself) to deceive Him, who by His very nature is everywhere, and sees and judges not only every act, but every intention and every secret inclination.[1] The great stay, therefore, of morality and of

[1] Where the Theistical belief is intire and perfect there must be a steddy opinion of the superintendency of a Supreme Being, a Witness and Spectator of human Life, and conscious of whatever is felt or acted in the Universe. So that in the perfectest Recess, or deepest Solitude there must be One still presum'd remaining with us: whose Presence singly must be of more moment than that

human society is the belief in a perfect Deity. Where this has prevailed, improved morality and increased social happiness have always followed, and wherever any tampering with this has gained general allowance, as where, for instance, the Deity has been misconceived of as imperfect and finite, there general morality has also fallen. Is not that opinion, which is the very bond of human society, in all probability true? But we have before shown it to be true; is it not then necessary and most useful?

of the most august Assembly on Earth. In such a Presence 'tis Evident, that as the shame of Guilty Actions must be the greatest of any, so must the Honour be, of well doing, even under the unjust Censure of the World. And in this case 'tis very apparent how conducing a perfect Theism must be to Virtue, and how great Deficiency there is in Atheism.—*Shaftesbury's Enquiry, c. Virtue*, b. i., p. 3, s. iii.

PART IV.

Some Important Deductions from the preceding.

CHAPTER I.

Of Man's relation to God.

WHEN we are assured of the existence of God, the first question which must arise is, in what relation do mankind stand to Him? It is manifest, that, as concerns existence, this relation must be that of creature to creator; for the alone eternally omnipotent must be the free cause of the temporal and finite, and man's existence must depend upon the will of God.

Another relation is that of power, as to which, man must be entirely subject to God and to his pleasure; upon this arises the enquiry, whether man is so subject to God's will, as the elements seem to us to be; in other words, when man acts, is his will so turned as to make him in fact God's passive instrument, and not the true originator of his own acts? This depends upon the difference between providence and fate, which we have before discussed—so far as natural necessity has been suggested as a substitute for any God at all. To the reasons there given, most of which apply to this case also, we are now entitled to add the argument, that since we know that God is good, and yet that man does evil, it follows that there must be some power of choice in man which is not directly controlled by God. Further than this we need not at present enquire, for in the possession of this choice consists man's power of

g the most important of all his relations to God, that of
If God made him and has preserved him, and man have
hoice, whether in opinion, sentiment, or action, he is
r bound to exercise that choice in whatever manner shall
st agreeable to the will of his Maker, whether he do it
usly, under the influence of gratitude, or prudently, at
ctate of self-preservation.

n's laws are certainly a testimony to God's law. What
as found most for his own benefit, and has therefore uni-
ly endeavoured to procure by the application of juris-
nce, his very endeavours declare to be in accordance with
ll of God; for they aim at man's benefit, which if God
good we cannot doubt He must desire. Earthly tribu-
re however fettered in their operation by the general
of man, and the uncertainty of all worldly things, but
ore by the difficulty of procuring evidence. With God
er, this can be no difficulty, for He sees and knows, and
eatures are conscious that He sees and knows all that they
, as well as all they do; so that while men can only judge
he action, God judges the motive, which is, as it were,
bstance, of which action is the shadow,—sometimes the
ful, always the uncertain shadow. Thus, a deed done by
man is not a crime, because he had not that free moral
which is essential both to good and evil; again, if a man
rth his hand to pull another from a precipice, but the
starting at the action, fall over directly in consequence of
t, manifestly the first, though the immediate cause of the
s death, is in no way criminal, though men might easily
se him so; but if he, seeing the other's danger, had re-
l to seem not to see it, that so the other might perish
ut his act, he would be guilty of that man's death,
gh it would probably be impossible to prove that he
he danger, and by that means to afford an opportunity
e intervention of human law. Human laws, therefore,

deal generally with negative precepts, for their breach can generally be proved, and but rarely with positive ones, because in that case they could be but rarely executed. With God, however, it is far otherwise; He knows what a man might have done, and He alone knows exactly how far every man has and can use a free choice: since then the law of God is, indubitably, that every man shall do all the good he can, no doubt He will detect and punish the transgressor.

It has been often observed, that human laws provide many punishments and few rewards. The true reason of this seems to be, that man's natural moral duty is not to do exactly as much good as evil, (in which case alone could rewards and punishments be properly propounded in equal proportions) but he is bound to do everything that is right, and nothing that is wrong. The law is made, that men may be rewarded by its observance, not for obeying it; thus, a law against murder is a reward in itself if obeyed, for the lives of the community are preserved, and this is the benefit to which the punishment for its breach is the equivalent, or rather perhaps the bulwark and in part the cause. Thus the benefit proposed to man by laying on him the duty of goodness, is, that in obedience to this natural law, and in the proper exercise of this, as well as of every other of his faculties, he shall find pleasure and happiness; he shall be happy in himself, and happy in the effects upon him of a like obedience in others. How great the reward thus attained is, every one can estimate who compares his own state with what it would be, were he hated instead of loved by those upon whose goodwill he depends, and had he never any consciousness of right to maintain him in external trials. Human laws may for expediency propose special rewards where obedience can be proved and disobedience cannot, as in the case of the application of great talents to promote the welfare of society, but in every case man's legislation is but an application of probabilities, and in fact secondary punishments have

often been more dreaded than what the law has esteemed more dreadful, and some men have even desired imprisonment and death; human laws, therefore, can be no substitute for, but only a witness to the divine law of God. I suppose the natural limits of man's power in repressing the crimes of others must be connected with, and might be proved as to be expected from the consideration, that much actual evil is really beneficial, and purely moral evil of course no external law could destroy, or outward decency prevent.

But whatever claim to reward obedience to human law might seem to confer, there can be no such claim as between man and God, because there is nothing which can pass from the creature to the Creator so as to raise any obligation in Him.[1] There can be no mutual right, the Creator being absolutely entitled to the creature, while the creature can have no right at all against the Creator. Thus it is possible for man to contract an obligation to punishment, but he can never gain any strict title to a reward. Our arguments, therefore, when we enquire what the intentions of God may be with regard to man, are not, and cannot be deduced from any injustice that might seem in some cases to threaten us, but must be drawn from our knowledge of the divine nature, and from the proba-

[1] Deus nos, beneficiis ornando, a se independentes quasi nihil acceperimus facere, nec vult, nec potest. Tres sunt rationes, quare hominum dona, quibus alios alii mactant, abeant in proprietatem accipientis; non abeant vero in proprietatem accipientis beneficia Dei. Prima est: si donantibus liceret repetere dona, si in donatarium non transferretur doni proprietas, quæ confusio in societate esset oritura? Nullum pactum, (nam et donatio species pacti est) ex eadem ratione, esset validum amplius. II. Homines ab hominibus beneficii compensationem possunt accipere, qua facta, ob datum æquivalens, nihil amplius repetere licet. III. Inter homines beneficiarius a benefactore non dependet necessario, nec in omnibus et singulis beneficiis: multa enim beneficiarius ab aliis accepit. Hæ tres vero rationes in Deum, summum benefactorem, non cadunt. Unde omnia ejus beneficia singulis momentis, repeti possunt: nec eorum ullum transit, respectu accipientis, in nostram proprietatem, ut dantis summum dominium excluderetur.—*I. G. Canz. Theol. Thetico-Moral.* The present law of England would justify even a stronger statement of the necessity of some consideration passing to the donor.

ble determinations of such a nature, where all is free and spor taneous, unless indeed, there have been some express promise and even then we should be entitled to expect only, not as our own right to require its fulfilment, and if we exceeded th conditions of that promise, we could gain thereby no certai right to any higher reward. The effect of these considerations must be, to heighten the heinousness of human offences against God, by ranking them with those desperate crimes, which no thing can atone for, and for which no recompense or repara tion can in any case be made; we must expect, therefore, tha God will punish them with severity.

Again, it cannot be doubted as a matter of fact, but tha the expectation of God's wrath, of some kind of retributor pain, or pleasure here or hereafter, has done much to hinde both open and secret crime, unless, therefore, which we can not suppose, God has allowed a false expectation as a mean of benefiting mankind, it would follow that he will punis vice: which leads us to two enquiries: first, do we see tha vice is punished here? And secondly, how long does man existence continue, that is, how long a time is there in whic man may be punished, or perhaps rewarded? The answer to this second question will be the subject of the next chapter as to the first, there is no doubt, that although the world is constituted that in the absence of seeming accidents, vice an misery are closely connected, there are nevertheless in pra

[1] If God have an absolute sovereignty over the whole world, the merit is totally excluded. His right is so absolute over all creatures, that He neither nor can be a debtor to any; not to the undefiled holiness of the blessed angels much less to poor earthly worms; those blessed spirits enjoy their glory by t title of His sovereign pleasure, not by virtue of any obligation devolving fro them upon God. Are not the faculties whereby they and we perform any act obedience, His grant to us? Is not the strength whereby they and we are e abled to do any thing pleasing to Him, a gift from Him?—God is Lord of a all is due to Him; how can we oblige Him, by giving Him what is His ow more His to whom it is presented, than ours by whom it is offered? He becom not a debtor by receiving anything from us, but by promising something to —*S. Charnock. The Dominion of God.*

tice so many differences in the condition and position of different men, that it can by no means rightly be asserted, that all vice and vicious men meet on earth with their appropriate recompense, a conclusion by no means unimportant in the consideration of the other of the two questions.

CHAPTER II.

Of the Immortality of Man.

THAT death is not annihilation is rendered highly probable by the fact, that our lives depend upon our own will to live, and still more upon the will of others towards us; for if death were annihilation, it would thus be in man's power to disregard or defy God's government altogether; the greatest miscreant might after his riotous enjoyment, withdraw himself for ever from the possibility of punishment, and the best and holiest of men might be robbed of his reward by the crime or mistake of some fellow-mortal.[1] Certainly it might be, that the wills of men might be so controlled as virtually to destroy this power, but we know that this is not actually done, for there have been many martyrs in the cause of truth and goodness, and not a few Neros have escaped by death the temporal retribution invoked against them by their crimes. Nay, we know as a fact, that disease, and what we call accidents, make no

[1] Ει μεν γαρ ην ὁ θανατος του παντος απαλλαγη, ἑρμαιον αν ην τοις κακοις αποθανουσι, του τε σωματος ἁμα απηλλαχθαι, και της αυτων κακιας, μετα της ψυχης· νυν δε επειδη αθανατος φαινεται ουσα, ουδεμια αν ειη αυτῃ αλλη αποφυγη κακων, ουδε σωτηρια, πλην του ὡς βελτιστην τε και φρονιμωτατην γενεσθαι.—*Phædo*, ξ. "If our soul is mortal reason is a dream, which Jupiter has sent to deceive a set of wretches, and virtue loses all the splendour which makes it godly in our eyes. Then, whatever we think beautiful, sublime, or moral, is no impression of God's accomplishments; for nothing perishable can imbibe or reflect the smallest ray of his perfection. Then, we are sent here like the beasts, to look about for food and die. Then, in a few days it will be the same thing whether I have been an ornament or a shame to society; whether I have been endeavouring to increase the number of the happy or the miserable. Then, the most reprobate of mortals has the power of withdrawing himself from under the dominion of heavenly power, and a dagger can cut asunder the chain that links us to God."—*Phædon, by Moses Mendelsohn.* (*C. Cullen's Translation*, p. 94.)

distinction of good and evil men, but are fatal to both alike, unless, therefore, there is a futurity of existence somewhere, there can be no true moral government of the universe; yet we know that there is some, and that vice and virtue are naturally and essentially connected with pain and pleasure: it follows, therefore, that since God is just, and will recompense both good and bad, both good and bad must continue in or return to life after the grave has closed upon them and hid them from our yet living eyes.

We must believe, however, that no part of man is essentially eternal; he must depend in this upon God's will, and we can only be immortal because He wills that we should be so. But we are sure that God wills our happiness, and from this we may reasonably conclude that we shall be immortal, for to think of the future is always noble and manly and godlike; to know, therefore, that we shall die is to look forward to death, but to look forward to the end of all possibility of pleasure, must mar our present happiness;[2] so that, except in the expectation of immortality, we can never be perfectly happy. Even taking happiness far from perfect, such as men realize enough of to make it the object of their actual desires, we know that though all long for it, no one has ever possessed and held it, and this alone is an argument for the existence of some future state, where we may enjoy it, else the destiny would not agree with the nature and natural constitution of man;[3] but man in his highest condition here knows no plea-

[2] What is life, already chequered with miseries, if its most agreeable moments are to be galled beside with the afflicting foresight of inevitable annihilation? What is an existence of yesterday which will cease to-morrow?—*M. Mendelsohn's Phædon* (trans.), p. 183. Nam si amitti vita beata potest, beata esse non potest. Quis enim confidit semper sibi illud stabile et firmum permansurum, quod fragile et caducum sit?—Qui autem diffidet perpetuitati bonorum suorum, timeat necesse est, ne aliquando, amissis illis, sit miser. Beatus autem esse in maximarum rerum timore nemo potest.—*Cicero de Finibus*, l. ii. c. lxxxvi.

[3] Quis nesciat hominem appetere naturaliter bonum, et magis majus, et maxime maximum bonum, videlicet ipsius satiativum perfecte, felicitatem seu beatitudinem perfectissime satiantem, et omnia desideria quietantem, sicut superius

sure that is not capable of increase, or that shall never suffer decay; if, therefore, he is to be perfectly happy, he must live after death, and that for ever, since annihilation must always be a pain compared with perfect pleasure, as we see that people who are very happy here desire most strongly not to die. The thought of approaching annihilation would be to be borne with resignation, but resignation is a bitter virtue, which cannot consist with perfect happiness. God, who is Almighty, perfectly wills our happiness: He wills, therefore, our perfect happiness, and can procure it, whence I conclude that we shall be perfectly happy, and therefore immortal.[1] Similarly, if God wills the misery of any, they must be immortal, or they could not be perfectly miserable. As one ray of light is inconsistent with perfect darkness, so one ray of hope or fear is incompatible with perfect misery or bliss. We might, for aught we know by nature, pass immediately into another state of bodily existence, or rest awhile in unconsciousness; or perhaps the soul might for a time exist alone; of this, however, we may be sure, that living with death constantly before us, and that annihilation, we could not be perfectly happy, even if there were no pain upon earth, but now we cannot approach to it, and so, since God is good, and all good, we may confidently conclude, that death is not annihilation, but rather the gate of everlasting life.[2] If it be said

tangebatur. Iste autem appetitus vel debet satiari plenarie, vel non debet; et quis dixerit quod non debet? Tunc enim otiosus et innaturalis homini videretur; sed quomodo naturalissimus, generalissimus, et maximus appetitus humanus permittitur esse talis? Quomodo etiam Deus qui—nihil agit frustra, talem appetitum otiosum indidit homini, tam perfectæ naturæ, tam nobili creaturæ? Non sic senserunt Philosophi, non sic sentiunt nisi forsitan insensati, si autem appetitus prædictus debeat satiari, et non satiatur in vita præsenti, sicut experientia crebra docet, satiabitur igitur in futura.—*Bradwardine, De Causa Dei*, lib. i. ch. i. Coroll. p. 39.

[1] V. Bradwardine, *De C. Dei*, lib. i. ch. i. Cor. p. 37.

[2] Denique nullatenus verum videri potest, ut justissimus, et potentissimus nihil retribuat amanti se perseveranter; cui non amanti tribuit essentiam, ut amans esse posset. Si enim nihil retribuit amanti, non discernit justissimus inter amantem et contemnentem id, quod summe amari debet; nec amat amantem

that we might be made to believe in our perpetuity, and so all the effects of real perpetuity might be produced, I answer, that then God would make us directly to believe a lie, and would seem better than He is, both of which are impossible, for we know that He is perfectly good.

The conclusion at which we have thus arrived, that man is in some manner immortal, is confirmed by the general sense of mankind, of whom the great body, that is, all who could not be called philosophical, devout, or impious, have always believed, that there is a God, and that at least remarkably good or bad men would be punished or rewarded after death, and in order thus to suffer or enjoy, would live for a time to which no end could be assigned; this was held alike by the classic nations of antiquity,[3] and the barbarous tribes of America,[4] and is now the prevalent belief of those beyond the pale

se; aut non prodest ab illo amari: quæ omnia ab illo dissonant: retribuit igitur omni se amare perseveranti. Quid autem retribuit? Si nihilo dedit rationalem essentiam, ut amans esset; quid dabit amanti, si amare non cesset?——Etenim ipsum idem bonum, quod sic se amare exigit, non minus se ab amante desiderari cogit. Namquis sic amet justitiam, veritatem, beatitudinem, incorruptibilitatem, ut his frui non appetat? Quid ergo summa bonitas retribuet amanti et desideranti se, nisi seipsum? Nam quicquid aliud tribuat, non retribuit: quia nec compensatur amori, nec consolatur amantem, nec satiat desiderantem. Aut si se vult amari, aut desiderari, ut aliud retribuat; non se vult amari et desiderari propter se, sed propter aliud: et sic non vult se amari, sed aliud: quod cogitare nefas est. Nihil ergo verius, quam quod omnis anima rationalis, si, quemadmodum debet, studeat amando desiderare summum beatitudinem; aliquando illam ad fruendum precipiat: ut quod nunc videt quasi per speculum, et in ænigmate, tunc videat facie ad faciem. Utrum autem ea sine fine fruatur dubitare stultissimum est: quoniam illa fruens, nec timore torqueri poterit, nec fallaci securitate decipi, nec ejus indigentiam jam experta illam poterit non amare; nec illa deseret amantem se; nec aliquid erit potentius, quod eas separet invitas. Quare quæcunque anima summa beatitudine semel frui cœperit, æterne beata erit.—*Anselm, Monolog.* c. lxx.

[3] Maro namque poeta pro pœna posuit, "sedet *æternum*que sedebit infelix Theseus." Sodoma ad calc. opp. S. Cypriani, and with this agree all the poets and avowedly religious writers of classical antiquity.

[4] It was a very remarkable address of the old Indian chief to Columbus, who after watching him at mass, said, as Herrera gives it: "Tu has venido a estas tierras que nunca antes viste con gran poder, y has puesto gran temor: sabe que segun la que aca sentimos, ay dos lugares en la otra vida, adonde van las animas:

of Christianity, as well as an essential part of Christianity itself. I think, therefore, that we may rightly ascribe it to the religious sentiment common to all mankind.

uno malo y lleno de tinieblas, guadardo para los que hazen mal: otro es alegre y bueno adonde se han de aposentar los que aman la paz de los gentes, y por tanto si tu sientes que has de morir, y que a cada uno segun lo que aca hiziere, alla le ha de responder el premio, no haras mal a quien no te le hiziere: Lo que aqui aveys hecho es bueno, porque me parece que es manera de dar gracias a Dios," &c.—*Herrera, Hist. de las Indias Occid.* dec. i. lib. ii. c. xiv.

CHAPTER III.

Of the Immortality of the Soul.

BESIDE the general arguments for the immortality of man stated in the previous chapter, which make no distinction of parts in human nature, but only assert some immortality sufficient to preserve the identity of each individual, we can establish by other arguments, applying exclusively to the soul of man, that as to that part at least, except by the intervention of some direct act of omnipotence, man must be immortal.

We know of no ordinary power in the actual course of nature, which does more than dissolve and re-arrange compounded things; except the Divine power, there is nothing to which we can attribute the annihilation of a simple single essence, such as the soul of man,[1] whence it follows, that the soul of man is naturally immortal and imperishable. The analogy of nature would even lead us further than this sort of negative proof, for it furnishes us with many analogies leading to the presumption of continued existence;[2] thus the same principle of being animates the varying forms of that creature which finds its highest apparent state in the butterfly, and gnats and dragon-flies, and many other insects and some reptiles, pass through a series of different forms, each complete and beautiful in itself, and each, no doubt, as unknown and

[1] En établissant la spiritualité de notre âme, je prouve par la même son immortalité. Car puis qu'elle n'est point matérielle, il s'ensuit qu'elle n'a point de parties; et si elle n'a point de parties, que ses parties ne peuvent point se séparer: et si ses parties ne peuvent point se séparer, qu'elle ne peut se dissoudre: et si elle ne peut se dissoudre, qu'elle est incorruptible et immortelle en elle-même.—*Abbadie, Ver. de la Rel. Chrét.* i. 1. 7.

[2] See *Butler's Analogy*, ch. i.

inscrutable in the preceding state as our condition after death is now to us. Beside these, we see analogies in the summer life and apparent winter death of plants, and in the constant recurrence of forms that seemed for ever departed,[1] which all suggest the secret continuance and future visible return of life, sufficiently to arrest our attention even in the absence of any special thought of God, but when taken in conjunction with the arguments of the last chapter and the natural immortality of the soul, ought certainly to have much weight with us.

I know there have been some, who would deny the independence, and spirituality, and unity of the soul; upon their opinions our previous arguments would only prove the high probability of a material resurrection, but I do not think their position is difficult of refutation.[2] It may be suggested, that

[1] See Pearson on the Creed, art. xi. and the collection of eloquent passages in the margin, to which add this from Minucius Felix. Vide adeo quam in solatium nostri resurrectionem futuram omnis natura meditetur: sol demergit, et nascitur; astra labuntur et redeunt; flores occidunt et reviviscunt, post senium arbusta frondescunt, semina non nisi corrupta revirescunt, ita corpus in seculo, ut arbores in hiberno, occultant virorem ariditate mentitâ. Quid festinas ut cruda adhuc hieme reviviscat et redeat? exspectandum nobis etiam corporis ver est. The analogy of nature *might* have suggested such an epitaph as this.—Pflanzet Blumen umher! Zwar schliesset der Winter die Blumen,—Aber mit thauender Hand, öffnet sie wieder der Lenz,—Weinet mit lächelndem Blick! ich ruh'im Schoosse der Erde,—Er der die Blumen erweckt, wecket zum Leben auch mich.—*Stolberg*.

[2] Iswara Krishna proves the existence of soul thus from the inertness of matter: "Since the assemblage of sensible objects is for another's use; since there must be superintendence; since there must be one to enjoy; since there is a tendency to abstraction, therefore soul is." Upon which the Bhásbya, or commentary of Gaurapáda says: "Soul is,—Why? Because the assemblage of objects is for another's use. The assemblage of intellect and the rest is for the use of the soul. This is inferred from the irrationality (of nature and its effects), as of a bed. In like manner as a bed, which is an assembly of bedding, props, cords, cottons, coverlids, and pillows, is for another's use, not its own; and its several component parts render no mutual service, thence it is concluded, that there is a man who sleeps upon the bed, and for whose use it was made: so this body, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for another's use; or, there is a soul for whose enjoyment this enjoyable body, consisting of an aggregate of intellect and the rest, has been produced."—*See F. T. Colebrooke's Translation of the Sánkhya Káriká*, c. 17.

perhaps consciousness is the result of a combination of matter, or that perhaps all matter is conscious. If all matter be conscious, I suppose it must be by every particle being separately conscious, as if not, the two suggestions are in fact but one. Now suppose every particle to be conscious, what is it conscious of? If it is conscious of individuality and personality with all that is contained in those ideas, then the suggestion amounts in fact to this, that there may be no such thing as we intend by matter in existence at all, and so but one kind of being in the universe, and a very great many more beings possessed of intellect and personality may exist than we have any acquaintance with, but nothing more follows from it, certainly it does not follow, that I am not what we understand by a spiritual being, any more than it follows, that what I am now writing is not a book, because there are many books in the world which I have never heard of.[3] The suggestion itself would never be for a moment entertained, but that it is supposed possible so to account for what however it cannot account for, and is, therefore, unworthy of any further serious discussion. Now, as to the first supposition; If a combination of matter does in fact produce a conscious being,—something quite separate and different from the matter from which it springs, this is only to attribute a creative power to matter, and furnishes no real solution of the difficulty. If it be said, that all these particles of matter together make up the conscious being, I ask how can many things make one whole, except in relation to a single intelligent observer; if, therefore, the soul were a sort of harmony, of which the particles of matter were the several members, what is it that comprehends those parts into one, and so gets the purely notional idea of harmony, a thing which cannot exist except in the mind of a thinking being? Clearly you must presuppose a thinking being, that shall create itself by a con-

[3] See an instance of the consistency of Theism with strange multitudes of spiritual beings, in Taylor's Preface to his Translation of Proclus.

templation of its own relations to external objects, which is absurd.[1] But my own consciousness tells me, that it is absurd to say, that a conscious being can be made up solely of material atoms, for what is compounded can be severed and again compounded, at least in conception; but the "I" is absolutely and essentially individual; you may imagine it possible to destroy it, but you can never divide it. In both these properties it is exactly the reverse of matter, which can always be divided, and is never destroyed.[2] Again, the "I" has no relation to time and space, it sleeps through a long night and wakes just as it fell asleep, sometimes in the very ideas it fell asleep with, as persons sometimes in awaking answer the last question they heard as they dropped off into unconsciousness; and so if you have no regularly changing matter to reckon by,

[1] Except in the thinking being, the power of the whole is nothing else than the single powers of the simple constituent parts, as they change and limit each other by action and reaction. By action and reaction no power can be produced which is dissimilar to these acting and reacting powers. If, therefore, we would gain in the whole something dissimilar to the parts, we must have recourse to the thinking being, which views the powers united, and in the different combinations of which they are capable, otherwise than it judges of them singly and without combination. We see an example of this in colours, as well as in harmony.—*Moses Mendelsohn, Phædo, (tr.)* p. 133. "Similarly no sense can have a notice of anything that is not an object of that sense. Thus vision has notice of no perception that is not visual, and hearing of none that is abstracted from sound. Besides, no sense can be sensible of itself, or of its own sensitive organ: for example, the sense of vision neither sees the person seeing nor the eye; nor can any sense perceive its own errors. Now the soul perceives at the same instant the sensations of all the senses, and determines a specific sound to proceed from a specific object of vision, and that this object is the producer of that sound. In the same manner the soul comprehends the distinct power and particular organ of each sense, distinguishes their natures, their frailties, and their errors; and of their notices discriminates which are right and which are wrong; and of consequence credits some and rejects others. But it is evident that it does not derive this kind of knowledge from the senses, for it is impossible to obtain from any sense that which it does not possess; nor can it have received from sense a decision which belies that sense. It is, therefore, evident, that the soul is distinct from the corporeal senses; that it is of a more noble nature, and of more perfect comprehension."— *Extract from the Akhlak-e-Naseri of Náser ud Dín, translated by Colonel Wilks. Transact. Roy. Asiat. Soc.* vol. i. p. 517.

[2] See a similar argument in Gualberti di Soria's work, "Della Esistenza e degli attributi di Dio."

the "I" loses count of time, and knows not how much has passed, for it reckons time by its own occupation, and so its reckoning needs constant readjustment to reconcile it with the time of the material universe. So again of space, unless you join to the "I" a material something, which must be somewhere, the spiritual individuality cannot think of its relations with others like it as being in any particular place, or actual relative position. There is no extension in a personal identity, you can neither see it nor handle it, all that your senses tell you of is a material something, acting so much after the likeness of that which is your own instrument, that you cannot but conclude, that there is another "I" which has similar relations to it,[3] which "I" you proceed to communicate with, not with the material structure. How the "I" is related to the body is certainly a mystery, by which I mean a fact, certain as a fact, yet into the manner, and method, and immediate causes of which the intellect has not yet penetrated. But if any one will yet say, why may not the "I" be,—not indeed the material particles themselves, but something produced by a combination of them, perhaps somewhat as electricity is generated by an electrical machine; I reply, that electricity is divisible and collected, not created; and there is no analogy between the production of the soul of man, or even vegetable life, from matter, and any other ordinary process in nature. But if life were thus produced, why does it not cease when the producing process ceases? and is it not much more true to say, that life preserves the organization, than the organization life? though indeed each is essential to the other. But if the conscious "I" be the result of a certain agglomeration of atoms, and continues only as long as the body continues, how is it that some of us thought, and spoke, and acted more than eighty years ago, when neither the outward form nor any of

[3] Which gives the common proof of the existence of the soul from spontaneity of action.

the material particles of the body were the same that they now are? yet the same "I" lives, and thinks, and speaks still, and so far as it is what we call spiritual, has neither grown nor decayed in all that time, although it may in so many years have gained and lost many powers and possessions. Even if past matter and vanished forms might be supposed capable of communicating a knowledge of their existence and actions to their successors, they could never make those past actions the acts of their successors so completely as our own consciousness tells us actions and words, now many years old, were our own, —were those of the present "I," which perhaps regrets, and would gladly undo, those past acts and speeches in this now present material body.

That our souls, although they be thus naturally indestructible, have nevertheless come into being at a very recent period, is rendered practically certain by the testimony of our consciousness (not that of any particular man, but of mankind generally) in regard to them; for it gives us no hint of their eternity, and even tells us, that we are utterly powerless in regard to them, so that their existence and preservation do not depend upon themselves, but must be ascribed to some creator and preserver.[1] If we examine our own consciousness as to how long we have existed, so far from carrying us back to eternity, it will not carry us even to the time of our birth; but

[1] Quid ante hanc etiam, [infantiam] dulcedo mea, Deus meus? Tunc alicubi, aut aliquis? Nam quis mihi dicat ista, non habeo, nec pater, nec mater potuerunt, nec aliorum experimentum, nec memoria mea.—Unde hoc tale animal nisi abs te, Domine? An quisquam se faciendi erit artifex? &c.—*Aug. Confess.* lib. i. c. 6. Now, had I received my being from myself, undoubtedly I should not have been subject to those frailties of dubitation and desideration, nor would anything have been wanting to my nature: for at the same time that I gave myself a being, assuredly I should have given myself all those perfections, whereof I have an idea in my mind, and so I myself should have been God. Assuredly, had I borrowed the greater, my substantiality, from my own stock of power I should not have denied myself the less, those accumulations or accidental additions [of knowledge and power] nor any of those divine accomplishments which I understand to be included in the idea of God.—*W. Charleton, D. of A.* ch. i. § 2; and see *ante*, p. 118, *n.* 2.

then the same external evidence, which assures us that we had some existence before the earliest time to which our conscious memory extends, assures us also, that there was then nothing apparent in us which we could expect to become the subject of memory, for if we were to recollect what then we knew, and the things which then we comprehended, we should probably recollect nothing, which is precisely our present condition; for we seem to have been then occupied in acquiring those simple sensational and intellectual ideas, which we know we had before the earliest time of our distinct recollections, and which would naturally leave no trace on a memory like ours, conversant only with the ideas such acquirements went to make us capable of having. In this fact, of the mind of man being apparently in his earliest days a mere blank capacity, consists one of the greatest difficulties in the way of any doctrine of the pre-existence of human souls. That theory, however, is the offspring of Theism, and it is against atheistic materialists chiefly, that it is useful to establish the natural indestructibility of the soul, for then they must either cease to be materialists, and therefore soon cease to be atheists also, or admit a creating and destroying power, and so cease to be atheists more directly.

CHAPTER IV.

Of the Punishment of the Wicked.

IF a good man, one that is, who is in all things conformed to the will of his Maker, and who uses all his faculties to those good ends for which they were appointed, may confidently expect an eternity of happiness; what shall we say of those who are wholly careless about such things, and work to the very opposite results,—what have they to expect, what will justice require for them?

The idea of justice is simple enough in itself, it is the disposition to reduce to fair and equal order the violated rule of right, to regulate the future in such manner as to compensate for the past, whether in rewarding those who have suffered wrongfully, or in punishing those who have enjoyed unlawfully. Yet fear and sympathy have done much to confuse the subject. Some seem to think, that all the evil which can ever be inflicted on bad men is only so inflicted with a view to reform them; of this kind of evil I have already spoken at length, but except perhaps as an inseparable penalty of imperfection, this is in no sense punishment; it may, nay, it must proceed from mere goodness, and mere goodness is not mere justice. To be sure, those who hold this view in its integrity, would probably affirm, that justice and guilt are words expressing mere antipathy, and founded on no basis of pure and true utility, as though morality and conscience were never anything but showy names for conscious self-love; yet there are many, who are not mere utilitarians, who incline to a very similar

view, because they do not see any reason in the apparent nature of things why guilt should be purged away by suffering; but I do not think it is necessary to show any such beyond the obvious fact, that there is a natural connection between the causing and suffering of pain. Our moral sense compels us to accept the theory as true, and self-preservation obliges us to act upon it; besides, the disposition to revenge, naturally inherent in all men, is either radically and entirely evil, or it is a corruption of that sense of justice which tells us, that evil doers ought to be punished; but as all vice arises from the excess of some intrinsically right feeling, it follows, that there is such a duty as that of punishing evil, and not merely that guilt tends to produce misery and to bring evil upon the guilty, for that, true as it is, is not an instinctive moral feeling, but the conclusion of reasoning and experience. We obey the dictates of a sense of justice, when we feel as we all do, less pity for a guilty person suffering punishment, than for an innocent person in like circumstances, and often we do not pity a sufferer at all, simply because he deserved even more. The offender himself feels that he cannot complain if he suffers for his guilt, and it is to the guilt of the criminal that we look in determining the severity of the punishment, for it would be a gross injustice to punish great crimes and small offences with the same severity; thus justice itself consists very largely in the proper adaptation and measure of punishment.

There must be a great difference between the justice of God and that of man in the infliction of punishment, inasmuch as there is no absolute human standard of just retribution; all that we can do is, accurately to investigate the punishments it is in our power to inflict, and then to apply them in due proportion to the crimes which we may have to punish; thus, although a relatively small crime may deserve a very high punishment, we may not apply that higher punishment, lest we put it out of our power to punish greater offences more se-

verely, and so indirectly put a premium upon the commission of great crimes, according to the proverb, "one may as well be hanged for a sheep as a lamb." Of course with God this is not so, his power of increasing punishment must be unlimited, and therefore smaller offences will not escape their due.

It would be, no doubt, strictly speaking, incorrect to say, that sin or voluntary evil-doing excites God's hatred and wrath, but we must say, what is in fact always intended by such expressions, that every infringement of the strict rule of right must be contrary to the pure and holy will of our Creator, for the very reason that that will is pure and holy; and he who shall encounter the force of that will must be so punished as that he shall abhor the day in which he ventured to transgress, and become a monument and a warning to all beholders. Manifestly a pure being wills universal purity, and if any one shall abuse the powers which were given him for good, he will have no reason to rejoice in his stolen pleasure, or despise the power of Him who is almighty. He who wilfully sins, chooses the present before the future, not a few moments now against a few moments of known duration hereafter, but a few moments now against the whole of that untried futurity. How then can such a one be appropriately and sufficiently punished? Surely that which he fears most, and yet disregards, will be the most proper infliction. That very thing of which he says, "It is dreadful, I cannot believe it; it would be intolerable;" that he acknowledges would be a real punishment, the only one which would be sufficient to deter him from evil. When, therefore, men refuse to believe that the wicked will suffer for ever, they seem to declare that such punishment will certainly come upon them, for what is a punishment one can look forward to calmly and see through to a happy termination, what is it but hoping to make a bargain with God, and for so much suffering purchase a license to so much sin? But God, if He be God, will never allow sin

for any amount of purchase money, and therefore His goodness cannot be reconciled with any scheme of transitory punishment, for all such arrangements must at last turn out to be devices, whereby sin may not shut out from the favour of perfect goodness, whereby purity and impurity may some day or other come to be reconciled, and that only pain to free and noble courage, the absence of hope, may be altogether excluded, so that he who thinks that to bear willingly is heroism, to dare and suffer for one's own will's fulfilment is noble, and having suffered, to obtain in one's own way is far more great and generous than to receive the same prize as a reward of abject submission,—such a one, on any theory of transitory punishments, will be thereby emboldened and even urged to sin freely.

He who asserts that after a limited period of punishment all men shall ultimately enjoy peace for ever, asserts, that no man, however great his crimes, shall ever see perfect misery, from whence it apparently follows; nor any man, however great his virtues, shall ever attain to perfect happiness, for as virtue and vice are contrasted in themselves, so according to every rule of justice must they be in their effects; but virtue and vice are so perfectly and irreconcileably opposite as only perfect happiness and perfect misery can be; if, therefore, we suppose that no man can ever experience perfect misery, God will be supposed to have propounded to us rewards not removed from one another in any true proportion to the contrast between their subjects, which is manifestly inconsistent with perfect justice, and therefore absurd. No lapse of time can measure against the remnant of eternity, and he who has present joy and an eternity of bliss, must have a better prize than he who sacrifices present pleasure for an infinitely small excess of future happiness; but in fact, man will not allow due weight even to this, for the essence of sinful pleasures is either excitement or carelessness, and no man eager for excitement

or lazily shunning exertion, does or can fear future transitory pain; on the contrary, it rather adds zest to his present relish of excess, and is not what he really fears; what he does fear is that hopeless, sleepless dulness which falls upon him in his intervals of solitude or unrest; this is what he fears, and do the forebodings of his conscience signify that an all-wise God is threatening him with what he does not fear? No surely, for that were neither wisdom nor goodness; not wisdom, for such a threat would certainly be despised; not goodness, for it would have no power to keep any man back from evil, and we are sure that wisdom can devise, and power will execute, a real and sufficient retribution.

Annihilation is no real punishment. It is, in fact, the very pleasure idle sloth seems to aim at realizing. Manifestly to those who seek in suicide relief from the tedium of existence, it would be rather a blessing, and all suicides seem to prefer it to their prospects in life. Let any man ask himself whether he really dreads annihilation, and if he do, it is only so far as he hopes for future pleasures; what punishment, then, can it be to him, who having lived out all his ill-gotten pleasures, has only their just reward to look forward to? Surely God will never punish a wicked man by restoring him to that state in which he was before he had any capacity to sin;[1] surely it

[1] Hinc utique colligitur, quod illa, quæ summi boni amorem contemnit, æternam miseriam incurret. Nam si dicitur, quod pro tali contemptu sic justius puniatur, ut ipsum esse, vel vitam perdat; quia se non utitur ad id, ad quod est facta; nullatenus hoc admittit ratio, ut post tantam culpam, pro pœna recipiat esse, quod erat ante omnem culpam. Quippe antequam esset, nec culpam habere, nec pœnam sentire poterat, Si ergo anima contemnens id, ad quod facta est, sic moritur, ut nihil sentiat, aut ut omnino nihil sit; similiter se habebit, et in maxima culpa et sine omni culpa: nec discernet summa sapiens justitia inter id, quod nullum bonum potest, et nullum malum vult; et id quod maximum bonum potest et maximum malum vult. At hoc satis patet quam inconveniens sit. Nihil igitur videri potest consequentius, et nihil credi debet certius, quam hominis animam sic esse factam, ut si contemnat amare summam essentiam, æternam patiatur miseriam: ut sicut amans, æterno gaudebit præmio; ita contemnens, æterna pœna doleat: et sicut illa sentiet immutabilem sufficientiam; ita ista sentiat inconsolabilem indigentiam.—*Anselm, Monolog.* chap. lxxi.

d be no terror to him to know that his pleasures would l he should ever feel; for when they shall cease in death ɔwer of feeling shall cease also, and all shall be tranquil . There remains only the supposition of annihilation a limited period of punishment, more reasonable, perhaps, either of the preceding; yet even this must be miserably quate, for fortitude might well meet it unshrinkingly, ıe who disregards the will of God might defy His power the boast, "Punish! I have strength to bear it all." No about to sin would confess to himself that he lacked for- ɜ; on the contrary, it is the fashion with sinners rather ɒff at the religious as cowards, and to arrogate to them- ɜ the exclusive glory of boldness and generosity. The nt alone is to man actual time; the future, all the eternal e, occupies a less space in his imagination than the one nt moment; and so it is with the past; it is nothing; present seems everything, although that too to a reflect- ıind is in this world at least but a single moment. There- [suppose it is that men can themselves forget and expect God will forget all their past sins, and that sinners can ıce their enjoyment of present pleasure by the recollec- that to-morrow we die. If eternity, however, seem so , how much shorter must time seem,—time which is to an end in annihilation, that is, in peaceful, dreamless

ıere is another general reason against the supposition a sinful man can ever enter into a state of peace, for if e without having become good, he carries with him into ıture state that which will certainly hinder him from iness. It involves a contradiction that any man should ; once wicked and happy, for the race is so constituted wickedness is the use of faculties to ends for which they ot adapted, and thus misery flows from it so necessarily, while man remains man, omnipotence itself cannot make

him at once wicked and permanently happy. But as a man may repent and reform at any time, this may perhaps be the case with those who die impenitent? I am afraid experience contradicts this, and shows that the habit of evil living makes repentance practically impossible after a certain period of continuance, and that for this hardening, human life but too frequently furnishes sufficient space.[1] The truth is, perhaps, that as what is habitually sought after by a man is alone pleasurable to him, one who has habitually sought after evil can find pleasure in it alone; and if this be so, then the avenues of repentance are, as to his own powers, closed finally and for ever, for to such minds the probability or even certainty of retribution only enhances their present enjoyment of stolen and malicious pleasures. Besides, we know that there are few things evil men resent more than the discovery and frustration of their evil designs. There is no reason, therefore, to expect, that he who dies impenitent will ever repent him of his sins so completely as to become capable of happiness,[2] and if this be so, eternal punishments will be necessary even to omnipotence, and so the whole race of man being immortal, will probably pass their existence some in heaven, some in hell.

[1] Plato could find some of whom even to say:—Οἱ δ'αν τα εσχατα αδικησωσι και δια τοιαυτα αδικηματα ανιατοι γενωνται, εκ τουτων τα παραδειγματα γιγνεται, και ὑυτοι αυτοι μεν ουκετι ονινανται ουδεν, ἀτε ανιατοι οντες, αλλοι δε ονινανται ὁι τουτους ὁρωντες δια τας ἁμαρτιας τα μεγιστα και οδυνηροτατα και φοβερωτατα παθη πασχοντας τον αει χρονον, ατεχνως παραδειγματα ανηρτημενους εκει εν ᾅδου εν τῳ δεσμωτηριῳ, τοις αει των αδικων αφικνουμενοις θεαματα και νουθηματα.—*Gorgias.* 525. *Socrates. loq.*

[2] What the Doctor [Burnet] suggests, that in the future state there will be no room for infidelity; that the *fomes mali* will be extinguished; that there will be no internal concupiscence, and no external incentive to feed and encourage their vices; supposing it all true, appears to hurt his cause as much one way as it can serve it another. For what is it saying less, than that that state is not a state of probation, will not admit of any moral discipline, and is calculated for no moral improvement at all? which is indeed the truth of the case; and though it be destructive of their scheme, and tears it up by the roots, it is the amount of all they have to offer, when they would persuade us that the wicked in hell will some time or other become good and virtuous.—*Matthew Horberry, Scripture Doctrine of Future Punishment*, ch. iv. p. 221.

There are of course difficulties in the way of forming any clear conception of eternity at all, yet if we examine our idea of it, it will be found simpler than that of time, for to conceive of eternity we have but to think of the present as a real, continuing thing; to conceive the actual present we must conceive of a point that passes us in the very conception; it is like the effort to discover and identify, at the moment that it passes us, some particular atom of water in a rapid river, flowing before us too rapidly for the eye to distinguish anything, except by discovering it before it comes to us, and following it when it is past; whereas eternity is like a still and tranquil lake, moved by no tide and ruffled by no breeze, where we may gaze our fill and turn away and return again and again to the contemplation, with the certainty that nothing will ever happen to disturb our object or distract our attention.[3] Human life is always rapid and often uneasy motion, while man's longing always is for some ultimate peace and permanence. These desires can only be satisfied where the present is fixed, that is, in eternity. Man is like a stone rolling down a steep hill-side, that rolls and leaps about uneasily, till it at last finds rest on the still earth in the vale beneath. To deny man an unchanging eternity would be to liken him to a stone falling down a well that has no bottom, a conception manifestly self-contradictory, for it includes that very idea of eternal duration it was introduced to destroy; man, therefore, will in all probability arrive at last at some eternal rest; if so, that rest must be pleasant or painful to him according to his moral character at its commencement; that is, at some time after death man must enter upon an eternal state of joy or despair. We are all rolling rapidly down the steep bank of life, some smoothly and quietly, some uneasily and irregularly, and

[3] Idem "nunc" est fluens à priori in posterius, et a præterito in futurum: et sic ipsum "nunc" facit tempus. Ut autem respicit *esse* æternum, et "nunc" subsistat permanens fixum; ut nec transeat actu, nec potentiâ, nec fertur, nec fluit, sed permanet, et sic facit æternitatem.—*Duns Scotus, De Rerum Principio*, qu. xxii. art. 2.

some leap off to the bottom ere they seem to have rolled half way; but as a stone is carried by the same force to a different resting-place, according to its shape and character, so it cannot be but that we too shall rest there at the bottom equally immoveably in different conditions, according to the varying shapes and characters of our own voluntary disposition.

The final conclusion, therefore, seems to be that as concerns the wicked, their punishment will be eternal, or at least that natural reason can lead us to no other conclusion. The true way for each of us to enquire how God will punish sin, is to enquire what would be the most severe and real punishment to us; with that we may be sure Omniscience is acquainted, that Omnipotence can inflict, and that our sins deserve; for he who, knowing God's will, disregards it, therein tauntingly dares all that His power can do, and disclaims for ever all dependance on His aid. If such a one were to suppose that the unmoved serenity of the Divine Majesty could not be so disturbed by his sin, but that he might escape, he would forget that the Deity need not be excited at all to punish him.[1] Justice is a calm virtue, and eternal justice may hold on its inflexible course with as little need of excitement to work out his punishment as the material universe would require to crush him if it were possible for him to cross its path; besides, he bears about in himself powers of self-torture, which, once set in motion, would not require any external inflictions to make his very existence intolerable.

[1] *Φυσικῃ μεν γαρ ιδιοτητι το θειον απαθες. πλην ουχι ταυτης ἑνεκα της αιτιας ανυπαιτιον γενοιτ'αν το ὑποχειρα και ζυγον κατημελημενος του πρεποντος· ουτι μην αζημιον τοις κειμενοις ὑπο σκηπτρα το εις αποστασιν σκιρτημα, χρηναι δε φημι καταικιζεσθαι δε μαλα εν δικῃ.*—*Cyril. Alex. adv. Jul.* lib. v.

CHAPTER V.

Of Prayer and other Religious Duties.

ALTHOUGH the first and greatest item of our duty to God must be to conform to His will in our modes of acting, speaking, and thinking, there are other duties which arise from our re- to Him, depending entirely upon His personal existence, on the distinction between the will of God and any abstract necessity. If there be a God, the whole of cannot consist in any mere living according to nature, ust include all such acts and feelings as are morally nd in a good man necessary and involuntary towards ect a being. Thus, from God's power and goodness ollows a duty of adoration and thanksgiving, higher f the honour we are bound to give good men, and of titude great benefits demand; forms so much higher fection is higher than manifest imperfection. Since nnot be advantaged by any act of ours, these duties e fulfilled in feelings, and the expression of those feel- s well in words, as in increased energy in well-doing.[2] rse we cannot contemplate the Divine perfections in such er of reverence as becomes the subject, without an in- lesire to become in all things such as He would have us if we attempt to express this desire, we are therein led

llect the idea, inadequate as it is, which we have of God, and the idea ves, and carelessness with regard to Him, whether we are to worship ll, whether we worship Him in a right manner, or conceited confidence do so, will seem to imply unspeakable presumption.—*Bishop Butler. Mus. Brit.*

to pray, to open our wants before God and beseech Him to supply them; we must arrive at the same disposition by any other comparison of ourselves and others as we and they now are, with what we should desire, and therefore may presume that God would not be unwilling, that we and they should be; and we do but obey a natural impulse when we ask for that we know we have need of, at His hands who is able to confer it. Thus it happens, that a good man will certainly be disposed to make use of prayer. But it may be said, God knows our wants and wills our happiness, He will therefore supply all our necessities; why should we, who have but so imperfect a conception of our own wants, ask Him for that, which, if good He will certainly give us, and if evil we should be madmen to desire. The fallacy of this argument resides in the assumption, that God will not regard us with more favour if we pray than if we do not; it assumes that prayer is not a moral duty, which is of course to beg the whole question;[1] if you exclude this assumption the argument amounts to this, that the Deity will make no distinction between good men and bad, which is palpably absurd. As to the objection drawn from our imperfect knowledge of our own wants, it is certainly not improper that one should pray for a better discovery of these, and a more clear apprehension of what is the real cause of our misfortunes and unhappinesses, but then we cannot doubt that God will regard our object rather than the means, which, though they seem to us most proper for its at-

[1] I suppose I can hardly quote a more unexceptionable witness than Thomas Hobbes; he says: "And for prayer, whereas he (Abp. Bramhall) saith, that the necessity of things destroys prayer, I deny it; for though prayer be none of the causes that moves God's will, His will being unchangeable, yet since we find in God's Word He will not give His blessings but to those that ask, the motive of prayer is the same. Prayer is the gift of God no less than the blessing, and the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed." —*Reply to Bramhall.* If it be possible, as Hobbes says it is, for these two to be united by natural necessity, it follows, that any argument to show them necessarily separate must be false and fallacious, and any argument not purporting to show this can prove nothing.

tainment, are really inconsistent with it. He will never give us that which is evil when we failed only through our infirmity to express what we really desired, or to distinguish what is really good; at the same time we may always remember our own ignorance with advantage, when our prayers seem unanswered, and enquire strictly whether what we have asked would really be of advantage to us,—whether there is no latent second object in our wish for it, no unseen danger in its possession.

A good man in this and all his relations with God will ask, not what must I, but what may I do? he will not be anxious to pare down his duty to the least burdensome observance possible, but will find his pleasure in such employment, and rather seek to go beyond, than but just to come up to the strict limits of bounden devotion. Any one who thinks of virtue and devotion as a burden, and is willing to escape the necessity of obedience to their demands, shows most clearly by that very willingness that he is not really virtuous, for to the virtuous, virtue and pleasure are one and inseparable.[2] The reason of this will be obvious enough, if we remember the essential goodness of the Deity, and indeed if pleasures conflict, as in the minds of the vicious and half-virtuous they always do, it is certain that, either such men are mistaking their course and running into fearful danger, of which these uncertainties and contrarieties are meant to warn them, or else there is no God and no real right and wrong. But a virtuous man feels no such difficulties, he can avow that it is better to suffer than to do a wrong;[3] better, if need be, to fall into the hands of

[2] *Τοις μεν ουν πολλοις τα ηδεα μαχεται, δια το μη φυσει τοιαυτ'ειναι· τοις δε φιλοκαλοις τα ηδεα τα φυσει ηδεα· τοιαυτα δε αι κατ'αρετην πραξεις· ωστε και τουτοις εισιν ηδειαι και καθ'αυτους. Ουδεν δε προσδειται της ηδονης ο βιος αυτων, ωσπερ περιαπτου τινος, αλλ'εχει την ηδονην εν ἑαυτῳ· προς τοις ειρημενοις γαρ, ουδ'εστιν αγαθος ο μη χαιρων ταις καλαις πραξεσιν.—Aristotle, Nich. Eth.* lib. i. c. 8.

[3] Πωλ. *Ηττου ο γε αποθνησκων αδικως ελεεινος τε και αθλιος εστιν;* Σωκ. *Ηττον η ο αποκτιννυς, ω Πωλε, και ηττον η ο δικαιως αποθνησκων.* Πωλ. Πως

wicked men than to run counter to the natural objects of his being[1] and incur the displeasure of his God, for he is certain that for all these things there will be a recompense[2] and a retribution;[3] his choice and desire are rather to have the privilege of doing an unrewarded act of goodness; he had rather, if it were possible, when he comes to review his past actions, find that he had in some things more than earned his reward, than discover that he has done only just so much as may enable God's goodness to excuse his failings; to him indeed this last idea would be full of humiliation and regret: our well-doing does not add to the blessedness of God, but it is our privilege by it to draw near to Him.[4] One who thinks in this manner cannot hesitate whether he shall pray, to him devotion will be a pleasure, and a reason against any address to God in his distress will be to him a reason why he should suffer discomfort; a reason, therefore, perfectly conclusive or wholly worthless.

But it is by no means clear, that prayer may not be a natural means of obtaining for us blessings, which otherwise we should never have enjoyed, for we do not find that God in other matters gives us anything without our own will to have it; no power compels a hungry man to eat except through his own will to do so, even when the most tempting food is laid before him; he must put out his hand of his own free will and take, and of his own free will receive and eat, or he will surely

δητα, ω Σωκρατες; Σωκ. *Ουτως ὡς μεγιστον των κακων τυγχανει ον το αδικειν.* Πωλ. *Η γαρ τουτο μεγιστον*; *ου το αδικεισθαι μειζον*; Σωκ. *Ηκιστα γε.* Πωλ. *Συ αρα βουλοιο αν αδικεισθαι μαλλον η αδικειν*; Σωκ. *Βουλοιμην αν ουδετερα· ει δ'αναγκαιον ειη αδικειν η αδικεισθαι, ἑλοιμην αν μαλλον αδικεισθαι η αδικειν.*—*Gorgias*, 469.

[1] Summum crede nefas, animam præferre pudori,
Et propter vitam, vivendi perdere causas.—*Juvenal. Sat.* lib. viii. l. 83.

[2] *Εν μακαρεσσι πονων ανταξιος ειη αμοιβη.*—*Homer. Iliad.*

[3] *Οτι αναγκαιον τον ὁυτω πραττοντα ζημιουσθαι εστιν.*—*Gorgias*, 470.

[4] *Εκ δε τουτων απαντων τοις μεν θεοις πλεον ουδεν τι γαρ αν πλεον γενοιτο Θεῳ*; *ἡμιν δε προς εκεινους γινεται συναφη.*—*Sallustius Phil. De Diis et Mundo*, c. xv.

starve. Who knows but that it may be so with prayer? Who knows but that we may never receive what was almost ours, because we never did quite all that lay in our power to obtain it? Perhaps because we never formed a conscious desire for it, or never set ourselves to enquire what it might precisely be that our necessities demanded. If what this analogy makes probable be true, provided that it is not, as it cannot be, unlawful to express in words to God what we may rightly feel in heart, it follows, that he who refuses to pray, in neglecting an opportunity of doing that which cannot be wrong and may be necessary, sins in any case, by tempting God to deny him that which he disdained and (sluggishly relying upon some presumption of his own about the will of God) refused to ask. He did not all that lay in his own power, and such tempting of Providence we know, in other matters leads only to destruction. I conclude, therefore, that it is part of our duty towards God, reverently and with due submission to His better knowledge of ourselves, to ask of His goodness all that we really desire, and generally, all that He sees to be really good. We can hardly bring ourselves to pray for anything which we are not thoroughly convinced to be good, and thus it is generally an effectual test of the nature of our intentions and desires to enquire whether we can sincerely pray to God to further us in them; thus it is too, that holy men seldom ask for any merely worldly gift.[5]

Those who feel strongly how grateful they ought to be for all the benefits they have received from God, will and must, when they are met together in social freedom, unite by common impulse in praising Him and thanking Him for all His mercies,[6] and then seeing how good and pleasant it is to be

[5] *Χρηματα αιτεις; μη ενοχλει θεοις· ουδεν αιτεις των καλων.—Maximus Tyrius. Dissert. An orandus sit Deus. Ουτε σωμασιν, ουτε χρημασιν ευδαιμονουσιν ανθρωποι, αλλ'ορθωσυνη και δικαιοσυνη.—Democrates. Sententiæ.*

[6] A la qual nos incitan no solo las leyes divines y humanas, mas tambien la misma naturaleza: como nos lo muestran todas las naciones del mundo; entre

thankful, and how sweet unity is in all good works, they cannot but desire to meet again, and to do so on a spot disturbed and sullied by no strife of worldly business, but hallowed by the memory of former acts of praise; hence have arisen, and must ever arise, temples, and oratories, and holy places, and public and peculiar festivals of religious joy, as on the other hand from the consciousness of sin, days of humiliation, and more costly offerings and the maintenance of sacrificial altars.

Again, as he who has found a treasure values it chiefly for the use he can make of it,—for the consideration it will give him in the eyes of men; and he who has discovered a long hidden truth cannot bear to carry it with him to the grave untold, so good men, be they philosophers, or priests, or mere unlearned laymen, when they have realized the great truths of theology, cannot enjoy their prize alone, they cannot but desire to urge upon their fellow men the duty of serving God and fleeing evil, to show them how to do so rightly, and to strive to convince all men that they ought to be very thankful, and therefore very pure from sin. Something of this feeling it was, that sent Socrates out into the market-place at Athens to preach his ethical philosophy and confound gainsayers of the truth; with some addition of intellectual pride, this feeling has made philosophers in all ages gather round them schools of hearers and made them willing to teach; above all, from this feeling has been formed in all ages that missionary spirit which has driven men of all classes and degrees of learning to wander about seeking to do, and we know as a whole doing good to the ignorant, the savage, and the

las quales ninguna hay tan barbara ni tan fiera, que no tenga alcun conocimiento de Dios, y no le ofrezca alguna manere de culto y reverencia, aunque no sepa qual sea el verdadero Dios. De lo qual se infiere, que necessariamente he de haver en el mundo alguna verdadera religion con que el verdadero Dios sea debida y santamente honrado y venerado. Porque de otra manera, vana seria esta inclinacion natural, si faltasse esta Religion.—*Luis de Granada. De Symbolo de la Fe.* ch. xxxviii. § 11.

despised. Hence, in the last place, by a natural course of development, might have arisen an order of priests and ministers of God, of men whose duty it is to offer prayers and praises in the name of all, to instruct mankind how to serve God most acceptably, or by reasoning—with persuasion to good and denunciation of evil—to bring men to think upon the Most High and therefore to do well. For seeing that all cannot devote themselves so entirely as they desire to such pursuits, nor can pursue the studies necessary to do so most effectually, being much occupied and confined by unavoidable worldly business, it is natural and right, that without neglecting to do personally what they can, they should all spontaneously give of God's gifts to them a portion to enable some to do in fact and with more completeness, what all do in part and in desire.

A good man, therefore, will be given to prayer and praise, and gladly embracing all opportunities of proclaiming his faith and hope, and will not despise or reject the public offices of his religion.

CHAPTER VI.

Who are the Wicked.

NOW that we have shown the existence of the Deity, and spoken of the relations in which we stand to Him by nature, there remains the enquiry, In what relation do we stand to God by our own choice? How many of us may hope for those things which we have seen are probably reserved for the good, and how many ought to dread for themselves, those which await the bad; in other words, Who are the wicked?

Many persons think it very difficult to distinguish the good from the bad; the difficulty, if there be any in reality, consists in the question, What amount of well-doing constitutes a good man? If a good man be one who more often thinks and acts rightly than wrongly, the difference must be in itself very minute, and there will probably be many who cannot be arranged in either class. But good and evil are mutually exclusive qualities, and though an action may be in one sense one and in some other sense the other, nothing can be at the same time and in the same sense both good and evil, it must be one or neither; but a moral being cannot be wholly destitute of moral quality, every man, therefore, who is not perfectly good, is in some sense evil. But what is a perfect man? Indubitably he is perfectly good. And what is our duty towards God? Manifestly to obey all his commandments, and this as we have seen is our mere duty, and not essentially meritorious. A good man, therefore, is he only who does no evil.

Now goodness does not consist in act, but rather in intention. It is by no means necessary to do impossibilities in order

to be perfectly good. Even if a man might save another's life by some very possible act and does it not, he may yet be perfectly good, provided that he had no previous reason to think that such an act would be beneficial; for then his intention might still be perfect. But if he might have known if he would, then it is scarcely possible, but that if his intention had been perfect, he would have known, for clearly a man has no right to shut his eyes and after that claim to be excused, because he did not see. Man's duty then is, in every action which he has power to do, or to leave undone, after such consideration as the case requires or his opportunities allow, to act in that manner which really seems to him best; in every thought to allow himself to dwell with pleasure only on such things as are right, and just, and pure, and to stop his ears against every inducement to possible evil. This as to any external force he plainly can do,[1] and this he is therefore bound to do, and cannot rightly be called good if he does not.

One of the very first and greatest of moral virtues is gratitude,—that every one who receives a gift should return to the giver, that spiritual incense of thankfulness so much more fragrant and more precious than any actual gift, as the soul of man is purer and more precious than his material form; at God's hands man has received all that he has ever enjoyed, and is still continually blessed with many gifts of real pleasure, and invaluable benefits of mere preservation, such as the contemplation of the misery which he might but for them endure, can alone enable him to estimate; in return for these reason demands that his whole life should be pervaded with a spirit

[1] *Ει δε τις τα ηδεα και τα καλα φαιη βιαια ειναι· αναγκαζειν γαρ εξω οντα· παντα αν ειη ουτω βιαια· τουτων γαρ χαριν παντα παντες πραττουσι· και οι μεν βια, και ακοντες, λυπηρως· οι δε δια το ηθη, μεθ' ηδονης. Γελοιον δε το αιτιασθαι τα εκτος, αλλα μη αυτον, ευθηρατον οντα υπο των τοιουτων, και των μεν καλων εαυτον, των δε αισχρων τα ηδεα. Εοικε δε το βιαιον ειναι, ου εξωθεν η αρχη, μηδεν συμβαλλομενου του βιασθεντος.—Aristotle. Nichomachæan Ethics*, lib. iii. cap. 2.

of thankfulness, yet this is so with no man, and most of us receive all these gifts as mere matters of course, and wholly forget the giver.[1] Who of us has complete control over his tongue? Who is there who has never spoken evil of his neighbour, and never even suggested a lie? Who can say that he has never taken or used anything that was not rightly his? Who has never longed for anything he could not have without sin? Who can say that none of his faculties have ever been applied to any but their own rightful use? Who can say, that neither in himself or others his faults have ever made any being miserable whom God created to be happy? Who is free from some stain of even far darker sins than these? Yet all the while we know that the smallest sin is a greater departure from the rule of right than can be measured by any difference between it and the greatest of all possible crimes; we have no moral zero, neither good nor evil, to reckon from: he who,

[1] Supposing a man, from the happy constitution with which he was born, from the advantage of a good education to form his sentiments, or from the kind conduct of God's providence, free from all those grosser offences which fall under the censure and distaste of all honest men, can he recollect that he is the creature of the infinitely perfect Being; that the great, the chief end of all those intellectual faculties that distinguish him from the rest of the creation, was to contemplate the power, the wisdom, the goodness of God, in His works and in His providence, and to admire, adore, and serve this source of goodness, power, wisdom and perfection; that his distinguishing felicity lay in pursuing his duty, in answering the ends for which those intellectual faculties were given; that a tribute of praise, of acknowledgment, and of thankfulness, is due to the God of nature, who has mercifully and beneficially framed the heart of man, so that the very act of paying this tribute is necessarily attended with the most perfect, pure joy, serenity, and satisfaction, that the human mind is capable of feeling; I say can he recollect these things, and at the same time be conscious—that the supreme good is not only not the object of the meditation of his mind or of the pursuit of his heart, but that these faculties and dispositions bountifully given for those honourable and blessed ends, are monstrously misapplied to the pursuit of fleeting, perishing, if not wicked pleasures;—without perceiving that he is guilty of high treason to the God of nature; that he is revolted from Him, and has substituted in His place and made choice of His creatures for the objects of his desires, and of his pursuits; that they are become his masters, who hold him in captivity, and he their slave; so chained to their drudgery that he has no more capacity left to return to the enjoyment of his Maker, and to relish the pleasures that are with Him for evermore?—*Duncan Forbes. Thoughts on Religion*, p. 102.

knowing God's law wilfully breaks it, does infinite evil, for he departs infinitely from his duty, abuses infinitely powers which were given him for good alone, and dares infinite power which gave the law, to infinite retribution for its guilty breach. This mere disregard of God's will is the substantial guilt of all sins, and is common to them all. The least sin springs from it, and the greatest is sinful in no other respect. Indeed, it is all that man can do, for the power and majesty of God are far too high to suffer any real diminution or contradiction from any act of man.

Let any one reflect upon man's duty and realize it, such as it must be universally confessed to be; and then, standing up in imagination in God's place, let him observe what a wreck we have made of all this good and fair creation, and he will see the universal guilt which calls for universal punishment, branded as with a hot iron on everything about us. The better a man is, the more clearly will he see the truth of all this, for he will know that every day he is discovering and correcting some deep-rooted sinful habit, and he will see that his hope daily to become still better is a continual confession of the fact, that hitherto he has gone astray and done wickedly,[2] and this from the very earliest beginnings of conscious action, for even then control and correction cannot be dispensed with.[3]

[2] *Μετατιθεσθαι γαρ και μεταγινωσκειν προσηκει μη ὁτι θεῳ, αλλ'ουδ'ανδρι αγαθῳ· ὁ γαρ στρεπτος ανηρ και μετανοητικος, ει μεν εις το βελτιον εκ του φαυλοτερου μετατιθεται, πονηρως εβουλευσατο· ειδε εις το χειρον εκ του βελτιστου, πονηρως εβουλευσατο.—Max. Tyrius. Diss. An orandus sit Deus.*

[3] Quis me commemorat peccatum infantiæ meæ?—Tunc—reprehendenda faciebam; sed quia reprehendentem intelligere non poteram, nec mos reprehendi me nec ratio sinebat. Nam extirpamus et ejicimus ista crescentes. *Nec vidi quenquam scientem, cum aliquid purgat, bona projicere.* An pro tempore etiam illa bona erant, flendo petere, etiam quod noxie daretur; indignari acriter non subjectis hominibus, liberis et majoribus, hisque a quibus genitus est; multisque præteres prudentioribus, non ad nutum voluntatis obtemperantibus, feriendo nocere niti quantum potest quia non obeditur imperiis, quibus perniciose obediretur? Ita imbecillitas membrorum infantilium innocens est, non animus infantium.—*Augustin. Confess.* lib. i. c. 8. Certainly both mos and ratio require that correction should commence very early.

I know there is a ready answer which some desire to give, —we have done what we could, they say, and nothing more can be required of us. But let him who answers thus take to himself the consciousness of its falsehood. He knows who thus speaks, that had it been any human benefactor, his friend, his favourite companion, any one whom he respects or admires, he would never have felt or expressed so little gratitude to him as he does to the Almighty.[1] If he could have received one such benefit as God gives him in abundance, one night's peaceful rest, one sunny day, one shower for his parched meadows, what would he not be ready to offer? Does he give as much for what he really has? Far from it, he gives nothing, and repays the care of Omnipotence with cold neglect, and yet he thinks he ought to be made still more prosperous!

Man is no less foolish than sinful in thus neglecting God's will. No one will tell you more readily than the least religious of worldly men, that it is the part of a fool to offend him in whose power you are, yet this is the very rule of their conduct in regard to Him who has far more power over them than one man can ever have over another. So they will tell you, that it is folly for a man to set his mind on things which are beyond his reach, and to waste his energies and sacrifice present enjoyment in the pursuit of that which cannot satisfy him, even if he ever get it; yet man, who cannot tell whether he may live to see even one to-morrow upon earth, is always reckoning upon some far distant morrow with all its earthly accompaniments, and is ever striving after something new, only the more and more eagerly as he finds the emptiness and folly of his former pleasures and desires. Certainly he is far from wisdom who does not prefer what is great and certain, before

[1] In friendship first, I think if that agree,
Which I intend
Unto my friend's intent and end,
I would not use a friend as I use Thee.
George Herbert. Poems, p. 68.

what is small and precarious, yet such a one he is who chooses pleasures which can but be had, for a little time, by the sufferance of God, in preference to those which the good may confidently expect at His hands for ever. Nay, more, even in this life the good attain to a greater total of happiness than is possible in like circumstances to any other; what folly, therefore, must it be, to incur the unknown penalties of retribution at the cost of often losing even present enjoyment! yet thus foolish and thus wicked are all the race of men.

Universal moral imperfection, that is, universal depravity, is a truth as clearly written upon the race of man as it is a legend painful to the eyes of him who reads it. It meets us everywhere, every duty recollected is a sin recalled; the flippant phrases of excuse, "no man is perfect," "to err is human," and so on, are all acknowledgments of habitual sin, and every sin bears in indelible characters this fatal inscription, God's will neglected, God's goodness despised, God's vengeance dared. The doctrine is in fact so clear, that no man has ventured to refute it, they have only endeavoured to shift it from themselves, as those who say that matter is essentially evil, as if sin could be the act of poor inert matter, and volition did not belong to the highest part of man; or else they have tried to shut it out from their sight, and abused it as a degrading dogma, arguing thus: I cannot bear to believe it, therefore it is not true. Unfortunately it is no speculative theory, but the necessary conclusion of experience; it is no balance of probabilities, in which arguments from antecedent likelihood can have weight, it is an evident fact.

Who then are the wicked? The race of man. For whom may we fear the punishment due to sin? For whom, but for our own selves, and for those who share with us the fearful attributes of actual human nature?

CHAPTER VII.

The Possibility of Pardon.

THE mind of man cannot rest under the conclusion at which we have just arrived. If it cannot disbelieve the truth, it must at least strive to find some escape; let us, therefore, enquire how there can be any such possible.

The difficulty is this, mankind are eminently sinful, and therefore eminently deserving of punishment, yet God is essentially and perfectly good, and therefore must desire the happiness of all His creatures; this, however, they cannot have, unless they are purged from the guilt of their sins; so if there be a way of escape, we may be sure that God will not close it; and as, if there were none, not one of us could escape, we cannot but hope and long to believe that there is one. What can it be?

It may be suggested, that we have supposed the Almighty bound by a certain moral necessity, and that possibly the difficulty might be lessened by supposing that good is only good because God wills it, and that therefore He would be free from any obligation, and might make injustice to be justice, and so at last absolve guilty man; but this supposition will not help us, nor would it at all support such a conclusion, unless indeed we might suppose perfection changeable, which it cannot be; otherwise, it in no way touches the difficulty; for whether goodness be good because it is God's will, or be His will because it is good, in either case God's will and perfect goodness are identical, and must always be so, for to suppose the Deity to reverse or alter the moral character of actions, is to suppose Him to will a contradiction, a thing impossible in

itself, and most obviously so in a Being all-wise and powerful. Some persons seem to think that guilt may be cleared away by repentance, without any other expiation, but this cannot be, unless guilt and future evil intention are one and the same, which they manifestly are not. Mere repentance has to do with future acts; it cannot recal the past and undo the deeds that have been done, or the evil intention with which they were then done, but justice has to do only with the act done, and the then present intention of the doer; thus the award of justice must be at once made and fixed for ever at the moment of the deed done, without any reference to the future conduct of the doer. Indeed, necessary as repentance is to remove the tendency to new crimes, it can exercise no purifying influence on the past life, because to repent and reform being our mere duty, not to do so would be a new sin, and thus repentance and reformation are no more meritorious in themselves than would be the avoiding of any other sin. To illustrate this, suppose a man at the moment of committing some crime to resolve that henceforward he would never do wrong again on any pretext, offering this last, as it were, as a parting sacrifice to his evil intentions (the case in small things is not exceedingly rare), would this last crime be a crime, and therefore deserve punishment? Certainly it would, and all the more clearly, because of the consciousness manifested by the accompanying resolution; yet in this case the reformation would be in intention, and might be in fact complete. But even if repentance could efface guilt, how little power or disposition has man naturally to repent at all, and if he does, how very imperfect his repentance always is; how impossible it is for any man to recollect and repent of every sin he has ever committed; he can but be sorry for and determine to amend specifically all that he can at the time call to mind, and then generally lament his forgotten faults, and resolve to plunge no more into any known sin. Such repent-

ance is very different from the sort of repentance men accept in this world as a species of title to forgiveness, and yet man, having no absolute right of dominion over his fellows, and having need himself also of forgiveness from them, justice and equity have claims upon his mercy which are altogether impossible as between God and His creatures. But by what argument do we justify to ourselves the pardoning an offender? We say, "Poor fellow! he has suffered enough already!" or we think that God will do justice without our endeavours, that is, we dispense with a second punishment, we do not intend to offer him complete impunity even when we think that the gnawings of a guilty conscience will by themselves be sufficient retribution. But suppose such a one openly to maintain, that because he would never again commit his old offence, and because he was sorry he had ever done so, that therefore he ought to escape, would mercy then plead for him? I think not, or at least it would be in vain, for it would be evident that in denying his liability to punishment, he would practically deny that he had done amiss, that is, he would declare himself impenitent by the very act of pleading his penitence; there is, therefore, no purifying power in mere repentance. Indeed, it is by no means clear that mercy does not essentially consist in the acceptance of suffering as an atonement for evil. Thus it follows from our natural moral instincts, that guilt is to be removed by punishment, and by punishment alone. This we sometimes regard, as between man and man, as inflicted in sufficient intensity by the gnawings of a guilty conscience; if we are assured that the criminal actually feels them so strongly as to be made to loathe and abandon his former evil way,[1]—there are cases in which the scandal of a crime is so great, that no mere internal and

[1] Οἱ γαρ γνησιως μεταμελομενοι, ταις πικροταταις του συνειδοτος αικιαις ἑαυτους κολαζουσιν, αἱτινες οδυνοτεραι των σωματικων εισι κολασεων, και κτησιωτεραι και μαλλον εκεινων δυσπαραμυθητοι.—*Simplicius. Comm. in Enchiridion Epicteti*, ch. xxviii.

private suffering can entitle the criminal to mercy. As regards human offences, therefore, sorrow for the evil done, with reparation where possible, and where reparation is impossible, yet greater sorrow, are the alone conditions of mercy, the only conditions on which justice will have us to be merciful, and mercy escapes the imputation of criminal indifference. This is the case between those who are independent of one another, and can make atonement to one another for their offences; but it is not so between us and God. We can undergo no voluntary punishment, no self-originated repentance towards Him: nor are we without a standard of punishment. The idea of repentance in such a case is like the offer to undergo half our sentence, which we cannot in any case avoid, provided that we may be excused the other, which is equally inevitable. But more than this, the universe is God's work, and one work, and is so ordered as to connect evil and its punishment, and, so far as we see it, the effect of repentance is only to avoid increase of punishment; only to do that which, as we have seen, is all that we ought to expect: the order of nature, therefore, cannot but work out our just punishment, and we cannot trust to mere reformation for excuse, for that has its reward in another way.

The analogy of nature, however, does suggest a mode in which the natural punishment of vice and folly may be lightened, or even altogether removed. When a man is so prostrated by sickness that if left to himself he could not but die, he may yet be saved by the assistance of others;—a man whose ignorance would allow him to rush into certain destruction may be saved by the communicated knowledge of another:—a man whose carelessness has brought his affairs to ruin, may be restored to affluence by the industry of another;—can it be, that he who by his own evil ways has deserved perdition, may yet be saved by the innocence of another?[2] There seems

[2] The following is perhaps deserving of consideration.—"Il-y-a trois degrez

at first sight some injustice in this, as indeed it is unjust that a careless man should enjoy the rightful proceeds of another's industry; yet when the industrious man has earned his money, it is his to give away as well as to keep, to spend that is as he will; and if he, of his own free will, gives it to that other, there is no injustice then. So again, if I have a sufficiency and need not labour, and yet choose to labour for my own maintenance, and dispense that my sufficiency among those in want; if I select those as objects of my bounty who will not be made worse by its enjoyment, there is no injustice here; on the contrary, I do well, and act as becomes a good man; yet it would be gross injustice in any other to compel me to do that which is praiseworthy in me if done voluntarily. Thus it must be in man's redemption, if man is to be delivered by the act of another, that other must offer something of his own, must have something, therefore, which he can offer; but here is a new difficulty, for no man can offer anything of his own, for he has nothing; even the eternal happiness of a good man is not his to offer, nor indeed can any creature of God have anything strictly of its own. There is not one, therefore, that can suffer for us, and sacrifice its own happiness to procure our deliverance. But is it not to accuse God of cruelty, to think that happiness can be purchased by the suffering of the innocent? What recorded instance have we of one man suffering

de la Justice. Le premier est celui par lequel Dieu punit le péché, de quelque manière que cela se fasse. Le second est celui par lequel il punit positivement le péché en la personne de celui qui l'a commis. Et le troisième est celui par lequel Dieu, à cause des péchez qu'un homme a commis, lui refuse la communication de quelque lumière intérieure ou extérieure, ou de quelque secours quel qu'il soit. Le premier de ces degrez est, non arbitraire, mais necessaire en Dieu. Car ce n'est autre chose que l'amour de la Sainteté, laquelle comme chacun sait est si essentielle à la Divinité, qu'il n'est pas possible de concevoir Dieu sans cet amour. Mais quant au second et au troisième dégréz, il est certain qu'ils sont arbitraire en Dieu, c'est à dire que pourvû que le péché soit puni, et que l'amour infinie qu'il a pour la Sainteté demeure en son entier sans reçevoir ni bréche ni ébranlement, il lui est arbitraire de punir le pécheur, ou de ne le point punir, de le secourir, ou de ne le point secourir, de lui accorder ses lumières, ou de ne les lui point accorder.—*Claude. Traité de Jesus Christ*, liv. i. c. 3.

for another upon earth, where the judge was not obnoxious to such a charge? Certainly, if the parting with wealth be suffering, we may find such instances; but I suppose, that if suffering be the true gate of mercy, and the natural means of purging guilt, as we have seen reason to believe that it is, and if the suffering for another's benefit be one of the highest acts of human love and goodness, as we know that it is, then so far from the permission of such an atonement being inconsistent with any of the attributes of perfection, we ought rather to expect such an act to be encouraged and most highly rewarded.

If guilt can at all be lessened by suffering, we cannot but conclude, that suffering without guilt will produce merit; and that there must be some common measure between them, some applicability of merit to the direct removal of guilt, as we know that in the world the guilt and merit of one man in relation to another is capable of adjustment, and is the rule of much of our conduct, and that one man may properly and meritoriously make atonement for the offences of another; and instead of its being unjust to accept, it would be as purely cruel to refuse such satisfaction, as it would be to demand it, if not willingly offered. But in truth our ideas of cruelty are a good deal confused in this matter by the fact, that one man has no antecedent right to take the life of another, and no power to restore it, both of which are in the highest degree possessed by God. If, therefore, we could find any being capable of having merit in relation to the Deity, we might believe in the possibility of an atonement whereby our obligation to punishment might be so far removed as to continue only in the form of a penalty, under which, as well as by the obligation of gratitude, we should be bound to obey, and conform ourselves to the will of the atoning person.

Supposing the Deity to act towards us as a purely benevolent ruler might be supposed to do to his subjects, who were all determined to despise his laws and brave his power, which

yet they could not resist, how beautiful an allegory might be framed of God's dealings with us, which should represent Him as viewing with the deepest compassion mankind, whom for His own glory He had at first created, now wandering farther and farther from the voluntary attainment of the object of their creation, and making it incumbent upon their Maker to draw from them by force, that which they refused to give willingly. If God were represented as of His own goodness giving up that glory which He might have acquired by the display of His justice and power, and choosing rather that milder honour to be obtained by taking all the loss to Himself, freely forgiving them all their past offences, and drawing them back by the spectacle of His own humility,—His own self-denying goodness,—to that path of right and virtue in which alone it is possible to find any real peace. If this would be so beautiful and appropriate in a well-written allegory, how much more so would it be if it were really done? In its simple form the thing appears no doubt impossible, as requiring something of human nature in the Deity; yet it is certain, that man being created for God's glory and being evil, that glory must be voluntarily sacrificed for his sake, or wrung from him by the hand of power.[1]

Perhaps, if there be spirits of evil, who have power over the wicked, and into whose hands as the executioners of God's wrath the wicked are committed, it might be sufficient that into their hands should the innocent redeemer be committed

[1] Deum impossibile est honorem suum perdere: aut enim peccator sponte solvit quod debet: aut Deus ab invito accipit. Nam aut Homo debitam subjectionem Deo, sive non peccando, sive quod peccat solvendo, voluntate spontanea exhibet; aut Deus eum invitum sibi torquendo subjicit: et sic se Dominum ejus ostendit, quod ipse homo voluntate fateri recusat. In quo considerandum quia sicut homo peccando rapit quod Dei est; ita Deus puniendo aufert quod hominis est.—(ut beatitudinem habere posset)—Licet Deus hoc ad usum sui commodi non transferat, quod aufert; sicut homo pecuniam, quam alii aufert, in suam convertit utilitatem: hoc tamen quod aufert, utitur ad suum honorem per hoc, quia aufert.—*Anselm. Dial. Cur Deus Homo*, i. 14.

as a substitute for man. But if he were only man, this were to give the good over to destruction, and it cannot be that God would allow the good to perish, yet if he bear the sins of the world he must be exposed to the power which punishes those sins, he could not, therefore, be himself merely man. And again, man's duty being to do good, he could not by simply doing that redeem his brother, seeing that he himself would still receive his all as a free gift; yet I can imagine, that if a man could be endowed with such atoning power, he might deliver himself to the destroyer, and rather suffer for his brethren, than that they should be finally lost, and so might purchase to himself a perfect sovereignty over all the ransomed tribes of man. For this he must be perfectly pure, and should according to all our ideas of justice be one who could rise triumphantly against the destroyer's power, and though he suffer from that power, yet finally he must be saved.[2] None of these things the natural power of man would suffice for, and yet human nature being to be redeemed, humanity should suffer. Again, there is to be a judgment,—the common conscience of mankind would suffice to declare that; but if God alone were Judge, we must be judged by perfection, and could not hope to stand; our only hope could be in being judged by one who knew and compassionated our infirmities, and compassion being suffering, cannot belong to the Divine nature, perfect love is all that can there represent it, beside that compassion springs largely from a sense of our own infirmity; now love would desire to purge us from our sins certainly, but not to bless us in them, for love of goodness can-

[2] *Inst.* Atqui non potest pœna peccati transferri in innocentem: *Resp.* Concedo. I. Si cum damno innocentis et damno publico fiat illa translatio. II. Si transferatur in inuocentem qui nullam habeat naturæ communionem cum nocente. Alias nego. Jam vero nullum horum locum habuit in Christo. Nam. I. Christus non succubuit pœnæ, deinde translata est in eum magno bono publico, denique ita translata est ut Deus eum considerarit tanquam caput nostrum.—*John Cameron. Diss. ad Coroll. III.* Opp. p. 361.

not tolerate love of sin, and perfect love must first desire the purity of its object. Whatever we have of defence is addressed, not to justice, but to sympathy. It would be very fitting, therefore, that our Redeemer should be man, but since a new element has entered into the definition of man, and all whom we know are sinful, he cannot be one of them, but must be man in his ideal purity.

There remains the fact, that some sort of solution of the difficulty has been discovered and applied, and it has ever been the same throughout the world,—I refer to the use of sacrifices; sinners have everywhere made offerings and offered sacrifices under the belief, that thereby they might make atonement for their sins. Abstractedly considered, it is indeed manifest, that the death of an animal can be no real atonement for human sins, yet the prevalence of such rites and of a belief in their efficacy, has been universal; being then naturally so unreasonable, we must find some other account of its prevalence than a mere reference to the conclusions of human reason, and I know of none that has been suggested in any respect so consistent and probable, as that the custom was introduced among men by some communication from without, at a time when they were much fewer and much less scattered than they have since become.

The true conclusion upon the whole subject seems to be that:—1. It is impossible for man to make atonement for his own sins. 2. That some atonement for them is absolutely necessary, to assure him of the possibility of future happiness. 3. That in sacrifices and offerings of innocent victims and of the fruits of the earth, mankind have somehow learnt everywhere to seek the remission of our sins; to which we may add in the last place, that a very numerous, very well informed, and highly moral portion of the community, namely, the professors of Christianity, do profess to have found a way to reconcile all these conclusions, and to have found One who is man to

suffer, and that freely, God to condescend, and atone, and overcome, our judge to pardon and our brother to sympathize; and so their creed is able, while admitting fully the sinfulness of man, and without derogation from the perfections of the Deity, to open up to the human race a reasonable hope of reconciliation with, and joy in the presence of the Almighty.

CHAPTER VIII.

Conclusion of the First Book.

AMONG such speculations as those we have just been pursuing, natural religion loses itself. Its practical effect should be, to teach us, besides the chief moral and religious truths and obligations, the great duty of humility and obedience; for it tells us of God, that He is in all things greatest, that He loves goodness, and has placed us here to do it, but that we have neglected His known will, and have but a dreary waste to look forward to of our own deserving; so that, in all things striving to do well, we can rest our hope only in His goodness, trusting that He will find a way, where to our poor natural reason, all seems dark and trackless. For we may not conclude, that because all men sin, therefore there is no sin in any of them; or that because they see no way to make atonement for their past offences, therefore they may continue in them. We all know that sin is to be avoided and abhorred, and if it follows, that therefore each or any one of us is bound to avoid and abhor the ways in which he has hitherto been walking, surely this can make no difference in his duty. Evil is evil, though he were necessarily evil, and as such to be hated and grieved over. True, a free choice is necessary to moral evil, but no external power ever yet compelled any sane man to do evil; and so if the evil was necessary, it was not because he had not a free choice, but because he necessarily exercised it amiss; and as this involves a contradiction, it follows, that the most sinful of men is not evil by necessity. However, if this were otherwise, it is certain that any one by hating, and grieving

over, and striving against, his conscious tendency to evil, may very greatly amend and improve his moral character; and he who does not by every means in his power strive to amend and improve his moral character, whatever his natural tendencies may be, wilfully, knowingly, and without excuse, chooses and fosters evil. Let any one set before himself, in all his words, and thoughts, and deeds, the fact, that God beholds him, and that He loveth right and hateth iniquity; that He sees him everywhere, and hears him when he even meditates a lie;—let him strive to remember always, that God must wish his good, and gives generally to those only that acknowledge their need, and he will shun vice and folly, and confess to God and to himself his own wickedness, praying often and fervently for help to attain to perfection. Such a man we all cannot but acknowledge, if he were not perfect, would certainly be far holier and better than we can dare to think ourselves; yet, as it is within the power of every man, every man who does not perform all this, is to some extent voluntarily, and therefore criminally, evil, and deserving of punishment, though he were excused all sins of mere infirmity.

This natural religion then, dark as it is, is a noble and ennobling thing, and few, very few there are that would not become better under its influence; and so let us, in conclusion, briefly contemplate man, as a true belief in the existence and perfections of the Deity would make him, even with all this darkness unabated.[1]

[1] Quod si solus Deus coleretur, non essent dissensiones et bella; cum scirent homines unius se Dei filios esse; ideoque divinæ necessitudinis sacro et inviolabili vinculo copulatos; nullæ fierent insidiæ, cum scirent cujusmodi pœnas Deus animarum interfectoribus præparet, qui clandestina scelera et ipsas etiam cogitationes prævidet: non essent fraudes neque rapinæ, si Deo præcipiente didicissent, et suo et parvo esse contenti, fragilibus et caducis solida, et æterna præferent.—Denique ad regendos homines, non opus esset tam multis, et tam variis legibus, cum ad perfectam innocentiam, Dei lex una sufficeret: neque carceribus, neque terrore pœnarum, cum præceptorum cælestium salubritas, humanis pectoribus infusa ultro ad justitiæ opera homines erudiret.—*Lactantius, Div. Inst. de Justit.* lib. v. § 8. They would then be conscious of the truth of that saying

There would then be no wretched irremediable poverty, because vice alone can put a man beyond the power of benevolence, and in the conscious presence of God habitual sin must be impossible. There would be no pride of wealth, because all would feel that they possessed it but as God's stewards; there would be no intellectual pride, for all would know and realize their littleness before the Omniscient. There could be no tyrants, and no rebels, for all would submit to God, and all would desire, in doing His will, the happiness of all. There would be no dread of coming evils too great to bear, for all would see and know that He in whose hands we are both knows and wishes for us all the good and happiness we are capable of. There would be no pride of superior moral excellence, for all would know that before God they are themselves unholy and impure. No man would waste that wealth of which he has to render an account. No man would spend his days in heaping up vast stores of riches, for he would see them as they are, sometimes hurtful, and always so many vast stores of responsibility. Men would not waste their lives in useless and frivolous emptiness, for they would feel that the curse of sin, and the stewardship of time, and affluence, and abilities, were far too serious considerations to allow them leisure for idleness. Vain and unfriendly talk, and idle recreations would not then be our social employments; but when we met together to enjoy society, we could not but have some common benefit in view. We should meet to encourage one another in the great strife with evil, by acting in unison to act with more effect, and by acting with sympathy to find joy, even in the abodes of sickness and sorrow. We should meet to consider how we might reclaim mankind, and first of

of the Chinese philosopher, thus rendered by Stanilas Julien: Celui qui prend injustement les richesses d'autrui, ressemble à un homme qui voudrait apaiser sa faim avec de la viande corrompue, ou sa soif avec du vin empoisonné. Quoiqu'il y réussisse pour un instant, la mort ne tarde pas à l'atteindre.—*Tai Chang. Livre des Recompenses* (p. 510).

all ourselves, from the sinfulness we should then not only know, but realize and deplore; that every one might learn his own faults, and find his own proper sphere of usefulness, and all in sympathy and concord, our very sickness and afflictions hallowed and turned into blessings, in peace and mutual love, in trust and hope in Him in whose power and goodness alone reason allows us with perfect confidence to rest, we should pass calmly and happily forward to the end of our appearing here, to the last long resting-place of our material form; and the tombs of our fellows would be dear to us, as the gates of that eternal home, of which, through mist and even darkness, we should hope all things, as the immediate presence of perfect wisdom and every perfect good.[1] How would

[1] Si namque Deus est summe bonus, ita quod nihil melius esse possit: est et summe misericors, ita quod nihil misericordius possit esse, aut etiam cogitari. Est et simili modo summe pius et clemens, summe dives et potens, summe liberalis, summe largus, summe magnificus, et bonitatibus omnibus summe bonus, et supra quam intelligi valet summe plenus. Quis enim vel leviter hæsitat misericordiam, pietatem, clementiam, potentiam, liberalitatem, largitatem, magnificentiam et cætera talia esse præclarissimas bonitates. Peccatum autem hominis quantumcunque, magnum, finitum est et parvum. Posset enim augeri, possetque esse peccatum aliud majus illo, imo est quasi punctus nihilum et inane, respectu divinæ misericordiæ, pietatis et clementiæ infinitissime infinitæ, sicut quodcunque finitum, respectu cujuslibet infiniti. Cur ergo tanta misericordia et pietas, tanta clementia et potestas, non possit tantillum peccatum superare, tollere et purgare? Cur tanta liberalitas et tanta largitas, et tam magna magnificentia non possit debitum tantillum dimittere filio prodigo pœnitenti humiliter supplicanti, et unde redderet non habenti? Cur non tantillum ejus indigentiam plenissime relevare, imo et ultra hæc aliqua magna munera ei dare? præsertim cum ex dimissionibus et largitionibus talibus, ipsius divitiæ et copiæ infinitæ nulla inopia minuantur, nihil ei decrescat: sed quodammodo magis accrescat unum inestimabile jocale, una clarissima margarita, una pretiosissima anima, una dignissima creatura, et per illam aliæ forsan multæ. Cum etiam per hoc cives ejus domestici et amici magno gaudio gratulentur, et magis eum laudent, glorificent et adorent. Nonne potentius est posse hæc facere, quam non posse? et nonne misericordius, et clementius, liberalius, et magnificentius est potentem sic facere misero, indigenti, veraciter pœnitenti, desistere proponenti et humiliter supplicanti; quam avertere faciem, obstruere aurem, cor impassibiliter obdurare et fontem inumbrabilis misericordiæ miseris præparatum misericorditer obturare? Nonne ergo posse sic facere, atque sic facere convenientissime convenit bono Deo, ac decentissimime eum decet.—*Bradwardine, D. C. D.* L. i. c. i. corol. 27.

the face of nature smile with ever newer and fresher beauties, when the eyes of all beheld in the warm brightness of the sun, the dazzling radiance of the face of God turned towards us in benevolence, in the showers and rain, the dew of God's careful love, preparing for us the blessings of the fruitful earth; and in the calm glisten of the moon, the sweet, submissive, peaceful radiance of the soul, which, faithfully reflecting from the All-perfect the matchless beauty of perfect holiness, is content to have nothing, and be nothing in itself, but only to prolong and reproduce to men the blessings of His tenderness. Then from every cool secluded grove would rise the prayer and sigh of penitence, in their true and truthful adaptation to our state and nature, more lovely far than all the mirth of thoughtlessness; then from every green hill and rocky summit would go up the hymn of praise and song of thanksgiving, from the assembled company of the holy, united by their holiness, sobered and sweetened ever by the plaintive notes of sorrow, that we, amid all these blessings, and under the guidance and protection of all this love, should still be so unworthy even to praise its Author.

BOOK II.

Utinam Magister noster et Domine, utinam tam ego, quam alii discipuli tui et servi, remota superbia excæcante, simplici mente quæramus, non apparentiam vacuæ vanitatis, sed existentiam solidæ veritatis; ut sic Te duce, illam mereamur veraciter invenire cognoscere et tenere.

THOS. BRADWARDINE, DE CAUSA DEI, L. 1. c. 2 Cor. p. 40.



BOOK II.

PART I.—OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED AND REMOVED.

CHAPTER I.

The Christian Revelation.

IT is not my purpose to attempt any direct proof of the truth of Christianity; all that I have now to do is to show that there is nothing in its teaching inconsistent with, but, on the contrary, much to confirm and illustrate the doctrines of natural religion,[1] concerning the being and attributes of the Deity, though in doing so I cannot but indirectly strengthen the evidence of both.

We have traced, in considering the previous portion of our subject, what should, I think, always be referred to that branch of the discussion, I mean the inextricable confusion, or painful expectations produced by the simple development of our ideas of perfection and goodness when applied to the relations between God and man. It does not belong to revelation to show that man has nothing to expect at God's hands but wrath and punishment—*that* man can of himself discover, and his bloody sacrifices and painful penances, his dread of death, his savage superstitions, and his unquiet conscience, all

[1] We commonly find the epithet "natural" applied to religion, in contradistinction to the epithet "revealed," although what a man learns from the works of God is as truly learned by revelation as what he comes to know by the written Word of God.—*S. R. Maitland. Eruvin. Essay*, i. p. 1.

show that he has never been ignorant of the fact. It does belong to revelation, and herein chiefly lies its necessity, to show how man's happiness may be reconciled with God's perfections, and by removing the painfulness of the truth, to allay that strife between reason and fear which ends but too often in unreasonable fearlessness. One reason why revelation has so feeble a hold upon the mass of mankind is, because they will not believe, not revelation itself, but those conclusions of their natural reason, which would make revelation necessary to their happiness. This view of the office of revelation is fully confirmed by the experience of Christian missionaries; when they talk with the heathen of God's existence, His unity and goodness, they win perhaps an intellectual assent; but when they speak of sin and a Redeemer, their words go directly to the hearts and consciences of their hearers, and they make converts, because there is something within the breast of every man, unless he stifle it by excess, that will not let him rest unreconciled to God; there is a chord somewhere, which the preacher need but strike to bring out, almost against its utterer's will, the question—What must I do to be saved? Every one who considers these facts must long to know something of man's real history and true condition, and of these Christianity alone has given any sufficient, consistent, and well attested account.

The Scriptures tell us, that God, having created the world, and adorned it with perfect beauty, formed the material structure of a man from the dust of the earth, and inspired it with a living soul, and thus man was made in the image of God himself, full of all that can befit a creature of such high intelligence. The first man being so made was not left solitary, but partly at least from his material form, God made a woman to bear him company, and gave her a soul resembling his: these beings, pure and happy, he then placed in a garden worthy of the name of paradise, to occupy themselves in in-

creasing the natural beauty of the place, and in perfect happiness to sing His praises who had made them and all things very good. So, had they but obeyed the voice of God, and believed His word, they might perhaps have lived on even until now.

But then follows the story of their fall. Amongst the trees bearing fruit, with which the garden abounded, was one called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; this they were forbidden, under the penalty of death, so much as to touch, and so long as they believed God, and touched it not, so long were they perfectly happy. Why any temptation at all was allowed we are not told; it may have been in order to raise up in them a habit of trustful obedience, by which they, though essentially finite and capable of change, might be made perfectly holy.[1] Those temptations to disobedience which man's intellect might of itself have at last suggested, were allowed (possibly in order that the guilt of the fall might be less) to be whispered by a being external to man, and unholy. Of this being we learn, that he too was created pure and good, but that, misusing the liberty inseparable from intellect, he fell into sin and so beneath the weight of God's displeasure. This Satan, taking the harmless form of one of the living things of God's creation, suggested to the woman first, that the tree, being a tree of knowledge, must be spiritually as good as it seemed to be externally; and so leading her to doubt God's goodness in the prohibition, yet to trust too much to it in regard to the penalty, she disbelieved and disobeyed, and the man joining her in her unbelief and sin fell likewise, thus all the race of man became at its very source unfaithful and corrupt.[2] Then they discovered, when too late, that there is

[1] See ante, book i. p. 56, note 2.

[2] Adamus fuit præditus cognitione practica ante peccatum, concedo: post peccatum et in ipso peccato nego: imo radix ejus peccati hæc fuit, quod non cognoverit cognitione practica finem et media. Fere omnes filii agnoscunt (cognitione theoretici) patrem esse colendum, ei esse obediendum, sed plerique putant non esse jucundum illi, in hac vel illa actione quam præscribit morem

some knowledge it is better not to possess, that it is better to know good alone than to know both good and evil. From that moment the whole course of the world in regard to man became changed and disordered; he lost that control over his own will and actions which he had so much abused; he lost the immediate conscious presence of and communion with the Deity, and, as he had lost that innate justice which at first belonged to him, he became sinful, and the world, created so good and fair for his gratification, was changed and blurred with evil for his punishment,[1] and the whole of the human race being evil themselves, as they could give being to nothing essentially better and greater than themselves, the progeny which sprung from these first parents became depraved and sinful, which progeny we are.

But God, who is pure love, and whose mercy is over all His works, would not leave us, who had thus destroyed the

gerere: aio ergo in ipso actu tentationis titubasse primum Adamum, deinde corruisse, et originem peccati fuisse incredulitatem, quæ et ipsa est peccatum, sedesque ejus est mens practica, quæ ratione tantum et formalitate quadam est a voluntate distincta.—*John Cameron, Disp. ad Thes.* xxviii. Opp. p. 357.

[1] Kennicott, Dissert. 1. cites the following heathen paraphrases. From Hesiod, Εργ. και Ἡμερ. Βιβλ. α.

Χρυσεον μεν πρωτιστα γενος (μεροπων) ανθρωπων
Ὡστε θεοι δ'εζωον, αληδεα θυμον εχοντες,
Νοσφιν ατερτε πονων και οιζυος· ουδε τι δειλον
Γυρας επην, αιει δε κακων εκτοσθεν απαντων.
——— ——— Καρπον δ'εφερε ζειδωρος αρουρα
Αυτοματη, πολλον τε και αφθονον.

And this from Virgil, *Georg. I.* 127.

Ipsaque Tellus
Omnia liberius, nullo poscente, ferebat.
Ille malum virus Serpentibus addidit atris—
Tum variæ venere artes. Labor omnia vincit
Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas.—
More et frumentis labor additus, ut mala culmos
Esset rubigo, segnisque horreret in arvis
Carduus; interemat segetes, subit aspera sylva,
Lappæque, Tribulique, interque nitentia culta.
Infelix lolium et steriles dominantur avenæ
——— Sic omnia Fatis
In pejus ruere, ac retro sublapsa referri.

goodness of His first creation, hopelessly to perish, but resolved to create us anew to a better hope, and provided for our sins an atonement, and for us a Saviour. This Saviour was promised immediately after the fall, His character was from time to time more and more clearly revealed, and the particular nation and family among whom He was to appear indicated with increasing distinctness, till in the fulness of time, when God saw to be most fitting He came, came indeed as man, but came as prophets and seers had from of old predicted, and heralded by angels as a Saviour, Christ, the Lord. Whilst remaining upon earth, our Lord did many wonderful and beneficent acts, suffered much evil, taught many disciples, and especially twelve apostles, or messengers to man, and at last, condemned and rejected by His own nation, He was delivered into the hands of a stranger, and by him cruelly and ignominiously put to death. Not long, however, was He held by the bands of death, but rising again on the third day, and appearing to His apostles and disciples, after completing His former instructions, He bade them go and announce to the whole earth, that the desire, the half-conscious desire of all nations was come, that man's redemption had been by Him accomplished, and a fountain of healing opened for all without money and without price.[2] So the apostles, timid and unlearned men, waited for strength from heaven till it came

[2] Hoc autem fieri nequit, nisi sit qui solvat Deo pro peccato hominis aliquid majus, quam omne quod præter Deum est. Illum quoque, qui de suo poterit Deo dare aliquid, quod superet omne quod sub Deo est, majorem esse necesse est, quam omne quod non est Deus. Nihil autem est supra omne quod Deus non est, nisi Deus. Non ergo potest hanc satisfactionem facere nisi Deus. Sed nec facere illam debet, nisi homo; alioquin non satisfacit homo. Si ergo, sicut constat, necesse est ut de hominibus perficitur illa superna civitas; nec hoc esse valet, nisi fiat prædicta satisfactio, quam nec potest facere nisi Deus, nec debet nisi homo; necesse est ut eam faciat Deus Homo.—*Anselm, Cur Deus Homo.* Lib. ii. c. vi.—Et quia impossibile est quod divina natura concurrat cum alia, sicut pars ad constitutionem tertii, nec quod ipsa transeat in illa, propter simplicitatem et immutabilitatem ipsius perfectissimam: hinc est, quod deitas et humanitas non uniuntur in unitate naturæ, nec accidentis: uniuntur igitur in unitate personæ et hypostasis.—*Bonaventura. Breviloquium,* Pars. iv. c. ii.

upon them with power, and then went forth to suffering, indignity, and death, that if it might be their persecutors might at last behold the face of God in all the happiness of heaven. In the same power have their successors gone forth continually even till now, and Christendom and Christian virtues are the visible fruits of their labour.

The teaching of these apostles we now call Christian doctrine, which, besides comprehending an authoritative sanction of pure natural morality and natural theology, teaches us, in connection with the facts just now briefly sketched out, that Christ, being wholly free from sin Himself, and knowing all things, freely offered Himself as an atonement for our sins, that in Him we have a new source of being, which can restore to us the lost image of God: for He, being himself very God, as well as very man, can make us anew by the Spirit of God, and make us by union with Himself sons of God, with all their privileges; this is accomplished by our new spiritual birth, our turning away from and abhorring our old sins, and persevering to our lives' end in all holiness and purity, and we have continual aids and assistances whereby our pilgrimage may be brought in the end to a prosperous issue.

Such is the solution of the great problems of the world and man, and natural religion, offered by Christianity, and confirmed by prophecy and miracles. It does not tell us why God made the world, nor why He made it as He did; but, as far as our own duty and peace of mind are concerned, it tells us all we need desire to know; for avoiding none of the darker and more repulsive truths which self-knowledge can expose, it tells us how to make our peace with God, and shows to us the Deity in a character of yet greater goodness and personal love towards us, than we could before have allowed ourselves to imagine.

It cannot be any objection to revelation that it does not tell us all we might know, for as to that, if all the life of the

longest liver were spent in mere gazing and listening, God would still have much more to show and tell us—much more than we could even mentally perceive or realize; our enquiry must therefore be, not how much more might have been revealed, but only how much more is necessary, and to this we may at once reply, nothing. In the following chapters I propose to answer such of the principal objections to Christianity as are capable of being put in the form of objections to the Divine existence and attributes, on the supposition of its truth; and then, after a short review of some of the direct evidence which is furnished by it, to pass on to the practical conclusion of the whole subject.

CHAPTER II.

Of Original Sin and the Fall of Man, as Facts.

THE two great doctrines of Christianity most generally excepted to as inconsistent with the Divine attributes, are the Fall of Man and Original Sin. These may be viewed either as facts or in theory, and I propose, in the first place, to show that, as facts, they are not revelations in the sense in which the scheme of redemption is so, but only, at least in the great outlines, such a revelation as is the suggestion of a truth, which, once suggested, is manifestly supported by sound reason, and that they are the conclusions which ought naturally to arise from the consideration of what is actually in the world and in ourselves. I shall afterwards make some suggestions for the better solution of the difficulty in theory, which is in fact the great and real difficulty of all theology; but I may remark in passing, that if I can show the truth of these doctrines as facts, the difficulty in theory ought to have no practical influence, because, as in other matters, we cannot but act, though we have no perfect theory, so in this, our practical duty being evident, the theory is little more than an object of scientific curiosity.

We are all of us, at times at least, conscious of internal struggles between contending principles, each desiring to lead us along in its own direction, and to bring us into subserviency to its own ends; and we feel at the same time, that these principles are not merely different, but seem essentially and irreconcileably opposite, so that we can conceive of no union or harmony between them. The co-existence of tendencies to good and evil at the same time, and in the same

person, is a most wonderful and perplexing consideration, especially as it is in our own thoughts, our own souls, in that which is most truly and essentially our own selves, that evil has its seat, for in the material world around us, if evil exist at all, it is not that moral evil which may perhaps rightly have an exclusive title to the name.

The distinction between these two principles is not a matter of mere habit or conventional language, it is not due to the influence of any particular external religious teaching, or revelations true or pretended. It is a fact, which our own feelings, if we will interpret them honestly, will not allow us to doubt. Let a man look to all nations under the sun, and see if he can find one where good and evil are not most clearly distinguished, and most oppositely esteemed. The universality of the distinction alone ought to satisfy us that it is matter of nature, not of mere institution.

So different do the pursuits of pleasure and of virtue seem in man, that it appears as though they could not co-exist, as though we must altogether forego one, before we can realize the other. Hence men have doubted what the true aim of human nature is; hence, professing alike to live according to nature, they have advocated the most opposite doctrines, and pursued the most diverse courses of conduct. On the one hand stand our lofty aspirations, our godlike dignity, our noble powers of self-control and self-reliance; these the Stoics embraced as true human nature, and strove to crush and extinguish all that seem to detract from them; on the other hand are the passions and appetites which crave present enjoyment at all hazards; these the later Epicureans followed, as the best guides to happiness. Yet further, in the healthy body we find all the parts duly co-ordinated with one another, and we see all the mandates of the will executed with instant celerity and perfect obedience; there is no refusal to act, no challenge of authority. But such is not the state of things in

that which should be the royal council of this well ordered system;[1] for there, though the reason may be clear and fully enlightened, it may fail to bend the will; so that, while the intellect is sparkling with an almost heavenly brilliancy, it may be in company with a will depraved and abandoned to the lowest desires of the animal nature, we are every day reminded how powerless we are in the government of the passions, how often do they induce us to act against that higher will to which we are conscious they ought to be subordinated, how often do we follow them with a full knowledge that they are leading us whither we would not, it may be to destruction.

Whence, we cannot but ask, has there come over us this lamentable disease, this paralysis of our mental and spiritual powers, which cripples all our actions, and leaves us too often passively to be tossed and driven about by the winds and waves of the outer world, through the midst of which we ought to have been steering a straight and independent course?

It would be possible to suggest, by way of answer, that man is originally and essentially evil, that all there is of consistent goodness in him is adventitious, and due to some external power or influence crushing and overcoming his natural tendencies. But surely we cannot for a moment admit this, when we consider, that to each of our faculties and powers, however capable of depravation, there is manifestly some good end, and some proper mode of working, the excess or neglect of which becomes a vice; thus the desire of excellence may be abused into corrupt ambition, virtuous indignation may be degraded into passionate anger, and a care for the welfare of others may run up into officious tyranny, or be dwarfed into

[1] Auguste Comte even makes this a ground of accusation against the metaphysicians, that they have held man to be a monad, and the intellect to be his true and natural guide.—(*Cours de Philos. Positive*, vol. iii. p. 778.) Comte's system is manifestly contradictory to our individual consciousness (which affirms what he denies), and therefore false; but the fact he builds upon is not the less a remarkable fact, that needs to be accounted for.

hardheartedness and indifference. So close is this relation between virtue and vice, between the true and the false ends of our various powers, that virtue may be even scientifically defined as the mean between opposite vices,[2] the true and natural exercise of all our faculties. It is upon this manifest existence of certain true ends and purposes for all the powers of man, the evidence which human nature itself gives to its original glory and purity, that all systems of natural ethics must depend. Careful and reflective observers, in every age and country, have discovered and proved that man, though a ruin, is a temple in ruins; though full of vice, is yet the original of a most lofty ideal of virtue, and requires its presence to the true and healthy development of his nature.[3] No one, who will attentively consider himself and his mental and physical organization, or indeed any of the operations of nature, can fail to perceive, that whatever evils may from time to time arise are all of them truly and properly the results of failings and of external influences, and not evils deliberately planned and aimed at in the original construction and natural constitution of the things themselves. Such is pre-eminently the case with man: we lament over all his imperfections as defects, we measure him always by the high standard of perfection, so that the very magnitude of his failings bears continual

[2] Εστιν αρα ἡ αρετη ἑξις προαιρετικη, εν μεσοτητι ουσα τῃ προς ημας, ὡρισμενι λογῳ, και ὡς αν φρονιμος ὁρισειε· μεσοτης δε δυο κακιων, της μεν καθ' ὑπερβολην, της δε κατ' ἐλλειψιν· και ετι, τῳ τας μεν ελλειπειν, τας δε ὑπερβαλλειν του δεοντος εν τε τοις παθεσι και εν ταις πραξεσι· την δ' αρετην το μεσον και ευρισκειν και ἁιρεισθαι. Διο κατα μεν την ουσιαν και τον λογον τον τι ην ειναι λεγοντα, μεσοτης εστιν ἡ αρετη, κατα δε το αριστον και το ευ, ακροτης.—*Aristotle. Nich. Eth.* lib. ii. c. 6.

[3] Εισι δε και παρ' ἡμιν ἁι αρεται κατα φυσιν, προς ἁς ἡ οικειωσις της ψυχης ουκ εκ διδασκαλιας ανθρωπων, αλλ' εκ αυτης της ψυχης ενυπαρχει. Ὡς γαρ ουδεις ἡμας λογος διδασκει την νοσον μισειν, αλλ' αυτοματον ἐχομεν την προς τα λυτουντα διαβολην· οὑτω και τῃ ψυχῃ εστι τις αδιδακτος εκκλισις του κακου. Κακον δε παν αρρωστια ψυχης, ἡ δε αρετη λογον ὑγιειας ἐπεχει. Καλως γαρ ὡρισαντο τινες ὑγιειαν ειναι την ευσταθειαν των κατα φυσιν ενεργειων. Ὁ και επι της κατα ψυχην ενεξιας ειπων, ουχ ἁμαρτησει του πρεποντος. Ὁθεν ορεκτικη του οικειου και κατα φυσιν αυτῃ αδιδακτως εστιν ἡ ψυχη.—*Basil. Hom. IX. in Hexaëmeron.*

witness to his natural greatness.[1] And as we do this in regard to his character, we do it also with far more consistency with regard to his position. No one ever thinks, without consideration, of comparing the present uncertain state of man with non-existence, we all compare it involuntarily with perfect happiness; thus showing clearly enough, that our intuitive reason thinks of man as naturally higher in character and condition than he now really is, and would tell us that his natural end and characteristic is perfection. Again, we call everything good when it is well adapted to its natural object, to that object for which it is used, or was made, as a watch is a good watch if it keeps time well; the air of a place is good if it conduces to health, and so on;[2] but when we come to a good man, all are agreed that he is a man whose moral character is unexceptionable;[3] though all are not agreed as to the sanction and origin of this necessity of goodness, all are agreed that by perfect virtue we hit the mark, whatever that may be. Perfect virtue is, therefore, of necessity essential to man's natural constitution in its original form.

[1] L'homme a des defauts je l'avoue. Son esprit se trouve renfermé dans un fort petit espace. Il se voit borné de tous parts au milieu d'une étendue sans bornes. Il se trouve obligé de suivre la condition d'une matière qui lui est extrêmement inférieure en perfection. Il se sent miserable et pauvre au milieu de la prospérité et de l'abondance. Rien ne le remplit. Rien ne le satisfait. Il se dégoute de tout, et désire tout. Il veut toujours connaître et il ne connait rien à fond. Il admire parcequ'il ignore. Il est curieux de savoir parcequ'il ne sait rien. Il n'est pas seulement le jouet des autres, il est en quelque façon le jouet de lui-même; ses passions sont à son égard l'équité et la rectitude, et la vérité ne se trouve que dans ce qui lui plaît. Ces défauts sont grands, et parcequ'ils sont grands, ils ne peuvent se trouver que dans un être excellent, et font voir mieux que toute autre chose la perfection de l'homme.—*Abbadie, T. de la Verité de la Rel. Chret.* p. i. s. i. chap. xiii.

[2] Vide *Anselm. Monolog.*

[3] *Ει δε τι τελος εστι των πρακτεων, ὁ δι'αυτο βουλομεθα, τα αλλα δε δια τουτο, (και μη παντα δι'ἑτερον αἱρουμεθα, προεισι γαρ ούτω γ'εις απειρον, ωστ'ειναι κενην και ματαιαν την ορεξιν) δηλον ὡς τουτ'αν ειη ταγαθον και το αριστον. Ηρ'ουν και προς τον βιον ἡ γνωσις αυτου μεγαλην εχει ροπην; και καθαπερ τοξοται, σκοπον εχοντες, μαλλον αν τυγχανοι μεν του δεοντος.—Arist. Nich. Eth.* lib. i. c. 2. There is a very fine passage, too long to quote, in Dr. Chalmers' *Nat. Theology*, Book iv. c. 6, showing how all the differences about this τελος serve but to confirm us in the fact, that virtue is the only way to compass it.

If this be a true account of the phænomena of human nature, as we feel it in ourselves and observe it in others, and as it has been felt and observed by reflecting minds in all ages, it is clear that man can neither be the work of an essentially evil being and adapted to evil ends, nor can that other supposition be allowed as possible, which some have suggested to account for the conflict actually going on within us, that two opposing powers were concerned in our origination. The beneficent unity of the original scheme of human nature and of the universe generally, which we still trace with certainty even in its present marred and degraded condition, leaves no room for any other supposition than that man must have been originally the work of one single good and beneficent Creator, but that the lustre and purity of his pristine condition have been sullied and spoiled by the coming over him of some terrible catastrophe or disease.[4] This is the conclusion to which we are led by our natural reason, and it is the doctrine of the fall of man, disclosing certainly none of the means, but conclusively establishing the fact.

The proof with regard to original sin is yet more easy; we are, as we know, full of tendencies to evil, all of us having a disposition which at some time or other we all yield to, to do evil in those things in which we have a conscious freedom of choice.[5] Is this evil disposition born with us, or does it come over us after our birth? Manifestly it is not a disease attack-

[4] Nunc reddenda est de justitia proposita disputatio; quæ aut ipsa est sola virtus, aut fons est ipsa virtutis; quam non modo philosophi quæsi erunt, sed poetæ quoque, qui et priores multo fuerunt, et ante natum philosophiæ nomen pro sapientibus habebantur. Hi plane intellexerunt abesse hanc a rebus humanis, eamque finxerunt offensam vitiis hominum cessisse terra, in cælumque migrasse: atque ut doceant, quid sit juste vivere (solent enim præcepta per ambages dare) a Saturni temporibus, quæ illi vocant aurea, repetunt exempla justitiæ; narrantque in quo statu fuerit humana vita dum illa in terra moraretur. *Lactantius, De Justitia. Inst.* lib. v. c. 5. These were not told purely as parables, and every good parable is, cæteris paribus, probable in fact. V. ante, p. 218, note 1.

[5] Vide ante, ch. vi. p. 192.

ing us and changing our character at any time after the dawn of consciousness, for our very first voluntary acts are tainted with it, and we are born needing schooling and wholesome discipline to restrain and improve our natural disposition, and to till the weed-producing soil into fields of ripening virtue.[1] Rightly, therefore, do Christians believe in original or birth sin as the accompaniment of every one who is born into the world, whereby every man is from his birth an alien from God, and obnoxious to punishment.

This argument may be confirmed by the recollection, that purity and perfection must in every pure and perfect system be necessary to happiness and enjoyment; those, therefore, that pass away from this world with a disposition which if they had remained here would have needed correction and education, and even with these would not have been pure and perfect, cannot without them go hence to happiness. Such is the frightful dilemma from which Christianity offers

[1] "Piety, benevolence, magnanimity, fortitude, temperance, and the other virtues, are not the spontaneous growth of the uncultivated mind,—but as the richest soil will, if it remains uncultivated, produce nothing but weeds and rubbish, so the human mind will not flourish in virtue, unless it is subjected to a suitable process of cultivation." Is it not a plain contradiction to add that there is no natural tendency to evil in this unvirtuous soil? yet the passages may be seen with such an insertion in *Belsham's Discourses*, vol. ii. pp. 123-4. In ipsa tamen pueritia, de qua mihi minus, quam de adolescentia metuebatur, non amabam literas, et me in eas urgeri oderam; et urgebar tamen, et bene mihi fiebat, nec faciebam ego bene; non enim discerem, nisi cogerer—nec qui me urgebant, bene faciebant, sed bene mihi fiebat abs te, Deus meus. Illi non intuebantur, quo referrem, quod me discere cogebant, præterquam ad satiandas insatiabiles cupiditates copiosæ inopiæ et ignominiosæ gloriæ. Tu vero, cui numerati sunt capilli capitis nostri, errore omnium, qui mihi instabant ut discerem, utebaris ad utilitatem meam; meo autem, qui discere nolebam, utebaris ad pœnam meam, qua plecti non eram indignus, tantillus puer et tantus peccator. Ita de non bene facientibus tu bene faciebas mihi, et de peccante me ipso juste retribuebas mihi. Jussisti enim, et sic est, ut pœna sua sibi sit omnis inordinatus animus.—*Augustin. Confess.* lib. i. c. 12. "I am daily more and more struck," writes Dr. Arnold, (*Life*, vol. i. p. 373,) "with the very low average of intellectual power, and the difficulty of meeting those various temptations, both intellectual and moral, which stand in boys' way; a school shows as undisguisedly as any place the corruption of human nature, and the monstrous advantage, if I may so speak, with which evil starts in its contest with good."

us an escape by supernatural means. Either the universe is not so ordered as to connect purity of disposition and happiness, and then the good may suffer for all eternity, or it *is* so ordered, and then all mankind are by nature doomed after death to evil. Said I not rightly, that our natural reason makes revelation necessary to our happiness?

There is something which seems at first sight strange or even contradictory in the idea of this certain yet unnecessary yielding to sin; it is like a habit contracted without the series of acts generally required to form one,[2] or if one tries to analyze it, it seems as though lassitude and weariness were its immediate causes;[3] yet unavoidable lassitude and weariness in any strict sense they are not. Some sin is practically certain, but every particular sin is contingent, and contingent upon the exercise of our conscious freedom. Strange as this is, it is in strict analogy with everything else in the constitution of the world; there is nothing which is strictly pure and complete; the nature and ideal of everything is only an idea; an idea to be obtained, like the pure ideal man, by removing from every individual the faults and blemishes peculiar to itself, and yet more clearly is it in analogy with the

[2] This comparison is treated of at much length by John Baconthorp in his work on the Sentences. Alia sunt in libero arbitrio essentialia, alia accidentalia tantum; quæ sunt essentialia, ut est potentia volendi et agendi libere, illa remansere in homine; quæ accidentalia, ut est *ἀδιαφορια* ad bonum et malum; illa immutatione facta, sublata sunt quidem, at nego ideo periisse quæ essentialia sunt.—*J. Cameron, Disp. ad Thes.* xi. *Opp.* pp. 358-9.

[3] Hoc totum dico, quod "non omnia possumus omnes:" rarusque aut nullus est divitum, qui in omni substantia sua paria universa possideat. Possibilia præcepit Deus, et ego fateor. Sed hæc possibilia cuncta singuli habere non possumus, non imbecillitate naturæ, ne calumniam facias Deo, sed animi lassitudine qui cunctas simul et semper non potest habere virtutes. Quod et si in eo argueris Creatorem, quare te talem condiderit, qui deficias atque lassescas, dicam iterum, major erit reprehensio, si eum volueris accusare, quare te Deum non fecerit. Sed dices, si non possum, ergo peccatum non habeo. Habeo peccatum quare non feceris quod aliis potuit facere. Rursumque ille, cujus tu comparatione deterior es, vel tui in alia virtute, vel alterius erit collatione peccator: atque ita fit, ut quemcunque primum putaveris, minor sit eo, qui se in alia parte major est.—*Jerome, Dial. c. Pelagianos*, § 23.

course of nature with regard to sentient beings; pain, sorrow, disease, and death, are all certain in the abstract, yet all contingent in the concrete. Thus, and thus only, is it possible for any being to be naturally evil, for if the evil were certain in the concrete, the very certainty would negative the moral character of evilness, whilst if it were uncertain in the abstract, of course the being could not be naturally evil. When we thoroughly comprehend the nature and workings of free will, we may hope to understand this; till then, though it must in all probability remain a mystery in theory, we shall find little difficulty in accepting it as a fact, since all natural analogies serve only to fortify its well-known certainty.

CHAPTER III.

The Doctrine of Original Sin.

HOW can a corrupt and sinful race be the creatures of a pure and holy God? This difficulty, supposing it were impossible to answer it, would still be only a difficulty, not a refutation of the doctrines of natural religion, for it invalidates none of the arguments upon which they are founded. The necessity and character of a necessary being, the intelligence and tendency to good in the constitution of the material universe, the witness of man's spirit to a just and all-powerful ruler, and the general consent of mankind in offering worship and reverence to the Deity, are all wholly unaffected by the speculative difficulty of reconciling man's voluntarily necessary sinfulness with the goodness of that Deity. The difficulty lies in the apparent contradiction between coexistent facts, and as such is a speculative difficulty only, one which although we cannot but desire to solve, it is by no means necessary to determine our duty or arrange our practice that we should be able to remove; for goodness is goodness, and evil is evil, and the one must be agreeable, and the other contradictory to God's nature, and we know one to be connected with pain, and the other to be the only certain guide to pure enjoyment; so that, although we should acknowledge that evil seemed without our fault inseparable from us here,[1] we should yet

[1] Thus Plato, asserting the universality of evil, points out the remedy with remarkable clearness: Σωκ. Αλλ'ουτ'απολεσθαι τα κακα δυνατον, ω Θεοδωρε, ὑπεναντιον γαρ τι τῳ αγαθῳ αει ειναι αναγκη· ουτ'εν Θεοις αυτα ἱδρυσθαι, την δε θνητην φυσιν και τονδε τον τοπον περιπολει ἐξ αναγκης· διο και πειρασθαι χρη ενθενδε εκεισε φυγειν ὁτι ταχιστα. φυγη δε ὁμοιωσις θεῳ κατα το δυνατον ὁμοιωσις δε δικαιον και ὁσιον μετα φρονησεως γενεσθαι.—Θεος ουδαμῃ ουδαμως

perceive that our power enabled, and therefore our duty required, us to seek the good, and strive to escape from the evil, and we should have no more right to disbelieve the existence of the Deity because we could not reconcile it with our own sinfulness, than we should have to disbelieve that sinfulness for the converse reason.[1] We have no right to assume that our intellectual powers are so perfect that there can never be an insuperable difficulty, but especially is such an assumption absurd where the very difficulty is caused by our moral imperfection, for pure morality and perfect intelligence are certainly connected. The only proper effect of such difficulties is to assure us that we are not sufficient of ourselves for all things, but that even our intellect may need support, and in this case it intelligently bids us depend for guidance upon the dictates of our moral nature, until there shall be some revelation which may assure us of the right road: but for these intellectual difficulties, a wise man would need no leader but his own intellect; as it is, it is the height of wisdom to do well rather than to strive to know all things; and wisdom is better than knowledge or learning. Thus we must believe in the existence and attributes of the Deity rather the more for these insoluble difficulties, for when our intellect leaves us, it leaves us to other guides,—our moral sense, or revelation,—and these will not allow us for a moment to doubt or hesitate.

It deserves to be noticed, before we proceed to do what we can to solve this difficulty, that that weakness which exposes us to the force of sudden impulses is by no means the cause

ἀλλως· ἀλλ' ὡς ἴσως τι διαφερουσης, και ουκ εστιν αυτῳ ὁμοιοτερον ουδεν ἡ ὁς αν ἡμων αν γενηται ὁτι διαφερουσης. και τουτου και ἡ ὡς ἀληθως δεινοτης ανδρος και ενδεια τις και ανοησια, ἡ μεν γαρ τουτου γνωσις σοφια και αρετη ἀληθινη, ἡ δε ἀνοησια ἀμαθια και κακια ενουσης.—*Theætetus*, 176.

[1] If their unity and consistency pass our comprehension, that will be no ground why we should reject the first things proved by reasons which we do comprehend. That would be for our ignorance to refute our knowledge.—*Duncan on Prophecy*, Disc. vii. (of a similar difficulty).

of unmixed evil, but often of much good also, for many a man has far excelled in action, from the mere impulse of the moment, any deliberate intention of beneficence he ever formed, and many have been prevented on the instant from the commission of long meditated crimes by some sudden impression, which could never have moved them in their cooler moments. Thus the power of committing the worst and blackest sin is destroyed along with the power of attaining to the highest goodness.

If the whole human race might rightly be viewed as but one individual unit in creation,[2] then the arguments of our first part might apply and vindicate the justice and goodness of the Deity towards us; and though there seem to be all but insuperable difficulties in the way of it, there is a mysterious connection both in body and soul among all mankind; and if it is true, as to some extent it seems to be, of animal and vegetable life, and of our own mixed being, as it certainly is of all the rest of the world, including even our own material forms, that there is now no strictly new creation,[3] but only the

[2] John Wickliffe says,—"As mankynde trespacid. So moot mankynde make asseth. And herfore it wer to straunge, that aungel made asseth for man, for he ne migte ne was he that persone that synnede here. But *seth alle men ben o persone*, that persone maketh asseeth: gif ony membre of his persone maketh asseeth for al this persone: bi this way we see, that gif God made a man of nogt of newe to the kynde of Adam, git he were holden to God as moche as he migte for hymself, and so he migte not make asseeth for hym & Adamis synne. And thus sethen asseeth moste be maad for Adamis synne, as it is seid, such a persone most make this asseeth, that were both God & man, for worthinesse of this personis dede were evene with unworthinesse of the Synne." Postil on Isaiah 9. Unto us a Son is given.—*MS. ap. Mus. Brit. Cotton. Claudius*, D. viii. The passage is given in a modernized form in *Vaughan's Wickliffe*.

[3] Perhaps the following theories from little studied authors may be interesting. In the "Elucidarium," among Anselm's works: "Discipulus. Sunt animæ ab initio creatæ? Magister Deus omnia simul et semel per materiam fecit, postmodum autem universa per speciem distinxit. Ab initio igitur animæ sunt creatæ in invisibili materia; formantur autem quotidie per speciem, et mittuntur in corporum effigiem." Lib. ii, c. 14. "Judæi autem ut nosti, omnes animas in mundo principio simul asserunt esse creatas et in loco uno repositas, et quousque incorporentur omnes, non esse diem venturum judicii, et ex quo incorporabuntur, statim provenire finem mundi. Christiani vero astruunt novas quotidie animas

evolvement of new products from aboriginal elements, and the coming into visible, or conscious existence of what in some sense had the rudiments of being from the beginning, and this according to fixed laws; and if, as the progress of modern science seems to make probable, the only thing purely contingent is man's own free choice, and even that foreseen from the beginning, and from the beginning provided for; then our individual souls must all have been in some mysterious way created with, and bound up in, and made to depend upon the existence, and be liable to be affected by the actions of the first men and women that lived upon the earth, to whose mere will we do certainly to some extent owe it, that we exist at all. In this case we should owe to God only that original perfection of goodness in which all things were at the first created, and to ourselves in our parents, that we are now degraded and sinful.[1]

procreari, formatisque novis in ventre corporibus infundi."—*Peter Alfonsus. Dialogus.* Tit. 1. "[Anima] cum creatur nova, fiat humanæ naturæ—facit ergo Deus animam novam, quæ naturam non habet novam. Est ergo eadem natura nova et non nova. In persona nova est, in specie nova non est. Nova est proprietate personali, non nova proprietate communi. Creatur a Deo de exstantibus, vel de nihilo, anima nova personaliter ejus naturæ, quæ fuit ab Adam universaliter. Cum dicis humanæ animæ persona creatur, humanam animam non dicis creari, sed personam. Persona autem humanæ animæ est anima individua. Creatur igitur non humana anima sed individua anima. Individua anima creatur, quia prius non erat, humana anima non creatur, quia prius erat, et in aliis personis erat. Ideo una et eadem substantia est utriusque, qui cum individua anima creatur, fit humanæ naturæ, et modo facta de nihilo, assumit in se factum ab initio. Assumit inquam individua communem, ut habeat eandem cum ea substantiam. Et cum proprietatibus suis differant, per substantiam penitus sunt idem—his rationibus ostenditur, secundum orthodoxos, omnes homines originaliter culpam trahere, et in Adam omnes peccasse, quamvis animæ non fiant de traduce.—*Odo Ep. Camerac. Opuscula Sacra*, lib. iii. §. 8.

[1] Equidem negari nequit, infantes in Adam fuisse, cum peccavit, sed in illo causaliter, sive materialiter, velut in semine fuerunt, in seipsis personaliter sunt: quia in illo fuerunt ipsum semen, in se singuli sunt diversæ personæ; in illo non alii ab illo, in se alii quam ille. In illo fuerunt ille, in se sunt ipsi: fuerunt igitur in illo, sed non ipsi: quoniam nondum erant ipsi. Forsitan dicet aliquis: istud esse quo alii homines in Adam fuisse dicuntur, quasi nihil et inane quoddam est, nec est nominandum "esse." Dicat ergo—nihil fecisse Deum, cum omnia quæ procreantur ex semine, Ipse fecit prius in seminibus, et dicat nihil,

It seems antecedently probable that the Deity, in creating a race to come into existence in succession would, according to that economy of power which is one of the surest evidences of wisdom, so link them all to the first of the race, as by making their existence to depend upon that first, to avoid all necessity for continual new creation. If so, the coming into existence of all after the first would not be directly or exclusively the act of the Deity, but in a certain sense the act of the parents also, and this of course to a greater or less extent, according to the degree of freedom possessed by those

vel vanum aliquid esse hoc, quod si vere non esset, hæc quæ videmus esse non essent. Si enim verum non est ea quæ natura procreat ex seminibus, in illis aliquid fuisse; nullo modo ex ipsis essent. Quod si hoc dicere stultissimum est, non falsum vel vanum sed verum et solidum esse fuit, quo fuerunt omnes alii homines in Adam: nec fecit Deus inane aliquid, cum eos in illo fecit esse; sed sicut dictum est, in illo fuerunt non alii ab illo et ideo longe aliud quam sunt in seipsis. Quoniam itaque in tantæ gratiæ celsitudine positus bona, quæ sibi, et illis servanda acceperat, sponte deseruit; idcirco filii perdiderunt quod pater illis cum servando dare posset, non servando, abstulit. Hæc mihi sufficere videtur ratio, cur ad infantes peccatum, et mala descendant Adæ; si diligenter, remota nostra voluntate, quæ sæpe et multum impedit mentem ab intellectu rectitudinis, ipsa pura justitia consideretur. Qualiter autem peccatum idem mihi videatur ad vos descendere, paucis expediam. Est peccatum a natura, ut dixi: et est peccatum a persona. Itaque quod est a persona, potest dici personale; quod autem a natura, naturale, quod dicitur originale: et sicut personale transit ad naturam; ita naturale ad personam hoc modo. Quod Adam comedebat, hoc natura fecit: quia ut hoc exigeret, sic creata erat. Quod vero de ligno vetito comedit, non hoc voluntas naturalis, sed personalis, hoc est, propria fecit: quod tamen egit persona, non fecit sine natura. Persona enim erat, quod dicebatur Adam; naturæ, quod homo: fecit igitur persona peccatricem naturam; quia cum Adam peccavit, homo peccavit. Siquidem non quia homo erat, ut vetitum præsumeret impulsus est: sed propria voluntate, quam non exigit natura, sed persona concepit, attractus est. Similiter fit in infantibus e converso. Nempe, quod in illis non est justitia, quam debent habere, non hoc fecit illorum voluntas personalis, sicut in Adam; sed egestas naturalis, quam ipsa natura accepit ab Adam. In Adam namque extra quem de illa nihil erat, est nudata justitia quam habebat: et ea semper, nisi adjuta, caret, hac ratione, quia natura subsistit in personis, et personæ non sunt sine natura, facit natura personas infantium peccatrices. Sic spoliavit persona naturam bono justitiæ in Adam, et natura egens facta omnes personas, quas ipsa de se procreat, eadem egestate peccatrices et injustas facit. Hoc modo transit peccatum Adæ personale in omnes, qui de illo naturaliter propagantur; et est in illis originale sive naturale.—*Anselm, De Conceptu Virginis et Orig. Pec.* c. 23.

first parents, so that, supposing the time and circumstances under which the rest of the race should come into existence should be entirely, in a negative, and almost entirely in a positive sense, in the power of those first parents—they being driven only by something, not even then an absolute necessity to give existence to their successors, somewhen and somehow, then the condition of that race is hardly at all to be ascribed to the act of God, but is almost entirely the free act of those first parents. Such we know to be very nearly the actual state of man, how then does the creation of this race stand in relation to the Deity? His first and only direct act, the act of creating the first men with such high and noble powers, was to those first men a very high and thankworthy benefit, and as for the race, so long as the primitive order remained, it was so to them likewise, but subject to certain delegated powers in a free agent, an agent so free as to be under no naturally absolute necessity of even continuing the race at all. Thus men now stand in a duplicate relation of origination—to their parents, and to the Creator of those parents; and from these two rules of authority, clashing as they do but too often, arise most of the more difficult points of casuistry. Previous to our birth, our existence lies almost entirely in the power of man. To some members of the human family, therefore, we stand nearly in the relation of creatures to a Creator, and the moment we have existence we stand also in that same general relation to God; but under what circumstances we are to enter into our relations to God depends very largely upon the will of our parents. This is, however, subject to general rules which govern the increase of all races for the general good of the members of those races; thus, as regards man, we see as a fact that intemperance and excess, and generally all vice and sin are unfavourable to the increase of the race; as, for instance, none of the pagan Roman emperors had a son born heir to the empire,

and so too, misery and scarcity, anxiety and national calamities all check the increase of the human family, so that the increase of the race is in fact prevented by natural laws in all cases, in which it could not but increase the amount of misery. Thus creation, instead of resembling a bare straight pole, where there is nothing which does not arise in a direct line from the base, is more like the beauty of a natural and living tree, where the leaves depend upon the twigs, the twigs upon the lesser branches, and these upon the greater, these all upon the trunk, and that maintains its hold upon the ground, whence the sustenance of all is derived, by the thousand sinuosities of its spreading root; hence it is that relations of benevolence to other men are implied in love to God, and are not truly virtuous without it; for how soon would a leaf decay, separable unit as it is, that merely touched the ground and scorned communion with the branches; how vain and useless would be its union with the stem, if through that stem it had no communion with the earth, its sustainer. A wise man, whatever his disposition towards religion generally, cannot but acknowledge that these compound relations may well exceed the unravelling ingenuity of the wisest, and that, where every step is but a probability, it must be rash to draw any conclusion from the whole, so positive as to rest upon it securely, in contradiction to arguments from other and independent sources far less obscure. This we can conclude with certainty, that there is no act of the Deity directly involving any evil consequence; that all His acts viewed in themselves are perfectly good, on which we may safely rest, without involving ourselves in the labyrinth of action and reaction, which have evolved such results from such original blessings.

It may, no doubt, be objected, that though our argument would justify the original creation of man by one who knew not how he would use his powers, it fails in not allowing for the fact that God must have foreseen all these, and so be

taken to have intended them; but, as we have seen,[1] it is exceedingly doubtful how far the acts of a free being can change the moral character of previous acts, in themselves good, towards that free being, and supposing that all the acts of the Deity through which it was possible for man to come to his present condition were good in themselves, which it is indeed very difficult to deny, then it is clear that the present acts of the Deity towards him are but a continuance of His old goodness, and are marked by a design to benefit man, and recall him from the evil effects of his fall, whence we may conclude the goodness of all the rest, however in some cases obscured; and particularly must this be manifest to a Christian, for, even allowing that man's foreknown fall would have made benevolence to him almost cruel, it is certain that his foreknown restoration would change that cruelty into the greater benevolence.[2]

But how could one sin produce such awful effects? The reason of this is probably to be found in the fact, that between a being without sin and one which has sinned, though but once, there is necessarily an impassable gulf, in fact as innocent and guilty are contradictories, so must be the conditions of these two beings. There is no discord in the desires of a pure being, although capable of sin. The will of God and the course of nature coincide with such a one's love of pleasure, and all is harmony;[3] but the moment that he has sinned, the

[1] Part 1. ch. vi.

[2] *Ὁτιμεν γαρ συμβησεται μεταξυ τῳ ζωῳ το ταθειν την φθοραν, ουκ ηγνοηκεν ὁ δημιουργος, αλλ'ηπιστατο, μετα τουτου, και των ατοπων την λυσω, και της φθορας την αναιρεσιν, και εις το αμεινον ανακομιδην, και των εν αρχαις αγαθων την αναλῃψιν.—Cyril. Alex. Glaph.* lib. i. *περι του Αδαμ.*

[3] Zwar ist ihm nach der Wahrheit seine Wesens Gott keinesweges ein Fremder, sein heiliger Wille nich etwas Aeusserliches; est ist seine Bestimmung, seinen Willen se völlig Enis zu machen mit dem göttlichen Willen, das jede fermere Möglichkeit der Abtremung aufgehoben ist; und erst in der Erfüllung dieser Bestimmung kaun er sich auch mit sich selbst, mit seiner Idee vollkommen Enis und eben darin vollkommen frei wissen.—*Julius Müller Christ. Lehr. d. Sünde*, vol. ii. p. 191.

will of God and the law of right come into direct opposition with his own love of pleasure, thus a discord is commenced within, and God ceases to be the natural and exclusive object of his service, he begins to serve sin, and so God removes further and further from him,[4] for to love God now is to love punishment, this his universal love of good revolts from as an evil. To shield himself from it he seeks and delights in the withdrawal of that very conscious presence of the Deity which was once his greatest pleasure; and thus, as we see every day, that one sin needs another to hide it, a being which has once sinned can scarcely avoid sinking a little deeper at every step; then, if he have children, these are subject to a triple discord —their own love of pleasure, their parents' wills (even omitting the power of example), and the strict and perfect rule of right, which no being subject to the perfect Deity can ever altogether forget—all strive to draw them in different ways, and man might easily have thus become what now we know he is. Besides, we can scarcely doubt, but that the sin itself was a sin, and against the will of God, chiefly because it was an act injurious to the sinner, and so the sin itself would add to all the consequences of mere sinfulness.[5] What man would then require would be the discipline of a strict education, to bring him back to right; then must all sensuous pleasures become fleeting and uncertain, and the earth become a place of labour

[4] Ainsi le principal changement qui lui est arrivé, et qui cause tout le désordre des sens et des passions, c'est ce que, par une juste punition, Dieu s'est retiré de lui, et qu'il n'a pas voulu être son bien, ou plutôt qu'il n'a plus fait sentir ce plaisir qui lui marquait qu'il était son bien. (See *Gregory Hom.* 39. *sur les Evangiles.*) De sorte que les plaisirs sensibiles, qui ne portent qu'aux bien du corps étant demeurés seuls et n'étant plus contrebalancés par ceux qui le portaient auparavant à son véritable bien, l'union étroite qu'il avait avec Dieu s'est étrangement affaiblie.—Aussi depuis le péché, les plaisirs de sens ont abaissé l'âme vers les choses sensibles par le défaut de ces délectations intérieures qui contrebalancoient, avant le péché, l'inclination que nous avons pour les bien du corps.—*Malebranche, de la Recherche de la Vérité*, lib. i. c. v. sec. 1.

[5] Perhaps the forbidden fruit itself produced irregular and morbid action in the physical system.—See *Burnet's Boyle Lectures*, vol. ii.

and discomfort, lest man, finding it still a place of mere enjoyment, should sink deeper and deeper into sin; and so death became necessary both as the end of education and as the natural result of pain and disorder. We know, in fact, that this discipline has even now some effect, for open sinners are far more rare in age than youth, and the whole race of man has certainly not receded even in morality, but rather, though its vices change very speciously, we may hope that each of the tidal waves of civilization has carried us a little higher in moral purity also. Education such as this can certainly never give us that purity which by nature we cannot have; it may, however, and in fact it does, prepare us to receive to good purpose that seed of God which is sown in the heart of Christians.

One reflection we may all draw with profit from this doctrine of original sin, and that is, that as in kind we are all alike sinful, we ought to love and strive to elevate and assist all who are sunk in sin, however deeply. One redemption we all need, one nature we all possess; as brethren of one family then, as partners in one misfortune, should we all aid one another in our advances to good, not despising one another, but condemning our own selves, that so our own great degree of holiness, which is, after all, sin, may not be overclouded and eclipsed by one who is comparatively even now full of all vice, but who has yet made more progress than we have, and a better use of smaller opportunities. Thus too we may console ourselves, though holiness seem impossible, for impossible it is by nature, impossible in this life, but not impossible for ever, if Christianity be true, not impossible even to us miserable sinners, by His grace, which if we have, we shall lament and strive to amend all our sinful failings; and if the will of man, against the will of God, plunged the whole world into misery, how much more if our whole will desire to co-operate with His, shall our efforts be crowned by Him with every success.

CHAPTER IV.

The Defect of Evidence.

THOSE who have striven to overturn Christianity have not infrequently objected, that if the All-powerful God had really intended to make a revelation to man He would have written it in the heavens, so that all men could not but see and believe it, so that they should be as irresistibly convinced of its truth as they are that they need food and ought to shun pain.[1] It is singular that these same writers, very often in the same work, object also that Christianity cannot come from God, because if so, it could not make so much as it does of belief and faith, as if these depended upon moral qualities rather than upon evidence, whereas, they say, on imperfect evidence no one can believe, on perfect evidence every one must. Now these two objections are mutually destructive, for if belief be a mark of virtue, then on their own principles must the evidence on which it is based be imperfect to all but the virtuous; so that if the evidence of Christianity were universally irresistible, Christianity itself would be necessarily false. If the evidence

[1] Malebranche observes, upon a similar objection with regard to the necessity of religion: Les biens du corps ne méritent pas l'application d' un Esprit que Dieu n'a fait que pour lui; il faut donc que l'esprit reconnaise de tels biens sans examen et par la preuve courte et incontestable du sentiment. Les pierres ne sont pas propre à la nourriture; la preuve en est convaincante, et le seul goût en a fait tomber d'accord tous les hommes. Mais pour Dieu, qui seul est le vrai bien de l'esprit, qui seul est au-dessus de lui, qui seul peut le récompenser en mille façons différentes, qui seul est digne de son application, et qui ne craint point que ceux qui le connaissent ne le trouvent point aimable, il ne se contente pas d'être aimé d'un amour aveugle et d'un amour d'instinct, il veut être aimé d'un amour éclairé et d'un amour de choix.—*Malebranche. De la Recherche de la Vérité*, liv. i. chap. v. s. 1.

of Christianity be not such as is obvious to all, but be discoverable only by careful and rather abstruse examination, then may it at the same time be, as it is, though fully proved, believed only by the careful and well disposed; thus religion and morality may be inseparably connected, and man may intelligently believe without becoming a mere automaton under an overpowering weight of evidence.

But let us enquire what is meant by having the evidence of Christianity written in the heavens. If this is impossible, the objection is itself absurd; if it is in any sense possible, and is in that sense actually done, then is the objection converted into a very important confirmation. Now to write in language and character would manifestly be of no use to those who cannot read, and surely they need such evidence most; besides that, no language is universally understood; but it must be to wrong the objectors, seriously to suppose that they dream of actual physical writing,[1] they must mean that there ought to be such appearances in the heavens as should lead all men to look upon them, and speculate upon their origin, and should lead all who honestly do so speculate to gather from their existence the truth of all the great doctrines of our faith: this is, no doubt, to some extent possible, and equally beyond a doubt is actually done. For who can help looking upward to those regions whence light and warmth and rain descend, to raise for him food, and to give him pleasure and refreshment? And who that looks can fail to see a power directing them with might irresistible, and goodness ineffable?[2] Who set the stars

[1] Perhaps it requires but little imagination to see a real written symbol in the constellation of the Southern Cross, but, like all symbols, it needs an interpreter.

[2] Τι τουτο; Ἡλιος, οφθαλμος λεγει· τι τουτο; βρονται, ακουη λεγει· και τον τεχνιτην ποθει, και καταμαντευεται της τεχνης.—*Maximus Tyrius. Dissert. De Deo sec. Platon.* Ἀναβλέψατε ἄνθρωποι λογισμῷ εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν· καταμάθετε, τίς ὁ τανύσας αὐτόν; τίς ὁ ποικίλας αὐτὸν τῷ ἀστρῳ ἄνθει; τίς ὁ διατάξας δρόμον φωστῆρσι; τίς ὁ θέμενος τάξιν τῷ παντί; τίς ὁ ἀπείρῳ ἐπιστήμῃ ὄντως τοῖς πᾶσιν ἁρμονίαν θέμενος, δι' ἧς ὥσπερ τεταγμένου χορῦ ἥτε σοφία τῦ ποιήσαντος ἀνα-

their courses? Who appointed the sun his rising and his going down? Who made throughout so large a part of the world the day for needful labour and the night for needful rest? Who ordered the summer and the autumn? Who sendeth rain to revive and fertilize the earth? And what power preserves all these things in regular and orderly beneficence? No one can deny that these influences render to man far greater blessings, and are indeed far more necessary to his very existence, than anything which merely human power can effect; nor that the Being, from whom they come, deserves the most grateful thanks and faithful service it is in the power of man to render. I say, the Being from whom they come, because it is the

φωνεῖται, καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πλουτεῖ ἄνθρωπος.—Leo Imperator. Hom. 9. In om. Sanct.—Πως γαρ αν ὑπεστη τοδε το παν, η συνεστη, μη Θεου τα παντα και ουσιωσαντος, και συνεχοντος; ουδε γαρ κιθαραν τις ὁρων καλλιστα ησκημενην, και την ταυτην εναρμοστιαν και ευταξιαν, η τις κιθαρῳδιας αυτης ακουων, αλλο τι η τον της κιθαρας δημιουργον, και τον κιθαρῳδον εννοησει, και προς αυτον ανα-δραμειται τῃ διανοιᾳ, κἀν αγνοων τυχῃ ταις οψεσιν.—Greg. Nazianz. Orat. 28. 6. Quid enim potest esse tam apertum, tam confessum, tamque perspicuum, cum oculos in cælum sustuleris, et quæ sunt infra circaque lustraveris, quam esse aliquod numen præstantissimæ mentis, quo omnis natura inspiretur, moveatur, alatur, gubernetur, &c.—*Min. Felix. Octav.* Nor is this mere theory, for one of the greatest of travellers thus in his own style of phrasecology bears witness to its universality. Ein dumpfes, schauervolles Gefühl von der Einheit der Naturgewalten, von dem Geheimnissvollen Bande, welches das Sinnliche und Uebersinnliche verknüpft, ist allerdings (und meine eigenen Reisen haben es bestätigt) selbst wilden Völkern eigen.—*Alex. v. Humboldt. Kosmos. Introduct.* Nemo est enim tam rudis, tam feris moribus; quin oculos suos in cælum tollens, tametsi nesciat cujus Dei providentia regatur hoc omne quod cernitur; non aliquam tamen esse intelligit ex ipsa rerum magnitudine, motu, dispositione, constantia, utilitate, pulchritudine, temperatione: nec posse fieri, quin id, quod mirabili ratione constat, consilio majori aliquo sit instructum.—*Lactantius de falsa Rel.* lib. i. § 2. "As the certainty of a first principle of all things is necessarily concluded from the being of creatures, and the upholding and sustaining power and virtue of God is concluded from the mutability of those things in the world, whence we infer that there must be some stable foundation to those tottering things, some firm hinge upon which those changeable things do move, without which there would be no stability in the kind of things, no order, no agreement or union among them; so from the goodness of everything, and their usefulness to us, we must conclude Him good who made all these things; and since we find distinct goodnesses in the creature, we must conclude that one principle whence they did flow excels in the glory of goodness."—*Stephen Charnock. Of the Goodness of God.*

unavoidable conclusion of every one who sees design and usefulness, that it has an intelligent Author, a conclusion so natural that scarcely a *philosopher* can bring himself to hesitate about it. Again, because in orderly and beneficent works men are apt to forget the power of Him that doeth them,—Who launches the lightning, and Who raises the hurricane? Surely His power is great, whose works no strength can withstand; and yet once more, lest in His power men forget His goodness, Who gave the thunder a law, and made a decree for the hurricane, that, amid all their fury, they should bring refreshment and reinvigoration to the earth and its inhabitants? Surely the light of nature is so strong that he who will not blind his own eyes must see, written in the heavens and engraved upon the earth in characters most plain and legible, that there is One who reigneth in power and goodness over all. But as he who wilfully keeps his eyes closely covered might truly say, that *he* had no evidence that light proceeded from the sun, or indeed had any existence, so let him who thinks and says, though truly, that he can discern none of this writing, beware lest he should at last discover, that it was his own act only that bandaged about his eyes, and so having hindered himself from seeing, he may be held responsible for all the effects of his blindness.

Thus, so far as Theism and Natural Religion, and man's dependance upon another for safety, his own natural weakness, and God's merciful provision for his security are concerned, their evidence is written upon the heavens, in the best, if not the only way, in which it was possible for it so to be. In these, too, are contained the fundamental evidences of Christianity; and as for the particulars of redemption, and the actual solution of those difficulties, which without it we could only conclude to be probably soluble, they are a special grant of extraordinary beneficence, adapted to those only who have already realized the difficulties with which they deal; to those who

have not, as any solution of unfelt difficulties would be useless, and perhaps a subject of scoffing, we cannot think it any objection to God's goodness that they are not revealed; but Christianity is now offered throughout the whole world to those who feel those real difficulties, and its claims are confirmed to them by the external and manifest miracles with which its origin was accompanied.

Those same objectors, to whom we have before alluded, sometimes deny the possibility, or at least the credibility, of any such thing as a miracle. If, as some say, there cannot be a moral revelation,[1] then no doubt there can be no miracle to attest it, but even then it would be quite conceivable that there might be a revelation of a fact previously unknown to us, as for instance, some account of the absolute nature of the Deity, and to attest such a revelation a miracle, so far from being incredible, would be the very thing every one would expect; nay, the revelation itself would hardly be credible without it. It is absurd to say, that because a miracle is in itself a most improbable occurrence, therefore it is most improbable even where the circumstances render its performance all but certain. As the Christian revelation, therefore, does profess to include new facts, miracles are antecedently probable in support of it; the same evidence, therefore, which would prove any other fact would prove the actual occurrence of these miracles, unless indeed it were possible, which it manifestly is not, to give a strict proof that Christianity could not possibly be true. But there can be no doubt that an open and notorious suspension of the ordinary course of nature

[1] Yet see Berkeley's *Alciphron*, Dial. vi. § 19. "Whether it were possible for mankind to have known all parts of the Christian Religion, besides mysteries and positive institutions, is not the question—and that they actually did not know them is too plain to be denied. This perhaps was for want of making a due use of Reason. But, as to the usefulness of Revelation, it seems much the same thing whether they could not know, or would not be at the pains to know, the doctrines revealed."

is the very thing a plain man would expect to attest a revelation, for he might rightly argue, that since he could have no evidence of its truth in the ordinary course of nature, (for if so it would not in strictness be a revelation,) the natural and true evidence of it ought to be looked for in something above and differing from the ordinary course of nature, that is, in a miracle.[1] And then it may be asked, why were miracles ever allowed to cease? I answer, that a perpetual miracle ceases to be any miracle at all, and becomes a mere wonder, such a wonder as are already all the marvellous operations of nature; but it may be suggested that such could never be the case, if temporal blessings were miraculously united to spiritual perfections. I reply that there are now many such miracles, which only because they are usual men deem hardly wonders. Otherwise how is it that good Christians are happy even in misfortune, and bad men are often miserable in prosperity; and how is it that vice produces disease, while temperate and virtuous living is the best means of securing health? Christianity, therefore, might be evidenced by miracles, worked openly at its first preaching, but ceasing after a while; and such miracles need no further attestation than other facts not in themselves highly improbable. Such evidence we have, and very much more and better than on any other historical subject.

[1] Qualiter autem potest esse per se notum, Deum aliquid dicere, vel facere in testimonium alicujus rei dicunt dupliciter: unomodo si beatus videns Deum per essentiam videret ipsum movere intellectum alicujus ad assentiendum alicui veritati, et iste modus non competit viatori: aliomodo si aliquis videret aliquem effectum excedentem totam virtutem creaturæ fieri in testimonium alicujus rei, ex hoc enim sciretur Deus faciens talem effectum testificaretur illud propter quod fieret.—*Durandus. in Prol. lib. sent. Qu.* i. *f.* 5.

CHAPTER V.

The Insignificance of Man.

ALTHOUGH men easily fall into the sin of pride, and are very apt to think contemptuously of other men, and hardly think at all of any other beings, centering all in self—living and acting and complaining, and feeling injured too, as if they themselves were, or ought to be, the centre and object of all existence; it is far from being either easy or agreeable to most of us to carry out even a much lower form of any such ideas in theory to its legitimate results, and to realize as a fact the doctrine that the race of man is so noble, and has so high a destiny, that this material world was formed with the chief, if not the exclusive, aim of being a fit habitation for him during a season of probation, and that God Himself did not disdain to take his nature, and in that nature suffer for him and provide for him warnings and instruction to bring him back when he had wandered away from right, and does not, even now, refuse to come and in a special manner dwell within him, but rather desires and strives with man to allow Him so to do. We must indeed have a high conception of human nature to hold this consciously and firmly, and thence arises that objection to Christianity, perhaps far more often felt than expressed, that man is made too much of in it.

Now I do not mean to allege, that the whole even of our solar system was made primarily for man; we have no communication with or adequate knowledge of any part of it except our own earth; but it is manifest, that whatever may have been the primary object of the creation of all these

heavenly bodies, they do, to some extent and in a certain manner, subserve mankind, and are the means in various ways of benefiting ourselves. That we derive many advantages from the sun and moon is obvious to all, and at the present time we seem continually developing newer and newer modes of usefulness. And were it only to furnish us with a universal measure of time and an unerring mark of direction, or to nourish our sense of beauty and vastness, to raise us by the contemplation of a grandeur, our conception of which should grow with the growth of our knowledge, to high and ennobling thoughts, still the starry firmament would be most useful, and even uses more direct it need not now surprise us to discover. So again for this our earth, though we are in very truth lords over it, there is nothing in it which serves but one purpose; its parts are not useful in one relation and to one purpose only, but are so wonderfully contrived, that in every possible relation they have a use, and serve as many purposes as they can have relations; yet the earth is not a chaos; there is a due gradation of things living and inanimate; each serves each, but each by serving each advances the whole, and all is under the control of man and of some higher power, that is, of the common Creator and God.

In what does this globe of earth and water, with its circumambient atmosphere, differ from that body which is undoubtedly intended chiefly, if not exclusively, for the use of man? Its conformation is not essentially more wonderful nor more intricate; its chief difference is its vast extent. But after all, this is but a "little globe," and I can scarcely doubt but that in time men will begin to sigh for a larger space to roam about in; already we have explored very nearly the whole of it; already there is a sameness in the accounts of travellers; already we have discovered a reason why very nearly every part is and must always be as it now is and will be, in order that any part may continue as it has been. But the truth is,

there can be no comparison of greatness save with our material forms, which are indeed diminutive; but man is not a mere living form; the brain of man is not of that size which the skull incloses; its true dimensions are to be estimated by the vast multitude of things it can take in and arrange in its repositories; the head of man has room for more than all this "little globe;" man can make this earth a unit, and comprehend a universe in which it is of the size of a drop of water or a grain of sand. And if we think of our material structure as absurdly small compared with the vast expanse the telescope reveals to us, another application of the same optical powers will teach us that creation travels from us in both directions, and for every new world discovered in space a new and well-formed living thing may be drawn out of the abyss of littleness; and then so far from being humiliated at the smallness of our bodies, we shall rather admire that skill which could make our puny limbs the instruments of powers so enormous. In fact, when we come to judge of the subordination of things to an end, mere size is wholly irrelevant; largeness is not greatness, and man must rank in nature according to the power and objects of his faculties, and the end to which they work; for a dwarfish man of genius is a nobler thing than a stolid giant or a megatherium. It is certain that, feeble as men are individually, as a race there is no mere earthly power that can withstand them, or is served by them in their higher faculties; man, therefore, may be the head of the things of earth, and the world may be his palace, the better fitted for his service by its very largeness.

That same pride which leads men to make much of themselves individually tends to lower their conception of themselves as part of the human race. They have seldom indeed the clearness of perception to discern, that if everything is so immeasurably less than themselves, it must be small indeed; but they do contract a habit of looking upon their race as

something external to them, something which they can exalt themselves by thinking meanly of, and there are consequences flowing from greatness to which they have an unbounded aversion. There is nothing which bears stronger testimony to the duty of goodness than the struggles of a proud man to escape from the consciousness of sin. In this his individual pride comes into collision with his pride of race; for if it be of the nature of man to attain so high a moral elevation, his conscience will not let him believe that he is not a degraded and debased example; on the contrary, if man be very low in the scale of creation, a mere leaf twirling in the winds of passion upon the extremest boughs of the tree of life, then indeed, though he be not much better than his fellows, he may be a very good kind of man for a mere man notwithstanding, and have something to be proud of; so of intellectual powers and attainments. Where idleness and carelessness will not allow a man to raise himself above his fellows, he can only be great and proud by debasing them; thus it is in his power to gain a false appearance of elevation by depreciating the abstract greatness of his race.

The dignity of man, as taken in connection with Christianity, is not to be measured by the present state of man, for that same revelation tells us that he is now fearfully degraded: we must conceive of man as he would be if all his faculties were settled in due subordination, and his conscience reigned supreme in pure and awful supremacy;[1] then indeed we can think of him as beloved of God and very high

[1] Virtue alone leads to happiness, and we cannot please the Creator otherwise than by striving after our real happiness. What a height has man in this situation reached upon earth! Consider him, my friends, the pure-minded subject of the kingdom of God: how all his thoughts, wishes, inclinations, and passions are harmonized! How they all tend to the real well-being of the creature and the admiration of the Creator! If the world could only show one example of such perfections, should we hesitate to say, This being, this object of Divine regard, must be the final end of the creation?—*Moses Mendelsohn, Phaedon.* C. Cullen's Translation, p. 176. When I speak of man before the fall, I mean a

in the scale of being; so high in capacity, that not only can he conceive nothing higher than the utmost possible perfections of intellect and goodness, which he himself possesses in no small degree, but he needs only to add the one power of creation to enable him to comprehend perfectly how everything he has ever discovered might have been made and ordered as it is; this cannot be the case with any animal possessed of lower powers, for they must see many things for which they are essentially unable to account. Such is man, truly made in the image of God, as we must for this purpose regard him.

We may remark that it is by no means clear that the effects of the redemption of Christ are wholly confined to the race of man; it may be far more extensive in its usefulness.[2] But a clearer refutation of the objection is furnished by the fact that man is so wonderful in his powers and their exercise, that mere natural reason will not leave us till we arrive at the suggestion of some such remedy; the effects of free will are so great and so powerful, that nothing but the direct intervention of the Deity can be supposed capable of reducing them to order. Now great and small, to the eye of a wise man, are measured by precisely this standard. A wise man knows that the source of all great calamities is some little error, and therefore he thinks nothing beneath his care on that account which may give rise to irremediable evils. So of man; his redemption is necessary to preserve a part of God's creation from irremediable ruin; God, therefore, will

happy being holding free intercourse with his Maker in a world where there was no curse, no sin, no suffering; and I feel my own wretchedness, that while I write these words I know not what they mean. I cannot but feel, not only that my knowledge is limited, but that from the darkness of my understanding and the depravity of my affections, I can form no just idea of the matter.—*S. R. Maitland, D. D. Eruvin Ess.* iii.

[2] See *Colos.* i. 20, *Eph.* i. 10; and in the Ignatian Epistle to the Smyrnæans, we read:—*Και τα επουρανια και ἡ δοξα των αγγελων, και οἱ αρχοντες ὁρατοι τε και αορατοι, εαν μη πιστευσωσιν εις το ἁιμα Χριστου, κακεινοις κρισις εστιν.*

and may without degradation directly interfere to save him, as He must have directly interfered to give an origin to the lowest and least of created things; let us realize the relative insignificance of all things to God, and then we shall not think this or that beneath His notice because of its comparative smallness. Man's salvation by God's own act is, no doubt, a subject of devout and lowly admiration, but for that alone, not for speculation upon the great and little of created things in relation to Him to whose eyes all things are alike distinct, and to whom the least evil is as repugnant as the very greatest.

CHAPTER VI.

The partial Influence of Christianity.

THE next objection to present itself is the fact that a knowledge of Christianity has never been given to a very large proportion of mankind, whence it might be said, How can God be just, and yet confine the knowledge of the true religion to only a chosen few?

I answer that a knowledge of the true religion never was, and is not now, confined to Christians or Jews.[1] There is a clear distinction between the speculative knowledge of facts and the practical knowledge of duties; the first of these in perfection is impossible to any finite being; the second, which is the essence of religion, has been known to all. The true religion is to love mercy and hate iniquity, as much as lieth in us to do good to all men, and to reverence and honour Him from whom we have freely received all that we now enjoy. This is what Adam practised in Paradise; what the Patriarchs handed down; what all men have everywhere acknowledged as their duty; what the Jewish and Christian revelations were meant to encourage and enable men to perform; and the facts therein revealed were made facts to supply our defects in. It cannot be essentially necessary to the deriving any good effects from Christ's passion, that we should know of its occurrence any more than the effect of medicine is impeded by our taking it under the impression that it was

[1] Res ipsa, quæ nunc Christiana religio nuncupatur, erat apud antiquos, nec defuit ab initio generis humani, quousque ipse Christus venit in carne, unde vera religio, quæ jam erat, cœpit apellari Christiana.—*Augustine. Retract. Lib.* 1. *c.* 13. § 3.

not medicinal. I do not think it possible to maintain, that the benefits of redemption are confined to those who explicitly believe it to have been accomplished; for if so, those prophets and kings who desired to see the day of our Lord, and saw it not, cannot be saved;[1] necessarily, therefore, an implicit faith may be accepted, but this men may have had in all ages and all countries, for they must everywhere hope to be saved through some (though to them obscure and hidden) means, which the infinite knowledge and goodness of God will discover and apply.

The true object of these two revelations, as it seems to me, has been to incite men to set themselves more zealously to do their acknowledged duty, to disclose and confirm intellectual truths to stand as bulwarks and landmarks for the preservation of sound, moral, and spiritual religion, and to remove the great difficulties as to the remission of sins which may have so strong an operation for evil in the formation of *their* characters who are wanting in intellectual humility, while under the latter, at least, extraordinary assistances are offered to the faithful in their endeavours after perfect holiness.

If I be asked why some parts of the world should have had the Gospel preached to them while all have not, I answer that it is of God's goodness to those nations that they have been so instructed, and that there is no injustice involved in this distinction, for the subject matter is one purely of spontaneous and extraordinary beneficence, and its object is to make man better than he is of himself willing that he should become. As to a reason for this selection, when any man can tell why he has received more at God's hands than he

[1] Alia est prioritas temporis, alia causæ moralis. Homines fuerunt Deo reconciliati ante satisfactionem Christi, respectu prioritatis temporis. Concedo. Fuerunt reconciliati ante Christi satisfactionem ratione prioritatis moralis causæ. Nego. Causa physica effectum suum præcedit tempore, non item causa moralis. —*John Cameron, Disp. ad Coroll.* iii. *Opp.* p. 361.

had any right to require, and this has been the case with every one who has received existence, then I may hope to be able to render a sufficient answer to the question why I was born in a Christian country, or what is the same thing in other words, why the Gospel was known in my mother land when I was born there. At present, save that God so willed, I must freely confess that I cannot tell, but I can never cease to be sincerely grateful (and I am heartily sorry that I should not be more so), for that God to all His other mercies has added this of having chosen me, in myself so utterly unworthy, to partake of these extraordinary and special blessings.

And now lastly, as to the scanty influence of Christianity upon the lives and actions of those who profess to have received it.[2] This surely can never be rightly charged upon any but upon those only who so neglect and misapply the means of happiness, or who are in themselves so desperately wicked, that all the inducements of love, all the horrors of punishment, all the arguments of true self-interest, all the promises, the threats, the ennobling ideas and the spirit-stirring examples contained in the Christian revelation,—all these, received, acknowledged, and professedly realized, are yet insufficient to turn them even so far away from sin, as to

[2] "Christians are entirely forbidden to strive and cry in the world, and try to display a front: I have no hesitation in saying that it is a false Christianity which attempts to do so. We are commanded most strictly to pray and give alms and fast in secret; and in proportion as the whole body of Christians has among it those who do so, in that proportion is it rewarded openly. And from the continuance of Christ's kingdom upon earth, I infer that these duties are still observed; and my belief is, that when the last day of account comes, we shall find that all the whole sum of outward and stirring exertion has done a mere nothing towards the promotion of His kingdom when put in comparison with the effect of these unostentatious duties. Hence the side of Christianity, which you see is just that which is the most contradictory to its distinctive characteristic as a practical system; whereas the side by which the Christian Church has power with God and prevails, is lonely weeping and supplication, which you do not see."—*J. B. Morris, Essay towards the Conversion of Hindus*, p. 357. Dial. 4.

make them use aright the means of grace propounded to them.

Perhaps we may see in this neglect and profanation one good and valid reason why so many nations have been so long left in darkness; perhaps it was because they would have done even more wickedly, and put even greater obstacles in the way of a general reception of the truth; and we cannot but observe how wonderfully it is contrived, that just in proportion as men recognize the true worth of Christianity, just in that proportion do they endeavour to spread it among the heathen; a cold, dead, useless Christianity would be no benefit to the converts, and accordingly the professors of it are never missionaries.

CHAPTER VII.

Some Objections to the Bible as the Word of God considered.

THERE are some who say that a revelation coming from a wise and benevolent Deity must come in so plain and unmistakeable a sense, and with such obvious evidence, that merely human learning could never be necessary to understand or defend it; this they say the elaborate expositions and learned array of evidences wherewith Christians have hedged in the Bible, show that *it* does not; either, therefore, the Bible is not God's word, or God is not wise and benevolent.

Now I affirm of Christianity, that its evidence and its substance are alike plain to all, it requires no learning to have a conscience of sin, it requires no deep meditation to discover the danger of offending, nor need a man have spent his life in study to perceive how Christianity propounds to him a remedy, or how it bids him live; nor does any man need further evidence than its inward adaptation to his own wants, and its notorious success in converting the world, in spite of bitter persecutions, to assure him that it is of God. We are here on the brink of one of the deepest questions of theology and philosophy, the influence of the Spirit of truth in guiding the humble and opening up deep things to the ignorant, it is certain that many uninstructed persons have been able to confound the wise, for this we must give God the glory, and to this evidence we must attribute some of the success of the Gospel.

But why, if this be so, has it ever been thought necessary to expend so much learning upon the defence and explanation

of Christianity? The true reason is, that ingenuity and learning having been expended on the one side, in the endeavour to refute or misrepresent it, it became necessary to resort to the same weapons in conducting the defence. If learning had not suggested difficulties from the remarks or silence of heathen authors, learning would not have been necessary to remove them; if ingenuity had never been expended in the search for inconsistencies in various parts of the Sacred History, ingenuity would never have been needed to discover and display undesigned coincidences. But the truth is, that the defenders of religion have so followed up its opponents in all their shifts, and so turned all their objections into confirmatory arguments, that there is little left now for those who will not believe but to object to the very extent and depth of those defences which perverse ingenuity was alone the cause of. To whom can these things be a difficulty? Certainly not to the learned, for they can appreciate the worthlessness of the objections; nor yet to the unlearned, for they cannot discern their weight. The one seeing and understanding all the details cannot be confused by them, the other seeing and understanding only the result, can have no room to doubt concerning the truth of that which has firmly held its own, and holds it still, when so many whole systems of difficulties have sunk into merited oblivion. To be sure, if a man will say—I do not see how these objections can be answered, therefore, without understanding the current and generally received explanations, I *will* doubt, —he may do so, and very impious and criminal he will be for his pains.

I do not mean to allege that there are no difficulties in relation either to the evidence or contents of our Revelation, but only that these difficulties are always met by a refutation adapted to the circumstances under which they arise; thus learned difficulties are disposed of by arguments worthy of learned men, and the difficulties which arise from ignorance

an ignorant man may well overcome; by which means, so far as practice is concerned, the Christian Revelation is well attested to all.

I say so far as practice is concerned, because no doubt intellectual curiosity may discover matters difficult of perfect explanation. This is in part owing to the nature of a revelation contained in written language. It is manifest to all that a written record of revelation is most useful, yet such a one must give rise to some necessity of study; for a book revelation cannot be immediately addressed to all, seeing that all cannot read; and besides, so far as it is a book, it must be written in some language, and there is but a small proportion of mankind that can understand any one language. For all practical purposes a good translation may be used as the original, but when we leave the regions of practice it becomes necessary to consider that those only who can read and understand the original are capable of giving an intelligent opinion about its true meaning. It follows, then, that it is absurd to object to the truth of the Bible, that learned writers must be studied in learned tongues completely to understand it, for this must be the case with every book in relation to far the larger part of mankind.

Much antecedent knowledge of the subjects treated of is necessary to understand *any* book; but when a subject of such immense extent as the history and destinies of the whole human race is treated of in a work of moderate compass, how vast must their learning be who are competent, not only to understand, but to discover and refute the errors in it. To apply this to the objections against the morality of the Bible, what a sound and learned moralist he must be who is competent to form a judgment on such a point. It cannot surely be pretended that one who has never thought at all about virtue and vice, and right and wrong, and liberty of moral action in man, and in God, can be entitled to deny of any particular

thing that it can possibly be right. Our own experience tells us every day, how apt the most able and acute among us are to estimate amiss the moral qualities of actions we see performed by others; shall we, who have thus learnt diffidence as to man, lay aside all our diffidence when we come to think of God? Shall we, when all our learning only shows us the more clearly how ignorant even the contemporaries of every man who has made a figure in the world have been of his true character, and of the true moral nature and purport of his efforts—shall *we* assume that we can instinctively penetrate the mind of our own Maker, and spell out perfect justice as it lies hidden in the will of the Almighty? Can the clay say to the potter, why hast thou made me thus? Can a man be more just than God? Could even we ourselves but a few years since form any sound judgment of the plans of others towards us, and of the justice and benevolence of such plans? Nay, can we not all recollect more than once, when no longer mere children, that we disliked and doubted of, nay even (to our shame be it spoken!) resented and resisted plans which now we see to have been dictated by solid judgment and sincere affection? If so, and if we realize all that is contained in the admission, we shall readily conclude that a man must be indeed a most sound and judicious moralist rightfully, or usefully, to sit in judgment on the Bible.

If the matter were not of too serious an importance, it would be amusing to observe how objectors assume that the book is not of God, before they begin to examine it, and then gravely tell us that their examination alone has led them to a conclusion, which they must have assumed before its commencement, unless indeed they admit that that commencement was impious and absurd. For what right has any man to criticise God's word, and what does it prove to show that there are things hard to be reconciled with our ideas in the record of God's dealings with us, when we know that our

own worldly education presented during its course difficulties at the time quite as inexplicable? Till, then, our education is complete we must conclude that He who made us has not made us for nought, that He who has given us all we have of good must bear a good will towards us, and that He in whose hands we are must know better what is right for us than we ourselves.

Men are very apt to look at and consider of God's dealings with other men in the same manner and upon the same principles upon which they would judge of the dealings of two mere men with one another, and then think that they can be impartial and fitting judges of the nature of that conduct; whereas the case is far otherwise, for He whose dealings with us are inscrutable, and to be received in faith, is equally inscrutable in His dealings with other men, and is their God as well as our own.

What then? Are we to accept a revelation on mere external evidence, without any thought of what it may contain? Far from it: we must, for instance, reject immediately every pretended revelation which has nothing in it mysterious, or hard to be understood; for the condition of man, as we feel it in ourselves, is terrible, marvellous, and mysterious, to an extent almost defying our belief,[1] still more rendering impossible any explanation wholly free from difficulties; and further, as we cannot fathom omniscience, or compass the mind of universal benevolence, whatever represents God truly must to us represent him darkly. Again, Revelation must have a certain analogy with external nature, which would also lead us to expect some mystery.[2] But through all this mist, the natural

[1] Πολλα μεν δεινα κουδεν ανθρωπου δεινοτερον πελει.—*Sophocles. Antig.* 332.

[2] See *Butler's Analogy*, and the passage from *Origen* upon which it is founded, and *Berkeley's Alciphron, Dial.* vi. § 8.—*Euph.* Tell me, Alciphron, do you not acknowledge the light of the sun to be the most glorious production of Providence in this natural world.—*Alc.* Suppose I do.—*Euph.* This light, nevertheless, which you cannot deny to be of God's making, shines only on the surface of things,

offspring of our blindness, Revelation must show us a Deity, wise and good in His own nature, and propounding to us wisdom and goodness, as both our duty in themselves, and as the only road to His favour and to future happiness. This its bitterest opponents confess to be true of the Bible, more than of any other book claiming a similar origin, though they say there are some things in it inconsistent with this teaching; but I think we cannot prudently deny but that the great majority of men are wholly incompetent to pass any independent judgment in the matter, and that to the greatest and wisest of us all we must expect any revelation, if true, to present great difficulties, some difficulties probably for ever insoluble.

The difficulties, however, to which I have alluded, are very seldom, if ever, wholly without good fruit if received as coming from God; thus, I can well imagine that it may seem strange that we find throughout the account of the kingly period of Jewish History, such constant reference to some extraneous chronicles, which are all now lost; but these references to a devout and contemplative mind are full of useful lessons. What would those kings themselves and their cotemporary admirers have referred to with so much pride as to the chronicles of the kingdom? "Behold! His might and how he warred and the ivory house that he made, are they not written in the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel?" It was for a lasting place in those Chronicles that they chiefly laboured and fought, and they have had their reward; yes, they have had it all, and the reference yet remains to mock the vanity of their wishes, to exhibit to us the emptiness of their object, and to

shines not at all in the night, shines imperfectly in the twilight, is often interrupted, refracted and obscured, represents distant things and small things dubiously, imperfectly, or not at all. Should it not follow, therefore, that to expect in this world a light from God, without any mixture of shadow or mystery, would be departing from the rule and analogy of the Creation? And that consequently it is no argument the light of Revelation is not divine, because it may not be so clear and full as you expect.

remind us that if we, like them, look to earthly fame, we may share their fate, for their memorial is perished with them; and so we, though we may engrave our names too deeply on our country's annals to be ever forgotten while they remain, may yet be at last remembered no more, and lose that deathless fame we gave our own souls to gain. One record remains to confront these kings when they arise to judgment; it is not the record of their wars or their magnificence, of anything that made a noise in their days,—it is the memorial in God's book of how they served Him; and the one altar that they built to Baal, the one prophet they oppressed or slew, are now a greater blot upon their memory than would have been the foulest defeat, and the meanest equipage they so dreaded to have connected with their names. Worse yet, this memorial is an everlasting witness to their sin and for their condemnation, and when all the fruits of their might and splendour are vanished like the chronicles, where alone they were ever written, this will shine only with intenser brightness, when the world itself shall be dissolved, and all its outward fashion pass away, and we shall be alone with God.

Some will put forward as a difficulty, that God is represented as changeable, and subject to passions, of which the true solution probably is, that an unchangeable being must in some sense be liable to change when it has relations to a changeable thing; thus a strong wind blowing steadily from one quarter will not propel all the ships that come within its influence exactly in one direction; but according to the various disposition of their sails and the action of the steersman in each vessel, may drive each one in a different direction from all the rest. So God's will being unchangeably directed to good, acts differently upon different men, and upon the same man at different times, according to the changes of his disposition. This variation is no variation in God Himself, but only the change of outward action necessary to preserve that inward

and external immutability: for if there were no external change, man's variation would work a real change in God's internal.

There are a few difficulties in chronology and criticism which may arise in part from the corruptions of time, in part from the deficiency and errors of other records, and in part from the fact that the scope of the writers was not the strict chronicling of historic events as such, but the declaration of God's will and providence. Besides these, there are the chief and only moral objections, such as the overlooking in some men of faults punished most severely in others, a point peculiarly within God's own province and beyond the power of our judgment, and the execution, by conscious human instrumentality of punishments, which would not have been objected to if inflicted only by what is called natural agency. Thus I suppose few would maintain, and no one be so convinced as to abandon his faith on the theory, that it would have been inconsistent with the Divine goodness that Sisera should have been killed by a fall from his horse, though in his flight from Barak, or that the Canaanites should have been annihilated by a pestilence. If so then neither was their death unjust, though caused by human agency; nor were those who slew those sinners under a direct Divine command a whit more criminal than is he who obeys the equally direct Divine command contained in the same book, to love his neighbour as himself. An executioner is not necessarily a criminal, though he may cause the death of an innocent man, much less can it be criminal to execute God's judgments, seeing that He can never deliver any innocent person into our hands. Thus there is no injustice in any portion of the whole matter, for the

[1] Καὶ οἱ μὲν τῶν ζώντων, ἐχθροὶ τῶν θεῶν, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου γινόμενοι ἐχθροὺς ἡμῖν ποιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς. Οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων ὀργιζόμενοι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων θεοὺς μὲν ἡμῖν οὐκ ὄντων ἐλαττῶν, ἑαυτοῖς δὲ κολαστὰς συναπτόντων.—*Sallustius Phil. De Dis et Mundo*, c. 14.

criminals were rightly punished by the will of God, and by the hand of man at his command.

There are few, even of those who condemn most strongly Jael's conduct (to take what I conceive to be the strongest instance), who do not hold that it is allowable, if not a duty, to misdirect an assassin when enquiring after his victim, which is, in principle, a justification of her conduct. If it be necessary to show that the wife of Heber did no wrong, but was in fact deserving of praise, we may, nay must, make a distinction in her favour between the condition of a Christian now and of a Kenite then. God's command was, that the Canaanites should be extirpated, as a punishment for their enormous crimes; in the performance of this command Jael used equivocation, if not direct deceit. Here was the doubtful part of her conduct; but, on the other hand, she, not being an Israelite, acknowledged the true God, dared the vengeance of Jabin by obedience to His will, and fought the most effectually of any that day against the idolatrous tyrants who had subdued and oppressed His people. These were some of her good deeds, and who shall say that they are not deserving of praise? Who, I mean, who is not beforehand determined to reject the Bible as God's word, for no one, except only these, can doubt but that His direction, in whose will alone, of all things, perfect justice and goodness are to be found, must be proper to be obeyed, and must through obedience work to the ultimate good of all.

The only question in any of these cases is concerning the giving of the command; I have already answered those who object to this as impossible, by reminding them of our common ignorance, and for the rest it should suffice that the Book says they were given, and says too that they were, like all the rest of God's commands, imperfectly performed by wavering, sinful men. Thus, so far as the Book is taken as a whole, it discloses no approval by the Almighty of any the least sin, but, on the

contrary, manifests his hatred of iniquity in his direction that it should be completely extirpated; and the record is strictly true to human nature, for it relates that the moment God commanded men to execute his judgments, the sinful love of blood and conquest cooled down, and men, ever sinful, sinned in loving sloth and peace.

There remain the great difficulties connected with hereditary sin and expiatory sufferings, but these I have before treated of, and shown not to be peculiar to revelation. These must be woven into the structure of any true revelation, and are so, I believe, by the Bible and the Christian religion alone, which is in itself a greater argument for their truth than anything drawn from difficulties of detail can be against it.

CHAPTER VIII.

How can the World have been so recently created?

I HAVE postponed the answer to this difficulty till this late portion of my work, because, without its being presupposed as satisfied, the progress of our reasoning has almost indefinitely diminished its importance. Several schools of philosophy have believed in the existence of the Deity, and yet denied the creation of the world; we have shown the truth of the positive part of their belief, by showing that there are no insuperable difficulties in the way of believing that there is one sole and perfectly beneficent Ruler of the universe, but that on the contrary, all we see and know tend to confirm this belief; thus we have removed one reason on which the supposition of the eternity of matter has been built, which may be stated thus. Man is evil. He is composed of body and spirit. God is a Spirit; therefore spirit is good. But, since man is certainly evil, body must be evil. Then, as God cannot be supposed to have given origin to anything that is evil, it follows that matter or body must have an existence independent of Him. This is altogether refuted by showing that there is nothing in the universe which God may not have created.

The other and more real difficulty is this. If this world is good, since God is not more good at one time than another, there can be no reason why the earth should have remained a whole eternity uncreated. It cannot, therefore, have done so; but God must have remained from all eternity immutable in His character of Creator of, or rather Author of existence

and order to the world, as well as in His other attributes. One consequence which might be drawn from this might be, that God was the World, which would be a pure contradiction, for the world is essentially mutable, while God was assumed, for the sake of this very argument, to be perfectly immutable. But wherein could the immutability of the Deity consist? for our own consciousness tells us, that creation and sustenance, though perhaps similar, are yet in some degree essentially different. If God, therefore, were immutably a Creator, this our world would be only one of an infinite series, and so might come into existence for the first time even now; but this too would imply mutability in the Divine nature, for the Deity could not be immutably the Sustainer of those worlds which till very lately had no existence. Again, it would be absurd to think of the world as essential to the Deity in any manner; for that would be to make a mutable thing essential to an immutable. Once more, since we gather the existence of the Deity from the government of the world, it is manifestly subject to the Deity, but how can a thing entirely subject to another be essentially independent of it? And lastly, the eternal existence of matter is as incomprehensible, both as an effect and as a fact as its creation; for the simple existence of matter could have or be no final cause.

In this conflict of conclusions, we must look to something external to mere antecedent reasoning for the satisfaction of our doubt. Our reason having shown us that either side is as probable as the other, we might receive with perfect confidence any revelation from that Deity, whose existence is not essentially mixed up in the discussion. But independently of Revelation, as the creation or non-creation of the world is either way a fact, we ought, when reasoning leaves us, to be guided by any evidence we may possess as to the fact.[1] Now

[1] Abbadie observes, that if the changes we now see going on had continued as they are from eternity, the rivers alone would have levelled the mountains and filled up the bed of the sea with the ruins.—*Traité de la Ver. de la Rel. Chrét.* p. 1. § i. ch. 7.

if one thing was ever created for the first time, there is an end of the whole difficulty; if one was, all might be; but that the human race only came into existence at a very recent period, is evident from the short time over which anything like authentic history extends. The ancients observed this fact, and generally held it conclusive;[2] the only answer, and that full of improbabilities, being, that men might have been from time to time overwhelmed by gigantic earthquakes or inundations, and so, though most refined and intelligent, have left no trace behind. But then, if the entire race were overwhelmed from time to time, there must have been from time to time a new creation; and unless the whole race were supposed to have been destroyed, the absence of tradition would not be accounted for; there ought, therefore, to have been such a tradition, as there is of one great deluge;[3] but the theory is finally negatived by the modern science of Geology, which shows conclusively, whatever faith we may put in geological theories generally, how comparatively recently any large bodies of men can have existed on the earth, and I may add, that these same geological researches show progress in organized bodies generally, and progress always points to a beginning. Thus it is obvious, that since, as we have before shown at large,[4] man cannot have sprung up of himself, from mere chance or necessity, he must have been created by God, and therefore creation in time must be consistent with the Divine perfections.

[2] ——— si nulla fuit genitalis origo
Terrarum et cæli, semperque æterna fuere;
Cur supra bellum Thebanum et funera Trojæ
Non alias alii quoque res cecinere Poetæ?
Quo tot facta virum toties cecidere? nec usquam,
Æternis famæ monumentis insita, florent?
Lucretius, lib. v. v. 325, *et seqq.*

[3] The argument in the Timæus is based entirely on the fact that there did remain some tradition, and that though Greece had often perished, Egypt had not.—Giacchè un Diluvio universale non é possibile nell' ordine della Natura; e però non è cosa naturale il pensarlo, e molto meno il pensare, che tali avvenimenti stati sieno frequenti sulla terra, acutely observes Valsecchi.—*Dei Fondamenti della Religione*, lib. i. c. iii. § vi.

[4] Book I. p. 118.

are most manifest in it, we must allow a certain cont
in regard of its creation.[1] But I think it is clearly
that God might from eternity have immutably determ
create the world at some particular time,—at some p
point in that ceaseless flow or still endurance, whi
either of them symbolize the Unceasing;[2] for, no dou

[1] Nunc debes, omnium actionum tres esse radices. Actio enim ali
debet esse, alia quæ non, alia simpliciter bona. Illa quæ debet ess
quam si facias gratus habebis si non facias culpaberis. Quæ vero
esse, si facias culpaberis; si non facias laudaberis. Quæ autem est
bona si facias gratus eris; si vero non facias, non tamen culpabe
ultima et mensura caret et tempore; velut si quis hodie eleemosynam
est inquirendum quare non fecerit heri. Similiter si unum dederit
non est investigandus, quare non dederit duos. Et quoniam totius m
tura est bona—non est inquirendum cur hæc non fecerit antea.—*Pat*
Dei, c. *Julian. Bibl. Max. Pat.* vol. xxi. The passage in brackets i
in this edition. I have supplied it from a very good MS. in the British
(*Harl.* 3261).

[2] Gott denkt der Welt auf ewige Weise, aber daraus folgt keines
Nothwendigkeit einer anfanglosen Welt und Zeit, sondern Er denkt
Beide, in ihrer unzertrennlichen zusammengehörigkeit als solche, wel
Anfang haben. Ist ferner die Personlichkeit Gottes die absolute, so k
irgend ein Bedürfniss ihn treiben ein andres Sein zu setzen.—*J. Müll*
Lehre v. Sünde. Quod Dei voluntas immutabilis est non affert ullam
tatem ejus voluntati, pariter eam, quæ est ex hypothesi, nempe hoc po
Deus aliquid velit, necesse est ut id velit constanter, sed ut hoc voluerit
necesse, nulla est enim necessaria connexio inter Deum, et res quæ
Deus vult: verbi gratia, Deus est, ergo creaturus est mundus nulla e
quentia.—*J. Camerus, In Matth.* c. xviii. v. 7. Eterno ed infinito in
potere: eterno ed immutabile il volere: ma per questo doveva essere
[illegible] Nulla meno: Conciosiacosachè Iddio fin dalla eternità ha vo

the capacity of creation, the possible idea of time must have ever been inherent in the Divine nature.

There is a theory which many have maintained, which may enable us the easier to comprehend an origin for creation as to this particular world; it is, that there existed a race of spirits, having free will, and not essentially perfect, themselves created at some remote period; and that some of these having abused their high faculties, having fallen from their old abodes of happiness, (all of which is far from inconceivable,) man was created to supply their place; upon this supposition, which has been gathered out of Christianity by many acute intellects, we can account, not only for the creation of man and of this world, but also for the existence of spiritual temptations and afflictions among mankind.[3] Thus in one way or other we may probably arrive at a conception of the possibility of recent creation.

However difficult it might have been to believe the world created, in following the dictates of mere natural reason, it is certain that reason could furnish no other clearer solution of all the phænomena of existence, and that the higher conception man attains of God, the more he frets against the notion of any co-eternal senseless co-existence. Far from being an objection, therefore, to the Bible, that it proclaims that God created all things, we must acknowledge that here Revelation deals with a subject most properly within its province, and decides it by competent authority in accordance with the previous longings of our moral sense.

[3] Book i. ch. vi. p. 71.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Holy Trinity.

THE Christian doctrine of the Trinity involved in the plan of salvation is, perhaps, scarcely within the scope of this treatise. But as it has been disputed, as if it were incompatible with one of the points we here profess to deal with, I mean the unity of the Divine nature, it may not be amiss to touch upon it briefly in this place.

It is in the first place objected, that the same thing cannot be one and yet three at the same time, which is not denied; but neither is it involved in the doctrine, because we do not assert three persons and one person, or three Gods and one God. What is revealed to us is rather the existence of three persons having a common nature, in the same manner, to some extent, as three men have each and all human nature; but that unity is a property of the Divine nature, so that all who possess it are in a special sense one. Unity, to an extent, must obviously be a property of perfection; man differs from man in two modes, one of which is impossible in perfection. There is an individuality of character possessed by every man, an identity, an idiosyncracy in his perceptions, taste, and judgment, which all arise from his imperfection. Two perfect beings must perceive alike; since each perceives perfectly, perfect goodness will point out the same ends, and perfect wisdom the same mode of arriving at them. Again, if two beings are present upon the same spot at the same time, they must have much of identity; and omnipresence being essential to absolute perfection, all perfect beings must be

everywhere. Thus, practically, and as far as any outward manifestation of being is concerned; so far, therefore, as the will and unity observable in nature are concerned, the Deity must be one. In this sense it is that the mass of idolatrous nations have erred; for they have, from being unable to separate the will of God from the evil in the world, degraded their Deity into imperfection, and so into a multitude of contending powers, until it was found necessary to resort, for the true idea of Deity, to a something called fate,—the triple fates, as the Greeks called them.[1] Of course there must be a much stricter and closer unity of absolute essence among such perfect beings than we can discover in man or any finite existence.[2]

But there is another distinction between partakers of the same nature, and that is personal identity or personality. This is an archaic, instinctive kind of idea, which all men have, which is indeed essential to conscious being, and which words can neither destroy nor explain. Now this identity may be conceived of, abstracted from all imperfection. I can imagine two personal identities knowing one another's inmost thoughts and all things external (if indeed anything can be external to perfection) knowing them, as and because they know themselves; thus there might be really a distinction of personality in the absolute unity of a perfect nature; and what we can conceive, may be, though what can leave no

[1] Χο. Τις ουν αναγκης εστιν οιακόστροφος;—Πρ. Μοιραι τριμορφαι, μνημονες τ' Ερινυες.—Χο. Τουτων αρ'ὁ Ζευς εστιν ασθενιστερος;—Πρ. Ουκουν αν εκφυγοι γε την πεπρωμενην.—*Aesch. Prom. Vinct.* 513, &c.

[2] Το θειον τελειον εστι, και ανελλιπες, κατα τε αγαθοτητα, κατα τε σοφιαν, κατα τε δυναμιν· αναρχον, ατελευτητον, αιδιον, απεριγραπτον· και ἁπλως ειπειν, κατα παντα τελειον. Ει ουν πολλους ερουμεν θεους, αναγκη διαφοραν εν τοις πολλοις θεορεισθαι, ει γαρ ουδεμια διαφορα εν αυτοις, εἰς μαλλον εστι και ου πολλοι, ει δε διαφορα εν αυτοις, που ἡ τελειοτης; ει τε γαρ κατ'αγαθοτητα, ει τε κατα δυναμιν, ειτε κατα σοφιαν, ειτε κατα χρονον, ειτε κατα τοπον ὑστερησει του τελειου· ουκ αν ειη θεος· ἡ δε δια παντων ταυτοτης ἑνα μαλλον δεικνυσι, και ου πολλους.—*Cyril. Alex. de Trinitate.*

external trace, it must be impossible to prove or disprove, except by revelation.

The arguments which prove the unity of God when applied to prove the single personality of the Deity, must suppose the possibility of clashing in perfection, which is absurd; for two or three perfect beings might wield omnipotent power, each alone, and all together, because there never could be a difference of will. So that, though regarded separately, there might be two omnipotent persons, such separation being purely an abstraction, really an impossibility, (thus making the common nature, at least in the original sense of the word, individual,) it would be more true to say, that there was, as there can practically be, but one Omnipotent. Sometimes it is put as though envy could have place in perfection, and perfection might not, in perfection, contemplate itself perfectly. The argument from a unity of origin and first cause embracing all existence, cannot avail, because a Christian holds that the Father is the real source of existence to both the Son and the Holy Spirit,[1] though not in time nor by way of creation. We know besides, that two spiritual beings can be copresent in the same place, at the same time, for, wherever we are, God is there present with us. There is there-

[1] Τηροιτο αν, ὡς ὁ εμος λογος, εἰς μεν Θεος, εις ἐν αιτιον και Ὑιου και Πνευματος αναφερομενων, ου συντεθεμενων, ουδε συναλειφομενων· και κατα το ἐν και ταυτο της θεοτητος, ἱνα οὐτως ονομασω, κινημα τε και βουλημα, και την της ουσιας ταυτοτητα.—ἀι δε ἰδιωτητες, Πατρος μεν, και αναρχου, και αρχης επινουμενου και λεγομενου, αρχης δε, ὡς αιτιου, και ὡς πηγης, και ὡς αγεννητου φωτος. Ὑιου δε, αναρχου μεν ουδαμως, &c.—*Gregory Theologus, Orat.* xx. 7. By the gift of eternal generation Christ hath received of the Father one and in number the selfsame substance, which the Father hath of himself unreceived of any. For every beginning is a father unto that which cometh of it; and every offspring is a son unto that out of which it groweth. Seeing, therefore, the Father alone is originally that Deity which Christ originally is not (for Christ is God by being of God, light by issuing out of light), it followeth, that whatsoever Christ hath common unto Him with His heavenly Father, the same of necessity must be given Him, but naturally and eternally given, not bestowed by way of benevolence and favour, [which] the other gifts [of union with God, and of junction given to Christ's human nature] both are.—*Hooker. Eccl. Pol. Book V.* c. liv. 2. (Keble's Edition.)

fore no objection to the existence of three Divine persons in the Godhead, not three Gods, because inseparable, except in conception.

The doctrine that there is some kind of Trinity in the Divine nature, derives much antecedent probability from a consideration of the Mythology and Philosophy of ages and nations to which Christianity, as such, was wholly unknown. It is singular that three should always have been a sacred number, its only rival, and that at a considerable distance, being seven, for which also a reason can be found in our revelation. If there be natural reasons why these numbers should be so regarded, then is that fact yet more remarkable. It is surprising that almost all the Pagan systems of Theology which have prevailed among refined and intellectual nations, should have made, at least the higher deities, easily groupable in threes. Surely one would rather have expected among the Greeks, for instance, four brothers; one to be supreme over each element, and that a kind of compound between Apollo and Hephaistus would have been the chief; or, at least, that when we came to the fates, to the government of the gods themselves, we should at last have arrived at absolute unity, instead of which we do in fact find triplicity in both cases, and triplicity allied to unity, for they are triplets of brothers and sisters. But still much more remarkable is it, that Plato should have suggested, and his heathen followers developed, a kind of Trinity, or rather, perhaps, Triunity, seeing that even this is, as it were, developed from unity.[2] We must suppose from this, that something like reasons for such a belief are to be found in Nature, though I do not think either Christians or Deists are now likely to be in a fit

[2] See for opposite views on this subject, 1. the chapter in *Cudworth's Intellectual System of the Universe*; 2. Cæsar Morgan's Work on the *Trinity of Plato*. See also Dr. Peter Allix's *Judgment of the Jewish Church*, &c. He whom no intricacy can appal may consult *Proclus on Platonic Theology*, which is one vast *congeries* of Triads.

sense of mind to estimate them aright. But if Plato surprise us, what shall we say when we find the head of one of the chief Philosophical sects of China, Laou Tsze, asserting a very similar doctrine?[1] What, but that in Nature or primæval revelation there must be something to reconcile men to this doctrine, and even to suggest and foster it?

If we turn from old Mythology and Philosophy to our own consciousness, we shall find that the deductions of our moral nature and the character of our intellectual conformation, furnish us with arguments for the probability, and analogies in support of the possibility, of a Divine Triunity. I refer principally to the difficulties of man's redemption, in which it is impossible to suppose our Redeemer to be a Creature, or the only creating Divine Personality;[2] and to the ready divisibility of our intellectual faculties into a threefold unity, as perception, reason, and active direction, or, in another view, memory, understanding, and will, are each and all mind, and one mind, not without a certain essential generation or procession of one from another.[3]

[1] Taou sing yih, yih sing urh, urh sing san, san sing wan wih. Taou produced one, one produced two, two produced three, three produced all things. (*Tao te King*, ch. xlii.) which is by the native commentators explained to mean, that when the world was to be, there came forth from Taou something which forthwith divided into the Yin and the Yang, the male and the female in this world's generation, and from these two was produced the breath of harmony, by which all things were formed. The Taou is the eternal non-existence, out of which all existence came; the word may often be translated "way," and is used among the Buddhists for a kind of simple aboriginal intelligence. The *Tao te King* was published at Paris, with a French translation by Stanislas Jullien, in 1842.

[2] See this elaborately deduced, at too great a length to quote here, in *Bishop Kaye's Account of the Three Creeds*, Article i.

[3] Compare Aristotle's division into αισθησις, νους, ορεξις. Connected with this are most of the Christian proofs or illustrations of the doctrine of the Trinity. See Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, lib. xi. c. 26-8; and *De Trinitate*. Albertus Magnus suggests two analogies, one, *S. T. Tr.* 3, *Qu.* 18, *Membr.* 1, to Forma. Formans. Spiritus formam rebens and *Sum. Theol. Tr.* 3, *Qu.* 15, *Membr.* 2, *Art.* 2, *Partic.* 1, *Subpart.* 2, to Memoria, Intelligentia, Voluntas. See *Cyril of Alexandria*, *De Trinitate*, θεος, λογος, πνευμα. Anselm demonstrates the doctrine under the names of Summum bonum. Locutio summi spiritus. Amor patris et filii Monolog. c. xii. 29-48, and 49-63, and Proslog. c. 23. One of the most recent argu-

To sum up the whole. Although we can directly perceive only the relations of the Deity to other existences, in which relations we see only the Divine Unity, our speculations are met by Revelation, which, telling us something of the absolute Essence of God and of His Will, discloses to us the fact, that in this Unity of Deity there is a Trinity of personality; not denying thereby the Unity, but again and again asserting it. This Triunity we cannot expect completely to comprehend;[4] and though we may figure it to ourselves by the analogy of some threefold division of the mind,[5] or of the procession of light and heat from the sun, and so forth,[5] we shall of course acknowledge after all, that God must be in His nature essentially above the comprehension of His creatures, and therefore we must be content to believe the details He has revealed to us of Himself, though we may be unable to find any analogy, or any theory to unite and explain the consistency of them all.[6]

ments to show the necessity of the Trinity, is in Julius Müller's *Christliche Lehrer der Sünde* (vol. ii. p. 180). Alle Bestimmtheit des göttlichen Wesens, als auch die Liebe, sich in göttlichen Selbstbestimmung gründet. Allerdings ist er die Liebe, weil er die Liebe sein will. Aber was berechtige uns zu behaupten dass er die Liebe überhaupt nicht sein könne, ohne auf seiner Freiheit zu versichten? Zur absoluten Freiheit aber reicht nicht hin, das ein Wesen nicht von einem andern abhange, sondern dazu gehört auch, dass aus ihm nicht mit Nothwendigkeit die Existenz eines andern Wesens abfolge, &c. Er ware dann doch nicht der in sich schlechthin Befriedigte, sich selbst Genugsame.— *θεος αυτοτελης, απροσδεης.*— Das Problem wird uns nur gelöst durch die Idee der göttlichen Dieieinigkeit—Dazu gehört eben so sehr die Einheit des Wesens wie der Unterschied der Personen. Denn ohne den persönlichen Unterschied, ohne ein Ich und Du giebt es überhaupt keine Liebe. Ohne die Einheit des Wesens aber würde aus der Liebe Gottes ein nothwendiges Verhältniss zu einem von Gott verschiedenen Wesen folgen.

[4] God would not be God could He not reveal of Himself more than we can comprehend.—*John Parnell. Serm. on Trinity Sunday.*

[5] See Tertullian, *Adv. Praxeam* and *Lanfranci Elucidarium*, ch. i. Aspice solem, in quo sunt tria; scilicet, ignea substantia, splendor et calor: quæ in tantum sunt inseparabilia, ut si velis inde splendorem segregare prives mundum sole, et si iterum calorem tentes sejungere, careas sole. In ignea igitur substantia intellige Patrem, in splendore Filium, in calore Spiritum Sanctum.

[6] *Ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐνρεθῆναι ἐν τῇ κτίσει εἰκόνα ἀπαραλλάκτως ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος παραδεικνύουσαν, τὸ γὰρ κτιστὸν καὶ σύνθετον, καὶ ῥευστὸν, καὶ τρεπτὸν, καὶ περιγραπτὸν, καὶ σχῆμα ἔχον, καὶ φθαρτὸν, πῶς σαφῶς*

ἀφαιρέσεως τῶν ποιοτήτων ἐστὶ λαμβάνειν τὴν ἔννοιαν; τίνος δὲ ἡ στέρησις, ἴδιον ἐκ τῆς τελείας ποιότητος ἐνοήσεται. οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ τὴν ἀπορρῆτον φύσιν τῇ φθορᾷ γνωσθήσεται.—*John Damascene. De Fide Orthod.* lib. i. p. 137. There is much genuine truth in the following. Theologia quidem affirmans vim habet comparandi et ingerendi et conjungendi: et hac maxime probat, scilicet Deum esse, ex iis quæ ab ipso facta sunt. Theologia vero negans demonstrat Deum esse supra omnia, ac veritatem maxime assequitur, qui dicit non esse Deum quidquam eorum quæ sunt, sed esse supra substantiam et supra omnia.—*John Cyparissiota, De Theol. dogmat. Decas* 2. cap. 1. *Extract. apud Bibl. Max. Patrum.* However, as the subtle Italian subtilly observes: Patet—quod nullas negationes cognoscimus de Deo, nisi per affirmationes, per quas removemus incompossibilia aliqua ab illis affirmationibus, sicut non removemus compositionem nisi quia attribuimus simplicitatem vel aliquid aliud, &c.—*Duns Scotus, in Lib. Sent. I. Dist.* ii. *Quæst.* 2.

PART II.—Direct Proofs.

CHAPTER I.

The Reciprocal Action of the Belief in a Deity and in a Revelation.

FROM the mere existence of Revelation, a new argument arises for the perfect nature of a God, and one which is not injuriously affected, but, as we shall see, rather confirmed by any weakness which may exist in the proofs of the Divine government derivable from natural reason. There never was a revelation that there is no God; this would, of course, be absurd; for if there were no God there could be no revealer, and therefore no revelation; and for this reason, in all probability, it is that the Christian revelation assumes the existence of a Deity and busies itself rather with the relations between man and that Deity. Since then Revelation assumes, and must assume, the existence of a Deity, the existence of a revelation at all proves the existence of the Deity; and all direct arguments which tend to show the truth of any revelation, are also arguments for the existence of the Deity; of these (besides consistency with, and adaptation to, the natural state of things of which we have already spoken), the two principal are Prophecy and Miracles, which we shall speak of more at length hereafter. But the existence of Revelation proves more than the bare existence of God; it proves also His goodness, for without some such attribute as goodness, the perplexity of

man could never have seemed deserving of solution at the hand of Deity: we never desire to increase the knowledge and solve the difficulties of those we hate; and knowledge is good, and man has no right to anything, and can receive nothing good at the hand of his Creator, but so far as the goodness of the Creator Himself may prompt. God, therefore, in giving us a revelation of Himself, manifests at the same time His existence and His love towards us, and this independent of the nature of the revelation; besides this, the mere existence of revelation shows also that God is powerful and wise, because it shows that He can make His will intelligible to us.

If any one have studied deeply the subject of Natural Religion, and still remains unsatisfied,—if it be true, as the wisest of the ancients were not slow to admit, that in all these matters human reason is but a frail and flattering guide, and that, with it alone to lead us through the trackless deserts of human ignorance, or the tangled thickets of error, in which so many of our fellow travellers have been lost before us, we can but very slowly and doubtfully proceed upon our search for the well of everlasting truth. If it be true, that whether there be a God, whether man be more than a mere machine, and whether good and evil are really good and evil to us, are questions which the mind of man, like a boiling caldron, is ever striving upward to discover, and ever falling back to doubt.[1] If all this be true, then indeed we must conclude that the wise men of old did not belie their wisdom in leaning as they did so often on the traditions and revelations which might be

[1] *Εμοι γαρ δοκει, ω Σωκρατες, περι των τοιουτων, ισως ὡσπερ και σοι, το μεν σαφες ειδεναι εν τῳ νυν βιῳ, η αδυνατον ειναι, η παγχαλεπον τι, το μεντοι αυ τα λεγομενα περι αυτων, μη ουχι παντι τροπῳ ελεγχειν, και προαφιστασθαι πριν αν πανταχη σκοπων απειπῃ τις, πανυ μαλθακου ειναι ανδρος· δειν γαρ περι αυτα ἑν γε τι τουτων διαπραξασθαι, η μαθειν ὁπῃ εχει, η ἑυρειν, η, ει ταυτα αδυνατον, τον γουν βελτιστον των ανθρωπινων λογων λαβοντα και δυσεξελεγκοτατον, επι τουτου οχουμενον, ωσπερ επι σχεδιας, κινδυνευοντα διαπλευσαι τον βιον, ει μῃ τις δυναιτο, ασφαλεστερον και ακινδυνοτερον επι βεβαιοτερου οχηματος ῃ λογου θειου τινος διαπορευθηναι.—Phædo.* λσ.

deemed to have left some traces of the truth in the fables of their poets and the oracles and services of their gods. For if things so necessary for man to know are yet hidden from the penetration of his reason, and undiscoverable to his natural intellect, then indeed it seems a necessary consequence, that either they are to be found out by other means, (and saving revelation other means who can invent?) or else they are the false spectres of a brooding imagination, and man is,—What? Immediately at that "what?" the caldron of doubt begins again to seethe and bubble upwards; the very facts we seemed to have shown impossible, the high moral nature of man, and the necessity of some all-wise and powerful Ruler, on whose wisdom and justice we may depend, again and again present themselves as after all perhaps the only possible answer to that "What?" Amid this doubt and difficulty, revelation arises before us and supplies the truths so difficult wholly to deny with that very superhuman authority, which alone seemed wanting to give us good grounds of faith. Thus revelation to those who doubtingly believed before, and such were all the greatest men among the heathen, is almost by their previous doubting belief alone, shown to be evidently true; for as astronomers with confidence look for and readily recognize the star their calculations tell them should be visible, so those who are convinced that there must be a just and holy God, and yet feel all the difficulties that may be alleged against the doctrine, must recognize in a consistent and well-evidenced revelation that one guiding star they needed, which should be, if their belief were sound, and being, must be true. God, being wise, knows man's defects and ignorance, and being good, by His own power supplies them in this manifestation of Himself with a fitting and sufficient remedy.[2]

Thus we show, from the wants of man and the existence of

[2] The common belief of the world has borne witness to the intrinsic probability of a revelation. Supposed revelations, or traditions of them, there have always been; and often they have been such, as, having nothing of merit or ex-

revelation, that God is, and is all-wise and good, nor does the natural ignorance of man militate against this proof; for, relying only on the well-known history of our race, we see that in no age or country were these difficulties, great as they are no doubt in theory, sufficient practically to annihilate man's belief and trust in God; this being so, the knowledge of his ignorance works only to his benefit, in producing a fitting spirit in him of humility, and reverence, and thankfulness, wherewith to approach the oracles of God.

cellence in their matter, nor any considerable inducement of evidence to recommend them, have yet obtained credit and been received, solely, as it should seem, on this ground, of the great reason and likelihood which men have owned in the first supposal of a revelation.—*Davison on Prophecy, Introd.*

CHAPTER II.

Of Christian Miracles.

WE have already spoken of some antecedent objections to the credibility of any record of miraculous interventions, and have shown that it is highly probable that revelation would be accompanied with some kind of miracles. These the Christian Scriptures declare to have been worked at the first promulgation of Christianity, and most objectors are even ostentatiously ready to admit, that if they had seen all the miracles recorded in the New Testament they should have believed most firmly in the true mission from God of those who worked them, and therefore of course in the existence of the Deity. If, therefore, the Scriptures are true records of facts, they are the records of a true revelation, to the authority of which we must all submit, or rather which we must all joyfully and thankfully accept.

I know that it is possible for learned ingenuity to find parallels in ordinary nature for some, or perhaps many things recorded as miracles, yet there is nothing which might not have been done miraculously, though in some rare cases a similar result might be produced by natural causes; and, if a miracle be difficult to believe, how much more incredible must be the happening of so very many startling coincidences, each by itself almost incredible, all following in due and natural order, all appearing the result of most inadequate immediate causes, and all falling into their natural places as the evidences of Divine authority in the preachers of a new religion: certainly, if nature naturally worked these miracles, the course of nature bore witness to the truth of Christianity, and so we

come very nearly to the same point as if we had chosen the less incredible belief, that these were, what those who were present thought them, real miracles, declaring at once the power and will of God.

There remain the objections to the historical accuracy of the Scriptures, which resolve themselves into these two: either that the writers were deceived, and that the events there recorded were invented by others, and palmed off upon them as true, or that the compilers set themselves to write what they knew to be false. This last supposition, the nature of the morality which it is one object of their works to inculcate, the absence of any worldly inducement to invent such a falsehood, the presence of inducements to suppress what they wrote even if true, and the incapacity of the writers to have imagined, or created from their own minds a system at once so contrary to their education and prejudices, yet so nicely adapted to the needs, intellectual and spiritual of mankind at large, all combine conclusively to refute; indeed, it is now universally admitted, that the compilers of the Gospels could not have been intentionally deceivers. The other suggestion is rendered equally untenable by the notorious facts of history. We may state them briefly thus. About the time of the culminating point of Roman power and civilization, there arose, in an obscure corner of the empire, a sect of men professing and propounding a system of religious belief and practice, to which nothing analogous had before been known to exist, if we except some few points peculiar among the Gentiles, to the greatest and wisest of the old philosophers. This sect was, however, eminently unphilosophical, prevailing chiefly among the ignorant and debased, whom it at once instructed and reformed, giving them the very highest and most noble conceptions of virtue and religion, and bringing their practice into conformity with these elevated theories; thus, in spite of the ridicule of the learned, and the cruel efforts of the powerful,

this new faith, always bold and uncompromising in its claims upon universal acceptance and unhesitating obedience, made its way to preeminence over all the old systems of belief and all the learned speculations of philosophers, until it finally crushed them for ever, and became the belief of the Roman Empire, and not only so, but of the conquerors of that empire; and has ever since held its ground among all the most civilized and powerful nations of the world, as what men mean when they speak of religion; nay, it is even yet going on to daily conquests in new climates and countries, only but now discovered. In this sect a body of literature was soon formed (great part of which still exists), new in its ideas and manner, and of great bulk. The head of this body of literature is the Christian Scriptures, out of them more or less directly the whole is in some sense deduced; there is no break in the series, it leads us regularly back to them, and fixes their date at a time when the formation of a mythology was impossible and cotemporary examination inevitable, whose verdict we see in the rapid extension of Christianity throughout the whole world, as we may discern the approval of a power still higher in its continued and ever extending prevalence. Indeed it is impossible to doubt that a doctrine which had to encounter so many difficulties, and could gain so great a triumph in spite of them all, must have had something very real and conclusive to support the courage and assure the minds of its first propounders and propagators; this need the truth of the Christian Scriptures with their record of miracles, at once and fully supplies, while the literature of the early Church, and the testimonies of unwilling heathen witnesses furnish a body of critical evidence as to the time and circumstances under which they must have been written and believed, such as the keenest intellect employed with the most hearty good will has never been able seriously to impair.

There has, therefore, been a revelation from God, sup-

ported by miracles: God therefore is, and is as in that revelation He declares Himself. What that revelation is we read in the Scriptures, the truth and inspiration of which are proved by proving the truth of Christianity, for a belief in these has always been an essential article of Christian faith; besides that, in them particularly are contained those prophecies which are a material portion of the evidence that promises to guide us to the truth.

CHAPTER III.

Of Prophecy.

PROPHECY, the second great evidence of revelation, is itself in the nature of a miracle, for it is the foretelling of events which no human sagacity could prognosticate, while they are yet hidden in the depths of futurity. This power of prophecy, as it is more than human, must bear witness to the existence and good will of a Power far higher than man, that is of God.

The difficulty has been often mooted, how it can be possible to foreknow a thing in its own nature contingent, and it may be put thus,—man having a free choice which determines only at the moment of acting, and is up to that time undetermined and uncertain, how can any knowledge prior to the moment of the action determine certainly what will be the direction of this essentially indeterminate and uncertain choice? There seems thus a contradiction involved in the idea of prophecy, but it is removed by the consideration that uncertainty and contingency are not convertible terms,[1] but that, on the con-

[1] Limborch distinguishes thus.—*Theol. Christian.* Lib. ii. c. viii. § 19. "Certitudo et incertitudo non sunt affectiones rei absolutæ, sed respectivæ, semperque relationem suam habent ad eum qui de re certus vel incertus est. Distinguendum siquidem est inter affectiones rei absolutas et respectivas. Absolutæ sunt, quæ rei in sese et in natura sua spectatæ tribuuntur: tales sunt necessitas et contingentia: res enim in se et natura sua spectata vel est necessaria, vel contingens; id est, ejusmodi habet essentiam, quæ vel potest non existere, vel non potest non existere. Respectivæ vero, quæ rei non tribuuntur in se et natura sua consideratæ, sed cum respectu et determinatione ad alterum; tales sunt certitudo et incertitudo, quæ semper includunt respectum ad alterum, qui de re aliquâ certus vel incertus est." Again, "Id quod nunc actu et determinate fit, hoc antea revera futurum fuit. Ergo sicuti nunc verum est dicere, Hoc jam determinate fit, sic antea verum fuit dicere, Hoc determinate futurum est."—

trary, every future event is in some sense certain, for every possible future event must be *now* an event which will, or will not happen at some determinate future time; and whatever is thus true it can involve no contradiction for a perfect Being to know and predict, indeed we must suppose a perfect Being to know all truth, and therefore these future events also. The only difficulty arises in the case of a being having an independent free will. We know that, to a large extent, we can predict the course of conduct any individual will pursue under any given circumstances, if we have a very intimate acquaintance with his mode of thinking and acting in general; of course the Deity possesses this foreknowledge in a far higher degree, and I should suppose that, in the idea of any particular free being, the perfect comprehension of the Deity must be able to perceive the voluntary direction which such a one would give to his own free will; that direction, not being any act of the Deity, but one, though voluntary as to direction, yet in some way necessary in the free being.[1] In this case the foreknowledge would be the result not the cause of its object, and so it must always be, because knowledge must always in an intelligent being precede volition, and volition alone can be a cause to anything external.

But the existence of a prophecy being a fact of which we

Episcopius, Inst. Theol. Lib. iv. sect. 2, c. xvii.; and see *Becanus Summ. Theol. Schol. De Attrib. Div.* c. 10. "Certitudo divinæ præscientiæ petenda est—ex determinata veritate futurorum contingentium," &c.

[1] Potest intelligi ut Deus infinita vi sui intellectus ita penetret, et comprehendat liberum arbitrium nostrum, ut ab æterno potuerit prævidere, in quam partem esset se determinaturum, si tales vel tales circumstantiæ illi offerentur, non quod ratio cognoscendi futuram determinationem, sit ipsa libertas arbitrii in se spectata, sed infinita perfectio divini intellectus, quæ plus potest cognoscere in causa, quam de facto in ipsa sit: hoc sensu concedendum est. Nam si vir prudens qui ingenium ac indolem suorum filiorum perspectam habet, potest probabiliter prævidere, quid singuli facturi essent si has vel illas occasiones haberent; multo magis potest Deus certo prævidere quid singuli homines facturi essent, si hæ vel istæ circumstantiæ adessent.—*Becanus Sum. Theol. Schol. De Attrib. Div.* c. xiii. qu. vii. *An Deus cognoscat etiam futura contingentia in causis ipsorum?*

are all capable of taking cognizance, speculative difficulties can be of no importance if we know that future events have been clearly foretold long before they could have been guessed at by human ingenuity;[2] and this, in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, we find to have been actually done in many striking instances.

The historical books of the Old Testament are almost exclusively the history of one family, which is traced from the very creation of the world, with the conscious object of preserving the line of descent of some one member, who in times even at the close of the Old Testament history still long future, was to arise in that family, and to be the wonder and object of reverence of the whole earth. Here is a wonderful prophecy, the prophecy of some great One, whose name should be above every name, begun in the remotest antiquity, carried on amid the greatest seeming discouragement, and maintained throughout a long season of apparently hopeless delay, a prophecy without a parallel in the history of any other nation. Whether we desire to reject Christianity or no, we cannot but admit that this prophecy has been fulfilled; that from the family of Abraham there has arisen one, whom all the nations of the earth have reverenced as their Lord, and do look to as a Saviour. From time to time the great centre prophecy was expanded and extended to minuter particulars; that which was a general promise to our first parents,[3] became a promise to one family in Abraham,[4] and the time of its fulfilment was revealed to Jacob, as to come before the sceptre should depart from Judah;[5] and certainly the greatest of all the seed of Abraham did arise before the tribe of Judah had lost its position as a distinct self-governing people. Afterwards, the

[2] Ratio potissima, quæ me movet et quæ meo judicio nullam justam instantiam patitur, unaque ac sola diluendis omnibus exceptionibus sufficit, hæc est: Deus prædicit contingentia certo atque infallibiliter futura esse. Ergo certe atque infallibiliter futura esse præscit.—*Episcopius Inst. Theol.* Lib. iv. sect. 2, c. xvii.

[3] Gen. iii. 15. [4] Gen. xxii. 18; xxvi. 3. [5] Gen. xlix. 10.

family of David was pointed out as the line of the great Deliverer,[1] and strange predictions began to be made concerning Him;[2] sometimes He was spoken of as God with us, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace;[3] sometimes He was described as smitten of God and afflicted,[4] without form or comeliness,[5] as valued, and valued at thirty pence;[6] sometimes He was described in a strange mixture of the two, as the King of Zion, coming unto her meek and lowly, and riding upon an ass,[7] as one that should make His grave with the wicked, and yet be with the rich in His burial.[8] Then too began the prediction of a forerunner, of one who should arise before Him to prepare His way.[9] It would require a volume, or rather many volumes to adduce and explain all the predictions fulfilled in Christ, yet those I have just now cited ought to suffice to satisfy us, that they could not come of mere human ingenuity, for how could that so guess at coming inconsistencies in Him, whom even an Atheist must acknowledge to have been so very true and exact a completion of these prophecies; for Christianity and what Christians believe concerning our Lord are such a fulfilment, and are facts which cannot be denied or explained.

By the side of those more direct prophecies concerning the Messiah, there were from time to time vouchsafed numerous predictions fulfilled within a short time of their utterance, and intended no doubt, to serve to the people of those times as evidence of the truth of these which relate to our own days; some there are of most striking character, which we see even yet coming true, such as that in Deuteronomy of the dispersion of the Jews among all nations, without being lost among them;[10] a prophecy given indeed with a condition, but accompanied with a declaration that that condition would

[1] Jer. xxiii. 5, &c. [2] Is. vii. 14. [3] Is. ix. 6. [4] Is. liii. 4.
[5] Is. liii 2. [6] Zech. xi. 12. [7] Zech. ix. 9. [8] Is. liii. 9.
[9] Is. xl. 3. Mal. iii. 1. [10] Deut. xxviii. 25, 37, 65, and ch. xxxi. 16.

be performed. So of other nations; the destruction of Babylon[11] and the degradation of Egypt[12] are even yet manifestly performed before us. Besides these, there was ordained among the peculiar people, (peculiar always, as all have acknowledged,) a formal ritual, prophetic in all its parts, and prophetic, as might well be shown if this were the proper place, of that very scheme of Christian doctrine which arose and overshadowed its final extinction in the destruction of Jerusalem and the dispersion of the Jews.

I have given but the rudest outline of a part of Scripture prophecy as it was vouchsafed in the Old Testament; and surely the destruction of Jerusalem, as foretold in the New, is fully as clear; yet how conclusive is it, how unlike anything to be met with elsewhere, enduring through so many ages, always so consistent, pointing so clearly to what without it would have been one of the most wonderful events in the world's history, the event which has from any point of view exercised the most important influence over the whole world, —I mean the life and death of Christ. We cannot understand and realize it without being compelled to acknowledge, that in prophecy God has manifested Himself to man.

I know that some will be inclined to object, that though in its main outlines clear enough, there is very much of obscurity in the writings of the prophets, and many predictions exceedingly hard to be understood;[13] but I do not think we can give much weight to such objections, seeing that a prophecy which is very clear, and so express that every one must

[11] Is. xiii. and Jer. li. [12] Ezek. xxix. 15.

[13] The Prophecies which we understand are a proof for Inspiration, but those we do not understand are no proof against it. Inasmuch as for the latter our ignorance or the reserve of the Holy Spirit may account, but for the other nothing can account but Inspiration.—*Berkeley's Alciphron, Dial.* vi. § 20. What evil or what inconvenience if we cannot comprehend what we are not obliged to comprehend, or if we cannot account for those things which it doth not belong to us to account for? Scripture not understood at one time or by one person, may be understood at another time or by other persons.—*Ibid.*

understand it, is an interference with what would otherwise be the free course of man's intentions, by impelling him to accelerate or impede the course of events predicted; and this is not the proper object of prophecy, for that which foretells future events is in general intended, and certainly to be the best evidence of foresight should be so stated as in no way to affect its own completion; therefore it is that many prophecies are and must be very obscure.

CHAPTER IV.

The Scriptural Account of God.

THE truth of the Scriptures being thus established, we have only now to listen to their voice and to accept as coming from God Himself the account they give of Him whose ways they reveal, and by whose inspiration they were written. I do not know how to exhibit this in so satisfactory a manner as by subjoining a statement of their teaching as nearly as possible in their own words, so far as the subject requires,[1] for they tell us much more of God than that He is, and is wise and powerful and good, to the proof of which we are here confined; and indeed the whole of the evidence the Scriptures give us concerning the ways and attributes of God, have never yet been adequately stated, and we can scarcely hope ever to see them so.

We are taught by God Himself then, that He exists in unity, while in this unity there subsists three persons, the Father, the Son, or Word of God, and the Holy Ghost, or Spirit of God. We read of the manifestation of this Trinity in the creation of the world and in the redemption and regeneration of mankind. Having been thus instructed concerning the nature of the Deity, we are taught (without any distinction of persons) that God existed before the world was, and is from everlasting to everlasting, and that there is none other like Him. Out of this absolute and all-including existence flow naturally the doctrines of His omniscience, whereby He knows all things, together with His omnipresence, whereby

[1] For a very full collection of this sort, see Warden's "System of Revealed Religion."

He knows and directs them as one ever close at hand; next His omnipotence, described in language of rare beauty and appropriateness when read in its original connection; and last of all, His goodness, without which power and wisdom are purely hateful, in which we may distinguish His holiness, His justice, and His mercy, all summed up in the one attribute of holy love, loving His creatures too well to tolerate among them any evil. These are the words of God's own ambassadors.

Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord.[1] The Lord He is God; there is none else beside Him,[2] in heaven above and upon the earth beneath; there is none else;[3] for there is one God, and none other but He.[4]

In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth;[5] and the Word was with God,[6] and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.[7] By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the *Spirit* of His mouth.[8]

All things are of God, who hath reconciled us to Himself by Jesus Christ,[9] who is over all, God, blessed for ever.[10] God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life.[11] For by one Spirit we are all baptized into one body,[12] that He might reconcile us unto God in one body on the Cross.[13] *Thus* we being many are one body in Christ,[14] and through Him we have access by one Spirit unto the Father.[15] We are baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,[16] and these three are one.[17]

[1] Deut. vi. 4. [2] Deut. iv. 35. [3] Deut. iv. 39.
[4] Mark xii. 32. [5] Gen. i. 1. [6] John i. 1. [7] Gen. i. 2.
[8] Ps. xxxiii. 6. דְּבָר and רוּחַ v. Judith xvi. 17. *απεστειλας το πνευμα σου, και ωκοδομησε.*
[9] 2 Cor. v. 18. [10] Rom. ix. 5. [11] John iii. 16. [12] 1 Cor. xii. 13.
[13] Eph. ii. 16. [14] Rom. xii. 5. [15] Eph. ii. 18. [16] Matt. xxviii. 19.
[17] 1 John v. 7. or John x. 30.

Thus saith the high and lofty One, who inhabiteth eternity,[18] —thus saith the Lord; I am the First, and I am the Last; and beside Me there is no God:[19] I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the ending, which is, and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty.[20] One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day.[21] He is the living God, steadfast for ever, and His kingdom that which shall not be destroyed.[22] Even from everlasting to everlasting, He is God.[23]

Known unto God are all His works, from the beginning of the world.[24] All things are open and manifest unto Him,[25] for He looketh unto the ends of the earth, and seeth under the whole heaven.[26] Hell is naked before Him; destruction hath no covering:[27] the darkness hideth not from Him, but the night shineth as the day.[28] The Lord seeth not as man seeth; for man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart;[29] for the Lord searcheth all hearts, and understandeth the imaginations of the thoughts;[30] He knoweth the things that come into our mind, every one of them.[31] He giveth wisdom to the wise, and knowledge to them that know understanding:[32] declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done.[33] He is perfect in knowledge;[34] His wisdom is infinite.[35]

Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? do not I fill heaven and earth?[36] High as heaven, deeper than hell,[37] He filleth all in all.[38]

All the gods of the nations are but idols; it is the Lord that made the heavens.[39] Glory and honour are in His pre-

[18] Is. lvii. 15. [19] Is. xliv. 6. [20] Rev. i. 8. [21] 2 Pet. iii. 8.
[22] Dan. vi. 26. [23] Ps. xc. 2. [24] Acts xv. 18. [25] Heb. iv. 13.
[26] Job xxviii. 24. [27] Job xxvi. 6. [28] Ps. cxxxix. 12. [29] 1 Sam. xvi. 7.
[30] 1 Chron. xxviii. 9. [31] Ez. xi. 5. [32] Dan. ii. 21.
[33] Is. xlvi. 10. [34] Job xxxvii. 16. [35] Ps. cxlvii. 5. [36] Jer. xxiii. 23, 24.
[37] Job xi. 8. [38] Eph. i. 23. [39] Ps. xcvi. 5.

sence; strength and beauty are in His sanctuary;[1] He worketh signs and wonders in heaven and in earth.[2] He quickeneth the dead, and calleth those things which be not as though they were.[3] He is in one mind, and who can turn Him?[4] For my thoughts are not as your thoughts, saith the Lord, neither are your ways my ways. My word that goeth forth out of my mouth shall not return unto me void, but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I send it.[5] Surely, as I have thought, so shall it come to pass; and as I have purposed, so shall it stand.[6] God alone spreadeth out the heavens and treadeth upon the waves of the sea; He doeth great things past finding out, yea, and wonders without number.[7] Behold! He breaketh down, and it cannot be built again; He shutteth up a man, and there can be no opening.[8] Behold! He withholdeth the waters, and they dry up; also He sendeth them out, and they overturn the earth; He bindeth up the waters in His thick clouds; He hangeth the earth upon nothing; by His Spirit He hath garnished the heavens.[9]

He giveth to all life, breath, and all things;[10] In Him we live and move and have our being;[11] He hath made everything beautiful in its time.[12] With Him is strength and wisdom; the deceived and the deceiver are His.[13] He is before all things, and by Him all things exist.[14]

Lo! these are but parts of His ways; but how little a portion is heard of Him; the thunder of His power who can understand?[15] Trust ye in the Lord for ever; for in the Lord Jehovah is everlasting strength.[16] The Lord God Omnipotent reigneth.[17]

[1] 1 Chron. xvi. 27. Ps. xcvi. 6.
[2] Dan. vi. 27. [3] Rom. iv. 17. [4] Job xxiii. 13. [5] Is. lv. 8, 11.
[6] Is. xiv. 24. [7] Job ix. 8, 10. [8] Job xii. 14. [9] Job xxvi. 7, 8, 13.
[10] Acts xvii. 25. [11] Acts xvii. 28. [12] Eccles. iii. 11. [13] Job xii. 16.
[14] Coloss. i. 17. [15] Job xxvi. 14. [16] Is. xxvi. 4. [17] Rev. xix. 6.

The Lord is a holy God,[18] glorious in holiness.[19] The Lord is a God of judgment,[20] a God of truth, and without iniquity; just and right is He.[21] The law of the Lord is perfect,[22] His counsels of old are faithfulness and truth.[23] God cannot be tempted with evil:[24] every word of God is pure;[25] He is of purer eyes than to behold evil.[26]

The thoughts of the wicked are an abomination to the Lord;[27] He is not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness, neither shall any evil dwell with Him, He hateth all workers of iniquity.[28] As for the transgressors they shall perish;[29] yea, the Lord our God shall cut them off.[30] But the Lord ordereth a good man's goings, and maketh his way acceptable unto Himself.[31] Right dear in the sight of the Lord is the death of His Saints;[32] at His right hand there is pleasure for evermore.[33] Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man (to conceive), the things which God hath prepared for them that love him.[34]

The Lord is gracious and full of compassion, slow to anger, and of great mercy.[35] He giveth to all men liberally;[36] for He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.[37] He is good and ready to forgive.[38]

God commendeth His love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us;[39] who gave Himself for us, that He might redeem us from all iniquity.[40] As many of us as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ,[41] and there is now no condemnation for them that are in Christ Jesus,[42] but all things work together for good, unto them that

[18] Josh. xxiv. 19. [19] Ex. xv. 11. [20] Is. xxx. 18. [21] Deut. xxxii. 4.
[22] Ps. xix. 7. [23] Is. xxv. 1. [24] Jam. i. 13. [25] Prov. xxx. 5.
[26] Hab. i. 13. [27] Prov. xv. 26. [28] Ps. v. 4, 5. [29] Ps. xxxvii. 38.
[30] Ps xciv. 23. [31] Ps. xxvii. 23. [32] Ps. cxvi. 15. [33] Ps. xvi. 11.
[34] 1 Cor. ii. 9. [35] Ps. cxliv. 8. [36] Jam. i. 5. [37] Matth. v. 45.
[38] Ps. lxxxvi. 5. [39] Rom. v. 8. [40] Tit. ii. 14. [41] Gal. iii. 27.
[42] Rom. viii. 1.

love God.[1] He that loveth not, knoweth not God, for God is love.[2]

Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God Almighty, who shall not glorify thy name? for thou only art Holy, thou only art the Lord.

[1] Rom. viii. 28. [2] 1 John iv. 8.

PART III.—Important Deductions.

CHAPTER I.

The Ten Commandments.

WE have now come to the conclusion of our *reasoning* concerning God; we have shown that He is Almighty, holy, just, and good; and this, first, from natural reason, and then from the existence and nature of the Christian revelation: it only remains to deduce from the doctrine such conclusions as may be most necessary and useful for mankind; and in the first place, if God be God, He should be alone yet wholly our God, not by necessity only, but by choice and love. "Thou shalt have none other Gods beside me," seems at first sight a commandment which is really and readily enough obeyed by all, but let us look at it and our obedience somewhat more closely. Can we say of the bulk of mankind, that they give any evidence at all of the fact that God is their God? What is their object in life? To gain a competence, or to maintain their station with honour, to see their children married well and well settled in the world, and so to have leisure and comforts to enjoy in their old age. Who is the God of these people? In the strong language of the Apostle, their God is their belly; true they may with their lips acknowledge the Almighty, they may every morning and evening acknowledge that they have done those things which they ought not to have done, and have left undone those things which they ought to

have done, but there is an end to their religion; the object of their hopes, of their endeavours, of their lives is earthly, and temporal; they are willing enough to reverence God, and hope to benefit from his goodness by way of bye play and second aim, but to think of kindness and charity, and heavenly-mindedness as the great objects of their worldly endeavours, to leave all thought of getting on in the world till they have ascertained and performed all the will of God, this they account fanaticism and superstition, and by so doing condemn themselves. They say we do God's will most surely, when we live honestly, and soberly, and well in this present life; as though it were honest to talk of serving God, as our object in the eager struggle to make a penny or two more than our neighbours; as if it were sober to be so sober in our sympathy with misery, and our zeal for perfect goodness, as to deem them mad who had rather spend and be spent in doing good, than labour to amass a competent fortune; as though it were well to love God so coldly, as habitually to think last of Him and first of what society requires and our interest demands. Cruel mockery; our interest demands! as if our temporal interests were supreme, and to serve God were only a convenient means of securing something after we have faded away from what we are striving for now. There are many who keep up a form of religion because the world thinks it decorous, many more who have a vague idea that it will one day be profitable. Can we wonder that these are not heroes in well doing? Surely no man can be a hero who only fights for his pay. Man has high powers and noble faculties, and can have but one central aim; if this is to do the will of God and to promote His glory, he will not live after the common fashion of mankind; if it be any other, it is but an insult to the Omniscient for him to say, that he believes in and worships the one holy God, he is really an idolater, and worships some image that he has himself set up. Very absurd it seems to us to take a piece of a tree and cut it into a rude similitude of

a man, and then fall down and worship it as God; much more absurd is it to join with our fellow-men in setting up a standard of outward decency, and then fall down and reverence that as the perfect good, the ultimate test of all true excellence; to deem ourselves good men if we conform to it, and never to dream of any really perfect good of which it is but the rudest similitude; yet that is what we almost all do, and measure ourselves, not by what God would have us be, but by what will be, as we say, for our interest, and what the world approves. O worse than heathen folly! O foul idolatry! O shameless wickedness! To reverence God with our lips, and worship in our hearts ourselves and our own imaginations.[1] I seem to see one who feels clear of this guilt; he is not intent on making a fortune, he has devoted himself to science, or he has courted poverty and high art; so be it, he is worshipping a better carved image, but it is only an image still; no science can be more than a rough travesty of omniscience, no art can produce a noble and lovely soul; grovelling and mean are all your pursuits, ye intellectual and scientific idolators, compared with his, who loves and reverences Him in whom are the archetypes of all knowledge and all beauty, and who strives to be like Him, who is alone the absolute and the perfect, who longs to be made one with God. We should be ready to give our whole time and our whole possessions to the service of our great King, yet we count His seventh of our time tedious, His tenth of our goods an exaction. Acknowledge God's sovereignty we may, because we cannot deny it; but to worship Him and serve Him with a true heart is too rare to leave much trace on the surface of society, unless indeed profane and causeless swearing be a distorted remnant of what was once a reverential mention of God's name.

From this unfaithfulness to God arises never-ending con-

[1] *Εις ὁ γαρ πραγμα ἡ καρδια τινος δεδεται, και ὁπου ἡ επιθυμια ἑλκει αυτον, ἐκεινο εστιν αυτου ὁ Θεος. εαν επιθυμῃ ἡ καρδια παντοτε του Θεου, αυτος εστι κυριος της καρδιας αυτου.—Macarius, Hom.* xlii.

fusion in society. Children do not reverence their parents, workmen combine against their masters, subjects rise in rebellion against their governors, chiefly because those parents seek to use their children for ungodly objects, those masters oppress and starve their servants, and those governors govern with sinister intentions. What wonder is it that, when parents propose to their children no higher object than the enjoyment of this world, those children should follow out their own conceptions of enjoyment? Can we be surprised, that when masters aim primarily at making money, making money should be the object of their workmen's strikes? What is there to marvel at, when subjects imitate their rulers, and forget that they owe obedience and respect to any higher power? Thus superiors ought to learn a lesson of obedience to God from the disobedience of those below them, and strive to be to Him what those ought to be to them; vainly will they look for any other measure for themselves than that which they mete out to those to whom they owe the same. Though I would address superiors in this strain, very differently am I bound to speak to inferiors. Their duty towards God is only in part direct, they must indeed first seek to serve Him rightly, and must do it fearlessly and heartily, but in all that is not contrary to this they serve God as really, though indirectly, in yielding reverence and obedience to those whom God's providence has set over them, however in themselves unworthy of the slightest deference. A superior, whoever he may be, stands in God's place, by God's appointment, to those below him; and so long as he acts as becomes God's minister in that matter, nay so long as he does not require anything contrary to God's law, as God he must be obeyed; it is a vain excuse to say that he disobeys God's will himself; it may be so, but the powers that be did not come into existence and do not continue without the will of the Almighty, or without God's knowledge that you are subject to them: it may be that God

will allow the wicked powers to destroy one another, but their wickedness will not excuse you; if you will be perfect take up these evils as your cross, and rejoice that you are thought worthy to suffer after your Master's example, so shall you be perfect, and who can tell but that the soul of your unworthy superior may be given as a reward to the vocal prayer of your lips and the silent supplication of your obedience.

It is not as between superiors and inferiors alone, that forgetfulness of God works mischief and sorrow; such is even more the case between equals. From whence comes passionate anger, with all the evil thoughts that go to excite a man to open or secret murder—and it is secret murder to wish another dead, though we dare not attempt to kill him—whence but from the absence of any habit of obedient self-control, of careful self-knowledge, and confident faith in Him to whom vengeance belongeth. I believe that murderous thoughts and wishes seldom or never arise without a consciousness of having suffered injustice, or an impulse of self-defence. How are these to be avoided? Clearly by so living, that the ruin of another may never be necessary to our protection; and by cultivating a habit of realizing the fact that God is judge, and that he will in due time so punish the offender, as to bring most good out of his evil: if we fill our souls with such thoughts as these, envy and malice and ill-will will be stifled in the very suggestion, or rather converted into a desire to deliver our enemies from the evil consequences of their wickedness. The recollection of God's presence will alone effectually keep us from those secret sins we should be ashamed openly even to mention, as too from silent theft and covert evil-speaking. Let us live in the faith of that saying, "Thou God seest me;" and we *must* live purely and honestly, and peaceably. Finally, that our minds may be closed to every avenue of sin, we must not covet, we must be content with that which it may please God to give us,—that station, that wealth, or poverty, that beauty

or deformity, that happiness or misfortune; we cannot covet anything we have not; by which I mean we cannot desire and repine at not possessing, or love to dwell upon the thought of how happy we should be if we had what perhaps we see our neighbour possess, and possibly abuse; we cannot so covet anything, without denying practically that God can and will give us all that we ought to have: by faith and confidence in Him, therefore, are we to seek deliverance from the torments of unsatisfied desire. Oh, happy and blest are they who have attained to, and can live in, such a faith as this!

CHAPTER II.

The Beatitudes.

IF the state of society and of our own hearts be such as we have seen, and cannot but daily feel and know it is, what must be our emotions, what must be the feelings, and hopes and fears of those whom God will receive and reward, to whom He will give His blessings?

The first thing that will be expelled must certainly be pride. How can a man be proud before God? and how can any one be proud when God seeth him not? He who is everywhere must see us always, and penetrate to the true meaning of our thoughts, and see our pride even when we see it not; and seeing, surely he must abhor it. Imagine a contest for precedence between two flies in a spider's web, and you have a very apt illustration of the sort of condition that men display their pride in. How absurd is it for two such poor, weak, fleeting creatures of a moment as we are[1] to despise one another at all, much more to do so about things so very immeasurably more insignificant than ourselves. How foolish it is for us to admit so very tender and vulnerable a feeling as pride, one which is sure to give us continual pain in one way or another; for who can approach a proud man so humbly as to show him due respect, and who can care for him tenderly and not seem to think too little of his powers on his own behalf; for a proud man would rather his wound should mortify, than any one

[1] Sicut siquis ad aliquam fenestram se demonstret, et statim revertatur; sic homo nascens quasi se demonstret in mundo, et mox in mortem revertitur.—*Elucidarium*, ch. xv.

should think he was not sufficiently clever of himself to heal it. How degrading it is to be proud; for how low and mean must *his* ideas of greatness be, who can for a moment imagine that he is really great,—he who cannot tell but he may at any moment unawares breathe poison, and who must so soon depart and decay,—he who can call nothing his, and has no power over the works of nature, save only to destroy,—he than whom, even among men, there have been many richer, or if not, more powerful, or more learned, or stronger, who, if he be really one of the greatest this earth ever produced, excels but in one or two points, and falls short of greatness in innumerable others; for such a one to be proud, is for him to confess his soul so mean, his intellect so narrow, his desires so grovelling, that he cannot attain to any true idea of greatness;[1] and cannot, even in theory, ascend to that elevated point, whence all the differences among mankind are seen in their true proportions, and discovered to be but the differences among a race of moles, as to which can see most clearly. Finally, how impious is pride! can we boast of that as our own attainment which, in fact, we owe to another, without detracting from the honour of the giver? how can we, without the most absurd presumption, act and think as though we were essentially better than those to whom God has given a similar nature to our own? Surely, before we had begun to exist we were no better than they, and in that we exist we were no more the cause of own being than they; and now that we do

[1] If one man thinks clay to be clay and therefore treads upon it, another thinks it to be gold and therefore admires it, which of these hath the braver mind? Hath not he who doth not admire the clay and embrace the dirt? So he truly that calls himself but dust and ashes hath certainly a very great soul; while he that understandeth not, but hath himself in admiration, is a weak and basely-minded man. He is generous, who despises things far greater than those which others esteem the marks of their glory; who doth not swell with high achievements, while his envious neighbours are puffed up with every trifle. If we admire anything here, let it be the sublimity of humble minds.—*Bishop Patrick, Parable of the Pilgrim*, ch. xi.

exist, how can we venture to be proud because we have become better than they, when we know that between us and them there is a short and measurable distance, but between us and God a limitless abyss; and if we are better than they, we know that so far as our own act has made us so, it has only been because we were spurred on to exertion by a low opinion of ourselves; let us but lose that spur to better things, and we are already beginning to fall. But if Christ stooped from heaven to consort with these poor sinners, how can we be going on to gain the likeness of God if we abhor and shrink from them as from a polluted thing, and deem them hopelessly beneath our love and sympathy? Blessed therefore are the poor in spirit, for pride can never attain to the kingdom of God.

But if we may not triumph even in our goodness, if we must think of all as immortal and capable of even more attainments in what is really good than we ourselves as yet possess, will it not hinder us from much mirth, and make us rather mourn than rejoice whenever we think of ourselves and our race? No doubt it may, but perhaps it ought to do so, and it may be the better for us that it should; indeed I know not how any one can walk about on our earth with his eyes really open without seeing at every turn some call to mourn; we see cruelty and oppression every day in all its forms, from the gigantic tyranny which carves out for itself a niche in history, down through all the grades that embitter the relations of society, to man as a cruel tyrant over the lower animals, and even to the conduct of little children among their playmates,—sad omen of their future conduct when they shall have more power to inflict, and more facilities and inducements to find pleasure in, such evil. Shall we see all these things, and say, It is nothing; let us be merry? No surely; that were as great folly as to weep at once with copious tears, and straightway forget that there were in these

things any lesson for our own instruction. We must mourn, if we be human, with the sufferers, and much more must we mourn for the oppressors when we see them so blindly rushing on to their complete and final perdition; such mourning will make us strive to amend ourselves, and in so doing, and besides so doing, to give our best efforts to reform the tyrants and to comfort the oppressed. I have spoken of but one subject where there are hundreds to tell us the same tale to the same purpose. Where can we turn without beholding negligent slothfulness, wasting away itself and all that it can influence; heartless selfishness, that gives constant pain, and never even discovers that it does so; headstrong folly, that carries its victim straight to his destruction; scandalous abuses, that eat out the heart of so many noble institutions; open impiety, which dares God's vengeance; and secret hypocrisy, which invites it; and, surrounding and intensifying all these, present pleasure-loving indifference, that tolerates and countenances every vice; while, if we look within, we find in our ownselves at least the rudiments of all these evil things? How can we see all these, and be merry all our days? Truly mirth was not made for man, as man now is, and better far is the house of mourning than the house of joy. Better for the man himself, because it purifies and elevates him, better for the race at large, because it sends out a missionary of light into the howling wilderness of darkness and trouble; better for the mourner, because it makes him capable of better and more enduring joys; better for those around him, because when they need a comforter and the world forsakes them, there will be one to care for them, a fellow-mourner to comfort them; better for the whole creation, because there is one soul enlightened, one good example of a sound mind displayed, one spirit brought nearer to God; and therefore, though our road through life be hard and grievous, there is yet joy over us among the angels of God, who know that they who mourn are blessed, for they shall be comforted eternally.

What is it that gives so great a charm to the society of those who have known much affliction, to those mourners who have not become peevish or selfish through their sorrows? Surely it is that they are mild, and gentle, and meek. Whom should we choose for our companion, when sickness or distaste for noisy pleasures threaten to overwhelm us with tedium? who but one who is mild, and gentle, and meek? And what temper is most likely to be produced by a true conception of ourselves, our virtues and our failings, our duties and our privileges, the influence which we cannot but exercise on others, and the means of making that influence most effectual for good? What but a temper most especially mild, and gentle, and meek? We, who know our own faults, must be meek, for we shall not readily take offence at those who in any case do not speak of us so ill as in some things we are sure that we deserve. True, they may blame us for that which we know is not a fault. What then? Shall we deny that we have any faults, because for the moment we are accused of the wrong failing? If we are blamed, and know that we are blameworthy, surely it is a quibble to distinguish with much nicety the nature of the fault, in order to justify our indignation, and to seem better than we know we are; if in such a case we would really have justice done us,—if our aim be, as it seems to us to be, to vindicate the truth from reproach, then we must proclaim the whole truth and confess the hidden fault, which after all is very likely to be the thing that really makes us odious, however skilfully we may have concealed its true nature; we have no right to take credit from unmerited absence of blame, and then talk of justice with regard to undeserved condemnation. Since, however, such a confession and vindication would be wholly uncalled for, and often might do real harm, our true course must be to take all blame as a warning that in such and such a matter we are suspected, and may prepare for being closely watched; then there need be no fear but that our very accusers will in

time see their error, and so we shall have double praise; if, however, they are not convinced by our actions, what a hopeless task it must have been that we were tempted to undertake, when we thought of procuring conviction by our words. However our meekness may be lost upon this person or that, we are none of us so isolated from mankind but that the gentle light of a meek spirit will shine in some dark place; and even if we were, God would see it, and the glowworm lamp, that men despised, He would make to shine as the sun among His saints in heaven. Especially blessed are the meek and gentle to those spirits which feel themselves cut off from any sympathy with the world and with their own immediate companions; to these the very knowledge that there are such gentle spirits here and there treading their silent way to the same heaven, amid the contradictions of sinners, repaying with love the contempt, and with blessings the evil words of the worldly and corrupt; this very knowledge often seems the only anchor to keep them from drifting out into the sea of blank despair, the only spring of comfort on their dreary road. Blessed therefore are the meek, and though noisy disputants and learned critics may seem to be the Church's defenders, her real hold upon the world is the silent influence of meek spirits, patient in well-doing; these have been her real champions; it is upon the multitude of these that her strength and preservation really depend.

Now if the knowledge of our ownselves shut us out from pride, if what we see both within and without lead us to so melancholy a view of man, if our natural dislike of blame and injustice be controlled by the same consciousness, what must be its effects upon our desires, what must be the wealth as to which we feel ourselves but beggars; what must we desire as consolation to our mourning souls, wherein will the suppressed vigour of our love of right find vent? There can be but one answer; it must be in the earnest longing for truth and good-

ness in ourselves and in the world; this is the wealth we and our neighbours have too little of, the presence of this would turn our mourning into joy, and in the endeavour to attain this, we shall expend that human energy which some seem to think religion wishes to destroy. There cannot be a more noble object of desire, nor, since men are always insensibly drawn into a resemblance to that they admire and long for, can there be one more ennobling, nor yet, as regards society, can there be an enterprise more useful than the sincere endeavour to extirpate all fraud and violence, and to make all men kind and good, and just and merciful. Ought we to reckon such a longing hunger and thirst after righteousness as among unlawful desires, which cannot hope to be satisfied? Away with the thought; what can we think of God if we are not well assured that such a desire must be most pleasing to Him, and that they who have it will be blessed by His holy power with perfect satisfaction? Even now we see that His approval is stamped upon such efforts by the good effects the laws of nature have affixed to them.

Very different is that true and earnest desire of goodness that yearns after right as the soul of a famished man longs for food, to that cold, unconcerned approval of virtue which lies dormant in the breasts of so many who are hunting after other game, and spending their energies in other pursuits. These too often forget that they themselves are not blameless. If they meet with evil so glaring that they cannot pass it, they wish it away and shut their eyes from it if they can; or, if they cannot, they are for unmercifully and indiscriminately repressing it by the strong hand of power; whereas the eye that sees in every soul an instrument endowed with a vast power for good will never pass it by, or let it perish uncared for, but will strive to win it back to right, and by mercy and sympathy to point out how lovely is holiness, that so, if possible, some faint desire may be awakened to imitate that which no one can see and

not admire—some little spark of returning consciousness that may be fanned into the flame of a thorough reformation; for a good man is far too merciful to be indifferent to sin, and knows that to be capable of pardon a man must at least be sorry for his offences. Such a one will be pure in heart, pure from every double-minded endeavour to serve two masters, pure from every degrading contemplation and every impure desire, pure from every compromise or tampering with sin. His mercy will be the mercy of one who is in sound health to one in sickness; men do not then sit by and try to persuade the sufferer that he has no disease, but they endeavour to induce him to take every means for his cure, they try to overcome his repugnance to noisome drugs and painful remedies, and all men would justly cry shame upon them if they sought to delude the sick man with any other comforts; so it is with the pure in heart, they hate no man, but they do hate sin, and never will they consent to join in the deception sinners seek to shelter under, that it is merciful to encourage with false hopes one who is labouring under so deadly a disease. Purity of heart leads naturally to peace, for as where all the parts of any mechanical structure are harmoniously conjoined and work all together steadily to one end, there can be no conflict and confusion; so it is with the soul that has discovered and is steadily pursuing its one and only proper end; there is there no conflict of desires, no harassing disquietude amid contending interests, the point to which it tends is fixed, the means to gain that object are unhesitatingly pursued, there is no anxiety to persuade the intellect to choose the worse for the better reason, but mistakes are readily corrected, old misapprehensions freely surrendered, new lights joyfully embraced, and all is peace and harmony. Such is purity of heart, and surely one ought to desire it.

When the soul is at peace within, its vision naturally becomes far more distinct, and it can gaze more steadily, and

realize more truly, the form and position of things without itself. If we could suppose a really pure and holy being suddenly placed in the midst of us, and realize his probable sensations, we should find among the first a horror at the strife and discord which reigns everywhere about us. Not only do many seek to gain one worldly object, and so strive of necessity each to keep down his brother, not only do the wicked strive for things to which they have no title, and every man hold himself in readiness to give offence for offence, but the greater part of us condemn one another, and give and take offence without so much as staying to understand what it is we are angry about, and so even those who are really well disposed are perpetually involved in strife and quarrels. How repugnant must all this be to the pure in spirit, who will clearly discern, however we may cover the matter from ourselves, that half the strife we deplore, and think we ought to grieve over, is in reality the natural punishment of our own hastiness and uncharitable thoughts. Hence arise the duties and the privileges of a peace-maker, for we are all of us too much disturbed at the moment of passion and in the heat of personal conflict, to review, with any chance of discovering the truth, the circumstances which have seduced us and the conduct which is the pretext for our anger; then it is that we need some one who is alike acceptable to both parties, who is in no way engaged in the struggle, and in whose purity of intention we can confide. How often have we reason to regret that no such person interposed in time to save us from falling into so many and so grave errors and offences as nearly every quarrel drives us into! The world, indeed, looks on coolly and indifferently enough to see our blunders; but they are cool enough to find them even amusing, and we find, when sober sense returns, that we have been in fact a laughing-stock to those whom we had imagined to have sympathized with us. Passion, so long as it lasts, is madness, and as madness is of

all diseases the most awful, so must a peace-maker be of all friends the most deserving of affection, and their employment must be of all others the most worthy of those who would be in truth the children of God.

In so many things are the holy deserving of praise from men, and for all these will they be blessed of God, yet, strange as it is, though they are indeed the salt of the earth, though their goodness mainly preserves society from corruption, the world does not like them, it hardly ever patronises, always undervalues, and often endeavours openly to put them down. The fact is, they will not bow before and worship the image the world has set up, they will not hold a reputation for being a thorough man of the world to be any great praise, they can see many faults in a finished gentleman, they will not obey implicitly all the demands of society, and they appeal to a higher tribunal from the authority of a military or a literary despot, and even from the omnipotent voice of public opinion. Their whole lives are a protest against the perfection of the world, and they are not sorry for an opportunity of proving to men that they are corrupt. Thus the wrath of society is aroused, and the eye of the world is opened wide to spy out some apparent defect, some plausible pretext for getting rid of such very unruly members. Sometimes they are ridiculed as enthusiasts, sometimes they are denounced as superstitious, their virtues are doubted of, and their faults proclaimed, their path is made intentionally difficult, and universal derision awaits them if they stumble or hesitate. Yet in all this they are blessed, they are blessed in that society does not present to them its most alluring face, they are blessed even in being so closely watched, for *they* desire to know their faults; they are blessed in being driven more and more to depend upon God alone as their support; their very forced singularity enables them to do good in various effective but discountenanced ways; they are kept together and made to love one

another the more by their practical excommunication, and the more they try to depend upon the God of right the more they realize the fact that there is a Power greater than the world ever thinks of, and better than even the good can conceive; while their own internal strength grows stronger and stronger, persecution has less and less power against them, and they learn, by their own experience, that it is really true, that he who seeks sound happiness will find it most certainly where the world has no power, and where there is but One to give or take it away, and He is unchangeably and most perfectly good; that God is all in all, and God is love.

Vainly does the world lavish all its choicest praises and all its richest rewards upon those whom it can call heroes; they are, after all, brave men only in a crowd and in broad daylight, and the Church has many more heroic deaths to record and heroic lives to make her boast of. Vainly must the world ever strive, since, as I shall show in the next and concluding chapter, even the objects worldly men propose to their attainment are in reality to be gained most surely in the Church.

CHAPTER III.

The Objects of Men's Endeavours.

WE see that pleasure, wealth, and power are commonly the great objects of attraction to the desires of man; and the lives of most men are but long-continued, and often fruitless, endeavours after their attainment. The love of getting is inherent in each of us; man is born ignorant and helpless, and nothing is supplied to him without some effort or forethought on his part; how then may this natural craving be most wisely satisfied, how shall man hope to gain most pleasure, most wealth, most power?

To speak philosophically, man is most likely to be happy in fulfilling the purposes of his physical and mental formation, in attaining that which is the most proper end and object of his being; so that, since most men seek for pleasure, and so forth, as their avowed object, they ought, though perhaps unconsciously, to be seeking also the true end and object of their being; and thus two roads lie open to us by which to seek the true rule and guide of human conduct. We may enquire what is the object of man's being, and thence conclude how he may be most what his nature impels him to desire to be; or we may enquire what man's nature sets before him as most desirable, and conclude that therein consists the true end and object of his being.

When we introduce the idea of the Deity, it is evident that man could only be created to promote God's glory, and can only do so by being entirely conformed to His will; thus then, to discover and conform to God's will must be man's proper

object; but how is this to be reconciled with those other pursuits? Readily, as I think, as follows:—First, as to getting, how can a man say he has anything which he cannot fix and appropriate to himself? He may have the momentary use of it, but it itself he cannot have. Now, what can he make his own, save only those habits and that character which only become more and more completely his by length of time? If a man strive to be perfect in goodness, then and then only can he gain anything that wastes not in the using, that no power can take from him, and every step in which is a satisfaction in itself; besides, as all good gifts come from God, and He can take away anything that a man has, except perhaps his voluntary character, we certainly can only hope to get, and so retain, that which it is pleasing to God we should have; and the only thing that we can know certainly is such, is real and persevering goodness. He then that strives to be entirely conformed to the will of God, strives for that which, if he can obtain, he will be most truly rich and have the most, and most real possessions it is possible for him to acquire. He is, also, most powerful, for no man can be rightly said to have power who is not himself free; and that man alone is free who can will what he pleases, and can perform whatsoever he wills. Many men think of religion as a slavery, and of themselves as free; yet they are not free, and ignorance alone allows them to think so. He who has never denied himself anything that seemed at the time pleasant, is not free; for he will find, if he tries, that he cannot will what he pleases, but, in spite of himself, will will what seems to offer present pleasure; there is not in nature a slave more abject than a man who has habituated himself to practices which offer present pleasure; he goes on, knowing that he is destroying his own happiness, and perhaps ruining his health, and shortening his life; but he goes on nevertheless, because he is not a free man,—because he has sold himself to his once darling vice, and cannot get quit of his

bargain. How despicable and how miserable a being is an ambitious man, who hangs helplessly about the scenes of his expected triumphs and experienced mortifications! How wretched a spectacle is an habitual drunkard, who has lost the first relish of his vice! What is true of great vices, is true also of little faults. Take a man of a hasty temper, he cannot help it; he often acts as he would have wished not to act; but the truth is, he is no longer a free man; his will has become a slave of which he is not the master: accident controls him; the mere careless words of another direct his actions, without his being so much as consulted about it. For some such reason, no doubt it is, that ambitious men have hardly ever succeeded, unless their ambition has been their only great vice. Thus it happens that there are very few free men in the world, those only having any claim to the title, who, by habitual self-control, can always direct their actions according to the conclusions of their own reason and conscience; these men alone are the direct originators of their own actions; these alone can will what pleases them, and these alone, as we shall see, can hope to perform what they will.

Something else is necessary even to the most exalted individuals of mankind than their own will, to enable them to accomplish anything. It is obvious that they must expect to live, and live in health of body and soundness of mind; they must expect no unforeseen accident to arise, so as to compel them to turn their attention to some other quarter; they must hope that their subordinates will continue to serve them as faithfully and ably as when they begin to form their purposes, and that they will continue in health and life in order to do so; they must believe, too, that there is no secret impossibility in what they propose, which has escaped their notice. A powerful king, who proposes schemes of foreign conquest, must be in doubt whether he shall live, whether his country will be free

from famine and pestilence, his subjects from discontent and ruin, his generals from weakness and treachery, his troops from panics and unhealthy quarters, his enemies from better commanders and more powerful allies; and must confess that an inundation, or a pestilence, or a famine, over the happening of which he cannot pretend to have any control, may ruin his advances and cripple his powers; that treason or mutiny in his army, a conspiracy or an insurrection at home, such as may happen unawares at any time, may turn his own power against himself, or cut him off in the midst of his highest prospects of glory. Many a king has looked upon his gallant troops, amid the loyal shouts of his people, and deemed himself invincible, when a few short months or years have terminated his earthly career in sorrow and disappointment, or brought him to sue for a disgraceful peace at the hands of unexpected, or despised opponents. Still more uncertain are the hopes of those who seek to rise in offices of state; they may be foiled at any moment by the caprice of superiors, the hostility of equals, or the envy of those below them. If a man hope to rise by the favour of the multitude, he rests his hopes upon that which is proverbially treacherous and fickle; if he hope to rise by the favour of some superior, he builds on a yet more uncertain foundation; his mere personal appearance, his very efforts to please may blight his prospects, or calumny, which he does not even know to have been uttered, may at any moment consign him to disgrace. Finally, the man who aims at intellectual powers, and at exercising a control over men by his writings, may be laughed down by his inferiors, silenced by the hand of power, or ruined by unforeseen accidents; his works may be burnt on the eve of publication, his influence may be destroyed by slanderous reports, the results of his labours may be superseded by the discoveries of an after age, or by the works of some more polished reproducer of those very ideas of which he was the true originator; and, besides,

a man can hardly ever write really well who is seeking chiefly his own advancement, who is not convinced of the truth of his theory, and does not write with a view to defend, as in the sight of God, that which is right and true. How many men who have thought to be great have died neglected and forgotten, and how very few have been able to perpetuate the better portion of their thoughts! How few there are that do not lose manliness in life at the moment when they are most capable of winning to themselves distinction! Beside the special uncertainties of each case, there remains this, which is common to all seekers of power, that it is impossible for them to know whether there may not be among their cotemporaries some one of yet greater ability than themselves, who may overmaster their reputation, and fairly outrun them in the race for pre-eminence: still more uncertain is it, whether some one, whose one good quality is address and a knack of acting or speaking at the right time, may not at any moment supplant them: therefore no doubt it is, that ambitious men, whatever may be the object of their ambition, are always full of jealousy,—jealousy which men call a vice, and might with equal propriety describe as the natural punishment of inordinate affection, and one of the most painful of mental diseases.

But why is it that there is all this uncertainty in the pursuit of power? the reason is that man as a whole, still more man as an individual, is not the ruler of the universe, but only one of the items that go to make up what we call creation. It is true the human soul is something independent of, and greater than the material universe, but it is also true that no human soul is its own originator, or can free itself wholly from external influences: it can therefore really have power to do that only which the course of the world around puts into its power: that only which the Ruler of the universe determines that it shall have power to effect. Therefore it is that so many human attempts are uncertain as to the issue,

because it is uncertain whether it is the will of God that they should prosper; but one thing we know surely is His will; one thing we are sure He will not interpose to defeat,—and that one thing is the raising of human nature from the mire of sin to its rightful pedestal of justice and true holiness; in this we know, that so far from perhaps thwarting our endeavours, He will certainly assist us, and, if we be true to ourselves, He will never forsake us, He will never suffer us to wander out of our way and perish. If our path be rugged, we know that it is because He is leading us by the shortest road to our object; if our way seem dark and dangerous, we know that He who is our Guide knows where we may safely go, and that the very darkness will be our defence, for we shall not see our enemies, and so shall pass fearlessly by that which in the light we had not dared to approach, and they will not see us, to take advantage of our weakness and to fall upon us and slay us. Thus he who seeks to bring all his will into accordance with the will of God, alone is free to seek what he will, and alone seeks that which he can hope certainly to effect. Does he seek that which is as noble as the objects of other men? Surely he does, for power over oneself must be the most noble of all power, and what is there more noble than generosity, the very essence of which consists in self-control and self-sacrifice? But if we ask whose name is most remembered among mankind, and whose reputation is most widely spread, it cannot be doubted but that the saints of the Christian Church have attained to that pre-eminence. Who do more men desire to have seen than St. Paul? whose influence has been more extensive, whose reputation more brilliant? Again, to take an instance long after the Apostles' time, the world has been more deeply moved by theological debate than from any other source, and all Western theology since St. Augustine's time, has been led by his spirit and swayed by his opinion, so that we may fearlessly say he

has exercised more influence upon men than any merely temporal potentate could possibly have done, and that too by means of their noblest faculties and deepest feelings. Besides, if our will and the will of God be made completely one, then we know that in accordance with our will are all things directed both in heaven and earth, all that concerns ourselves, and all things that have reference to the outer world and its inhabitants; a height of power which on any other principle it would be madness to dream of.

Can it be that mankind are so deceived as to what will give them pleasure, that in spite of all their practical denials, virtue and religion are the best means for its attainment? certainly if there be a God they must be, for how can man be happy without God's will, and how can His will concur in giving to those who despise His law in larger proportion than to those who seek in all things to obey His commands? Yet how can it be, if this be so, that the first impulse of one that determines to seek pleasure is generally to sin? I doubt whether this is so universally true as it is generally assumed to be; there is a fascination in many objects of sin much more akin to that fascination which forbids a victim to escape its destroyer, than to the conscious desire of pleasure; many persons recollect that their habitual sin came upon them at first without any conscious pleasure-seeking in its commission, and many even remember that at first they disliked it; in truth, if a man set himself in earnest to consider wherein he can find most pleasure, he will be very unlikely to fall into the pursuit of mere sensual or sinful enjoyment; for it is undeniable that religious pleasures can make out a better case as a matter of argument, and are much more congenial to any one who desires to act reasonably in all that he does.[1] They de-

[1] "I, for my part, have often thought those pleasures which are highest in the esteem of sensualists, so far from being the chiefest good, that it seemed doubtful, upon the whole, whether they were any good at all, any more than

pend less for their delights upon the will of others, and far less, if indeed at all, upon the external circumstances of the individual, both of which so often thwart the seekers of sinful pleasure, nay, so constantly, that in order for a man thoroughly to enjoy these last, he is always supposed to be furnished with the accidents of a vigorous and graceful form and pleasing features and address, with sound and genial health, cordial and faithful friends, and above all an ample fortune; he is then supposed to live his youth out in the enjoyment of mirth and pleasure, and what becomes of him afterwards is excluded, because it would not look well in the picture. It is left to the religious to do that part of the portrait, to exhibit him in the debility of premature old age and the suffering of disease,—his dreary loneliness when all his summer friends depart, his helpless poverty, his remorseful conscience, his early and uncared-for death, and the fiery background of the wrath of God,—all these are left for the religious to draw, and then the worldlings say they make a gloomy picture of life; so they do, perhaps, but is it not true, and is not its gloominess the natural consequence of the unreasonable brilliancy of its companion portrait? It is certainly true, that all vicious excess tends naturally to wear out the vigour and exhaust the spirits, to leave its impress on the face and manner, to dull the eye and retard the step, to break down the constitution, and open the way to painful and disgusting diseases and an early death. Are the friends and boon-companions of a pleasure-seeker ever constant (at least except those imaginary ones recorded in works of fiction)? Can the most ample fortune bear a career of dissipation uninjured?

the mere removal of pain. Are not our wants and appetites uneasy? They are. Doth not sensual pleasure consist in satisfying them? It doth. But the cravings are tedious, the satisfaction momentary. Is it not so? It is; but what then? Why then it should seem that sensual pleasure is but a short deliverance from long pain. A long avenue of uneasiness leads to a point of pleasure, which ends in disgust or remorse."—*Bp. Berkeley, Alciphron, Dial.* ii. 16.

And is it not certain that solitude and self-reflection are painful, and the indignation of God and punishment at His hands most probably approaching to every one who seeks pleasure, heedless of how far it may be sinful? There is another pair of portraits drawn by the same hands, but reversing the character of their styles. The world draws a religious man a narrow-minded, anxious being, ever on the watch for faults in himself and others; not daring to join in anything merry or joyful, but afraid to do this and anxious to avoid that; seeking and loving to talk about those things only which are dullest and most awfully correct; ever haunted himself, and ever teazing others with the cowardly dread of something to come, and the horrid impropriety of something everybody allows and nobody doubts to be agreeable; one who seems never to have felt the joyful buoyancy of youth, or that generous boldness and unrestrained vehemence of thought and action which seems to constitute the great charm of youthful health and spirits; such is the individual, an eager self-tormenter and an intolerable bore, which the world draws and calls a serious young man, and then they say, how can anybody be so absurd as to call religion pleasant? But there is another side to this picture also, and we see in it one who loves best what tends most to the happiness of others as well as his own, who loves to relieve the afflicted and to share his good things with those who most need them; who is not afraid to think, and can be alone without feeling languid or dreary; who can tell what he is living for, and knows that he is seeking something worth possessing; who has always good reason to be cheerful, and who so lives as to retain longest the healthful vigour of his body and mind; to conciliate the most, the truest, and the most constant friends; to retain so much of his fortune as he will, and be able to recall with pleasure how he has spent the remainder; and at last, departing hence in peace and regretted by all, to pass to that happy home whither his Lord has gone

before to prepare him a resting-place, there to be free from all pain and sorrow, and to remain for ever full of those good things which Almighty power and perfect love alone can give. Such a one, all through his life pre-eminently a reasonable and an amiable happy person, is a religious man as the religious draw him. Of course there are heroes on both sides, and their characters might be similarly compared, but as we are most of us only ordinary persons, as ordinary persons we ought to be drawn. In comparing these sketches, if we suppose them all to be true, it is evident that the religious view looks to the present as a time in which to prepare for the future; the irreligious shuts out the future altogether, that is so far as it is possible to do so, and it is very manifest that so to disregard the future is highly unreasonable, unless it be uncertain whether there will be any future, or at least whether our state in that future will at all depend on our present actions; but no man doubts but that there will be some future, and that to some extent at least our state then must depend on our actions now. Again, the religious looks rather to mental enjoyment; the irreligious to that of the senses, and therefore if, or rather since the mind is greater and more enduring than the body, the religious propose to themselves the higher pleasure. Again, the religious view offers eternal pleasure to all; the other but temporary pleasure, and that only to those who can purchase it; for vicious amusements are much more expensive than those of the religious; if one half of what is spent in vice were laid out in acts of benevolence, there would be a dearth of objects; and if only the same industry and energy were expended in useful pursuits that are wasted in the hunt after pleasure, there would be many more wise men, and very many more great men than there are in the world now. Again, the pleasures of sense waste and grow less pleasurable in the using; the pleasures of virtue continually increase by its practice; and lastly, if we enquire

what it is that detracts from the happiness of religious persons, we shall find it to be almost always the defects in their religion, while, on the other hand, what is attractive in irreligious persons is precisely that in which they act according to the dictates of religion, as for instance, their generosity, candour, and cheerfulness, unless indeed it consists in accomplishments that may be possessed alike by both classes, and so in no way affect the question, such as good taste and a polite education.

Thus then, whether we seek for pleasure, power, or riches, they are to be found most certainly and in the most enduring form in true religion; and if, as some say, we should look to the knowledge of truth as one of the objects of our life, then we shall find it in the same pursuit; for the grandest of all knowledge must be that which has relation to the Creator and Governor of all, and His will towards us. Thus the enquiry, what is the proper object of man's life? is answered from a consideration of what men actually desire, in a manner quite consistent with the answer we before arrived at by another road; so that, beyond all doubt, the object of man's efforts should be to become conformed in all things to the will of God.

If this is so manifestly true to him who regards only the mere idea of God, much more must it be so when one contemplates the Christian doctrine of the redemption of mankind from sin and death. "If one died for all,"—if Christ died for all, that is, since Christ died for us,—"then were all dead." Let us consider this, let us apprehend it clearly. We were dead, and Christ died for us; He rescued us, not when we were in danger, when we might perhaps by ourselves have escaped, but when we were actually dead,—when our own strength had failed and we were drifting down helplessly to misery, Christ stepped for us Himself into the pit and rescued us. It is difficult to find words to praise him who

daring the contagion of plague or pestilence stays to minister to the sick and dying; and how shall we measure the obligation of him who by his help is relieved and restored to health, to happiness, to prosperity? Yet Christ hath done more than this for us; no worldly happiness can be so great as that to which He has opened a way for us, no death so painful as that from which He has delivered us, no self-devotion so noble as that by which He has saved us. Let us consider the horror of a painful, lonely, lingering death,—the death of an outcast, loathly and infectious, dying in the full consciousness that his own acts, against the entreaties, the warnings, nay, to the hurt of his dearest friends, driven from him only by his own persevering wickedness, have brought him to it, and try to feel and know that that was and naturally is our state; let us put ourselves in it and feel its certain anticipations till its awfulness is clearly before us, and then let us picture to ourselves a life the most joyful and smiling, with prosperity and a good conscience, friends and youth and health and riches and unmingled happiness, and let us recollect that far above all this is that state of joy and everlasting felicity Christ's blood has purchased for us. Consider what gratitude we should owe to any man who had so changed our fate, then let us remember the agony and death by which we have been redeemed, and finally in reverent awe, yet full of awful love, let us contemplate the nature of our Lord, His incomprehensible Majesty and Godhead, and all earthly things will fade and crumble from before us; our hearts will be lighted up with that fire of love, which can accomplish all things, and we shall almost long for some difficult and painful task to show what we can do for Him who hath done so much for us; and when we learn that He requires of us only that which will most certainly secure our present happiness, only to value goodness to our fellow men above unnecessary worldly possessions, to imitate Him without His agony; can

we hesitate? Can we draw back? Can we refuse to serve Him? No! No! it is impossible, for the love of Christ constraineth us, His love to us while we were yet sinners, and flowing from that as its cause and root, our love to Him, our glorious and ever blessed Saviour.

THE END.

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